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Executive summary 
In this report, the committee underscores the importance of affordable, secure and 
suitable housing as a vital determinant of wellbeing. But, based on the evidence, the 
committee finds that a significant number of Australians are not enjoying the security 
and comfort of affordable and appropriate housing—that currently Australia's housing 
market is not meeting the needs of all Australians.  
Sustained growth in median housing costs above the rate of median household income 
growth in recent decades has made it increasingly difficult for a growing proportion of 
Australians to afford housing that is safe, secure and appropriate to their needs. Added 
to the general decline in housing affordability, and indeed compounding the trend, the 
stock of affordable housing—that is, housing appropriate to the needs of low- to 
moderate-income households—has failed to keep pace with demand in recent decades. 
The committee does not believe the issue of housing affordability in Australia is 
rightly categorised as either a 'supply-side problem' or a 'demand-side problem'. With 
this in mind, it is clearly evident that supply is currently not keeping pace with 
demand in the housing market. In this context, policy interventions that add to demand 
without addressing or at least accounting for supply-side constraints risk inflating 
house prices and exacerbating affordability problems. 
Worsening housing affordability is reflected in declining home ownership rates. This 
decline is troubling for a number of reasons, not least because home ownership can be 
an important means for people to achieve financial and social wellbeing. Moreover, 
high rates of home ownership also provide broader economic and social benefits to the 
community. As such, while the committee believes governments should work to 
improve affordability outcomes for all types of housing tenure, it considers it 
appropriate for governments to promote home ownership.  
The committee makes a range of recommendations directed primarily toward 
improving home purchase affordability. They include state governments phasing out 
conveyancing stamp duties, to be achieved through a transition to more efficient taxes, 
potentially including land taxation levied on a broader base than is currently the case. 
Other recommendations are directed at improving the efficiency, effectiveness and 
equity of infrastructure funding arrangements, which can have a strong influence on 
the cost of new housing. Similarly, a number of recommendations are made with the 
intention of ensuring land supply, urban planning and zoning processes have a 
positive effect on housing affordability.  
Evidence indicated that direct grants to home owners, including First Home Owner 
Grants, need to be targeted carefully in order to be effective. While the committee 
suggests that First Home Owner Grants might need to be more tightly targeted, it also 
believes that shared equity programs are a promising means of helping more 
Australians become home owners, and consideration should be given to expanding 
 
 
such programs. Equally important, the committee recommends that programs 
designed to help older Australians 'age in place' when they want to, or downsize (or 
'rightsize') to meet their needs, should be explored.  
A large amount of the evidence received during this inquiry concerned the possible 
effect on home purchase affordability of existing taxation arrangements for investor 
housing, in particular negative gearing and the capital gains tax discount. The 
committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate the effect of the 
current taxation treatment of investment housing on home purchase affordability 
(among other things), and consider if alternative approaches would help improve 
affordability.  
The problems engendered by poor housing affordability are also clearly evident in the 
private rental market. Here low- to medium-income earners encounter significant 
problems accessing affordable and appropriate housing, with significant numbers 
experiencing rental stress or even severe rental stress. Indeed, one witness described 
the private rental market as a brutal place for people on welfare payments.  
Evidence indicated strongly that renting must be recognised as a mainstream, and for 
some, a permanent form of tenure in Australia's housing system and must be placed on 
Australia's national policy agenda as a key issue to address poverty. Undeniably, the 
increasingly tight and expensive private rental sector is locking some low- to 
moderate-income earners out of affordable and appropriate housing. This situation 
indicates market failure and suggests that market solutions to low cost housing will 
simply not emerge naturally: that there is a clear need to find ways to attract private 
investment into low cost and social housing. But currently, without government 
incentives, affordable housing does not tend to appeal to private investors. 
Many pensioners and people dependent on welfare or disability payments, who find 
themselves priced out of the private rental market, seek relief by accessing social 
housing, which provides a much needed safety net. But here they also face fierce 
competition.  
An adequate supply of social housing would mean that older Australians are better 
able to age in place and not have to forgo daily essentials simply to pay their rent, and 
people with disability are not left to fend for themselves in substandard dwellings that 
make no allowance for their particular needs. Also, an adequate supply of social 
housing would mean that women escaping domestic violence would not be forced to 
stay in motels or, worse still, remain in abusive relationships. Unfortunately, social 
housing is in short supply and waiting lists are long. It has become 'housing of last 
resort' and many people desperate for safe, secure and affordable housing are left to 
ask 'Where do I go?' 
The committee makes recommendations that address identified deficiencies in 
Australia's rental market, including a concerted effort by governments at all levels to 
commit to increasing the overall proportion of social housing as a percentage of 
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Australia's housing stock. Another cluster of recommendations call for the review and 
reform of tenancy laws (security of tenure, stability and fairness of rent rises, energy, 
comfort and safety standards, evictions and dispute resolution mechanisms). In 
addition, they also deal with the responsibilities and obligations of landlords when it 
comes to energy efficiency and home modifications for tenants with particular needs.  
The committee also targets its recommendations at reinvigorating and improving 
current Commonwealth and state and territories agreements—National Affordable 
Housing Agreement (NAHA) and partnership arrangements including National 
Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing (NPARIH) and National 
Partnership Agreement on Homelessness (NPAH). Furthermore, recognising that the 
National Rental Affordability Scheme has started the much needed process of 
attracting private investors into Australia's affordable rental market, the committee 
recommends building on its success. The committee also looks at ways to make 
Commonwealth rental assistance more effective. In addition, the committee 
recommends establishing a Housing Supply Financing Task Force to investigate and 
advise government on mechanisms, including housing supply bonds, for engaging 
private investment in the affordable housing market.  
Undoubtedly, Australia has a housing affordability problem—the challenges are 
complex, diverse and interact differently in different parts of Australia. 
Considering the vital importance of housing to a person's overall wellbeing and the 
current problems gaining access to affordable and appropriate housing, the committee 
is convinced that access to affordable housing is a matter of national importance. 
Furthermore, affordable housing should be a national economic issue that needs to be 
a central and cross-cutting theme of government.  
The committee believes governments, including the Australian Government, have a 
legitimate role, and indeed a responsibility, to use policy interventions to improve the 
efficiency, efficacy and, critically, the affordability of the housing market. Evidence 
indicated, however, that Australia's housing policy and effort is fragmented, which has 
led to a good deal of confusion and discord in attempts to address housing issues. 
The various levels of government, and indeed different areas within the same 
government, often have contradictory objectives that pull in different directions. 
Clearly, one of the dominant messages coming out of this inquiry is the need for the 
Australian Government to give coherence to the numerous local, state and national 
incentives and schemes intended to contribute to the provision of affordable housing. 
A long-term, integrated and coherent plan with consistent policy governing a national 
approach to affordable housing is needed.  
In the committee's view, the Australian Government should be the driving force 
behind the development and implementation of this plan. As such, the current lack of 
a dedicated Commonwealth housing minister is of concern. Housing-specific policies, 
and policies that shape the housing market more broadly, have direct and in some 
cases profound effects on the lives of Australians across the socio-economic spectrum 
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and in all tenure types. In this context, the committee contends there is a compelling 
argument for a dedicated Commonwealth housing minister able to provide cross-
portfolio and national leadership on this important policy issue. 
Many of the key policy levers that shape the Australian housing market and housing 
affordability rest with the Commonwealth. In particular, demand-side levers such as 
taxation policy generally reside with the Commonwealth. Although many supply-side 
policy levers fall within the remit of the states and territories, the committee is firm in 
its view that the Commonwealth is best placed to provide the leadership to coordinate 
and guide the cross-jurisdictional reform necessary to improve the efficiency of 
housing supply across Australia. 
An institutional mechanism is required to bring all levels of government together in 
order to deliver the overarching strategic approach to affordable housing in Australia. 
The committee believes that the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
provides the ideal structure within which the Commonwealth and states and territories 
can develop the strategy and devise the best way to implement it. A Ministerial 
Council on housing and homelessness within the COAG system, as the committee, 
recommends, would allow representatives from key government agencies, the not-for-
profit organisations, industry bodies and associations, academics and other housing 
experts to participate in, or contribute to, the formulation of policy. 
In this report, the committee recommends that the Australian Government direct its 
attention and efforts to a number of areas, and makes recommendations accordingly, 
including developing a long-term national affordable housing plan that: 
• recognises affordable housing, including affordable rental housing, as a 
mainstream and national policy objective and places affordable housing at the 
forefront of government policy across Australia; 
• is spearheaded by a dedicated minister for housing and homelessness and 
supported by an institutional infrastructure that would provide the continuity, 
expertise, experience and established networks with all levels of government;  
• fosters intergovernmental cooperation in solving housing issues within a 
'whole-of-system housing policy framework';  
• places a high priority on improving the supply-side efficiency of the 
Australian housing market;  
• reinvigorates NAHA placing particular emphasis on improving transparency 
and accountability, and introducing a robust evaluation and reporting 
framework; 
• contains clear, consistent and longer-term funding commitments adequate to 
meet the growing demand for social housing; 
• recommits to halving homelessness by 2025; 
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• takes account of the findings outlined in this report including facts such as the 
age pension assumes home ownership and the projected decline in home 
ownership especially among older Australians;   
• builds trust and confidence that Australian governments at all levels, led by 
the Commonwealth, are committed to increasing the supply of affordable 
housing; 
• provides consistency, coherence and policy certainty for the affordable 
housing sector that would enable housing providers to forge stronger 
partnerships with the private sector; 
• recognises that significant volumes of public and private finance would be 
required to meet the projected need for additional rental housing and the 
importance of attracting institutional investors into the affordable housing 
market; 
• understands that efforts to attract a significant level of institutional investment 
into affordable housing have to date been largely unsuccessful; and  
• makes institutional investment a core policy objective in affordable housing. 
Overall, and as highlighted in the strong and resounding messages drawn from the 
bulk of evidence, the committee is firmly of the view that: 
• the Australian Government cannot vacate the affordable housing space or step 
back from its responsibilities to ensure that every Australian has access to 
affordable, safe and sustainable housing; and 
• in the long run, investment in affordable housing returns dividends not only to 
the individual struggling to access safe, secure and affordable housing but to 
the budgets of the Australian, state and territory governments and ultimately 
the Australian taxpayer (by having a more productive community with 
reduced costs for social, health and unemployment services and for justice and 
policing.) 
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Recommendations 
Recommendation 1       paragraph 4.15 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government appoint a Minister for 
Housing and Homelessness, with the portfolio to be located in a central agency such 
as the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet or the Treasury, or in the 
Department of Infrastructure with formal links to the central agencies. 
Recommendation 2       paragraph 5.65 
The committee recommends that, as a matter of priority, the Commonwealth and 
states and territories agree to establish a ministerial council on housing and 
homelessness within the Council of Australian Governments ministerial council 
system. 
Recommendation 3       paragraph 5.66 
The committee recommends the establishment of a new body, ideally a statutory body, 
similar in function to the former National Housing Supply Council, but also with 
responsibility for monitoring performance against a new affordable housing plan (see 
recommendation 4) and measuring housing need according to key demographic 
trends, socio-economic and cultural factors.   
Recommendation 4       paragraph 5.67 
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth and states and territories 
collaborate in the development of a long term, national affordable housing plan, 
ideally to be developed through a new ministerial council on housing and 
homelessness within the Council of Australian Governments ministerial council 
system (see recommendation 2). While the shape of the plan and its relationship to the 
National Affordable Housing Agreement would be determined through the 
development process, the committee recommends that the plan: 
(a) include performance indicators, which should be monitored and reported 
on by the body recommended at recommendation 3; and 
(b) include base funding, possibly drawn from the National Affordable 
Housing Agreement funding envelope, with consideration also given to 
including Commonwealth reward payments linked to achievement by 
individual jurisdictions against the performance indicators. 
Recommendation 5       paragraph 6.40 
The committee recommends that state and territory governments phase out 
conveyancing stamp duties, and that as per the recommendations of the Henry 
Review, this be achieved through a transition to more efficient taxes, potentially 
including land taxation levied on a broader base than is currently the case. 
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Recommendation 6       paragraph 6.66 
The committee recommends that all states and territories report to the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG), preferably through a new ministerial council on 
housing and homelessness (see recommendation 2), on what policy changes, if any, 
have been made to ensure infrastructure charges are consistent with the four principles 
agreed through COAG in July 2012. 
Recommendation 7       paragraph 6.67 
The committee recommends that state and local governments investigate the 
possibility of using Tax Increment Financing and other innovative finance 
mechanisms to fund infrastructure for new housing developments.  
Recommendation 8       paragraph 7.57 
The committee recommends that the proposed new Council of Australian 
Governments ministerial council on housing and homelessness (see 
recommendation 2) investigate ways to improve the consistency, timeliness and utility 
of government-collected and published information about land supply across 
jurisdictions.   
Recommendation 9       paragraph 7.58 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government: 
(a) show leadership in regard to national urban planning policy and urban 
regeneration, given the role both can play in improving and driving 
housing affordability outcomes across Australia's major urban centres; 
(b) reinstate the National Urban Policy and Major Cities Unit given the 
former role both played in driving housing affordability policy and 
outcomes at the national level; and 
(c) show leadership in its policy capability and engagement with the states 
and territories with regard to urban planning policy.  
Recommendation 10      paragraphs 7.59–7.60 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider developing a 
long-term strategy for regenerating Australia's urban centres and transport corridors. 
This strategy might be incorporated into a revised national urban policy, and would 
provide for an intergovernmental and coordinated approach to infrastructure delivery, 
including upgrades to social infrastructure, and the identification of redevelopment 
opportunities for government-owned land (as outlined in recommendation 11).  
The committee further recommends that the Australian Government consider re-
establishing the Urban Policy Forum, reconnecting with key stakeholders from the 
public and private sectors, academia and the community, and including responsibility 
for reviewing jurisdictional performance against targets relating to urban regeneration. 
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Recommendation 11       paragraph 7.61 
Government-owned land, whether state or Commonwealth-owned, represents a 
potential land supply for affordable housing. Current governance, transparency and 
divestment arrangements could be improved so that this potential might be realised. 
The committee recommends: 
(a) the creation of a transparent, public, up-to-date register of government 
land and buildings that are considered 'surplus' or on the divestment 
program, including the location and size of this land, and any 
development restrictions attached to it; 
(b) the direct involvement of the Commonwealth agency with housing 
policy responsibility in any asset divestment programs, and the possible 
application of affordable housing targets in divestment programs;  
(c) the development of innovative partnerships involving public, not-for-
profit, community and private consortiums that develop affordable and 
diverse housing on government land and buildings; and 
(d) the exploration of innovative models, such as community land trusts, on 
government-owned land where the government retains the land or a 
share in the development, but a community or not-for-profit housing 
provider develop affordable housing. 
Recommendation 12       paragraph 8.38 
The committee recommends a separate parliamentary inquiry into the Australian 
prefabricated housing industry, and its potential role in improving housing 
affordability and stimulating new activity in the manufacturing sector. This inquiry 
should consider, among other things: 
(a) the development of a comprehensive approach to creating a sustainable 
prefabricated building and insulated panel production industry; 
(b) the possibility of Commonwealth prefabricated housing targets in a 
national affordable housing plan (see recommendation 4); 
(c) the possibility of a Commonwealth prefabricated modular housing 
industry package to provide support for research and development, skills 
and training, assistance to establish new production and manufacturing 
facilities, and world class demonstration projects. 
Recommendation 13       paragraph 9.70 
The committee recommends that, to the extent such matters are not addressed by the 
White Paper on the Reform of Australia's Tax System, the Treasury should prepare 
and publish a study of the influence of negative gearing and the capital gains tax 
discount on home purchase affordability and on the rental market (including the effect 
on security of tenure for renters), the effect of these arrangements on revenue, and 
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their effect (if any) on economic productivity. This study should examine the likely 
effects of alternative taxation treatments of investor housing. Alternative approaches 
considered in this study (including, where appropriate, in combination) should 
include: 
(a) a housing-specific 'quarantine' approach, wherein losses for investment 
properties can only be deducted against rental income, with provision for 
losses in excess of rental income to be carried forward and deducted 
against future rental income and capital gains;  
(b) a broader 'quarantine' approach, wherein interest expenses on all 
investments, including but not limited to housing assets, are only 
deductible in any given year up to the amount of investment income 
earned in that year, with provision for losses in excess of this amount to 
be carried forward and deducted against future investment income and 
capital gains;  
(c) limiting the application of negative gearing arrangements to new 
housing stock, or designated new affordable housing stock;  
(d) limiting the application of negative gearing to a certain number of 
properties (assessing options for various limits in this regard);  
(e) options for phasing out negative gearing on investment housing; 
(f) applying the savings income discount recommended in the Henry 
Review to investment housing, with consideration given to the impact of 
this approach both with and without the implementation of the Henry 
Review's recommendations in relation to housing supply and housing 
assistance; and 
(g) reducing or removing the capital gains tax discount for investment 
properties, or reverting to the pre-1999 system of taxing real rather than 
nominal capital gains on investment assets. 
Recommendation 14                paragraph 11.86 
The committee recommends that, to the extent state and territory governments 
maintain first home buyer grants, they apply appropriate value caps and limit their 
availability to new housing stock (with appropriate exceptions for certain groups of 
buyers), and consider introducing means testing to ensure that the grants are 
appropriately targeted.  
Recommendation 15                paragraph 11.87 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider introducing a 
scheme designed to assist first home buyers save for a home deposit, drawing as 
appropriate on the experiences of the First Home Saver Account scheme. 
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Recommendation 16                paragraph 11.88 
The committee recommends that all governments, through the proposed ministerial 
council on housing and homelessness (see recommendation 2) or another appropriate 
intergovernmental forum, investigate ways to expand shared equity programs, 
including both government-backed and private-sector backed programs. The 
committee further recommends that, as part of this process, consideration be given to 
other mechanisms to facilitate affordable home ownership, such as community land 
trusts, rent to buy schemes, and the like, and consider the inclusion of such 
mechanisms within the national affordable housing plan proposed at 
recommendation 4, or the National Affordable Housing Agreement.  
Recommendation 17                paragraph 12.42 
The committee recommends that the government investigate new policy settings that 
will address barriers to downsizing (or 'rightsizing') by retirees, including schemes 
along the lines of the Housing Help for Seniors pilot. 
Recommendation 18              paragraphs 13.97–13.98 
As a national policy issue, affordable home ownership tends to overshadow affordable 
renting even though many Australians struggle to access affordable and appropriate 
housing in the rental market. With this in mind, the committee recommends that the 
Australian Government recognise affordable renting as a mainstream form of tenure in 
Australia and place it prominently on the national policy agenda.  
Given that renting will be the only form of housing for many Australians, one of the 
key challenges for government is to change the traditional view of renting as a short-
term transitional phase. The committee recommends that the Australian Government 
in collaboration with the states and territories, through the recommended ministerial 
council on housing and homelessness within COAG, start the urgent process of 
turning around this acceptance of short-term insecure tenure as normal. As a first step, 
the committee recommends that the proposed ministerial council consider tenancy 
regulations in the various jurisdictions with a view to delivering greater security for 
long-term renters. 
Recommendation 19              paragraph 13.104 
Considering the evidence presented to this inquiry, the committee recommends that 
the states and territories review their tenancy laws to ensure that all rental properties 
are required to meet minimum standards.  
Recommendation 20              paragraph 13.105 
The committee also recommends the Australian Government: 
• together with the states and territories, investigate national minimum 
standards that would set specific minimum standards including security of 
tenure, stability and fairness of rent prices, a new efficiency and comfort 
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standard, safety and security of the home, and better protection for groups in 
marginal housing;  
• review (and increase) funding levels and access to tenancy advice services; 
• in recognition of the value of tenancy advice services, make funding through 
the National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA) conditional on the 
states and territories ensuring that they have in place adequate tenancy 
advisory services; and 
• include as a priority for the re-established Housing Supply Council (see 
recommendation 2) to review and publish detail on the current national rental 
affordability gap. 
Recommendation 21              paragraph 13.106 
Recognising the reluctance of tenants to exercise their rights under the respective 
residential tenancies legislation in each state, the committee recommends that the 
states review their existing system for settling tenancy disputes. The committee 
recommends further that the states consider establishing an independent body such as 
an ombudsman or giving specific powers to their consumer affairs agencies to act for 
tenants. Again, the committee recommends that the Australian Government act as a 
catalyst through the COAG process to encourage the states and territories to establish 
dispute resolution bodies that provide easier and less expensive access to a mechanism 
for the resolution of tenancy matters. 
Recommendation 22              paragraphs 14.55–14.56 
The committee recognises that public housing has now become the housing of last 
resort for many Australians with supply unable to meet the demand and waiting lists 
far too long. With this situation in mind, the committee recommends that the 
Australian Government, together with the states and territories, commit to retaining an 
adequate supply of public housing with the goal of increasing the overall proportion of 
public housing as a percentage of housing stock. Targets should be established for 
both the proportion of social housing and the reduction in existing waiting lists as part 
of the national housing plan, working through COAG and the re-established National 
Housing Supply Council. The initial goal would be for the Australian Government 
together with the states and territories to fund public housing in order to lift the 
percentage of public housing from its current low base and to reach agreement on a 
plan to achieve this objective. 
The committee recommends further that an underlying principle shaping the 
development or redevelopment of public housing must be to prevent the concentration 
of people with complex problems in the same locality and in locations removed from 
important services—transport, education, health, welfare and employment. 
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Recommendation 23                paragraph 15.54 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government request the Productivity 
Commission undertake an inquiry into the merits of transferring public housing to the 
community housing sector with particular emphasis on the advantages and 
disadvantages of transferring property title.  
Recommendation 24                paragraph 15.57 
Consistent with the recommendation for the Australian Government to increase the 
overall proportion of public housing as a percentage of housing stock, the committee 
recommends that the Australian Government together with the states and territories 
commit to achieving a higher proportion of overall social housing as a percentage of 
Australia's housing stock. This recommendation recognises that currently social 
housing in Australia forms only a small proportion of Australia's housing stock and is 
falling far short of meeting demand. 
Recommendation 25                paragraph 15.69 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government in collaboration with the 
states and territories monitor carefully the transfer of public housing stock to the 
community sector to ensure that this transfer does not adversely affect tenants of 
public housing or cause them unnecessary anxiety if required to vacate their dwelling. 
The recommendation is intended to ensure that tenants are consulted about the 
changes and that their rights as tenants, including security of tenure, of rent levels, and 
of access to dispute resolution mechanisms is preserved. 
Recommendation 26                paragraph 16.26 
In light of the anticipated rise in the number of older Australians in the private rental 
market, and the insecure tenancy confronting many older renters, the committee 
recommends that the Australian Government look closely at its aged care policy so 
that it takes account of the particular difficulties confronting older Australians in the 
rental market. The aim would be to determine how policies designed to assist older 
Australians remain in their home could take better account of, and accommodate, the 
added difficulties for older people accessing safe and secure housing and in 
conducting modifications to rental dwellings, and more broadly renting in the private 
rental market. 
Recommendation 27              paragraphs 16.88–16.89 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government together with the states 
and territories commit to ensuring that adequate funding be made available so that 
women and children escaping domestic violence are housed in secure and appropriate 
housing with the necessary support network that would allow them to remain in a safe 
environment. This approach would mean that women and their children would 
experience as little social and educational disruption as possible and that the pathway 
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to more permanent housing would be easier. A priority would be to consider the 
introduction of programs throughout Australia such as New South Wales' Staying 
Home Leaving Violence initiative, which is designed to protect women who want to 
live separately from a violent husband or partner, but remain in their home. 
The committee also recommends the Australian Government reverse the cuts to the 
capital program in National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness (NPAH) and 
apply needs-based supply and services program as part of the national affordable 
housing platform in recommendation 30 (the cuts are discussed in chapter 18). 
Recommendation 28                paragraph 16.91 
The committee recommends that, in its consideration of current tenancy law, the 
proposed ministerial council also place a high priority on the obligations and 
responsibility of landlords when it comes to house modifications for those with 
particular housing needs. The committee recommends that the council look at 
measures, such as tax incentives, to encourage landlords to improve the energy 
efficiency of their properties and to make required modifications for tenants with 
disability. 
Recommendation 29                paragraph 17.36 
The committee recommends that housing should be included in the Prime Minister's 
Closing the Gap report: that access to affordable and appropriate housing must be 
regarded in the same context as Indigenous education, health and employment. 
Recommendation 30                paragraph 18.75 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government: 
• take a definite and high profile role in placing affordable housing at the 
forefront of government policy across Australia;  
• make a strong and certain recommitment to NPAH (including considering 
reintroducing ongoing capital component) and its continuation for at least ten 
years; 
• task Homelessness Australia with investigating and quantifying the service 
delivery gap to people experiencing homelessness, and commit to funding 
NPAH to meet that gap;   
• recommit to the target to at least halve homelessness by 2025 (originally set at 
2020 in the 2008 White Paper) with set milestone at two yearly intervals to 
track and report on progress and to offer supported accommodation to all 
rough sleepers who want it;  
• work to achieve multi-party support for this long-term goal and, noting that 
this problem cannot be solved at any one level of government, encourage 
states and territories to commit to this target and to coordinate their response;  
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• take a longer-term approach when funding programs or agreements that would 
provide certainty of funding so that organisations and people engaged in 
delivering programs can, with confidence, plan ahead and seek to achieve 
continuity in the services they provide to homeless people; and 
• introduce an urgent capital program with the Australian Government and the 
states sharing responsibility for funding through NPAH to provide fast build, 
sustainable and appropriate emergency housing and affordable rental housing 
to meet the needs of Australians rough sleeping and seeking appropriate 
housing, with the target of housing by 2020 all rough sleepers who seek to be 
housed. 
Recommendation 31                paragraph 18.77 
Noting that much of the evidence presented before this committee was consistent with 
the Australian National Audit Office's (ANAO) findings on the implementation of 
NPAH, the committee recommends that COAG establish a working group to review 
the ANAO's findings and reassess the implementation of NPAH to ensure that NPAH 
has: 
• clear performance measures that can be tracked and verified; 
• a requirement for states and territories to report to government on their 
expenditure on housing under NPAH complemented by a reporting 
framework that measures the implementation of reforms against set 
benchmarks and the extent to which they are being delivered on the ground;  
• Commonwealth funding linked to the achievement of agreed milestones; and 
• investigate Centrelink as a one stop shop to assist people experiencing or at 
risk of homelessness with referral and in-house expertise to link clients with 
services and housing. 
Recommendation 32                paragraph 18.78–18.79 
The committee recommends that the Australian and state and territory governments 
recognise the important work of advocacy and peak organisations in housing and 
homelessness and provide adequate support to enable them to continue to deliver their 
much needed services. 
The committee recommends further that the Australian Government reinstate funding 
for the peak bodies that represent and provide advice on homelessness, community 
housing and housing and tenancy policy. 
Recommendation 33                paragraph 18.87 
The committee notes that the advice provided to the committee on the Williams 
decision and the consequences for Commonwealth funding for housing and 
homelessness simply adds to the uncertainty around the future of Commonwealth 
funding in this area. The committee recommends that the Australian Government 
clarify what the consequences are for Commonwealth funding grants for housing and 
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homelessness that flow from the Williams decision and how it intends to respond to 
them. 
Recommendation 34                paragraph 19.29 
The committee recommends that through COAG, the National Affordable Housing 
Agreement (NAHA) be reinvigorated with particular emphasis on improving 
accountability and transparency. The committee recommends that the following 
particular reforms of NAHA should be considered and acted upon: 
• expand the agreement to include all forms of housing assistance—funding for 
social housing, affordable rental housing, rent assistance and the various 
programs to support people to remain housed;   
• develop measurable benchmarks and ensure these benchmarks are used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of government expenditure on affordable housing; 
• improve the collection and publication of data, especially on the number of 
new homes added to the pool of social housing; and 
• ensure that funding is tied directly to concrete outcomes, for example, by 
tightening conditions on Commonwealth funding to the states that would 
realise growth in the stock of social housing. 
Recommendation 35                paragraph 19.31 
The committee recommends that the Federation White Paper process consider 
carefully NAHA in this critical area of transparency and accountability. Importantly, 
that the committee's findings feed into the White Paper process with the aim to 
improve NAHA so that a robust evaluation and reporting framework is established 
ensuring that the funds allocated to improving affordable housing can be tracked and 
the intended outcomes measured and evaluated. 
Recommendation 36                paragraph 21.56 
The committee recommends that: 
• in the absence of any credible alternative scheme designed to increase the 
supply of new affordable housing and considering steps have already been 
taken to improve the administration and implementation of the National 
Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS), that the Australian Government 
continue with NRAS round 5;  
• the Federation White Paper process look at the Queensland NRAS model, 
which appeared to have much tighter controls over eligibility, as a means of 
determining where further improvements or fine-tuning could make the 
system more robust and effective; 
• the Federation White Paper process look at how NRAS or a replacement 
scheme could be reframed to take account of the particular housing 
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circumstances of regional Australia and ensure that NRAS housing was better 
targeted to areas in most need; and  
• as part of the Federation White Paper process, a thorough cost benefit analysis 
of NRAS be undertaken, and that any such analysis include comparison of 
forgone revenue from demand subsidies such as the first home owners grant, 
and negative gearing and capital gains tax.  
Recommendation 37                paragraph 21.57 
The committee recommends that when considering NRAS, the Federation White 
Paper process: 
• take note of the concerns raised by many submitters and witnesses about the 
need for continuity and certainty in order to attract and to gain the confidence 
of private investors; and 
• ensure that any proposed refinement or a replacement of the scheme:  
• places the highest priority on restoring and building on the initial success 
that NRAS had in attracting private investors; 
• provides investors with certainty regarding the scheme by committing to 
a consistent flow of incentives extending over a period of at least five 
years; and 
• takes note of lessons to be learnt from NRAS such as the need for clear 
and tight eligibility criteria and better targeting to areas of need (the 
ANAO audit should provide a sound starting point). 
Recommendation 38                paragraph 21.68 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government, through legislative 
recognition of charitable status, resolve any uncertainty over the effect that 
participation in NRAS or any similar scheme would have on the tax status of entities 
operating as charities, or public benevolent institutions (PBIs). 
Recommendation 39                paragraph 22.45 
The committee recommends that the Australian Government:  
• review the eligibility criteria for Commonwealth Rental Assistance (CRA) to 
ensure that it is targeted at those most in need; 
• review the method of indexing CRA with a view to retaining its adequacy; 
and 
• review the adequacy of CRA. 
Recommendation 40              paragraphs 23.45–23.46 
The committee recommends that the Federation White Paper process give due 
consideration to the proposal for the introduction of housing supply bonds using the 
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Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute's (AHURI) research as a starting 
point for its consideration. 
The committee also recommends that the Australian Government establish a cross-
sectoral high level industry and government Housing Supply Financing Task Force, as 
proposed in the AHURI report. It would provide advice to governments on the 
potential for a Housing Supply Bond in Australia and investigate other mechanisms 
for private investment. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 On 12 December 2013, the Senate referred an inquiry into affordable housing 
to the Senate Economics References Committee for inquiry and report by 
26 June 2014. The Senate subsequently extended the reporting date on four occasions: 
first to 27 November 2014, then to the first sitting day in March 2015 and  
14 April 2015 and finally to 8 May 2015. The terms of reference are comprehensive 
and include the following matters: 
(a) the role of all levels of government in facilitating affordable home 
ownership and affordable private rental, including: 
(i) the effect of policies designed to encourage home ownership and 
residential property investment, 
(ii) the taxes and levies imposed by the Commonwealth, state, territory 
and local governments, 
(iii) the effect of policies designed to increase housing supply, 
(iv) the operation, effect and future of the National Rental Affordability 
Scheme, 
(v) the regulatory structures governing the roles of financial 
institutions and superannuation funds in the home lending and 
property sectors, and 
(vi) the operation and effectiveness of rent and housing assistance 
programs; 
(b) the impacts, including social implications, of public and social housing 
policies on housing affordability and the role of all levels of government 
in providing public and social housing; 
(c) the impact of Commonwealth, state and territory government policies 
and programs on homelessness; 
(d) the contribution of home ownership to retirement incomes; 
(e) the implications for other related changes to Commonwealth 
government policies and programs, including taxation policy, aged care, 
disability services, Indigenous affairs and for state and territory 
governments; 
(f) the need to develop improved overview and accountability mechanisms 
in relation to Commonwealth grants and funding to the states and 
territories in order to ensure that public funding delivers outcomes 
consistent with Commonwealth objectives; 
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(g) planning and policies that will ensure that women, particularly 
vulnerable women, have access to secure, appropriate, affordable and 
adaptable accommodation; 
(h) planning and policies that will ensure emergency and essential service 
workers have access to affordable housing close to where they work; 
(i) planning and policies that will ensure the availability of an appropriately 
skilled workforce; 
(j) the role of innovation in building materials and construction, including 
prefabricated and sustainable materials; 
(k) the impacts of improving sustainability (including energy efficiency) of 
new and existing housing stock on improving housing affordability; 
(l) the role of innovative and responsible funding mechanisms used in other 
countries, including the United Kingdom, United States of America, 
France, Canada, Austria and the Netherlands, that provide a stable and 
cost effective way of funding affordable rental and social housing, such 
as affordable housing supply bonds and an affordable housing finance 
corporation; 
(m) the role and contribution of the community housing sector in delivering 
social and affordable renting housing; 
(n) the need to increase the supply of accessible and adaptable housing, and 
housing that is culturally appropriate; 
(o) the impact of not having a long-term, national affordable housing plan; 
and 
(p) any other matters the committee considers relevant. 
Conduct of inquiry 
1.2 The committee advertised its inquiry on its website and in the Australian. The 
committee also wrote directly to the Commonwealth, state and territory governments, 
organisations, academics and other people known to be interested in housing in 
Australia drawing attention to the inquiry and inviting them to make written 
submissions.  
Submissions 
1.3 The committee received 231 submissions, which are listed at Appendix 1, as 
well as additional information and answers to a series of written questions. They are 
listed at Appendix 2. The committee held eight public hearings in Adelaide, 
Canberra (3), Melbourne, Brisbane, Sydney, and Perth. A list of witnesses who 
appeared is at Appendix 3. 
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Relevant reports and publications 
1.4 In addition to the evidence presented during the inquiry, the committee relied 
on information and data produced in numerous reports which included Australia's 
future tax system (the Henry Review); the National Commission of Audit, a New 
System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes (welfare reform interim report)1 
and the Pension Review Report. It also drew on various publications by the Australian 
Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI), Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO), Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS), National Housing Supply Council (NHSC) and the Productivity 
Commission. A selected bibliography is provided at the end of the report. 
Federation and Tax White Papers 
1.5 The committee has also taken into consideration the development of two 
white papers that have a direct bearing on matters covered by the inquiry's terms of 
reference: the White Paper on the Reform of the Federation (the Federation White 
Paper), and the White Paper on the Reform of Australia's Tax System (the Tax White 
Paper). 
1.6 In May 2014, the government announced that the two white papers were to be 
completed by the end of 2015. They would consider the spending and taxation roles 
and responsibilities of the different levels of government in Australia to ensure that, as 
far as possible, the states were sovereign in their own sphere.2 A related discussion 
paper explained in full: 
The White Paper on the Reform of the Federation is considering options to 
achieve a more efficient and effective federation, which supports Australia's 
growth and living standards. Any changes to roles and responsibilities of 
the Commonwealth and states and territories may have revenue and tax 
implications. The white paper processes on Australia's Federation and 
taxation are proceeding in tandem and, as such, provide a unique 
opportunity to inform a system-wide approach to taxation.3 
Federation White Paper 
1.7 Working with the states and territories, the Australian Government has 
committed to develop a Federation White Paper. A taskforce within the Department of 
1  A final report by the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, A New System for Better 
Employment and Social Outcomes, was released on February 2015. References in this report 
are drawn from the interim report published in June 2014.  
2  Budget Paper No. 1, Budget Strategy and Outlook 2014–15, Budget Overview, 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2014-15/content/bp1/download/BP1_BS1.pdf 
3  Australian Government, Re-think, Tax discussion paper, Better tax system, better Australia, 
March 2015, p. 2, http://bettertax.gov.au/files/2015/03/TWP_combined-online.pdf 
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the Prime Minister and Cabinet is producing the White Paper.4 As part of this process, 
an issues paper was published in December 2014 on roles and responsibilities in 
housing and homelessness.5 
Tax White Paper 
1.8 The Tax White Paper is intended to provide a longer-term considered 
approach to tax reform that is consistent with the government's core principles of 
fairness and simplicity.6 A Tax White Paper taskforce has been set up in the 
Department of Treasury. A tax discussion paper was released in March 2015.7 
Background  
1.9 Every Australian has a fundamental right to an adequate standard of living 
including access to a safe, secure, habitable and affordable home. Australia is party to 
seven core international human rights treaties which uphold this right to appropriate 
housing. As such the Australian Government recognises that adequate housing is 
essential for human survival with dignity. Indeed, the Australian Government and the 
states and territories have entered into an agreement that has as its aspirational goal: 
...all Australians [to] have access to affordable, safe and sustainable housing 
that contributes to social and economic participation. 8 
1.10 Recently in Australia, however, much attention has focused on housing 
affordability, with concerns mounting that some Australians were not only being 
priced out of home ownership but facing difficulties accessing appropriate housing in 
the rental market. This inquiry, with its comprehensive terms of reference, canvasses 
many aspects of affordable housing. 
4  Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 'Reform of the Federation White Paper', 
https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/about  (accessed 2 April 2015). 
5  Reform of Federation White Paper, Roles and Responsibilities in Housing and Homelessness, 
Issues Paper, 2 December 2014, p. 26, https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/issues-
paper/Housing_and_Homelessness_Issues_Paper.pdf. See also Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, Reform of the Federation White Paper: a Federation for our Future, Issues Paper 
1, September 2014, https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/issues-
paper/issues_paper1_a_federation_for_our_future.pdf  
6  Budget Paper No. 1, Budget Strategy and Outlook 2014–15, Budget Overview, p. 1–9, 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2014-15/content/bp1/download/BP1_BS1.pdf 
7  Australian Government, Re:think, Tax discussion paper, Better tax system, better Australia, 
March 2015, http://bettertax.gov.au/files/2015/03/TWP_combined-online.pdf 
8  Council of Australian Governments, National Affordable Housing Agreement, p. 3, 
http://www.federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/content/national_agreements.aspx (accessed 
18 March 2015). 
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Structure of report 
1.11 The report is divided into two parts—the first part of the report deals mainly 
with affordable housing in the context of home ownership; the second part considers 
affordable housing from the perspective of Australians who are unlikely to own their 
home and must rent.  
1.12 In Part 1, the committee provides an overview of housing affordability in 
Australia, including detail on defining and measuring housing affordability. It 
determines the extent to which Australia has a housing affordability problem and its 
significance to Australian households. The committee also examines the role of the 
Commonwealth, both through its funding of affordable housing and its contribution to 
developing a national policy and strategic approach to affordable housing.  
1.13 The committee also looks at the supply- and demand-side factors that shape 
Australia's housing market and considers in detail: 
• relevant state and local taxes, fees and charges and their effect on housing 
affordability; 
• zoning, planning and approval processes including land release, rezoning, 
infill development and densification; 
• building costs, codes and regulations and innovations in construction and 
building materials; 
• the Commonwealth tax regime as it affects housing in Australia, in particular 
negative gearing and capital gains tax discounts and exemptions; 
• financing for home purchases, the housing investment market, lending 
practices and macro prudential regulation; 
• home ownership in Australia—covering the social and financial benefits of 
home ownership, trends in home ownership, and mechanisms to help first 
home owners such as first home owner grants and shared equity programs; 
and 
• older Australians and home ownership, including the assets test for the aged 
pension and downsizing (or 'rightsizing'). 
1.14 In the second part of the report the committee's focus turns to those who 
through necessity must rent—those whose circumstances do not extend to home 
ownership. It considers the Australian rental market, the supply of rental properties, 
the costs of renting, the growing disparity between rents and income, the changing 
profile of the rental market, and the challenges and difficulties that low-income 
earners experience in accessing suitable accommodation. The committee looks at the 
level of rental stress in the community, the security of tenure for Australian renters 
and their rights as tenants. 
1.15 Recognising that for some Australians the private rental market cannot deliver 
affordable and appropriate housing, the committee examines options provided by 
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social housing. In this context, the committee considers both public and community 
housing, the particular attributes of each sector, the waiting lists for such 
accommodation and the incentives for the tenants of public and community housing to 
remain in their rental properties. The committee looks at the transfer of public houses 
to the community housing sector, the contribution that community housing makes to 
affordable housing, the potential for it to increase the supply of affordable houses and 
the challenges for community housing providers to finance the maintenance and 
development of their properties. 
1.16 Having established the difficulties confronting low-income earners to access 
affordable and appropriate rental houses, the committee considers the challenges that 
Australians with particular needs face in finding a safe, secure and affordable home. 
They include older Australians dependent on income support, women and children 
experiencing or under threat of domestic violence, people with a long-term health 
condition or disability, young unemployed Australians, migrants and refugees and 
Indigenous Australians. The committee then looks at the most extreme manifestation 
of housing stress—homelessness. It considers what is meant by homelessness, the 
nature and magnitude of the problem and what is being done to help people out of 
homelessness and to keep them in safe and secure accommodation.  
1.17 The committee analyses and evaluates the principal forms of Commonwealth 
assistance and the partnership agreements it has with the states and territories to 
improve access to affordable housing. In particular, the committee examines: 
National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA)—a broad ranging housing 
agreement which commits a significant amount of Commonwealth funding to 
the states and territories through a national specific purpose payment. The 
agreement provides the overarching framework within which the 
Commonwealth and states and territories work together to 'improve housing 
affordability and homelessness outcomes for Australians'. 
National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing 
(NPARIH)—an agreement between the Australian Government and the states 
and territories with the principal aim of ensuring that Indigenous Australians 
have the same housing opportunities as all Australians. It is a subsidiary 
agreement to NAHA designed to address significant overcrowding, 
homelessness, poor housing and severe housing shortages for Indigenous 
communities. 
National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness (NPAH)—an agreement 
between the Australian Government and the states and territories, which 
focuses on prevention and early intervention to stop people becoming 
homeless, breaking the cycle of homelessness and improving and expanding 
the service response to homelessness. The agreement has two headline 
objectives: 
• halve overall homelessness by 2020; and 
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• offer supported accommodation to all rough sleepers who need it 
by 2020. 
National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS)—a partnership between the 
Australian Government and the states and territories to invest in affordable 
housing. It was designed to stimulate and add to the supply of affordable 
housing by offering annual financial incentives to private investors and 
community organisations to build and rent homes to low- and moderate-
income households at a rate at least 20 per cent below market rates. 
Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA)—recognises that many renters in 
private or community housing are struggling to pay high rents. It is intended 
to ensure that adults with limited means can afford to live in rental housing 
that satisfies adequate standards. CRA payments are provided to eligible 
income support recipients, which involves a base payment to certain 
households to help them meet basic living needs. It is paid at the rate of 
75 cents for each dollar above the rent threshold up to a maximum rate. 
1.18 Finally, the committee looks at the role of the Commonwealth as both an 
investor in, and enabler of, affordable housing. The committee's main focus in this 
section, however, is on efforts to attract institutional investors into affordable housing. 
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Part I 
The first part of this report assesses the current state of the housing market in 
Australia and outlines the negative social and economic implications of declining 
housing affordability. It looks at the underlying reasons for this decline, and considers 
the need for a coordinated intergovernmental effort to address the issue and the role of 
the Commonwealth therein. 
The committee also focuses on falling home ownership rates, and the implications of 
this trend for individual households and the community as a whole. It considers how 
policy settings at various levels of government, including taxation settings, influence 
house prices, and potential steps that might be taken to bring the 'Australian dream' of 
home ownership back within reach of those who aspire to it.  
 

Chapter 2 
 Overview of housing affordability in Australia 
2.1 Defining concepts as complex as 'housing affordability' and 'affordable 
housing' can be problematic. What constitutes affordable housing for a particular 
household, and how pressing a concern housing affordability is for that household, 
will depend on a number of factors. These include a household's financial situation, 
the housing market it is in, and where it sits on the housing continuum—that is, 
whether the household is currently renting or seeking to rent a property, looking to 
purchase a home, or working to repay a mortgage. 
2.2 While no single measure can capture the diversity of Australian experiences 
of housing affordability, this chapter demonstrates that most indicators point toward a 
deterioration of affordability in recent decades. This decline is keenly felt by a broad 
array of people, including people wanting to become homeowners, renters and people 
living in community and public housing. Homelessness, meanwhile, is a tremendously 
complex problem, and it would be reductive to suggest it is simply a corollary of 
housing affordability and nothing more besides. Nonetheless, this chapter suggests 
that poor housing affordability creates pressures throughout the housing system, and 
this is clearly a key factor in the poor housing outcomes of people experiencing or at 
risk of experiencing homelessness.  
2.3 The deleterious effects of poor housing affordability are manifold. As 
explained in this chapter, the inability to afford access to safe, secure and appropriate 
housing puts people at higher risk of experiencing poor outcomes across the course of 
their life. Moreover, poor housing affordability damages economic productivity and 
increases risks to the stability of the financial system. 
2.4 The remainder of this chapter considers what is meant by 'housing 
affordability' and 'affordable housing', assesses whether Australia has a housing 
affordability problem, and highlights the social and economic implications of poor 
housing affordability.  
Defining and measuring housing affordability 
2.5 'Housing affordability' and 'affordable housing' are contested terms, in part 
reflecting the complexity of the housing market and the diverse experiences of people 
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in accessing and maintaining housing.1 As the Department of Social Services (DSS) 
put it in its submission, the housing market: 
…is complex, with many stakeholders, and as such it is problematic to talk 
about 'housing affordability' or 'affordable housing' in aggregate terms. 
Affordability instead should be examined on the basis of 'repayment', 
'purchase' and 'rental' affordability.2 
2.6 DSS further explained that the housing market consists of three broad 
categories of households: those able to afford housing through private ownership; 
those able to access the private rental market; and those who cannot access the private 
rental market without government assistance, or who require assistance through public 
housing or crisis accommodation.3 
2.7 DSS told the committee that 'housing affordability' meant different things to 
different people, in part depending on which household category they found 
themselves in at a given time. Complicating matters further, DSS suggested that 
policies and programs designed to improve one dimension of housing affordability or 
improve affordability for a particular cohort of people 'may actually have adverse 
impacts for other cohorts or for other dimensions of housing affordability': 
For some, their primary concern is rental affordability. For others, it is 
house purchase or home purchase affordability. For others, it is loan 
payment affordability. There is no single index or measure that captures the 
complexity of housing affordability. Further, as some types of affordability 
improve, others can deteriorate. For example, when interest rates fall, loan 
repayment affordability and borrowing capacity improve. Conversely, with 
falling interest rates, house prices typically rise and home purchase 
affordability declines, obviously.4 
2.8 The Housing Industry Association (HIA) made a similar point, telling the 
committee that while housing affordability was an issue for the entire community, it: 
1  In its submission, the Department of Social Services (DSS) notes that the term 'affordable 
housing' is sometimes used to refer to specific types of low cost housing, such as public or 
community housing. DSS uses the term more broadly in its submission, to refer to 'the ability of 
all individuals and households to access housing that is appropriate and affordable to them.' 
Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 6. This report prefers the broader definition 
used by DSS, and therefore unless otherwise specified, the term 'affordable housing' herein 
should not be taken to refer specifically to public or community housing.  
2  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 3. In setting out these categories, DSS notes 
that the first two categories include people who do not have acceptable outcomes—for 
example, owner-occupiers in mortgage stress and private renters experiencing rental stress or 
living in inappropriate accommodation. 
3  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 5.  
4  Ms Felicity Hand, Deputy Secretary, Disabilities and Housing, Department of Social Services 
Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 1. 
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…impacts on different households in different ways. At one end of the 
spectrum, you have housing affordability relating to what we describe as a 
relatively unconstrained decision about how much of the household's 
income is directed to housing costs. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
housing affordability challenge relates to a household's capacity or 
eligibility to access any available shelter, irrespective of whether it is 
suitable or appropriate for their needs. These two situations, in a way, 
represent the polar ends of what we would describe as Australia's housing 
continuum. The housing situation of the majority of Australian households 
falls somewhere in between these polar ends.5 
2.9 Likewise, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) noted that there are a number 
of things people might have in mind when they use the term 'affordability': 
Affordability measures will differ depending upon whether we are talking 
about owners or renters and also on whether we are interested in some 
specific market segment, such as first home buyers or low-income 
households. For owner-occupiers perceptions of affordability will depend 
on many things, including price, household income, the cost and 
availability of finance and a whole host of factors affecting the needs and 
aspirations of the buyer.6  
2.10 Part of the problem with assessing housing affordability is the lack of a 
commonly agreed measure of what it is. As DSS noted, this is in large measure due to 
the concept of 'affordability' being influenced by a number of complex and interacting 
factors. These factors, according to DSS, include: the price of housing; the financial 
capacity of owner-occupiers and renters; the ability of owner-occupiers and investors 
to access credit, and the cost of that credit; and the supply of suitable housing stock 
and rental accommodation.7 Associate Professor Judith Yates from the University of 
Sydney suggested that the complexity of housing policy was itself partly due to the 
difficulty in defining precisely what is and is not affordable housing. There are, she 
wrote: 
…no clear-cut definitions on what we should be expected to pay for 
housing; there are no clear-cut standards about how much housing is 
appropriate for each of us and at what point we should be able to have the 
right to live independently; there are no clear-cut definitions of where this 
housing should be located; and there are no clear-cut definitions of how 
much households should pay for, for example, transport costs to get from 
where they live to where they work.8 
5  Dr Harley Dale, Chief Economist, Housing Industry Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 43.  
6  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, pp. 1–2. 
7  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 6.  
8  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney's Senior Visiting Fellow 
Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 36. 
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2.11 The lack of a single agreed measure of housing affordability is well 
recognised. In its submission, DSS set out some of the key measures that are 
sometimes used to determine housing affordability: 
• the '30 per cent rule'—under this rule, housing is considered to be 
affordable where it takes up less than 30 per cent of a household's gross 
income before tax; 
• the '30/40' rule—under this rule, housing is considered to be affordable 
where a household spends less than 30 per cent of its gross income on 
housing where it has disposable household income in the bottom 40 per 
cent of the income range; 
• comparing house prices to consumer prices—under this approach, 
house prices are compared to growth in the overall consumer price 
index (CPI) and where house price growth exceeds CPI growth, housing 
is considered to be increasingly unaffordable; 
• comparing house prices to incomes—broadly, housing is considered to 
be affordable if it costs less than three times household income; 
• a comparison of the extent to which average weekly earnings can repay 
and service a mortgage for a median-priced dwelling; 
• determining the deposit gap—this approach measures the gap between 
the median dwelling price and average borrowing capacity as a 
percentage of a household's disposable income (a larger deposit gap 
reflects relatively more unaffordable housing); 
• identifying the amount of residual income of a household—this 
approach looks at the amount of income a household has after paying its 
housing costs and whether this is sufficient to maintain the household's 
standard of living; and 
• the effects on home ownership rates—a reduction in home ownership 
rates indicates a reduction in affordability for potential owner-
occupiers.9 
2.12 Many of these measures were used by witnesses in this inquiry to support 
their respective arguments. Most commonly, submissions used the median income to 
median price measure (or variations thereof), and either the '30 per cent rule' or the 
somewhat more targeted '30/40 rule'.  
2.13 For example, AHURI submitted that while definitions of housing affordability 
vary, from a social policy perspective it could be defined using the abovementioned 
'30/40 rule'. This definition, it explained, could be applied to: 
…housing that is being purchased or housing that is rented through the 
private, public or community sectors. The rationale behind this definition of 
housing affordability is that when households on these modest incomes 
spend more than 30 per cent of their gross income on housing costs, they 
9  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, pp. 6–7.  
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will have insufficient income left for necessities such as food, clothing, 
health or schooling.10 
2.14 For its part, the Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA) submitted 
that 'housing affordability', at its basic most level: 
…refers to the level of income required to attain a reasonably adequate 
standard of housing. Housing may be considered to be unaffordable if it 
requires a high proportion of household income (above 30% is a common 
guideline) or if the level of housing expenditure impacts on the ability of 
households to meet other basic needs.11 
2.15 A joint submission from Mr Luc Borrowman, Associate Professor Lionel 
Frost and Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch from the Department of Economics, Monash 
University, offered a detailed comparison of ratio measures and residual income 
measures of housing stress. Ratio measures define affordability as a fraction of 
income used for housing (commonly 30 per cent). The residual income approach, 
meanwhile, 'defines the normative level of adequacy for non-shelter items as a 
monetary amount that is independent of income but very dependent upon household 
composition and the non-housing cost of living as a function of time and place'.  
Mr Borrowman, Associate Professor Frost and Dr Kazakevitch argued that ratio 
measures, which are commonly employed by researchers and policy-makers alike, fail 
to properly reflect the complexity and variance of housing costs across household 
types. Nor, they argued, do ratio measures reflect how housing costs interrelate with 
other household costs. While allowing that residual measures lack the inherent 
simplicity of ratio measures, the submitters suggested that residual measures better 
reflect the interface between housing and non-housing expenditure. Further residual 
measures recognise that 'true affordability is sensitive to differences in household 
composition and income'.12 They suggested that the: 
…residual affordability measure is adaptable to different household 
compositions and grounded in its society standard, and therefore allows for 
informed decisions on housing policies that specifically target the 
composition of households that are most vulnerable to housing stress.13 
2.16 HomeGround Services also noted the limitations of the ratio measures in 
defining housing affordability, noting that residual measures might better represent 
what constitutes affordable housing for people on very low incomes. HomeGround 
argued that: 
10  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. ii.  
11  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 6.  
12  Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23, pp. 4–7.  
13  Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23, p. 2.  
 
                                              
16  
…for people on very low incomes, ratio measures of affordable housing are 
meaningless. When someone pays 25% of their income in rent and still 
cannot afford other basic necessities such as food and clothing, the result is 
extreme poverty. Residual measures of housing affordability at least make 
allowances for the cost of other necessary purchases in calculating what is 
affordable.14 
2.17 Housing researchers from the Swinburne Institute for Social Research also 
argued that residual income measures should be preferred over ratio measures of 
affordability. They contended that the 30 per cent of household income ratio, while 
revealing a sharpening of the affordability problem in recent decades, had no solid 
normative basis as a measure of housing affordability. By contrast, they argued, a 
residual income approach: 
…recognises that housing makes the largest claim on after-tax income for 
most households and therefore that non-housing expenditures are limited by 
how much income is left after paying for housing. This means that a 
household has a housing affordability problem if it cannot meet its non-
housing needs at some minimum level of adequacy after paying for 
housing.15 
2.18 Using a residual income approach, the Swinburne researchers were able to 
develop what they suggested was a more nuanced picture of the housing affordability 
problem in Australia. This included a clearer understanding of how housing 
affordability was experienced by different household types.16 The researchers 
emphasised that the question of measurement was not simply a technical or academic 
one. Rather, if targets are set using a flawed method measurement of what constitutes 
affordable housing, then a less than optimal policy outcome will follow: 'In other 
words, measurement matters.'17 
2.19 Mr Adam Mills from the City of Melbourne told the committee that while the 
definition of 'affordable housing' as housing costing less than 30 per cent of a low to 
moderate income household's income was useful as a benchmark for policymakers, in 
reality the situation was often more complex:  
The reality is that the definition varies for every household. It is dependent 
on particular life circumstances, such as childcare costs, whether you need 
to own a car, travel to work et cetera.18 
14  HomeGround Services, Submission 70, p. 5.  
15  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 2.  
16  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, pp. 2–3.  
17  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 4.  
18  Mr Adam Mills, Senior Strategic Planner, City of Melbourne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, p. 29.  
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2.20 Hobsons Bay City Council suggested the lack of agreed definitions of 
'affordable housing' and 'housing affordability' created confusion in discussions about 
affordability. The Council noted that it had adopted its own definition of 'affordable 
housing', namely 'housing that is owned and managed by community organisations, 
state owned public housing or housing that costs not more than 30% of the income of 
households on the lowest 40% of the income scale'. The Council recommended that 
federal and state governments 'develop a universal definition that describes what type 
of housing and income groups fall within affordable housing'.19 
2.21 On the relative merits of the various measures of housing affordability, DSS 
wrote that all measures: 
…have their relative strengths and weaknesses. However, it should be noted 
that most standard measures of affordability show an improvement when 
household income is growing faster than house prices, or when interest 
rates fall and increase the borrowing capacity of households. It should also 
be noted that applying some of these measures to total populations 
including, for example, home owners that have already paid off their 
homes, can limit the usefulness of particular measures, and that the 
methodology used to calculate house prices and household income can have 
a significant impact on measurement of affordability. 
Given the different characteristics of owner-occupiers, potential purchasers 
and renters, a generic measure of housing affordability that seeks to 
measure affordability across all three types of household is unrealistic.20 
2.22 The RBA also pointed out that that while it was necessary to make use of 
summary measures in any analysis of housing affordability, it should nonetheless be 
acknowledged that such measures 'will inevitably gloss over the diversity of 
experience across different types of households'.21 
Committee view 
2.23 How housing affordability is measured matters. As Mr Borrowman,  
Associate Professor Frost and Dr Kazakevitch observed, measures of affordability 
inform policy design and targeting, including the provision of housing subsidies.22  
2.24 Notwithstanding the importance of identifying and utilising robust measures 
of housing affordability, the committee also notes that the many different measures 
currently in use do not always tell the same story or point in the same direction. The 
committee does not believe it is in a position to assess which of these measures is the 
19  Hobsons Bay City Council, Submission 39, p. 4.  
20  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, pp. 6–7.  
21  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, pp. 1–2. 
22  Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23, pp. 4–5.  
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'best'. Indeed, on the basis of evidence received, it believes it highly unlikely that a 
single 'best' measure of housing affordability exists, or that it would necessarily be 
productive for governments to agree official measures of affordability. At the same 
time, as discussed further below, it is plainly evident that, taken in aggregate, these 
indicators show that home ownership is becoming less and less affordable and rental 
affordability is trending in the wrong direction.  
2.25 The distinction used by DSS between 'purchase', 'rental' and 'repayment' 
affordability appears to the committee a useful one—as such, this distinction is used 
throughout this report. Similarly, the committee notes DSS's point that housing 
affordability will vary across household types, which can be separated into three broad 
categories: those able to afford housing through private ownership, those able to 
access the private rental market, and those who cannot access the private rental market 
without government assistance or who require assistance through public housing or 
crisis accommodation. This report considers the experience of all three household 
types. 
Does Australia have a housing affordability problem? 
2.26 It is important to maintain a sense of perspective when considering housing in 
Australia. While it is certainly the case that the Australian 'housing system' is failing 
some people, for the most part, as Mr Saul Eslake pointed out, Australians are: 
…well housed—at least in a physical sense. Although it hasn't always been 
the case, and it isn't the case for all Australians today (not least for 
Indigenous people), most of us live in houses or apartments that are well-
constructed, amply fitted with various devices that make the 
accomplishment of household tasks easier than it was in our great-
grandparents' day, and replete with other appurtenances and chattels that in 
some way or other provide us with enjoyment or add meaning to our 
lives.23  
2.27 However, after discussing the declining rates of home ownership in Australia, 
which he explained as at least in part a consequence of declining affordability, 
Mr Eslake added: 
Although most Australians are, as I noted at the beginning, physically well 
housed, it can no longer be said that we are, in general, affordably housed; 
nor can it be said that the 'housing system' is meeting the needs and 
aspirations of as large a proportion of Australians as it did a quarter of a 
century ago. And in making that assertion I am thinking of the extent to 
which the housing system meets the needs and aspirations of those who 
don't want, or can't and won't ever be able to, become home-owners, as well 
as of those who do seek that status.24 
23  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 2.  
24  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 7.  
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2.28 An overwhelming majority of witnesses agreed with Mr Eslake's contention 
that housing affordability in Australia had deteriorated in recent decades and was 
continuing to trend in the wrong direction. For example, it its submission AHURI 
noted that the 2011 Census of Population and Housing revealed the number of 
households paying more than 30 per cent of their income to buy a home had risen by 
17.8 per cent since 2006.25 
2.29 The City Futures Research Centre (CFRC) submitted that Australia's housing 
markets are among the most expensive in the world, and housing affordability had 
become an entrenched structural problem. It argued that the problem could not be 
addressed simply through lower interest rates or cash subsidies, and would likely 
further deteriorate on current trends in supply and demand (as discussed in the next 
chapter): 
House prices have continued to outpace household incomes and low to 
moderate income households face fewer affordable housing options. There 
is no sign that housing markets operating under current policy settings will 
offer more affordable housing.26 
2.30 Similarly, the UDIA pointed to a troubling set of indicators in relation to 
housing affordability, including a worsening median household income to median 
house price ratio. It added: 
Worsening affordability is also reflected in falling rates of home ownership, 
with fewer households owning their homes outright, and an increasing 
proportion of households forced to rent. This trend is particularly stark 
when considered in light Australia's aging population, which other things 
[being] equal should result in a growing proportion of households with 
outright ownership.27 
2.31 Master Builders Australia (MBA) presented the committee with the findings 
of a detailed study it had conducted on housing affordability in 2012. The study 
revealed that whereas housing in all states except for New South Wales was in the 
'affordable' range in 2001 (as measured using the median household income to median 
house price ratio), by 2011 none of the states qualified as 'affordable' and four were 
rated 'severely affordable' (see Figure 1).28  
2.32 United Voice highlighted the 'dramatic divergence' between wage growth and 
the cost of housing in the past 15 years. It noted that: 
…while the cost of housing had until 2001 risen in proportion to income 
growth, since 2001 the boom in housing prices has vastly outstripped 
growth in household incomes. NATSEM [National Centre for Social and 
25  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 4.  
26  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, pp. 7–8. 
27  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 6.  
28  Master Builders Australia, Submission 48, pp. 9–10.  
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Economic Modelling] data shows that house prices increased by 
147 per cent compared to income growth of just 57 per cent between 2001 
and 2011. In dollar terms, the median price of a house more than doubled 
from $169,000 to $417,500 while after tax income increased from just 
$36,000 to $57,000. Whereas in 2001 an average home price in Australia 
was 4.7 times the average income, by 2011 this had increased to 
7.3 times.29 
 
Figure 2.1: Housing Affordability in Australia 
 
'HAR' is the 'Housing Affordability Ratio', and is measured by dividing the median house price by the 
median income of the house purchaser. A ratio of 5 or less (that is, below the green line) is considered 
'affordable'; a ratio of 7 or more (that is, above the purple line) is considered 'severely unaffordable'. 
Source: Master Builders Australia, Submission 48, p. 10.  
 
2.33 Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry from the Centre for Urban 
Research (RMIT University) pointed to what they regarded as a developing 
affordability crisis in the rental sector. They argued that this emerging crisis was in 
part due to pressure on other parts of the housing system: 
29  United Voice, Submission 169, p. 5.  
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Falling home ownership rates and a declining public housing sector are 
resulting in rising demand for private rented housing. However, existing 
market failure in the private rented sector means that increasing numbers of 
lower income and otherwise disadvantaged households are struggling to 
access housing suitable to their needs and resources. There is developing a 
structural shortage of low rent dwellings in Australia's cities and regions.30  
2.34 Some witnesses used international comparisons to demonstrate the 
deterioration of housing affordability in Australia. In this regard, the Salvation Army 
referred to the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey results for the 
third quarter of 2013. The survey noted that of 360 international housing markets 
assessed for housing affordability across nine countries: 
…Melbourne is ranked as sixth least affordable city in the cohort with 
Sydney ranked fourth. Hong Kong is the least affordable city, followed by 
Vancouver and San Francisco. London is more affordable than Melbourne. 
Overall, Australia has 25 severely unaffordable localities. Demographia 
states that severely unaffordable housing markets are very attractive to 
investors, especially international investors seeking extraordinary returns on 
their investment by seeking high profits in the short term.31 
2.35 Professor Andrew Beer, the Director of the University of Adelaide's Centre 
for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, also referred to the Demographia index, 
noting that Australia often appears: 
…at the very top end of unaffordable housing. Most years Sydney is the 
most unaffordable housing globally. In 2012 it was actually Port Macquarie 
that had the most unaffordable housing in the world. It is not an index that 
you want to win.32 
2.36 It might be noted at this point that housing affordability is far from uniform 
across Australia, with dramatic differences across (and indeed within) housing 
markets. As the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA) noted during its appearance 
before the committee: 
The housing market in Australia is a patchwork quilt of affordability. You 
can purchase a three-bedroom family home in Broken Hill for $39,000, 
while the median price in Sydney has pushed through the $800,000-mark—
and it is now $811,837.33 
30  Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, Centre for Urban Research, RMIT University, 
Submission 24, p. 3.  
31  The Salvation Army, Submission 114, p. 6. The nine countries assessed by Demographia were 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.  
32  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 16.  
33  Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 72.  
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2.37 Similarly, Professor Carolyn Whitzman (University of Melbourne) and 
Professor Tony Dalton (RMIT University) told the committee that in order to 
understand housing affordability in Australia, it was necessary to recognise the 
diversity of housing markets in Australia. The noted that Australia has multiple 
housing markets and submarkets, rather than a single undifferentiated market.34 
2.38 Some witnesses took issue with the idea that housing affordability had 
materially declined in recent years. For instance, Rismark pointed to evidence that the 
cost of housing relative to household disposable income had, in fact, remained 
essentially constant over the past decade. Rismark's submission also included data 
suggesting median house prices have risen in alignment with increases in the 
borrowing capacity of Australian households. Rismark acknowledged that certain 
cohorts were unable to access affordable housing in certain areas—for instance, 
essential workers in inner suburban areas. Yet Rismark argued that assessments of 
affordability often focused disproportionately on the most expensive segment of the 
housing market, namely detached housing in capital cities: 
What is often forgotten is that this most expensive segment only achieves 
its price levels due to high income households competing for the most 
desirable assets at prices that these households can afford. Interestingly, a 
focus on this particular segment of the market ignores attached dwellings 
(that is, flats, apartments, townhouses, etc.) which represent 25.1% of the 
capital city housing stock. Further, fully detached capital city dwellings 
only represent 43.2% of the nation's total housing stock. It is for this reason 
that many people are surprised to learn that the median price of all 
dwellings sold nation-wide in the December quarter of 2013 was only 
$450,000.35 
2.39 Whereas Rismark implied that housing affordability was essentially a problem 
for certain market segments within the larger capital cities, other submitters, including 
the Tamworth Regional Council, maintained that housing affordability was also an 
issue in many rural and regional communities.36 Housing Alliance, meanwhile, noted 
that a 2011 study by Professor Beer, which had focused on rural and regional centres, 
had 'identified that regional Australia has faced a similar trend to larger cities in terms 
of the rapid escalation in house prices and rents in the period since 2000'.37 
2.40 In contrast to claims by Dr Lawson and Professor Berry (among others) that 
an affordability 'crisis' was developing in the rental sector, Mr Cameron Murray 
argued that rental affordability had remained more or less constant over the last two 
decades. Mr Murray also suggested that home ownership was 'comparatively 
34  Professor Carolyn Whitzman, Professor of Urban Planning, University of Melbourne, and 
Professor Tony Dalton, Professor of Urban and Social Policy, RMIT University, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 28.  
35  Rismark International, Submission 64, pp. 2–3.  
36  Tamworth Regional Council, Submission 12, p. 3. 
37  Housing Alliance, Submission 73, p. 5.  
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affordable by historical standards, due to the reduction of interest rates, stagnant home 
prices, and wages growth since the financial crisis of 2008'. In light of this data, 
Mr Murray argued, 'the housing affordability situation in Australia could be described, 
with reference to recent historic norms, as highly affordable'.38 
2.41 In its February 2014 submission to this inquiry, the RBA reported that at a 
macro level, 'pressures on affordability on both purchased and rental housing' had 
eased somewhat since the Senate Select Committee on Housing Affordability's final 
report in June 2008.39 The RBA suggested this was due in part to the fall in variable 
mortgage interest rates. It acknowledged, however, that the experience of specific 
groups in the population would differ from this overall trend. Moreover, it noted that 
investor driven demand in Sydney may have resulted in some potential home owners 
being priced out of certain parts of the market.40 
2.42 The Australian Bankers' Association (ABA) suggested that Australian house 
prices, when measured using the median dwelling price to income ratio, are actually 
close to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
average. The ABA also noted that interest rates and arrears rates were at low levels 
relative to historical averages, and the HIA-Commonwealth Bank Housing 
Affordability Index 'shows that housing affordability increased during the  
September 2014 quarter to 75.1 and is at its highest (best) level since June 2002.'41 
However, the ABA also observed that home ownership rates were declining, 
particularly for younger Australians: 
These facts mean we need to give consideration to housing policy and the 
impact of home ownership on pre and post retirement income, expenditure 
and wealth.42 
2.43 Drawing out its abovementioned point about the different experiences of 
housing affordability for various household types, DSS outlined distinct (if 
interrelated) trends in recent decades in terms of purchase, rental and repayment 
affordability: 
Over the past 30 years, arguably, the most challenging aspect of housing 
affordability has been purchase affordability, with a particular impact on 
first home buyers. Since 1986, established house prices have increased by 
almost 6½ times, whereas CPI, consumer price index, has only increased 
2½ times. Low-income households also face affordability challenges and 
limited choices in the private rental housing market, a challenge that has 
been exacerbated by a period of higher than CPI rent growth between 2007 
38  Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, p. 5.  
39  Select Committee on Housing Affordability in Australia, A good house is hard to find: Housing 
affordability in Australia (June 2008). 
40  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 1–3.  
41  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 7.  
42  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 9.  
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and 2013. On average between 2007 and 2013 private rental costs have 
grown significantly faster than CPI. Most recently, growth in rents has 
slowed and in the year to June 2014…rents actually grew more slowly than 
CPI for the first time since 2006. 
Since the early 1990s, repayment affordability has benefited from the 
relatively low interest rate environment that has prevailed in comparison 
with interest rates in the seventies and the eighties.43 
2.44 DSS suggested that without reform to existing policy settings: 
…the current issues with housing affordability will not recede, and indeed 
are more likely to intensify given the current low interest rate environment. 
This will lead to an increase in the number of Australians excluded from 
owning their own home, which is likely to put further pressure on the 
private rental market, and in turn, community and public housing and 
Commonwealth budget outlays through Commonwealth Rent Assistance.44 
Committee view 
2.45 The overwhelming weight of evidence received by the committee 
demonstrates that Australia has a housing affordability problem. As Mr Eslake put it 
in his submission, while most Australians are 'physically well housed, it can no longer 
be said that we are, in general, affordably housed'. Sustained growth in median 
housing costs above the rate of median household income growth in recent decades 
has made it increasingly difficult for a growing proportion of Australians to afford 
housing that is safe, secure and appropriate to their needs. Added to the general 
decline in housing affordability, and indeed compounding the trend, the stock of 
affordable housing—that is, housing appropriate to the needs of low to moderate 
income households—has failed to keep pace with demand in recent decades.  
What are the implications of poor housing affordability? 
2.46 As Dr Lawson and Professor Berry put it in their submission, 'Few material 
concerns are more important to Australians than the homes they live in'.45 The ability 
to afford access to safe, secure and appropriate housing is a key determinant of good 
life outcomes. Equally, the affordability of housing and the state of the housing 
market more broadly plays a central role in shaping economic and productivity 
outcomes in Australia. The influence of housing on wider social and economic 
outcomes was noted by Anglicare Australia: 
Everything we do is linked to housing. Our employment, our social lives, 
our civic lives—everything. When the housing market is broken, everything 
43  Ms Felicity Hand, Deputy Secretary, Disabilities and Housing, Department of Social Services 
Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 1.  
44  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 3.  
45  Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, Centre for Urban Research, RMIT University, 
Submission 24, p. 5. 
 
                                              
 25 
else that links to it is broken. We have to think more broadly about housing 
than just [as] a wealth creation asset. It is an infrastructure issue. It is a 
productivity issue. It is a social issue. On that basis, it affects us all.46 
2.47 Similarly, the Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) noted that 
housing affordability had a significant impact on life outcomes for individuals, on 
economic growth and on the wellbeing of the community as a whole: 
Housing, affordability and location are integral to enabling population 
growth, and labour mobility, supporting improvements in participation rates 
and improving productivity. The housing and construction industries are 
also key drivers of economic activity, and associated jobs growth. Adequate 
housing is also a basic necessity and human right which impacts on 
education, health and employment outcomes, as well as the overall 
wellbeing of the population. Having a private place to be which is decent 
and over which we have some real control is fundamental to the wellbeing 
of every one of us as individuals and communities. In this sense, affordable 
housing is both vital economic and social infrastructure.47 
2.48 The relationship of housing affordability to social and economic outcomes is 
explored further below.  
Housing affordability and social outcomes 
2.49 A wide range of experts to the committee that access to affordable housing is 
a key determinant of wellbeing across a person's life course. Housing, they argued, 
can profoundly influence educational attainment, employment outcomes, physical and 
mental health and social participation, among other things.  
2.50 Professor Beer was asked by the committee about the 'everyday effects' on 
people of living in unaffordable housing. He responded that because housing was 
commonly the biggest expense for households, how much a household paid for 
housing tended to have a flow-on impact on how much it spent on other necessities:  
We pay our housing first. Then, if you have a small income at the 
beginning, you have less for those other things: education, transport, food, 
medical care. So we have pretty good evidence that, as soon as people are 
paying off that top bit for their housing, all of those other things suffer 
down the line.48 
2.51 The CFRC underscored the interconnectedness of housing outcomes and 
broader social outcomes. Housing, it noted, is: 
46  Ms Michelle Waterford, Director, Research and Policy, Anglicare Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 24. 
47  Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 108, p. 1.  
48  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 17.  
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...a key pillar of social policy: the ways that housing and housing assistance 
are provided influence not only housing affordability, appropriateness and 
security but, more broadly, the employment, educational and health 
outcomes of citizens. Spatially housing plays a core role in shaping our 
cities and their economic, social equity and environmental performance.49 
2.52 Dr Emma Baker, Deputy Director of the University of Adelaide's Centre for 
Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, outlined the relationship between housing 
affordability and health outcomes. Dr Baker referred to her research findings showing 
that poor housing affordability and poor health outcomes tend to reinforce one 
another—that is, people with health vulnerabilities are more likely to have to live in 
unaffordable housing, and people living in unaffordable housing are more likely to 
experience health vulnerabilities.50 
2.53 The Department of Education explained the importance of housing 
affordability in supporting children's development, education and overall wellbeing.51 
Similarly, Professor Beer highlighted the causal relationship between poor housing 
affordability and poor educational attainment in children. Children in households 
occupying unaffordable housing, he explained, are less likely to have the resources 
needed to support their education: 
They may not have separate space for study, they may not have adequate 
nutrition, they may not have adequate parental supervision as the parents 
are working very long hours to achieve the outcomes they are looking for.52 
2.54 The Australia Institute suggested that high house prices also tend to reinforce 
intergenerational income inequality. It explained that: 
…households who own a house have a greater ability to help their children 
buy property, while those who could not afford to buy a house themselves 
will be unlikely to be in a position to provide equivalent assistance to their 
children. The result is an intergenerational transfer or continuation of 
income inequality.53 
2.55 Poor housing affordability can also reinforce intergenerational inequality 
because it fosters greater spatial disadvantage in urban areas. That is, low to moderate 
49  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 4.  
50  Dr Emma Baker, Deputy Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 14. The research findings 
Dr Baker referred to are presented in Emma Baker, Kate Mason, Rebecca Betley and Shelley 
Mallett, 'Exploring the Bi-directional Relationship between Health and Housing in Australia', 
Urban Policy and Research 32, No. 1 (2014): 71–84.  
51  Department of Education, Submission 142, pp. 5–8. 
52  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 14.  
53  Ms Molly Johnson, Researcher, The Australia Institute, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 60. Also see The Australia Institute, Submission 92, pp. 5–6. 
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income earners are often forced to move to areas with relatively poor access to 
employment, services and transport infrastructure in order to access housing they can 
afford. This dynamic, which is discussed in greater detail in chapter seven, was 
identified in a submission from the Tenants Union of Victoria. It told the committee 
that the general lack of good amenity in suburbs with affordable rents was 'creating a 
horrible social problem for the future', and this problem needed to be addressed in 
order to avoid an intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality.54 
2.56 Dr Lawson and Professor Berry also argued that the lack of affordable 
housing was a threat to intergenerational equity and social inclusion. Existing market 
dynamics were, they argued, driving poor affordability outcomes and damaging 
Australia's ability to: 
…adequately house not only its current population but also future 
generations of households. The benefits of rising house prices have not 
been shared evenly and the trickling upwards of housing wealth is 
diminishing social and inter-generational equality.55 
2.57 Conversely, good housing affordability and housing outcomes generally 
enhance the likelihood of positive social outcomes. Some witnesses drew the 
committee's attention to the beneficial impact of home ownership (as discussed in 
chapter eleven). As the REIA put it, these benefits could include: 
…improved educational levels for children, better mental and physical 
health, and greater social connectedness and participation in community 
and voluntary organisations.56 
2.58 Similarly, the UDIA submitted that affordable home ownership provides 
people with the financial and social stability they need to:  
…plan for long term decisions such as having children or forming a 
household, and provides an added measure of certainty and security to their 
future. Households that struggle to meet their housing needs are likely to 
have a lower quality of life, and may struggle to satisfy their need for other 
essentials such as health care, education, and social engagement.57 
The social costs of severe housing stress and homelessness 
2.59 Referring to the difficulties faced by low-income and other people forced into 
insecure accommodation, the Kingsford Legal Centre (University of New South 
54  Mr Mark O'Brien, Chief Executive Officer, Tenants Union of Victoria, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 44.  
55  Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, Centre for Urban Research, RMIT University, 
Submission 24, p. 6.  
56  Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 72.  
57  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 7.  
 
                                              
28  
Wales) noted that a lack of affordable housing was not only a 'source of great stress 
for individuals', but also has: 
…huge impacts on our local community because relationships are severed 
when people are forced to vacate their homes and relocate. This causes 
major disruptions to families, and is particularly disruptive to the schooling 
of children.58 
2.60 In a joint submission, Anglicare Sydney, Churches Housing and BaptistCare 
likewise suggested that the lack of affordable housing for low income households had 
serious detrimental impacts on individual, family and community wellbeing: 
Appropriate, affordable and sustainable housing is essential to the 
wellbeing of both individuals and community. When people are uncertain 
about the sustainability of their housing situation, they experience what the 
literature refers to as housing insecurity. A lack of stable, secure and 
affordable housing has significant impacts on individual and family 
wellbeing. It can exacerbate financial hardship which impacts on the 
acquisition of basic necessities including food, adequate clothing and 
heating. It can lead to transience and dislocation, compromising people's 
sense of place and belonging in communities. The stress and anxiety which 
housing insecurity generates can lead to relationship breakdown. Often 
people who live with housing insecurity are transient and may be forced to 
move to locations which are cheap but have poor transport infrastructure, 
creating barriers to employment. The lack of stable housing impacts on 
children's developmental milestones which can compromise their 
educational and employment opportunities over the life course.59 
2.61 Looking to the extreme end of housing stress, HomeGround Services 
explained that homelessness hurts both individuals and society more broadly: 
Decent, sustainable, affordable housing matters because without it people 
can lose hope. Hope gives an individual the determination and will to reach 
their goals and implement strategies that overcome adversity. The social 
and economic costs that are associated with people experiencing housing 
crisis and homelessness impact on us all. Coping with crisis leaves people 
with little capacity for initiating longer range strategies for improving their 
lives and dealing with other contributing issues. These stresses also 
contribute to negative outcomes in terms of health and social participation. 
Where these issues become acute during childhood, the costs to society may 
be very high indeed.60 
2.62 Both the Community Housing Council of South Australia and the Council to 
Homeless Persons noted that, in addition to the profound impact on individuals 
experiencing homelessness, the economic and productivity costs to the community of 
58  Kingsford Law Centre, Submission 68, p. 3.  
59  Anglicare Sydney, Churches Housing and BaptistCare, Submission 85, pp. 8–9. 
60  HomeGround Services, Submission 70, p. 6.  
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homelessness are substantial. These costs can include added imposts on the justice 
system, the health system and emergency services, and the costs associated with 
unemployment or low levels of economic participation.61  
2.63 While the drivers of homelessness are more complex than housing 
affordability, the evidence nonetheless suggests a strong causal relationship between 
declining affordability and the incidence of homelessness and housing stress. As the 
St Vincent de Paul Society put it, 'Unless we address housing affordability in 
Australia we will never succeed in eliminating poverty and homelessness.'62 The 
relationship between, on the one hand, homelessness and, on the other, poor housing 
affordability and a lack of supported affordable housing stock, is addressed in 
chapter 18. 
Broader economic and productivity impacts 
2.64 The performance of the housing sector, including the state of housing 
affordability, is directly related to Australia's overall economic performance. As the 
CFRC put it in its submission, the housing sector 'has potentially profound 
implications for macroeconomic performance and economic management and 
productivity'.63 In part, this is a function of the sheer size of the housing sector. As 
DSS noted in its submission, at the close of 2013 the Australian residential property 
market was made up of approximately 9.3 million dwellings, which had an estimated 
total value of just over $5 trillion (with $1.26 trillion in loans outstanding against 
those dwellings).64  
2.65 Housing costs can also have a fundamental impact on the financial wellbeing 
of individuals and their ability to accumulate wealth. Beyond the fact that housing is 
often the most significant household cost, regardless of tenure type, a key reason for 
this is that housing in Australia is an important store of private wealth. According to 
the ABS, in 2011–12 owner-occupied property accounted for 43 per cent of household 
assets, and represented a value of $370,000 (net of liabilities) when averaged across 
all households. Nearly 20 per cent of households also owned property (residential and 
non-residential) other than their home; the value of this property averaged $129,000 
across all households, and accounted for 15 per cent of total assets. In total, 
58 per cent of all household assets were property. Nearly 90 per cent of household 
61  Ms Maria Palumbo, Chair, Community Housing Council of South Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 39; Ms Sarah Toohey, Manager, Policy and Communications, 
Council to Homeless Persons, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 55–56 
62  St Vincent de Paul Society, National Council of Australia, Submission 189, p. 2. 
63  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 3. 
64  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 5.  
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liabilities, meanwhile, could be attributed to property loans (57.5 per cent for owner-
occupied housing and 32.4 per cent for other property loans).65  
2.66 DSS noted that house price inflation had worked to the significant financial 
benefit of existing home owners and investors. However, it had had: 
…the opposite impact on potential first home owners, potential up-graders, 
renters and those households in public and community housing. 
While the most noticeable impact of the reduction in the availability of 
affordable housing is the reduction in home ownership experienced by 
younger Australians, it is also having an impact upon labour force 
participation, household formation and historical consumption, investment 
and retirement trends.66 
2.67 The UDIA outlined the myriad ways in which poor housing affordability 
damaged the economy. These included the need for households to spend increasing 
proportions of income on housing, thus reducing spending on other goods and 
services. High housing costs, it argued, also undermined the health of the construction 
industry and increased the cost base for businesses, reducing their international 
competitiveness. In sum, high housing and land costs: 
…flow throughout the entire economy, increasing the cost of doing 
business, destroying jobs, damaging productivity, and reducing the 
international competitiveness of Australian businesses. The high level of 
charges on new housing, a major contributor to poor housing affordability, 
also damages activity and employment in the property development and 
construction industries, one of the largest sectors of the Australian 
economy.67 
2.68 In addition to noting the whole-of-economy importance of housing 
affordability, JELD-WEN emphasised the economic significance of the housing sector 
itself. According to JELD-WEN, more than a million Australians are employed in the 
home building sector or in businesses supplying products and services to the sector. 
New home construction and renovations, JELD-WEN noted, generate more than 
$200 billion a year throughout the Australian economy, and housing industry and 
related business activity make up 15 per cent of the national economy. A responsive, 
stable housing sector, JELD-WEN wrote:  
…can avoid bouts of damaging super house price inflation and encourage 
builders, manufacturers and suppliers to become more innovative and to 
adopt more efficient technology and processes to remain competitive. A 
housing market that is able to provide affordable housing enables 
65  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Household Wealth and Wealth Distribution, Australia, 2011–
12, 21 August 2013, pp. 4, 19.    
66  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 4.  
67  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, pp. 4, 7.  
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householders to respond more quickly to new work opportunities; it fosters 
economic growth and jobs.68 
2.69 National Shelter told the committee that housing was in part a productivity 
issue, particularly if people were not well located to employment, health and 
education services.69 Similarly, PowerHousing Australia, a network for community 
housing providers, argued that a lack of affordable housing in areas where new jobs 
were being created was acting as 'a handbrake on economic growth'.70 Regional 
Development Australia, Gold Coast, suggested that such productivity costs were 
hurting economic activity in the Gold Coast, with the lack of affordable housing 
hindering efforts to attract new investment to the city and diversify the local 
economy.71 
2.70 Associate Professor Yates also noted that poor housing affordability can affect 
the efficient operation of the labour market, both in terms of people having access to 
appropriate employment and employers having access to appropriately skilled labour. 
Productivity was further damaged, she argued, by congestion associated with urban 
sprawl and the search for affordable housing. Associate Professor Yates further noted 
that excessive reliance on debt to finance housing potentially added to financial and 
economic instability (an issue addressed in the next section of this chapter).72 
2.71 National Shelter suggested that current policy settings and high house prices 
in Australia were distorting investment decisions and reducing the pool of capital that 
might otherwise be directed towards productive forms of investment. In part, National 
Shelter argued, this was a consequence of a tax system that encouraged both owner-
occupiers and investors to overinvest in housing, at the expense 'of other forms of 
productive investment'. Moreover, because house prices were so high, large amounts 
of capital that might otherwise be directed to other productive activities were tied up 
simply in finding and holding a place to live.73 
Housing costs and risks to financial stability 
2.72 Since 2011, when the RBA started its current cycle of cutting interest rates, 
median house prices in Australia have climbed 21 per cent. In Sydney, prices have 
68  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 3.  
69  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 33.  
70  PowerHousing Australia, Submission 79, p. 19.  
71  Ms Kerrie Young, Committee Member, Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 26.  
72  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney's Senior Visiting Fellow 
Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 36. 
73  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 34.  
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increased 37 per cent over the same period.74 At various points during the inquiry the 
committee considered the rapid growth in house prices, particularly in Sydney, and the 
attendant risk to financial stability of a sudden price correction.  
2.73 Witnesses disagreed on whether housing price growth in Australia could be 
characterised as a 'bubble'. Prosper Australia was particularly strong in its insistence 
that the preferential tax treatment of land, as it saw it, and excessive borrowing had 
created a property bubble. Ultimately, Prosper Australia argued, the value of land will 
revert to the mean and the bubble will burst, causing 'tremendous economic damage' 
in the process—'a lot of people will lose a great deal of money and our country will 
suffer very, very badly.'75 
2.74 Associate Professor Roger Wilkins from the University of Melbourne was 
rather more sceptical as to whether house price inflation constituted a 'bubble': 
International and historical comparisons suggest that prices are above what 
some sort of notion of fundamentals would suggest they should be; but, if it 
is a bubble, it is a very long running bubble. Over the last 10 years real 
prices have not actually net grown that strongly. Sure, in the last few years 
they have picked up again, but the real growth has not been that strong. It 
suggests to me that there are perhaps some longer-running structural drivers 
of this high price growth.76 
2.75 Dr Ian Winter, Executive Director of AHURI, told the committee that 
arguments over whether or not a 'bubble' existed somewhat missed the point. The key 
issue, he suggested, was the need to address the structural drivers of poor housing 
affordability, which 'have been in place for the past 25 or 30 years and are steadily 
getting worse'.77 
2.76 Asked directly if there was a bubble in the Sydney housing market, the RBA's 
Head of Financial Stability, Dr Luci Ellis, responded that the RBA did not think this 
was a useful way to frame the problem. Rather, the issue was whether there was 
excessive speculation in the housing market and what that might mean for the price 
74  Benjamin Purvis, 'Housing boom is 'lesser evil' for RBA, says Goldman Asset', AFR, 
23 March 2015.  
75  Mr David Collyer, Policy Director, Prosper Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, p. 1; Mr Philip Soos, Researcher, Prosper Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 2–3. 
76  Associate Professor Roger Wilkins, Principal Research Fellow, Melbourne Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, p. 27. 
77  Dr Ian Winter, Executive Director, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 28.  
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cycle. And, Dr Ellis added, at the moment the RBA felt there was 'more speculative 
activity than we are comfortable with'.78 
2.77 Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor (Financial System) of the RBA, 
explained that while the RBA's concerns were focused on speculative investor activity 
in the Sydney and Melbourne housing markets, there was a broader material risk to 
the economy as a whole: 
We have said that this is a risk concentration problem, but it is big enough 
to have impacts on the national economy. That is what we are worried 
about in the end. Our mandate is the performance of the national economy, 
the stability of the economy and, eventually, the financial system itself. 
Sydney and Melbourne are a big part of the economy; they are a big part of 
the lending focus for the banks.79 
2.78 The RBA outlined in its submission the risks that speculative booms present 
to overall financial stability:  
Any increase in demand for a good or service will be met with some 
combination of an increase in prices and an expansion in quantity supplied. 
It is unrealistic to expect prices to be completely unaffected as demand 
increases. In the housing market, the price responses seem to dominate the 
quantity supply responses, which can have undesirable consequences. A 
period of rapidly rising prices does not only make it harder for first home 
buyers to purchase a home; if the price growth is extrapolated into 
expectations about the future, it can engender a speculative boom that, with 
its attendant increase in leverage, could be harmful to financial stability.80  
2.79 The RBA was asked by the committee to describe the kind of macroeconomic 
risks posed by excessive investor activity in the housing market. Dr Ellis responded 
that the RBA's principal concern at the moment was the impact price falls might have 
on the financial stability of households:  
In particular, the more you have an upswing in housing prices now, being 
driven by investors in particular, the more likely it is that the end of that 
boom will be a more severe decline in housing prices. That can catch out 
certain households—potentially, not the ones that were engaged in bidding 
house prices up to begin with.81 
78  Dr Luci Ellis, Head, Financial Stability, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
2 October 2014, p. 10. 
79  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 11. 
80  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 7.  
81  Dr Luci Ellis, Head, Financial Stability, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
2 October 2014, p. 5. 
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2.80 If households found themselves in negative equity following a fall in house 
prices, more borrowers would default, impacting on spending and the wider economy. 
Dr Edey added: 
The important thing to remember is that distribution matters. A one per cent 
fall in household wealth does not make much difference if it is evenly 
distributed. But if it manifests as, for example, one per cent of households 
losing their homes, that will have quite a severe effect on household 
spending and welfare. So that is what we are really concerned about. It is a 
slightly complicated transmission from the current developments to the 
shock that we are worried about. It is very hard to calibrate exactly how 
large that is because it is not something we have seen in Australia before. 
But it is certainly something I do not want to find out how big it is when it 
happens; I would prefer to avoid it.82 
Committee view 
2.81 The committee is keenly aware that declining housing affordability is not a 
new problem. In fact, few public policy issues have been subject to as much 
commentary and debate in recent years as the cost of housing in Australia. The current 
inquiry has nonetheless served to underline for the committee the extent to which poor 
housing affordability threatens the social and economic fabric of the nation, while 
throwing into sharp relief the increasingly urgent need for well-considered policy 
responses.   
 
82  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, pp. 5–6. 
 
                                              
  
Chapter 3 
 The drivers of housing affordability in Australia 
3.1 In seeking to explain the decline in housing affordability in Australia in recent 
decades, some of the evidence received by this committee focused predominantly on 
either supply-side or demand-side factors. Taken as a whole, however, the evidence 
points to an affordability problem that is driven by a complex interaction of factors. 
Whether the weight of these factors falls on the supply-side or demand-side, the 
evidence points to a substantial mismatch in supply and demand in the housing 
market. As DSS explained in its submission, while: 
…demand for housing has increased significantly over the last 30 years, the 
supply of new dwellings has not responded, with average annual 
completions of new dwellings remaining around 150,000 since the  
mid-1980s.1 
3.2 This chapter provides an overview of the drivers of housing affordability in 
Australia, and in turn considers the need for government policies to take account of 
these drivers so that policy interventions are efficient and effective. 
An overview of supply-side and demand-side considerations 
3.3 Some witnesses told the committee that the problem of housing affordability 
was principally one of supply constraints. For instance, MBA argued: 
…that when you really drill down to the problem that needs to be solved, it 
is an issue of supply or the lack thereof. That is not to say that in the short 
term there are not issues that perhaps arise from cyclical factors that may 
need some sort of attention. But our proposition is that unless 
governments—and I put this in the plural—address the whole issue of 
housing supply then unfortunately and regrettably we may have even more 
of these inquiries looking into housing affordability.2 
3.4 The HIA also framed the issue of affordability as essentially a consequence of 
a 'persistent imbalance between growth in demand for housing and the slow rate at 
which the nation has added to the housing stock.'3 There were various reasons for this 
constrained supply, it submitted, including the inadequate supply of developable land 
(discussed in chapter seven), the impost of taxes and charges on new housing 
(discussed in chapter six) and delays in providing supporting infrastructure for new 
1  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 4.  
2  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 34.  
3  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 3.  
 
                                              
36  
developments.4 The HIA argued that the combination of constrained housing supply 
and a rapidly growing population had: 
…resulted in a systemic deterioration in housing affordability. This has 
meant that households across a wide range of Australia's housing 
continuum are now facing increasingly restricted housing choices. It has 
now been 10 years since a reasonably tight historical linkage between 
population growth and new housing supply disconnected. The current 
cyclical recovery in new home building will provide a partial and 
temporary reprieve, but we do face a structural undersupply of adequate 
affordable and readily available shelter. The housing challenge, be it for 
first homebuyer accessibility or those with the most restricted choices along 
the housing continuum, has one root cause—that is a lack of readily 
available housing supply.5 
3.5 According to the HIA, over the past 20 years Australia has, on average, added 
around 156,000 new houses per annum to existing stock. Yet, it continued, under the 
most conservative estimates Australia will need to add about 180,000 per annum 
between now and 2050 in order to 'successfully house our growing and ageing 
population. The difference is very wide and it is growing by the day.'6 The HIA 
submitted that the: 
…long term failure of new housing supply to keep pace with the growth in 
demand manifests itself in a considerable constraint on the housing choices 
available to Australians. Households experience lower levels of housing 
affordability when their housing choices are restricted. Restriction to the 
point of exclusion is evident in the case of Australia's homeless, while a 
severe restriction is evident in the under-provision of low income public 
and social housing. Restrictions also exist in the private rental market, 
especially for low and lower-middle income renters, but also for 
low/middle income owner-occupiers.7 
3.6 The HIA noted that despite strong population growth over the period 2004 to 
2013, largely resulting from net overseas migration, the annual number of new homes 
commenced had declined in seven out of the ten years. Moreover, the HIA noted that 
since the economic recession of the early 1990s, new home building in Australia has 
experienced three episodes of recession—in 1996–97, 2001 and 2009, with a fourth 
episode narrowly avoided in 2012. While welcoming a recent improvement in new 
home building activity, the HIA maintained that under current policy settings this 
improvement 'will be insufficient to see Australia attain building levels commensurate 
4  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 44–45. 
5  Dr Harley Dale, Chief Economist, Housing Industry Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 43.  
6  Dr Harley Dale, Chief Economist, Housing Industry Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, pp. 43–44.  
7  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 3.  
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with the requirements of providing an adequate and affordable level of housing to a 
growing and ageing population'.8 
3.7 The HIA emphasised the interconnectedness of the different types of housing 
supply, and explained how shortages in one area flowed through to others. That is, 
inadequate supply in one type of tenure (purchase, rental, community or public 
housing) has a cascading effect, creating pressures across the housing continuum.9 
3.8 BIS Shrapnel also suggested that the 'primary factor underlying the 
deteriorating affordability of housing in Australia has been the inability of supply to 
keep pace with the underlying demand for new dwellings, and the resulting emergence 
of a significant national undersupply'.10 The UDIA made essentially the same point, 
telling the committee: 
We simply do not build enough new homes and have not done so for a 
number of years. In the face of rapidly increasing demand, this undersupply 
of new housing has led to rapidly increasing prices and declining 
affordability.11 
3.9 High population growth resulting from immigration was identified by a 
number of witnesses as a key driver of growing demand for housing. The Department 
of Immigration noted that Net Overseas Migration (the net gain or loss of population 
through migration to and from Australia) 'can fluctuate considerably from year to 
year, but has exceeded the natural increase in the population since 2005'.12 The 
Department noted that the likely continuation of strong population growth would 
continue to increase demand pressures on housing supply. At the same time, 
Australia's skilled migration policy would: 
…go some way to reducing skill blockages and labour shortages which can 
impede housing construction, and therefore can contribute positively to 
improving housing affordability.13 
3.10 The UDIA submitted that while population growth offered Australia many 
benefits, governments needed to provide for the growing population with improved 
processes for land release, house construction and infrastructure creation. Their 
collective failure to do so, UDIA argued, has:  
8  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 3.  
9  Dr Harley Dale, Chief Economist, Housing Industry Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 43.  
10  BIS Shrapnel, Submission 16, p. 1.  
11  Mr Liam Foley, Policy Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 66; Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 9. 
12  Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Submission 113, p. 2. The submission was 
made in March 2014, and considered Net Overseas Migration through to 2012–13.  
13  Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Submission 113, p. 2.  
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…meant that the supply of new housing has struggled to keep up with 
increasing demand, and both rents and house prices have risen dramatically 
as a result.14 
3.11 The REIA told the committee that at a recent roundtable it had convened with 
industry leaders, housing supply was identified as the main factor that needed to be 
addressed to improve affordability.15 At that roundtable, the then Minister for Social 
Services, the Hon Kevin Andrews MP, noted that the shortfall in housing supply was 
projected to rise from 228,000 dwellings in 2011, to nearly 370,000 dwellings by 
2016 and 663,000 dwellings by 2031.16  
3.12 The RBA explained that Australia's urban structure created particular 
constraints on the ability of supply to respond to demand.  Australia's urban 
population, it noted: 
…is unusually concentrated in two large cities, and these and the other 
large cities have unusually low population densities compared with cities in 
other developed countries with similar population sizes. It is more costly to 
build additional housing supply in a limited number of locations; land 
prices could be expected to be lower if there are more undeveloped 
locations competing for buyers.17 
3.13 Professor Terry Burke contended that the housing supply shortage in Australia 
was in part due to the nature of the Australian construction industry. Most countries, 
he explained, have speculative construction industries, where builders add stock in 
anticipation there will be buyers for it. However, Australia has a contract building 
system in which a consumer needs to commission new construction. As a result, it 
was hard to have an oversupply in Australia, but quite possible to have an 
undersupply.18 
3.14 Prosper Australia disputed the idea that an undersupply of housing was 
driving price increases. Prosper Australia researcher, Mr Phillip Soos, told the 
committee that since the 'price boom' had begun in 1996, Australia had built one new 
dwelling per 1.9 new people, not far from the long-term post-war average of one new 
dwelling per 2 new people and well below the average household formation of 
14  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 9.  
15  Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 72.  
16  The Hon Kevin Andrews MP, 'Opening remarks to the Real Estate Institute of Australia 
Housing Affordability Roundtable', 26 March 2014, 
http://www.formerministers.dss.gov.au/15342/opening-remarks-to-the-real-estate-institute-of-
australia-housing-affordability-roundtable/.  
17  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 8.  
18  Professor Terry Burke, private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 14–
15.  
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2.7 people per household.19 Mr Soos pointed to the recent booms and busts in housing 
markets in the United States and various European nations, where claimed housing 
supply shortages during boom periods had subsequently proven non-existent:  
During the boom it is difficult to see that supply, especially when the vested 
interests—anywhere from the real estate institutes to the banks to the 
government—all get together in a chorus saying that there is a shortage. In 
Ireland and Spain they had strong immigration rates, approaching two to 
three per cent, as we have had in Australia in the last half a decade, but 
those markets still went down-under, because if immigration had an effect 
on prices you would see it in rents as well. Rents have remained mostly flat 
over the last decade or so.20 
3.15 According to Prosper Australia, price inflation is not caused by supply 
shortages, but rather by debt-fuelled speculative demand driven by the preferential tax 
treatment of land.21  
3.16 Contrary to the evidence presented by Prosper Australia, the HIA told the 
committee that over the past decade rents in Australia have increased by about 
55 per cent, which is roughly in proportion to the 62 per cent growth in residential 
property prices. On this basis, the HIA rejected the idea that strong price growth in 
residential property prices has been due to speculative demand: 
Rental prices reflect the value of housing services rather than any 
entitlement to future growth. Strong concurrent growth in home prices and 
rental prices is consistent with the demand for housing services exceeding 
the supply.22 
3.17 Against Prosper Australia's suggestion that housing supply relative to 
population growth was more or less trending near to the historical average, Mr Eslake 
observed that from the end of World War II until the early 1990s, housing stock 
increased at a much faster rate than population growth. The growth in housing stock, 
Mr Eslake wrote, slowed in the decade from 1991 to 2001 (18.3 per cent), but still 
outstripped population growth (11.5 per cent). However, in the decade from 2001 to 
2011, population growth (15.9 per cent) actually outstripped housing stock growth 
(15.2 per cent), the first time this had occurred in the post-war era. The failure of 
housing stock growth to keep pace with population growth had occurred despite 
19  Mr Philip Soos, Researcher, Prosper Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, 
p. 7.  
20  Mr Philip Soos, Researcher, Prosper Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, 
p. 7. 
21  Prosper Australia did, however, suggest that while there was no shortage of housing supply, 
there was a shortage of supply of affordable housing. This apparent contradiction could be 
explained, it argued, by the fact that prices were not based on fundamentals like rents, income, 
GDP and inflation, but on debt speculation. Mr Philip Soos, Researcher, Prosper Australia, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 9. 
22  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 5.  
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demographic trends that, according to Mr Eslake, would have warranted a reverse 
scenario (that is, housing stock growth exceeding population growth) if supply was 
properly responsive to demand. These trends included: 
• average family sizes declined between the early 1960s and the early 
1990s, implying that more dwellings are required to accommodate the 
same number of people; 
• family breakdowns have meant that more dwellings are required to 
accommodate the same number of people; and 
• population ageing has resulted in more people living alone, again 
increasing the number of dwellings required to accommodate the same 
number of people.23 
3.18 A number of witnesses argued that declining housing affordability could not 
be viewed simply as a function of supply constraints. As noted later in this chapter, 
Dr Winter recommended that government housing assistance and subsidies should be 
directed towards increasing housing supply. However, he also noted that supply was 
not the only consideration, and pointed to research showing that Sydney prices had 
experienced strong growth despite a significant rise in dwelling completions: 
City dwelling completions doubled from 14,000 to 28,000, so that is a 
doubling of supply over that period of time, yet house prices still went up 
by 21 per cent. An exclusive focus on supply is not going to solve the 
problem. It is obviously one very important part, but it cannot be the be-all 
and end-all of trying to solve affordable housing problems in Australia.24  
3.19 A similar point was made by Mr Adam Mills, Senior Strategic Planner for the 
City of Melbourne. According to Mr Mills, the City of Melbourne: 
…is seeing unprecedented levels of new housing. In 2013 the City of 
Melbourne was the fastest-growing local government area in Australia, with 
11,000 new residents. Last year there were more than 3,000 dwellings 
completed, which is expected to increase to over 5,000 this year and then 
up to 8,000 new dwellings in 2015. This is against the historic average of 
around 2,000 dwellings, so it is significant. Yet this increased supply in the 
central city is not improving housing affordability. In fact, affordability is 
worsening.25 
Financial deregulation and disinflation as drivers of housing price growth 
3.20 In its submission, the RBA observed that in the decade or so up to 2003, 
Australian house prices had increased by about two-thirds relative to income. This 
23  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, pp. 3–5.  
24  Dr Ian Winter, Executive Director, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 14.  
25  Mr Adam Mills, Senior Strategic Planning, City of Melbourne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, p. 29.  
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increase, it explained, was primarily the result of a secular shift resulting from 
disinflation and financial deregulation: 
[T]he primary driver of this large increase in housing prices relative to 
income was the secular decline in average interest rates brought about by 
the decline in inflation in the 1990, together with some increase in 
borrowing capacity enabled by financial deregulation.26 
3.21 The RBA stressed, however, that housing price growth should not be 
conflated with declining affordability. To the extent Australian borrowers were better 
able to service larger loans with the same repayment, affordability could not be said to 
have worsened. This was the case, it argued, even if house price growth had outpaced 
household income growth.27  
3.22 Moreover, it was reasonable to suppose, the RBA told the committee, that the 
structural shift in housing prices in the decade prior to 2003 was unlikely to recur, 
even if prices had recently started to rise out of ratio to household income growth:  
Both the shift to low inflation and the comprehensive deregulation of the 
financial system are things that happen only once. In broad terms, the 
adjustment of the housing market to this new environment seems to have 
been completed by around the middle of last decade. Since then, the ratio of 
housing prices to incomes has been relatively stable but, for reasons I have 
already alluded to and which I will come back to, it has been rising recently 
and is now at the upper end of its recent range.28 
3.23 DSS also noted that since the introduction of financial deregulation in the 
mid-1980s, Australians have had greater access to capital for both consumption and 
investment. This had in turn flowed through to house price growth: 
[T]his increased access to capital has largely been used by households to 
increase their consumption of housing. The additional consumption of 
housing by both owner-occupiers and investors has increased significantly 
as official interest rates have continued to fall to record lows. This increase 
in 'financial' demand for housing has been supplemented by an increase in 
'actual' demand for housing, driven by increases in Australia's estimated 
resident population by around 48 per cent since 1984 and by around 9 per 
cent since 2008.29  
26  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 6.  
27  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 6. The RBA does allow that such growth in house 
prices 'may, however, have some implications for intergenerational equity if first home buyers 
increasingly rely on parental assistance or bequests to fund larger deposits (and thus higher 
prices) than they could sustain from their own resources, because such assistance may not be 
available to the children of renters.' 
28  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, pp. 1–2. 
29  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 4.  
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3.24 Associate Professor Yates provided a useful summary of how structural 
supply and demand trends had interacted to drive price increases since the 1980s. In 
doing so, she located these trends within a global context: 
From the mid-1980s until the series of global crises that began in 2007, 
global trends fuelled housing demand. Real household incomes increased; 
disinflation meant that nominal interest rates fell and borrowing capacity 
increased; deregulation and financial innovation meant that finance was 
more readily available. These demand pressures have been exacerbated in 
Australia by population growth and by increased longevity. Increased 
demand, together with a sluggish dwelling supply response, contributed to 
dwelling prices rising ahead of household incomes and reduced access to 
home ownership for first home buyers.  
Rising prices have contributed substantially to the wealth of home owners 
and this has reinforced the demand for larger and better located homes. 
This, in turn, has added to difficulties faced by first home buyers (and, 
consequently by renters). For over a decade, supply has failed to keep pace 
with increased demand. Any lack of confidence by Australian households 
in the Australian economy, depresses effective demand, but also aggravates 
supply shortfalls. In the longer term, if no intervention is undertaken to 
improve supply, underlying demand pressures are likely to keep aggregate 
house prices at levels that remain unaffordable for low and moderate 
income households and rents are likely to continue to increase.30 
The impact of foreign buyers 
3.25 The effect of foreign investment in residential property was not a key concern 
of this inquiry, although it was raised by a handful of witnesses as a potential cause of 
recent house price inflation. In this regard, the committee notes 
Professor Andrew Beer's point that while in recent years some private investment in 
property appeared to be coming from offshore, and in particular China, 'there is a lot 
of debate about the quality of the data in terms of understanding the full size of that 
impact.'31 
3.26 The committee notes that the House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Economics held an inquiry on the subject and released its Report on Foreign 
Investment in Residential Real Estate in November 2014. The inquiry produced four 
key findings. They were that: there is a lack of accurate or timely data that tracks 
foreign investment in residential real estate; there had been a 'significant failure of 
leadership' by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), which was 'unable to 
provide basic compliance information to the committee about its investigations and 
enforcement activities'; there needs to be a greater willingness to enforce foreign 
investment rules in order to improve compliance; and the Australian taxpayer 
30  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 2.  
31  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 18.  
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currently 'foots the bill' for the administration of FIRB and the Foreign Investment and 
Trade Policy Division of Treasury. The committee made 12 recommendations 
following from these findings.32 
Ensuring policy interventions responses are effective 
3.27 While witnesses tended to focus on either supply-side or demand-side drivers 
of housing costs, many acknowledged that housing affordability could not be rightly 
characterised as a 'supply-side problem' or a 'demand-side problem'. Similarly, several 
witnesses reminded the committee that the drivers of poor affordability were not 
uniform across the country. Rather, as AHURI put it, the 'causes and nature of 
Australia's affordable housing problems are complex, diverse and interact differently 
in different parts of Australia'.33  
3.28 Given the complexity of the causes of the housing price growth, it follows that 
a policy response that focuses simply on supply or demand will be found wanting. As 
Professor Beer told the committee, housing affordability: 
…is a multiple challenge and something that should not be underestimated. 
It needs multiple solutions operating in all dimensions of the housing 
supply and demand equation. Solutions that focus only on demand will be 
inadequate and solutions that focus only on supply will be inadequate.34  
3.29 Similarly, the RBA told the committee that trying to cast housing affordability 
as a supply-side or demand-side problem missed the point. Instead, as Dr Edey 
explained, it was necessary to understand that: 
…housing prices and affordability are affected by the interaction of both 
supply and demand factors. The factors that I have mentioned so far—
household incomes, the cost and availability of finance—primarily affect 
the demand side of the market. In the short to medium term it is those sorts 
of factors that will tend to have the predominant influence on housing price 
movements. The reason for that is that the supply side of the market is 
dominated by a large existing stock of dwellings and new supply takes time 
to come on stream. In the longer term, however, supply factors are critically 
important. It is the supply response that determines the extent to which 
additional demand results in higher prices over time. Our submission 
highlights that Australia faces a number of longstanding challenges in this 
area. These include regulatory and zoning constraints, inherent 
geographical barriers and the cost structure of the building industry. There 
32  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Report on Foreign Investment in 
Residential Real Estate (November 2014).  
33  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. iii.  
34  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 10.  
 
                                              
44  
are also obstacles to affordable housing created by Australia's unusually 
low density urban structure, although this is gradually changing.35 
3.30 Dr Edey noted that the RBA was not seeking to offer policy prescriptions to 
improve housing supply. However, he nonetheless made the general point that: 
…we cannot improve housing affordability simply by adding to demand. 
Targeted assistance can certainly help particular groups, such as first home 
buyers, but without a supply side response any generalised increase in 
demand will just be capitalised into prices. An important emphasis in our 
submission is that due attention needs to be given to supply side factors in 
any policy response to perceived problems of affordability.36 
3.31 A number of witnesses argued that poorly considered housing policies not 
only fail to achieve their objectives, but risk compounding the problems they were 
intended to address. This was particularly true if policies simply served to stimulate 
demand in supply-constrained markets, or inhibited otherwise efficient market-driven 
supply responses to housing needs. As the CFRC explained, governments have 
traditionally intervened in the housing market to:  
…improve allocative and productive efficiency by addressing market 
failures, to enhance equity and to contribute to macroeconomic stability and 
growth. Ideally, such intervention enhances people's housing opportunities 
and ensures equitable access to housing. 
Badly-designed housing interventions, however, can have substantial 
negative effects. Assistance that increases demand for housing is 
unproductive if it is capitalised into dwelling prices because of sluggish 
supply responses in housing markets. Supply side subsidies may crowd out 
private investment that would otherwise have occurred or may displace 
those who are already disadvantaged in housing markets.37 
3.32 In its submission, DSS went to the heart of what government housing policy 
should be directed toward: in the end, it concluded, housing affordability would only 
be improved through a structural reduction in demand for housing, or an increase in 
supply. To this end, the best way governments could improve housing affordability 
was to 'seek to alter the framework within which the housing market operates, rather 
than through direct interventions in the operation of the market'.38  
35  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 2. 
36  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 2. 
37  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 4.  
38  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, pp. 3–4.  
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Committee view 
3.33 The committee acknowledges the complexity and urgency of housing 
affordability in Australia, and does not believe the issue is rightly categorised as either 
a 'supply-side problem' or a 'demand-side problem'. With this in mind, it is clearly 
evident that supply is currently not keeping pace with demand in the housing market. 
In this context, policy interventions that add to demand without addressing or at least 
accounting for supply-side constraints risk inflating housing prices and compounding 
affordability problems.  
 

  
Chapter 4 
 A Commonwealth Housing Minister 
4.1 A broad range of views were expressed during the inquiry regarding the role 
of governments in facilitating good housing outcomes, both in terms of the provision 
of affordable housing and in promoting housing affordability more generally.  
A common theme in many submissions was that government policies need to be 
holistic in their design and implementation. Specifically, it was argued that while 
housing assistance was an important responsibility of government, housing policy 
should not be regarded as simply an adjunct of welfare policy. Instead, governments 
should approach housing policy as, at once, social, economic, taxation and 
infrastructure policy, and more so besides. 
4.2 Some witnesses argued that in order to properly reflect and address the  
cross-portfolio nature of housing policy, the Commonwealth should appoint a 
dedicated housing minister. A number of these witnesses further argued that a 
Commonwealth housing minister should not be narrowly cast as a minister for 
housing assistance or a minister for social housing. Indeed, some suggested that rather 
than locating the housing portfolio within the Department of Social Services, it would 
be more appropriate to move the portfolio to one of the central agencies, such as the 
Treasury or the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.  
4.3 This chapter considers these calls for a Commonwealth housing minister, and 
arguments regarding the location of the housing portfolio within the Australian 
Government.    
A Housing Minister, not a Housing Welfare Minister 
4.4 A key idea to emerge from this inquiry was that housing policy should not be 
viewed exclusively or even predominantly as a welfare issue. National Shelter told the 
committee that a whole-of-system policy response was required if Australia were to 
prevent the current housing 'crisis' from becoming a 'catastrophe': 
We too frequently talk about affordable housing as just the welfare end of 
the spectrum. We can never fix it from the welfare end; we have to actually 
fix the system to make more affordable housing available for people on low 
incomes and very low incomes. That means looking at how the market 
operates, looking at the tax treatment of housing, looking at our funding of 
affordable and social housing, and the very models and approaches that we 
have to housing affordability in Australia.1 
1  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 33.  
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4.5 According to a number of witnesses, the design and delivery of holistic 
housing policies required the appointment of a dedicated Commonwealth housing and 
homelessness minister. (Whereas the former Labor Government had included a 
dedicated Minister for Housing and Homelessness,2 under the current government the 
Minister for Social Services now has portfolio responsibility for housing and 
homelessness policy and programs.) For instance, ACOSS told the committee that it 
was: 
…very disappointed not to have a designated housing minister in this 
current government. Partly because the issues are so complex and there are 
multiple policy levers across different portfolio areas, it is a loss not to have 
a minister who has the capacity to have a fairly single minded focus on 
those issues.3 
4.6  Professor Dalton told the committee that the profile of housing policy had 
generally waned in recent decades. This decline, he argued, was reflected in the 
relatively junior status of housing ministers under Labor governments (with some 
exceptions), and the absence of a dedicated housing minister under both the Coalition 
government of the Hon John Howard OM AC and the current government.4 
4.7 The CFRC also expressed concern about the current lack of a dedicated 
Commonwealth housing minister 'with responsibility both for housing policy and for 
assessing the impacts of Australian Government policy more broadly on the housing 
system'. At the same time, it suggested that the 'procession of six short term Housing 
Ministers' under the former Labor government 'provided limited opportunity for 
strategic housing policy development'.5 
4.8 Arguing the need for a coordinated, intergovernmental approach to housing 
policy, NT Shelter recommended that the Australian Government 'appoint a single 
Minister for Housing, Homelessness and Urban Development with responsibility to 
coordinate housing‐related policy decisions across agencies'.6 
4.9 For its part, the HIA argued that states and territories were not held 
sufficiently accountable by the Commonwealth for the housing-related funding they 
2  Ministerial titles included Minister for Housing (3 December 2007 to 14 September 2010), 
Minister for Social Housing and Homelessness (14 September 2010 to 14 December 2011), 
Minister for Housing and Minister for Homelessness (14 December 2011 to 25 March 2013), 
and Minister for Housing and Homelessness (23 March 2013 to 18 September 2013). 
3  Ms Jacqueline Phillips, Director of Policy, Australian Council of Social Service, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 28.  
4  Professor Tony Dalton, Professor of Urban and Social Policy, RMIT University, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 12–13.  
5  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 6. 
6  NT Shelter, Submission 118, p. 13.  
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received, and this lack of accountability underlined the need for a Commonwealth 
housing minister.7 
4.10 Many of the witnesses arguing the case for a dedicated Commonwealth 
housing minister also emphasised the importance of defining a housing minister's 
roles and responsibilities broadly so as to capture issues beyond social housing and 
housing assistance. For instance, National Shelter stressed that a national housing 
minister should not act simply as a minister for welfare housing. Rather, a national 
housing minister should also be engaged with Treasury on tax policy and other 
relevant economic matters.8 Asked where a housing minister might sit in the federal 
government, ACOSS responded that the housing portfolio would be better placed in 
one of the central agencies rather than in DSS: 
Perhaps in a way you would ultimately want it to sit under the 
Prime Minister. Certainly Treasury has a key role to play around tax 
settings, depending on the outcomes of this reform process. I would be 
concerned about seeing housing sitting as a subsidiary of social services 
because of the 'welfarisation' of housing. Housing is a mainstream 
economic issue and relates to employment and economic participation. In 
that way, it needs to be a central and cross-cutting theme of government, I 
would argue. So, without fully answering the question, I think the housing 
minister should be located somewhere centrally.9 
4.11 The CFRC also suggested that the placement of housing in the social services 
portfolio or similar since 1996 'has perpetuated the narrow and inadequate framing of 
housing as a welfare issue'.10 Referring to its call for the appointment of a 
Commonwealth housing minister, the HIA said that in the past housing ministers had: 
…been captured by the inevitable but understandable call for additional 
social housing, additional housing at the lower end of the income 
continuum. Essentially a housing minister at a federal level becomes a 
minister for payments and writing cheques or instructing cheques to be 
written. That is not, in our view, an appropriate responsibility or portfolio 
for a housing minister; a housing minister needs to look at housing supply; 
it needs to look at housing demand; it needs to look at the issues that are 
impacting upon housing, including infrastructure, including taxation, 
including town planning delays. They may not necessarily fit at a federal 
7  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 47. 
8  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 36. 
9  Ms Jacqueline Phillips, Director of Policy, Australian Council of Social Service, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 28.  
10  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 7.  
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government level but certainly they are matters that impact on housing 
supply and as such will impact on future government expenditure.11 
Committee view 
4.12 The committee believes governments, including the Commonwealth, have a 
legitimate role, and indeed a responsibility, to use policy interventions to improve the 
efficiency, efficacy and, critically, the affordability of the housing market. As such, 
the current lack of a dedicated Commonwealth housing minister is a matter of concern 
for the committee. Housing-specific policies, and policies that shape the housing 
market more broadly, have direct and in some cases profound effects on the life 
outcomes of Australians across the socio-economic spectrum and in all tenure types. 
In this context, the committee believes there is a clear need for a dedicated 
Commonwealth housing minister able to provide cross-portfolio and national 
leadership on this important policy issue.   
4.13 Housing and homelessness is a particularly complex policy area, and the 
committee believes addressing housing purely or overwhelmingly as a social policy or 
'welfare' issue is problematic. This is particularly true at the Commonwealth level, 
where taxation and other broad economic settings have a fundamental influence on the 
housing market. The committee recognises that housing policy will necessarily be 
cross-portfolio (and, as discussed in the next chapter, intergovernmental) in its design 
and execution, but believes greater emphasis needs to be given to the economic 
dimensions of policy settings than has been the case in recent years.  
4.14 In order to reflect properly the cross-portfolio nature of housing and 
homelessness issues and better leverage policy tools and expertise, the committee 
believes that the housing and homelessness portfolio would be best placed within a 
central agency of government, such as the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet or Treasury. There is ample precedent for such a move: a recent example 
would be the current government's decision to move Indigenous policy from the 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (now 
the Department of Social Services) to the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. The Prime Minister, the Hon Tony Abbott MP, explained that this move 
would give Indigenous policy 'the full focus of the Prime Minister and across-
government implementation'.12 Alternatively, the housing and homelessness portfolio 
might be better placed within the Department of Infrastructure, with formal links to 
the central agencies.         
11  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 47.  
12  Media release, 'Tony Abbott – Establishment of a Prime Minister's Indigenous Advisory 
Council, 10 August 2013, http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2013/08/10/tony-abbott-
establishment-prime-ministers-indigenous-advisory-council.  
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Recommendation 1 
4.15 The committee recommends that the Australian Government appoint a 
Minister for Housing and Homelessness, with the portfolio to be located in a 
central agency such as the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet or the 
Treasury, or in the Department of Infrastructure with formal links to the central 
agencies.      
 
 

  
Chapter 5 
Housing as intergovernmental policy: roles, 
responsibilities and accountability 
5.1 A central theme emerging from the evidence received in this inquiry was that 
all levels of government have an interest in addressing housing affordability and 
improving the supply of affordable housing. Moreover, there was broad agreement 
that good housing outcomes will only be achieved if all levels of government 
coordinate and align their efforts. 
5.2 The institutional architecture for housing policy, particularly in the 
intergovernmental space, was found wanting by many witnesses. In particular, there 
was strong support for establishing a body with equivalent functions to the recently 
abolished NHSC. Some witnesses also recommended re-establishing a Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) ministerial council on housing and homelessness 
(with the previous ministerial council having been abolished in December 2013). This 
chapter explores and assesses these arguments.     
5.3 This chapter also considers whether a national housing plan might help 
improve the consistency and coherence of Australian housing policy. In particular, 
this chapter outlines and weighs evidence suggesting that a national housing plan 
could enhance intergovernmental efforts to improve housing affordability, and help 
ensure the supply of affordable housing is as efficient and effective as possible.   
Roles, responsibilities and the need for intergovernmental coordination 
5.4 Both the Commonwealth and states and territories (and by extension, local 
governments) are responsible for policy settings that shape housing affordability 
outcomes. Moreover, both levels of government provide direct housing assistance and 
homelessness services to help people unable to access and maintain appropriate 
housing in the private market. The division of responsibilities between the 
Commonwealth and the states and territories, and the degree of overlap in these 
responsibilities, was set out recently in the Reform of the Federation White Paper 
issues paper on housing and homelessness (see Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1: Summary of Commonwealth and Sate and Territory roles and overlaps 
 
Area State and Territory role  Commonwealth role  Overlaps 
       Shared lead  Shared lead  High 
 
Policy 
Oversee policies that 
directly affect the housing 
market (land release, 
zoning, land taxes). 
Social housing and 
homelessness 
policy. 
 Oversees policies that 
indirectly affect the housing 
market (migration, tax 
settings, financial services 
regulation). 
Commonwealth Rent 
Assistance (CRA) policy. 
Influences national social 
housing, homelessness and 
Indigenous housing policy. 
 Both levels of government 
share responsibility for policy 
to address housing 
affordability pressures. 
 Shared lead  Shared lead  High 
 
Funding 
Fund social housing 
and specialist 
homelessness services. 
Funds grants and 
concessions for first home 
buyers. 
 Provides funding to States and 
Territories for social housing 
and homelessness services. 
Funds the National Rental 
Affordability Scheme (NRAS). 
Funds CRA. 
Funds Commonwealth 
homelessness programmes. 
 Both levels of government 
jointly and separately fund 
housing assistance and 
homelessness programmes. 
 Lead  Secondary  Low 
 
Delivery 
Oversee delivery of 
housing and homelessness 
services (often provided by 
non- government 
organisations). 
 Typically not involved in 
delivery of housing services. 
Delivers CRA payments to 
individuals. 
Limited direct involvement in 
homelessness services. 
 Limited overlap in delivery of 
individual programmes. 
 Lead  Secondary  Low 
 
Regulation 
Regulate housing 
(community housing, 
tenancy management, 
planning, land release and 
zoning). Local governments 
also regulate residential 
planning and construction. 
 Regulates NRAS.  Little regulatory overlap. 
 
 
 
Source: Reform of the Federation White Paper, Issues Paper No. 2, Roles and Responsibilities in 
Housing and Homelessness (December 2014), p. 12. 
Key
Lead Secondary Shared lead High Medium Low
Who leads Level of  overlap
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5.5 The various responsibilities of each level of government, along with shared 
roles and responsibilities, are also set out in the NAHA.1  
5.6 It might be noted here that the critical question of which level of government 
is responsible for what aspects of housing policy is, as DSS told the committee, a 
matter currently under review as part of the Federation White Paper process. 
Ms Felicity Hand, Deputy Secretary for Disabilities and Housing, suggested that this 
aspect of the White Paper process was: 
…an excellent initiative because, for many years, many governments have 
struggled with this issue of supply and homelessness. To have a review of 
who is doing what and how we make best use of all monies—state and 
territory money and Commonwealth money—is a very good thing.2 
5.7 Very broadly speaking, whereas the Commonwealth's current responsibilities 
tend to lie on the demand side, the states and territories responsibilities tend to fall on 
the supply side. Notwithstanding this rough division, the overwhelming view from 
witnesses to this inquiry was that all levels of government need to work in concert in 
order to improve housing affordability and the provision of affordable housing. Thus, 
there was broad agreement with DSS's suggestion that better housing outcomes would 
'require all levels of government to work together to address this issue, which directly 
or indirectly, impacts all Australians'.3 
5.8 This view was echoed by a wide range of individuals and organisations. For 
instance, National Shelter stressed the need for a national, inter-governmental 
approach involving states and local government.4 The REIA, meanwhile, told the 
committee that: 
…governments at all levels have an important role to play in improving 
affordability by addressing the structural factors that encourage excessive 
demand for housing and reduce the responsiveness of supply. This is to do 
with land release, council restrictions, development charges and fees. It is a 
whole lot of different issues. As we mentioned, it is complex, and it needs 
all levels of government to work together.5  
5.9 The REIA made a similar point in its submission, arguing that the 
Commonwealth needed to: 
1  National Affordable Housing Agreement, pp. 5–6.  
2  Ms Felicity Hand, Deputy Secretary, Disabilities and Housing, Department of Social Services 
Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 3.  
3  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 4.  
4  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 36. 
5  Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 76.  
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…take a leadership role and work with the other two spheres of 
government, state, territory and local, in developing a coordinated and 
strategic approach to the provision of housing. This means ensuring that 
complementary policies, covering amongst other things first home buyers, 
taxation and supply, are in in place to achieve this6 
5.10 The UDIA contended that: 
…all levels of Government have a critical responsibility in ensuring all 
Australians have access to appropriate and affordable housing, because of 
how fundamentally important it is to the community and economy, and also 
because government policy has such a powerful and wide reaching impact 
on affordability. 
State and local governments have a primary role to play in ensuring an 
adequate supply of land, providing sufficient local infrastructure and 
services, and ensuring an efficient and effective planning system to support 
new housing. At the same time, the Federal Government has a major role in 
funding urban infrastructure, supporting affordability and social housing 
programs, and in undertaking long term strategic population growth 
planning.7 
5.11 The CFRC submitted that a 'consistent and assertive national approach' to 
housing policy was needed to drive improved housing outcomes. It argued that: 
…the future governance of Australia's housing is a core issue to be 
addressed. Effective governance is not a simple matter of one level of 
government (the Commonwealth or the states/territories) being allocated 
responsibility and accountability for housing policy. Nor is the simple 
formulation of less government (regulation) and more market going to 
work. In our view, the complexity of the issues involved, the significant 
impact of other ('non-housing') national policy settings on housing 
outcomes (especially fiscal, monetary and immigration policies) and the 
challenges mounting in our housing system make national leadership 
essential.8 
5.12 Each level of government, Housing Tasmania argued, has a role to play in 
creating an environment conducive to the effective operation of the private housing 
market: 
Different policy levers are available at each level of government to generate 
outcomes. The challenge to be met by all levels of government is 
identifying, agreeing and implementing policy levers that will encourage 
and support the private market to increase both general and affordable 
housing supply.9 
6  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, pp. 15–16. 
7  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 7.  
8  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 6. 
9  Housing Tasmania, Submission 217, p. 2.  
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5.13 A common thread in the evidence this committee received was that the 
various levels of government needed to better coordinate their efforts in relation to 
housing issues. The UDIA pointed to a trend in recent years toward blame shifting 
across the various levels of government, with housing policy 'marked by the refusal of 
governments to acknowledge their role, and a tendency to try and defer that 
responsibility to someone else'.10 Similarly, the HIA told the committee of its 
frustration with: 
…the fact that at various points along the continuum councils point to state 
governments, state governments point to the federal government and the 
federal government points to state government and local councils. The three 
levels of government do not seem to be working in concert.11 
5.14 HomeGround Services argued that the current lack of coordination and agreed 
outcomes between governments (as it saw it) meant the housing vulnerability of low 
income earners in Australia was not being properly addressed: 
Governments at all levels need to work together on a clear set of agreed 
outcomes in order to realise secure housing for all Australians. The current 
system shows what happens when efforts are not coordinated. For example, 
the level of Commonwealth payments has a direct and significant impact on 
rental revenues in the social housing sector and represents a cost shift to the 
states. Similarly, the greater reliance on Commonwealth Rental Assistance 
for tenants in private rental over investment in social housing in Victoria 
represents a cost shift back to the Commonwealth government. Importantly, 
neither of these strategies address the underlying need for more and better 
housing for low income earners.12 
5.15 The committee heard how effective action by one level of government was 
often contingent on clarity and certainty about what the other levels of government 
were doing. For instance, the Western Australian Local Government Association 
(WALGA) identified certain areas of reform that local governments might focus on to 
improve affordability outcomes, including land use planning strategies, the 
development of surplus or underutilised local government-owned land, and so on. Yet 
WALGA added: 
Before progressing with any of these solutions, though, it is critical that 
local governments have a well-informed housing strategy. To do this, they 
need better access to data to identify local supply and demand issues; they 
need clarity about state and Commonwealth plans, policies and funding; 
10  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, pp. 7–8.  
11  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 47.  
12  HomeGround Services, Submission 70, p. 18.  
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and they need a commitment to supporting the outcomes from all levels of 
government.13 
5.16 The Local Government of Association of Queensland (LGAQ) made a similar 
point. It argued that while there were many things that local governments could do to 
improve housing affordability, many local governments in Queensland simply did not 
have the fiscal capacity to bear the cost of some of these initiatives, particularly in 
rural, regional and remote areas. Furthermore, local governments often lacked the 
legislative or regulatory support 'to do more than encourage or advocate for increased 
affordability in housing in relation to many of the above identified initiatives'. As 
such, local government initiatives in Queensland were often dependent on support, 
including financial support, from the Commonwealth or the state government.14  
5.17 The CFRC complained that since late 2009, COAG had not given adequate 
attention to a substantial housing reform agenda. It noted that the NAHA, which came 
into effect in 2009, was:  
…intended to operate as a strategic framework for driving a long term 
partnership with the states on improving housing outcomes. However, in 
operation, the Commonwealth's influence appears to have been weakened 
by the new framework and its capacity to drive reform has not lived up to 
expectations so far.15 
5.18 Given the broad consensus that all levels of government needed to work 
together to address housing affordability issues, several witnesses expressed concern 
that the current Australian Government appeared to be reducing (or positioning to 
reduce) its involvement in housing policy. For example, Dr Lucy Burgmann from the 
NSW Federation of Housing Associations said she was concerned the 
Commonwealth's interest in housing policy appeared to be waning, together with its 
'appetite for involvement in the housing system as a funder or policy maker'. She 
expressed specific concern that there were some indications the current government 
would prefer to leave the housing system to the states or the market to deal with. 
Against this backdrop, Dr Burgmann told the committee that the Commonwealth: 
…has a really important leadership role to play. Not a sole role to play, but 
a shared role with the states, with local government, with our industry and 
with other players. Because of the scale of the challenges around housing 
affordability, which we and others have called a housing affordability crisis, 
I think it requires us all to turn our attention to it rather than to leave it to 
others or to just one part of the system.16 
13  Mrs Allison Hailes, Executive Manager, Planning and Community Development, Western 
Australian Local Government Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, 
p. 42.  
14  Local Government Association of Queensland, Submission 196, p. 5.  
15  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 6.  
16  Dr Lucy Burgmann, Chief Executive Officer, NSW Federation of Housing Associations, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 11.  
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5.19 Dr Burgmann added that the Commonwealth controlled many of the taxation 
levers that shaped the housing system (to the extent that a housing 'system' could be 
said to exist). Moreover, she added, in relation to providing affordable housing the 
Commonwealth was best placed to develop and implement 'creative financing 
mechanisms or guarantees that help trigger private investment, which might be the 
only way to lead to at-scale affordability'.17 Professor Beer also argued that: 
…there is an ongoing need for some federal engagement with this issue 
because housing markets in this country operate not only at a state and 
territory jurisdictional level but also at a national level, and so national 
oversight is needed.18 
5.20 Asked about the Commission of Audit's suggestion that the role of the 
Commonwealth in relation to housing policy and service delivery should be reduced, 
the Council for Homeless Persons responded: 
The Commonwealth government holds all the demand drivers for housing 
at the moment: it holds income, it holds taxation, it holds banking 
regulation and it holds immigration, which are all key demand drivers, but 
it has a very limited role in supply. From a state government perspective, I 
do not think it is acceptable to have one side holding all the demand drivers 
and the other side expected to pick up the supply problem that is associated 
with those demands.19 
5.21 Dr Heather Holst, Chief Executive Officer of HomeGround Services, 
endorsed this view, adding that she would be: 
…very sad to see the federal government withdrawing; in fact, I think they 
need to take a step forward in this space.20 
5.22 Some submitted that the current government's apparent relative disinterest in 
housing policy simply represented more of the same, rather than a break from 
previous governments. In its submission, the CFRC bemoaned what it described as a 
lack of leadership and continuity of effort by the Commonwealth in housing policy 
over the last three decades. It also warned that Commonwealth policy capacity with 
regard to housing matters: 
…has been largely eroded and there has been no long-standing 
administration dedicated to housing since the early 1990s—a situation 
17  Dr Lucy Burgmann, Chief Executive Officer, NSW Federation of Housing Associations, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 12.  
18  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 11.  
19  Ms Sarah Toohey, Manager, Policy and Communications, Council to Homeless Persons, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 55.  
20  Dr Heather Holst, Chief Executive Officer, HomeGround Services, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, p. 55.  
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contrasting with arrangements in the US, Canada, the UK and much of 
Western Europe.21  
5.23 It might be noted that the CFRC was no less critical in its assessment of state 
and local government approaches to housing policy in recent decades. It suggested 
that state governments: 
…are (increasingly) starved of the resources necessary to run housing 
assistance programs effectively and the essential coupling of housing, urban 
and infrastructure policies that should drive new residential development 
has been largely absent. … Recently, in a further narrowing of the state 
level housing policy agenda long standing housing departments have been 
absorbed into welfare departments in most jurisdictions (WA is a laudable 
exception) resulting in dilution of a broader housing policy outlook and 
expertise. Unlike in most advanced economies, local or city governments 
have very limited and poorly-defined roles in housing and lack the 
resources and capacity to influence local housing outcomes or to catalyse 
local responses and bottom up innovation.22 
5.24 Professor Hal Pawson from the CFRC also told the committee that 
Commonwealth leadership was necessary, given housing policy 'is a national issue 
that has national importance and is a cause for national action'.23 He added: 
As emphasised in our submission, we believe that all three levels of 
government have important housing responsibilities and powers. But we 
also believe that experience has shown that fundamental reforms of the type 
that we argue are needed cannot be achieved without national leadership 
from Canberra. Partly that is because some of the most significant 
government interventions in the housing market are controlled at the 
Federal level and not by the states and territories. 
We recognise that there are complexities to the Commonwealth 
government's role in this kind of domestic policy area and that, under the 
federal system, Canberra's ability to impose housing reforms would be 
limited even under a government that wanted to do that. But we also think 
that it is not tenable to pretend that, under the Federation, the 
Commonwealth does not have a remit to lead and coordinate in this area.24 
5.25 Ms Maria Palumbo from the Community Housing Council of South Australia 
told the committee that she 'passionately' believed a national approach was needed to 
improve housing affordability, and the Commonwealth needed to lead that approach:  
21  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 5.  
22  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, pp. 5–6.  
23  Professor Hal Pawson, Associate Director, City Futures Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 34.  
24  Professor Hal Pawson, Associate Director, City Futures Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 34. 
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When the Commonwealth drives reform, things happen; when it is left to 
the states, our experience has been that things meander.25 
5.26 Mr Simon Schrapel from Uniting Communities and Dr Alice Clark from 
Shelter SA endorsed these remarks, with both stressing the need for Commonwealth 
leadership in the housing policy space.26 Mr Scott Langford from Junction and 
Women's Housing added his agreement to these arguments, adding: 
If you consider that access to appropriate and affordable housing is really 
the backbone of both a civil society and a strong economy, I fail to see how 
any argument can stand up to suggest that this is not an issue of national 
importance. This is a huge opportunity for leadership, and we would expect 
that some of that would come from the federal level.27 
Commonwealth role in supply side policy 
5.27 Despite arguing the need for intergovernmental cooperation on housing 
policy, DSS suggested that supply side issues were primarily a matter for the states 
and territories. The policy levers to address supply, it told the committee: 
…sit primarily with the states and territories. The Commonwealth largely 
has the demand levers, such as taxation, environment, immigration and a 
whole range of other things... But supply issues, such as planning 
approvals, state taxation, housing infrastructure changes and land release, 
really fit in the state and territory domain.28 
5.28 While it was generally acknowledged that the policy levers affecting housing 
supply tend to reside with the states and territories (as discussed further in 
chapter seven), witnesses also noted that the Commonwealth could play a constructive 
role in this space. Noting the significant financial contribution the Commonwealth 
made in relation to housing—for instance, in CRA payments and money spent on 
residential aged care facilities—the HIA argued the Commonwealth's role: 
…needs to be more than simply writing cheques. They need to take a role 
in assisting with state and local governments in the provisioning of the 
necessary infrastructure to support housing developments.29 
25  Ms Maria Palumbo, Chair, Community Housing Council of South Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40.  
26  Mr Simon Schrapel, Chief Executive, Uniting Communities, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 40; Dr Alice Clark, Executive Director, Shelter SA, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 40. 
27  Mr Scott Langford, General Manager, Junction and Women's Housing, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40. 
28  Ms Felicity Hand, Deputy Secretary, Disabilities and Housing, Department of Social Services 
Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 3.  
29  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 45–46.  
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5.29 Similarly, when asked what role the Commonwealth might play in addressing 
inadequate housing supply in Australia, the UDIA responded that the Commonwealth 
had a 'clear role' to play in the provision of urban infrastructure, including 
infrastructure such as telecommunications, major roads, public transport and so on.30 
Both MBA and the UDIA also argued that the Commonwealth had an important 
coordination and leadership role to play in facilitating reforms on the supply-side of 
the housing affordability problem: 
When we talk about planning systems being delayed, land supply and that 
sort of thing, they are not predominantly federal government issues. But I 
think there needs to be involvement of the federal government in planning 
for this, coordinating this and taking a strategic approach.31 
State and territory spending on housing: accountability and transparency 
5.30 Several witnesses suggested there was currently a lack of adequate 
accountability and transparency in how the states and territories used Commonwealth 
funding for housing policies and programs. In order to address the apparent need for 
'greater accountability, greater openness and transparency',32 MBA suggested 'there 
needs to be tighter metrics in terms of conditions' around Commonwealth-state 
funding agreements.33 JELD-WEN, meanwhile, contended there was a 'gaping lack of 
information' on the outcomes of state programs funded with Commonwealth money: 
The paucity of readily available information on the effectiveness of 
Commonwealth-funded State housing programs and initiatives has reduced 
transparency and diminished accountability and contributed to uncertainty 
about the value received from the commitment of scarce Commonwealth 
taxpayer funds to joint housing programs delivered by State 
Governments.34 
5.31 Junction and Women's Housing told the committee that competition for 
Commonwealth payments might help promote greater transparency regarding state 
and territory spending on housing policy: 
We would argue that there is some benefit in some directly-contestable 
funding for the community-housing sector. At the moment it is passed 
through the states, and how that is then distributed is largely left to the 
30  Mr Liam Foley, Policy Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 66–67.  
31  Mr Liam Foley, Policy Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 69; Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders 
Australia Ltd, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 40. 
32  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 34. 
33  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 41.  
34  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 4. 
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states. The reporting of that is ambiguous, in terms of what is provided back 
to the Commonwealth. Competition is one way to foster transparency.35 
5.32 The National Council of Women of Australia told the committee that the 
Commonwealth should better target its spending to develop areas of particular need, 
and related this back to the need for better accountability: 
I think too that if you came to an agreement with Commonwealth-state 
bodies, it makes it more accountable if you say, 'This is an area of need that 
you need to put this money into for redevelopment. Let's see what you do 
with it.' Quite often it can be scattered around, and there seems to be very 
little accountability in some cases about what the money is actually being 
spent on. You only have to look at the money supposedly spent in the 
Northern Territory on Aboriginal housing, which we know has fallen far 
short of any target, and very few houses have been built despite great 
aspirations about fixing the problem of 10 years ago. They were going to 
build 750 houses in the Northern Territory. I doubt they have built more 
than 75. Where has the money gone? Where is the accountability of this 
money, where the Commonwealth hands over the money and does not say, 
as with any good governance, 'What have you done with it? Show us where 
you spent it and we'll see if it is worthwhile giving you the next lot.' I think 
anyone who gives out money has a right to ask what it is being spent on.36 
5.33 Dr Winter also criticised the lack of requirements attached to how states and 
territories used Commonwealth funding provided under the NAHA: 
The other component of the NAHA reform we need to take is to reintroduce 
and retie matching of funds. The current federal financial agreements 
whereby there is not a tying of the matching of the funds I think just leads 
to uncertainty on the federal government's part about where the funds are 
going and what the states' contributions to those things are. So I think some 
of that discipline of the old Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement 
needs to be in a new national formal housing agreement as well.37 
5.34 While some witnesses focused their attention on the apparent need for 
enhanced accountability regarding the expenditure of public funding on housing 
policies and programs, others referred to the burden associated with excessive 
reporting. Community Employers WA, for instance, warned against excessive 
reporting obligations, particularly in relation to the not-for-profit sector. It suggested 
that housing providers were often forced to respond to: 
35  Mr Scott Langford, General Manager, Junction and Women's Housing, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 41.  
36  Ms Margaret Findlater Smith, National Coordinator of Standing Committees, National Council 
of Women of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57.  
37  Dr Ian Winter, Executive Director, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 20.  
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…excessive questioning of line item by line items on minor Grants 
comparing budgets to actual in instances where the overall spending is in 
line with the authorised amounts. 
As part of the Committee's Inquiry, we would support a recommendation to 
continue focusing on how the overview and accountability mechanisms can 
be designed to minimise the extent and level of compliance. We would 
recommend that States and Territories, and recipients of funding grants, be 
empowered and encouraged to deliver Affordable Housing more efficiently 
without excessive reporting and red tape.38 
5.35 Housing Tasmania argued that public accountability was in fact already a key 
element of the current federal financial relations framework, including National 
Agreements and National Partnership Agreements related to housing and 
homelessness. The problem, according to Housing Tasmania, was not a lack of 
emphasis on accountability, but rather that: 
…the performance frameworks were hastily conceived and while it has 
proved robust in some areas in others source data to measure performance 
has been problematic. In addition some concepts are difficult to 
operationalise into performance indicators such as social inclusion while 
other issues are notoriously difficult to measure accurately, for example 
counting homelessness.39 
The institutional architecture of housing policy 
5.36 Given the importance of coordinated and integrated intergovernmental 
approaches to housing policy, some witnesses made the case for improving the 
institutional architecture of housing policy. Professor Jago Dodson from RMIT 
University explained why he thought this architecture was currently lacking: 
We do not have a particularly coherent system of organising our housing 
policy in Australia. We have the federal government involved in various 
aspects through the [Australian Taxation Office], the Treasury, the RBA, 
the DSS and other agencies. We have state planning and housing agencies 
involved in housing processes and we have a raft of local governments that 
deal with housing considerations in various ways, including in relation to 
planning. We lack a systematic way of coordinating all the policy settings 
at those different levels of our governance system in a way that can work 
coherently and with coordination towards social objectives that we as an 
overall society might have set. 
That means not only that our policy architecture is weak and fragmented 
but also that it is interfacing with quite a complex economic system around 
the supply of housing. If you take the finance sector, the building sector, the 
construction sector and the planning sector, they all have their own 
38  Community Employers WA, Submission 46, p. 2.  
39  Housing Tasmania, Submission 217, p. 12. 
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subsystem arrangements that also face problems of coordination in 
responding to market processes.40 
5.37 There was broad support from a wide range of witnesses for re-establishing 
the NHSC, or a body like it. Some submitters also noted the need to better represent 
and progress housing policy matters at COAG, and argued for re-establishing a 
COAG ministerial council on housing and homelessness. These arguments are 
outlined below.  
National Housing Supply Council (NHSC) 
5.38 The NHSC was established in May 2008 to 'monitor housing demand, supply 
and affordability in Australia, and to highlight current and potential future gaps 
between housing supply and demand from would-be home-owners and renters'. The 
NHSC's role was to aggregate and assess data on housing supply and demand, and 
thereby strengthen the evidence base for decision making by all levels of government. 
It also provided advice and recommendations on options and strategies to improve 
housing supply and affordability. A key task of the NHSC was the preparation of an 
annual State of Supply Report, which examined housing supply over a 20-year 
horizon, with the intent of providing information that would help government and 
industry improve supply.41  
5.39 The NHSC consisted of a chair and eleven members, with appointments made 
by the Minister for Housing in consultation with the Treasurer. Members had 
expertise in areas relating to the  housing sector, and sector representation sought to 
encompass the housing, property and construction industry, planning and 
development, infrastructure provision and financing, social welfare and community 
housing, banking and finance, and housing research.42 
5.40 The NHSC was abolished on 8 November 2013, along with a number of other 
non-statutory bodies. The functions of these bodies, according to the government, 
were no longer needed and could be managed within existing departmental 
40  Professor Jago Dodson, Professor of Urban Policy, RMIT University, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 13.  
41  National Housing Supply Council, State of Supply Report (2008), p. xii. The NHSC's terms of 
reference were amended in 2012, the most important change being that it was directed to 
examine the implications for housing supply of urban planning and infrastructure development 
processes, including transport and telecommunications services. For the updated terms of 
reference, see National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 
2012–13 (2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx, pp. 131–133. 
42  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13 (2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx, p. 133. 
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resources.43 A statement from the Prime Minister also indicated that many of these 
non-statutory bodies: 
…have outlived their original purpose or are not focused on the 
Government's policy priorities. As a result, their work is best carried out by 
the relevant government departments or agencies. 
Ministers will continue to receive advice from a broad range of sources 
including industry and community stakeholders, relevant departments and 
from Ministerial Advisory Councils.44 
5.41 However, the ministerial council on housing and homelessness was abolished 
one month after the abolition of the NHSC, and the evidence received by the 
committee would suggest that the NHSC's functions have not been absorbed into 
Treasury. Indeed, Treasury acknowledged that with the NHSC disbanded, 'there is no 
vehicle through which [Treasury] would then have responsibility to assist the 
government' in relation to policy advice on housing supply.45 
5.42 Asked about the importance of the work that was being done by the NHSC (of 
which she was a member), Associate Professor Yates explained that it: 
…coordinated information across all the states and territories. It tried to 
standardise the source of that information. It put it together in one spot. It 
was an independent source. The Housing Industry Association, for 
example, has tried to replicate that, and that is a fair enough thing, but there 
are vested interests, whereas the council was a representative body across a 
whole range of stakeholders—developers, planners, local government 
people, economists, finance people and housing policy people. So you had a 
spectrum of interests—a coordination of information; the bringing together 
of a wide range of stakeholders.46 
5.43 Professor Beer spoke highly of the work that was being done by the NHSC, 
and said that the academic community 'really relied on the solid data that they put out'. 
He also suggested that the housing industry itself needs a forecasting body to be able 
to assess likely demand.47 Professor Pawson submitted that the abolition of the NHSC 
had damaged the Commonwealth's leadership capacity in housing policy, along with 
43  Treasury, National Housing Supply Council, http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-
Topics/PeopleAndSociety/completed-programs-initiatives/NHSC.  
44  The Hon Tony Abbott MP, Prime Minister, 'Boosting Productivity and Delivering Effective, 
Efficient Government', 8 November 2013, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/2829445/upload_binary/2829445.p
df;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/2829445%22.  
45  Mr Rob Heferen, Executive Director, Revenue Group, The Treasury, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 18.  
46  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney's Senior Visiting Fellow, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 39. 
47  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 11.  
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the 'scope for evidence based policies'.48 Similarly, Shelter SA stressed the need for a 
strong evidence base on which to make informed policy decisions, and argued that in 
this sense the NHSC was 'an absolutely vital organisation that cost practically nothing, 
if anything, to government.'49 
5.44 Junction and Women's Housing agreed that the work being done by the 
NHSC was very valuable, telling the committee that it had: 
…found it to be a very useful source of information for starting to 
understand where the supply issues are and what the dynamics in the 
broader market are, at a macro level, and how that affects our local markets. 
This has a significant role for us in terms of where we put our resources and 
energy and where we see the opportunities to bring in private-sector 
investment.50 
5.45 The CFRC also submitted that the NHSC had been providing 'much needed 
specialist advice and information on critical housing supply issues to governments and 
the housing industry'. It noted that the 'the over-riding need for a regular and 
authoritative Australia-wide housing demand and supply analysis remains 
undiminished'.51 For its part, the UDIA suggested that prior to the existence of the 
NHSC: 
…states kept various pieces of data in relation to housing, housing supply 
and the like, but it was all different and very difficult to compare. It was 
very much apples and oranges. The Housing Supply Council was able to 
pull together a methodology in consultation with the various states to 
ensure that we had a better and more consistent view of what was 
happening in relation to housing policy and housing supply around the 
country.52 
5.46 The HIA was somewhat more critical in its assessment of the NHSC. It told 
the committee that while the NHSC had 'started off on the correct foot' in looking at 
the housing supply chain, it: 
…became a little bit waylaid and got involved in a lot more policy 
development work and seemed to lose a lot of its initial terms of reference. 
We therefore supported the Housing Supply Council being abolished but 
believed that it should be replaced by something that would do the task that 
it was initially set out for it to do—something along the lines of an 
48  Professor Hal Pawson, Associate Director, City Futures Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 34. 
49  Dr Alice Clark, Executive Director, Shelter SA, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 41.  
50  Mr Scott Langford, General Manager, Junction and Women's Housing, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 41–42.  
51  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 7.  
52  Mr Liam Foley, Policy Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 70; Mr Richard Lindsay, Chief Executive Officer, Urban 
Development Institute of Australia (National), Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 70.  
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indicative planning council. It would be something where we would have a 
much better understanding of where our future housing was going to be, 
what the time lines for bringing those houses to market—whether or not 
they were detached houses, multi residential or high-rise apartments; having 
a much better understanding of where they would go and what the time 
lines for the delivery would be. That would allow the industry and also the 
various governments to better understand the best investment in 
infrastructure and other support systems that were necessary to bring those 
houses to market, and we could better marry the demand side with the 
supply side.53 
COAG ministerial council on housing and homelessness 
5.47 Asked about the abolition of the COAG Select Council on Housing and 
Homelessness, MBA responded that there was a need for: 
…some sort of high-level institutional mechanism whereby these sorts of 
difficult issues and public policies can be discussed. We would argue that 
housing should be one of the top agendas for any government, regardless of 
its political persuasion, because the complexity of the problems need fixing 
and therefore it should not operate in an institutional vacuum. A body like 
that, and perhaps a reinvigorated COAG process, is obviously something 
that we would ask for.54 
5.48 The CFRC also expressed concern that the ministerial council had been 
disbanded, noting the important role it had played in coordinating and driving 
'essential cross jurisdiction reforms to housing and homelessness programs'.55 
5.49 At the same time, the committee heard evidence that the COAG system was 
not conducive to receiving potentially valuable input from non-governmental sources. 
For instance, Ms Palumbo argued that COAG might gain a broader view of housing 
issues if, instead of simply drawing on the advice of officials and ministerial advisers: 
…there were a different advisory structure—I would say there are peak 
bodies that should be involved; there are industry bodies that should be 
involved. There should be a way of having a diverse voice, where ministers 
are not just hearing from their key advisers, they are actually hearing from 
the whole community. What tends to happen is that when there is a 
representative from, say, the community sector there is a view that that 
individual might be self-serving and they are only representing their agency 
views and there is not a voice. It is about broadly representing the whole 
group rather than an individual getting at a table and then pushing their 
agency's views ahead of broader views. There needs to be a way of having a 
53  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 46. 
54  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 39.  
55  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 7.  
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much broader conversation so that there are shared views as opposed to that 
real separation.56 
5.50 Uniting Communities endorsed Ms Palumbo's comments, and added: 
The problem is the COAG process is kept within governments talking to 
each other. In just about every one of these domains, but certainly in 
[housing policy], you have significant players with interests, not just self-
interest, who can make quite significant contributions to the debates and the 
solutions. We do not engage those. Having separate advisory boards or 
councils to ministers and then having the COAG process operating in some 
other domain over here is not an effective way of developing good public-
policy solutions. You need to marry them in some way.57 
The need for a national affordable housing plan 
5.51 Given the complexity of housing policy and its inter-governmental 
dimensions, a large number of submitters made a case for developing and 
implementing a national plan for improving the supply of designated affordable 
housing or housing affordability more broadly (or both). For instance, arguing that the 
current institutional environment for housing policy was lacking in coherence and 
allowed for 'all sorts of unintended side-effects and dysfunction', housing researchers 
from Swinburne University wrote that Australia required 'a national urban and 
housing policy to set a clear direction as to what we want from our urban form and 
associated housing system.'58 
5.52 Ms Jacqueline Phillips from ACOSS told the committee that a national 
affordable housing strategy would recognise the complex policy levers across the 
various levels of government that influence housing affordability. She suggested that 
ideally a strategy would be developed through COAG or other intergovernmental 
discussions.59 
5.53 The UDIA noted that a national strategic plan on housing affordability was 
needed, in part because the interests of the Commonwealth and the states did not 
always coincide, leading to policy inconsistencies. Specifically, whereas the 
Commonwealth has some incentive to facilitate population growth because of the 
benefits to tax revenue, the states have an incentive to resist growth because they bear 
the brunt of the infrastructure and service costs. It recommended that the 
Commonwealth and states: 
56  Ms Maria Palumbo, Chair, Community Housing Council of South Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 42.  
57  Mr Simon Schrapel, Chief Executive, Uniting Communities, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 42.  
58  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 1.  
59  Ms Jacqueline Phillips, Director of Policy, Australian Council of Social Service, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, pp. 27–28.  
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…collaborate to establish a national strategic plan, providing funding for 
new urban infrastructure, and requiring cities to maintain a rolling supply of 
development-ready land to meet demand driven by population growth.60 
5.54 The ABA also argued that a national housing affordability strategy was 
needed to address the complex supply and demand factors shaping the market: 
A national plan should contain a holistic approach based on a better 
understanding of the motivations for home ownership by individuals, 
families and communities, the incentives and disincentives for home 
ownership during changing market and economic conditions, the barriers to 
home ownership across different cohorts and geographical areas, the 
lessons learned from policies, interventions and assistance programs 
designed to encourage home ownership, and the potential responses which 
could better integrate public and private sector initiatives, and in 
partnership.61 
5.55 MBA called for all levels of government to work together to develop what it 
termed a 'National Housing Affordability Agenda'. Such an agenda, as envisaged by 
MBA, would include targeted reforms and agreed outcomes directed to improving the 
supply-side efficiency of the Australian housing market, the area MBA suggested was 
most in need of attention if Australia were to improve housing affordability.62  
5.56 MBA also recommended that the Commonwealth provide 'competitive, 
efficiency dividend' payments to states, territories and local governments for 
delivering certain housing affordability policy outcomes. Reflecting MBA's emphasis 
on the need for a 'supply-side first' response to declining housing affordability, the 
outcomes MBA suggested might be tied to such payments related to improving land 
release, streamlined and more efficient planning and approval processes, and reforms 
to infrastructure (or 'developer') charges.63 
5.57 Over the course of the inquiry, the committee heard from a number of local 
governments about the steps they had taken and the strategies they were implementing 
on housing (including strategies specific to the supply of affordable housing).  
For instance, Brimbank City Council provided the committee with information on its 
ten-year housing strategy, Home and housed. Like other local governments, Brimbank 
City Council noted that while it was addressing housing affordability through local 
strategies, ultimately a national level strategy was needed: 
Liveable homes, neighbourhoods and cities can only be the product of 
purposeful, housing and planning policies coordinated across all three 
levels of government to create the conditions for affordable and appropriate 
housing. A long term, national housing plan that supports and gives 
60  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, pp. 5, 9–10. 
61  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 1.  
62  Master Builders Australia, Submission 48, p. 6.  
63  Master Builders Australia, Submission 48, pp. 12–13.  
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direction to housing development, particularly in Australia's capital cities, is 
required to support the creation of multi-level partnerships to this end.64  
5.58 NT Shelter argued that a 'genuine national housing policy' would help 
policymakers and service providers overcome the confusion and fragmentation that 
often confounded housing policy.65 Housing Tasmania, meanwhile, suggested that a 
national housing policy would encourage intergovernmental cooperation to address 
housing issues within a 'whole-of-system housing policy framework'. This would, in 
turn, contribute to 'better housing outcomes for all Australians'.66 The LGAQ also 
argued for a national housing policy on the grounds that the 'complex issues 
concerning the provision of affordable housing, together with the multiple 
components of "affordable housing" mean that a fully integrated approach is needed to 
deliver successful solutions'.67  
5.59 The Housing and Local Government Network, a grouping of local 
governments in Victoria 'working to promote and support the increase supply of 
affordable housing', was critical of existing policy settings. It argued that current 
intergovernmental funding arrangements, such as the NAHA, left local councils in the 
position of second guessing the direction of Commonwealth and state housing 
policies. It called for: 
…a significant overhaul of the current narrow, inflexible and bureaucratic 
[NAHA] towards a mutually agreed and integrated intergovernmental 
governance instrument based on an authentic spirit of good will and with 
local government as an equal partner.68 
5.60 In its submission, the CFRC set out what it considered the attributes of 
successful international policy responses to housing affordability issues similar to 
those facing Australia. The committee believes the attributes outlined by CFRC are 
well considered, and as they might help inform the development of a national housing 
affordability plan, considers them worth reproducing in full here. They are:  
• A view of housing as being an integral part of economic, social and 
environmental policy 
• Sufficient housing expertise both within and connected to government, 
which is committed to building policies and relevant institutions to 
deliver desired housing outcomes 
• A long term commitment to achieving desired housing outcomes, in 
which government plays an assertive and important role in a 
constructive partnership with all relevant public and private agencies 
64  Brimbank City Council, Submission 193, p. 2.  
65  NT Shelter, Submission 118, p. 13. 
66  Housing Tasmania, Submission 217, p. 17.  
67  Local Government Association of Queensland, Submission 196, p. 5.  
68  City of Darebin, Submission 123, p. 3. 
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• Progressive development of a modern institutional framework for 
delivering government desired housing outcomes using a well-designed 
mix of market and non-market mechanisms 
• A climate and practice where diversity, flexibility and local innovation 
can flourish without leading to the abandonment of appropriate national 
policy responsibilities and the efficient allocation of subsidies according 
to need 
• Comprehensive and up-to-date market analysis and policy oriented 
evaluation strategies that can help to ensure the efforts of government 
are effective, responsive and appropriate 
• The adoption of balanced multi-tenure policies with a common focus on 
increasing affordable and sustainable housing options, improving tenure 
choice and pathways and supporting socially mixed communities.69 
5.61 JELD-WEN, departing somewhat from the general consensus that a national 
strategy was needed, cautioned that any attempt by the Commonwealth to impose a 
national plan for housing supply might prove counterproductive: 
The temptation to pursue a centralised, prescriptive national planning 
strategy should be avoided. Instead, the Commonwealth should aim to work 
co-operatively with State, Territory and Local Governments but with clear 
lines of responsibility, supported by a new structure of financial rewards 
and incentives tied to performance milestones, similar in approach to the 
previous National Competition Payments. This approach offers the prospect 
of achieving better and more durable outcomes.70 
Committee view 
5.62 Evidence received by this committee underlined the fact that many of the key 
policy levers that shape the Australian housing market and housing affordability rest 
with the Commonwealth. In particular, demand-side levers such as taxation policy 
generally reside with the Commonwealth. Although many supply-side policy levers 
fall within the remit of the states and territories, the committee remains firmly of the 
view that the Commonwealth is best placed to provide the leadership to coordinate 
and guide the cross-jurisdictional reform necessary to improve the efficiency of 
housing supply across Australia. As will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, 
the committee also believes the Commonwealth has a central role to play in driving 
the development of new affordable housing stock, whether through programs such as 
NRAS or other mechanisms.     
5.63 The committee welcomes the review of housing and homelessness policy 
responsibilities being undertaken as part of the Federation White Paper process, and 
notes that as part of the process the government has released an issues paper, Roles 
69  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 10. 
70  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 1. 
 
                                              
 73 
and Responsibilities in Housing and Homelessness (December 2014). The committee 
anticipates the release of the Federation White Paper later this year will prompt 
renewed public discussion about how optimal housing and homelessness outcomes 
can be achieved within our federal system. It is the committee's hope that the White 
Paper will recognise the important role the Commonwealth has to play in this policy 
space, and the imperative for intergovernmental coordination and cooperation. The 
committee also hopes that the White Paper will serve as a foundation for a renewed 
bipartisan commitment at the Commonwealth level to tackle the problem of housing 
affordability and the shortage of affordable housing in Australia. 
5.64 The need for and potential value of a long-term, national affordable housing 
plan was made clear throughout the inquiry. The committee believes a national 
affordable housing plan should be developed through an appropriate 
intergovernmental forum, with substantive input from the community housing sector, 
stakeholders in the housing industry and third sector representatives. This plan would 
provide the direction and certainty needed to ensure housing affordability improves 
and the supply of affordable housing is better matched to housing need. A national 
affordable housing plan could potentially sit under the umbrella of the NAHA. 
However, the committee believes the Commonwealth and states and territories, 
through COAG, are best placed to determine if this would be help or hinder the 
implementation of such a plan.     
Recommendation 2 
5.65 The committee recommends that, as a matter of priority, the 
Commonwealth and states and territories agree to establish a ministerial council 
on housing and homelessness within the Council of Australian Governments 
ministerial council system. 
Recommendation 3 
5.66 The committee recommends the establishment of a new body, ideally a 
statutory body, similar in function to the former National Housing Supply 
Council, but also with responsibility for monitoring performance against a new 
affordable housing plan (see recommendation 4) and measuring housing need 
according to key demographic trends, socio-economic and cultural factors.   
Recommendation 4 
5.67 The committee recommends that the Commonwealth and states and 
territories collaborate in the development of a long term, national affordable 
housing plan, ideally to be developed through a new ministerial council on 
housing and homelessness within the Council of Australian Governments 
ministerial council system (see recommendation 2). While the shape of the plan 
and its relationship to the National Affordable Housing Agreement would be 
determined through the development process, the committee recommends that 
the plan: 
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(a) include performance indicators, which should be monitored and 
reported on by the body recommended at recommendation 3; and 
(b) include base funding, possibly drawn from the National Affordable 
Housing Agreement funding envelope, with consideration also given 
to including Commonwealth reward payments linked to 
achievement by individual jurisdictions against the performance 
indicators.  
 
 
  
Chapter 6 
The impact of state and local taxes, fees and charges on 
housing affordability 
6.1 According to many witnesses, the taxes and fees that apply to housing 
transactions and construction add significantly to housing costs. While 
Commonwealth taxation settings are often regarded as adding to housing demand 
(and, in a market with supply constraints, housing costs), state and local taxes were 
identified by witnesses as adding directly to the supply-side costs of housing.  
6.2 This chapter considers the effect of state and local taxes on housing 
affordability, including state stamp duties on conveyances (referred to henceforth 
simply as 'stamp duties'). The overwhelming weight of evidence received by this 
committee suggested stamp duties are a highly inefficient and inequitable means of 
taxing land and improvements, and also undermine home purchase affordability. 
Flawed as stamp duties might be as a form of taxation, states and territories remain 
heavily reliant on the revenue they provide. Acknowledging this, some witnesses 
noted that any removal or reform of stamp duties would likely require a shift to a 
different revenue source. Attention in this respect generally settled on a possible 
broadening of land taxation, including its extension to owner-occupied property. The 
committee also heard arguments in support of broad-based land taxation on the 
grounds that its application would help discourage excessive speculation and 
overinvestment by investors and owner-occupiers.  
6.3 This chapter also considers whether infrastructure fees and charges levied by 
state and local governments, most commonly in relation to greenfield housing 
developments, undermine housing affordability. In doing so, this chapter also outlines 
and addresses concerns expressed by some witnesses regarding the apparent lack of 
transparency and equity in the application of infrastructure fees and charges.  
The burden of state and local taxes, fees and charges on new housing stock 
6.4 Some submitters highlighted the costs that taxes and fees added to new 
housing construction, and the extent to which these costs were ultimately reflected in 
higher house prices. The taxes and fees referred to in this respect included some 
Commonwealth taxes, notably the Goods and Services Tax (GST). However, on the 
whole witnesses focused on state and local taxes, fees and charges.  
6.5 Although not referring exclusively to state and local taxes, the HIA told the 
committee that in 'absolute terms, new housing is the second most heavily taxed sector 
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in the Australian economy', out of a total 111 sectors. The HIA argued that any 
national tax reform agenda should consider how to reduce this tax burden.1  
6.6 Similarly, the UDIA emphasised the relatively high tax burden on new 
housing and its impact on  housing affordability: 
A major contributor to the high cost of housing in Australia, and 
subsequently affordability pressures in recent years is the escalating level of 
taxes and charges on new homes. The development and construction 
industry is one of the most heavily taxed sectors in the Australian economy, 
with various government taxes and charges accounting for up to 44% of the 
price of a new house in some cities. Many of these taxes are economically 
inefficient and inequitable, further discouraging investment, contributing to 
Australia's housing shortage, and worsening housing affordability.2 
6.7 The UDIA continued that while a large proportion of this tax was levied by 
state and local governments: 
…their replacement with more equitable and efficient taxes will only be 
achieved with cooperation and leadership from the Commonwealth, due to 
the vertical fiscal imbalance experienced between Australian 
Governments.3 
6.8 JELD-WEN provided more detail on the cost taxes and fees added to new 
housing. Citing research by the Centre for International Economics, JELD-WEN 
indicated that: 
More than 35 per cent or in excess of $100,000 of the cost of a new house 
and land package in the eastern state capital cities, consists of the GST, 
development charges, stamp duty, land tax, building fees and charges; in 
many cases, these indirect taxes and charges cascade throughout the 
acquisition and development pipeline to final sale.4 
Stamp duty 
6.9 While each state and territory levies stamp duty on the transfer of property on 
a progressive rate scale, rates and thresholds vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As 
the final report of the Henry Review noted, the average rate of stamp duty across the 
states rose from 2.45 per cent in 1993 to 3.25 per cent in 2005, 'largely due to the non-
indexation of the scales in the face of property appreciation'. The highest rate of stamp 
duty, the Henry Review further noted, was 7 per cent for residential properties valued 
above $3 million in New South Wales.5 Stamp duty revenues are volatile, because 
1  Dr Harley Dale, Chief Economist, Housing Industry Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 43; Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, pp. 6–7. 
2  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, pp. 11–12. 
3  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, pp. 11–12. 
4  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 7. 
5  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), pp. 251–52.   
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they are determined by the value and volume of properties being transferred. While 
volatile, these revenues consistently make up a very substantial proportion of the 
revenue raised by states and territories. For instance, in 2007–08, stamp duties raised 
$14.4 billion for the states and territories, more than 25 per cent of total state tax 
revenue that year (see Figure 6.1 below). In some states, stamp duties have at times 
been the single largest source of revenue.6    
 
Figure 6.1: Revenue from conveyance duty 
 
Source:  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), p. 254.  
 
6.10 While acknowledging the reliance of states and territories on stamp duty 
revenue, many witnesses were critical of the effect stamp duties had on housing 
affordability and economic productivity. The REIA, for example, argued that stamp 
duties: 
…represent additional costs to property transactions, thereby discouraging 
turnover of housing and distorting choices between renting and buying, and 
between moving house and renovating. Individuals who move more 
frequently would pay more taxes than those who move less. Others, who 
would have to buy or sell if they changed jobs, could be deterred by these 
costs thus reducing labour mobility. These distortions lead to…sub optimal 
6  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), pp. 253–54. 
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outcomes, reduce investment in the property market and impede labour 
mobility.7 
6.11 The Residential Development Council (part of the Property Council of 
Australia) also argued for the abolition of stamp duties. It noted the various 
inefficiencies and distortions created by stamp duties, including distorting the 
decisions people made about where to live.8 
6.12 Like the REIA, a number of submissions highlighted not only the costs stamp 
duty imposed on the purchase of housing, but also the negative impact on labour 
mobility and productivity more broadly. For instance, in her submission, 
Associate Professor Yates suggested that stamp duty 'can discourage turnover, 
influence housing decisions and inhibit mobility'.9 Similarly, AHURI referred to the 
'disincentive to residential mobility for existing home owners wishing to sell and 
purchase another property especially in higher valued areas'.10 The UDIA explained 
that stamp duties: 
…distort the efficient allocation of housing and land by penalising owners 
for moving to properties that best suit their needs. This has the effect of 
damaging economic productivity by constraining labour mobility, as the 
Productivity Commission recently reaffirmed in its study on Geographic 
Labour Mobility.11 
6.13 Mr John Hawkins also highlighted how stamp duties can distort decision 
making in a way that negatively impacts on housing affordability: 
The relevance for housing affordability is that by discouraging people from 
moving houses, it tends to lead to people remaining in houses that do not 
suit them. For example, an older couple whose children have left home may 
prefer to live in a smaller house which a growing family would prefer to 
vacate. But the stamp duty could deter both of them from moving. Stamp 
duties may also encourage first home buyers to buy a larger house than they 
need at the time to avoid paying further duty should they require a larger 
home as their family grows.12 
6.14 HomeStart Finance pointed to the difficulties stamp duty created for low to 
moderate income first home buyers. Stamp duty, it argued, is regressive in the sense 
that: 
7  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 14. Also see Mr Liam Foley, Policy 
Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, 
p. 72. 
8  Residential Development Council, Property Council of Australia, Submission 212, p. 13. 
9  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 6. 
10  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 7. 
11  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 12. 
12  Mr John Hawkins, Submission 105, p. 3. 
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…the most vulnerable customers—low-moderate income first home 
buyers—are least able to afford it, or afford to save for it. The imposition of 
this tax at the time of purchase creates a significant disincentive both for 
first home buyers and overall property market transactions.13 
6.15 The HIA drew the committee's attention to the fact that stamp duty is often 
applied multiple times along the process of a new home being brought to market: at 
the point of sale of land to developer, the sale of land from the developer to the 
builder, and the final sale of a house and land package to a purchaser. The HIA noted: 
This transaction and taxation process which can apply to the new home 
building sector is essentially treating new housing as 'trading stock' and is 
unique to this sector. In other industries, for example the used car industry, 
the 'commodity' is regarded as holding stock and does not attract stamp 
duty until the sale to the ultimate consumer. For the new home building 
sector, the taxes paid whilst approvals are being sought during the 
development phase can be significant and should be addressed by either a 
cut in rates or an exemption.14 
State government land taxation 
6.16 Witnesses also provided evidence suggesting that more broadly applied land 
taxes might help improve housing affordability, or at least provide a more efficient 
form of taxing housing than stamp duties.  
6.17 In Australia, land value taxes are levied at the state and territory level. As the 
Henry Review explained, there are currently three taxes on land in Australia:  
The first is property conveyance duties (stamp duties) levied on the transfer 
of land and buildings. In 2007–08 they raised $14.4 billion for State 
governments. A significant proportion of this revenue is raised on the 
transfer of building values, rather than of land. The second is local 
government rates levied on land (and also on building values by some 
councils). They raised $10.2 billion in 2007–08. Finally, State government 
land tax (mostly levied on unimproved land values) raised around $4.3 
billion in 2007–08.15 
6.18 For the purposes of this chapter, 'land tax' is taken to refer to state government 
land tax, unless otherwise specified.  
6.19 All jurisdictions except the Northern Territory levy land tax, and depending 
on the jurisdiction the calculation is based on either the 'unimproved' or 'site' value of 
the land. While the rate of land tax varies from state to state, it is generally only levied 
on commercial and investor-owned residential land. Owner-occupied land is exempt 
from land tax in all jurisdictions. As the Henry Review noted, the exemption of 
13  HomeStart Finance, Submission 72, p. 16. 
14  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 7. 
15  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), p. 251. 
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owner-occupied housing 'removes around 60 per cent of land by value from the tax 
base'. The Henry Review concluded that the exemption: 
…is likely to have particular influence on land for residential property. The 
exemption of owner-occupiers rules out around 75 per cent of residential 
land and, for the remainder, high thresholds in some States effectively 
exempt many small-scale investors. As land can shift in and out of the tax 
base depending on who owns it, it is unlikely that the tax will be fully 
reflected in lower land prices for residential property. The portion of tax 
that is not reflected in lower land prices is borne by investors through lower 
returns, or by their renters through higher rent. This means the tax, to some 
extent, has been passed forward to workers and the owners of capital. 
Further, it is likely that, in the long run, much of the burden of the tax is 
shifted to renters, as rents adjust to ensure that investors achieve an 
adequate return. This may be inequitable, as renters generally have low 
income and wealth.16 
6.20 Other submitters, including the Tenants' Union of NSW, suggested that the 
exemption of owner-occupied housing from land tax encouraged overinvestment in 
owner-occupied housing.17 Professor Frank Stilwell argued that a uniform land tax 
applied to the value of all land would help 'drive out the speculative element of the 
market', thereby bringing land price inflation under control: 
Indeed, if the government captured the economic surplus that is currently 
privately appropriated by landowners, it would only make sense for people 
to hold land for its use value—whether for housing, agricultural or other 
commercial purposes. There could then be no significant speculative gain, 
and land ownership would not be a vehicle for capital accumulation. Land 
price inflation would then be relatively stabilized. 
The current forms of land tax implemented by State governments do not 
achieve this outcome because the land tax rates are low and the exemptions 
are very extensive. A more comprehensive, nationwide land tax system 
would need to replace or supplement these State taxes.18 
6.21 Mr Cameron Murray also argued in favour of land tax reform, suggesting: 
Increasing taxes on land in proportion to its value at its highest and best use 
provides enormous incentives to construct new housing even if it reduces 
rents and prices.19 
6.22 For his part, Professor Dodson suggested that a more sophisticated land tax 
system would be able to capture the increase in land values, and redistribute it for 
'infrastructure or affordable housing purposes'.20   
16  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), pp. 260–61. 
17  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 7; 
Tenants' Union of NSW, Submission 120, p. 13. 
18  Professor Frank Stilwell, Submission 25, p. 4. 
19  Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, pp. 6–7. 
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6.23  AHURI also noted that, in varying measures depending on the jurisdiction, 
land tax is only levied on the value of the land of investment properties above a 
certain threshold. For example, in Victoria land tax only applies on the excess value of 
$250,000 of rental properties held by an investor. This arrangement, it suggested: 
…is potentially responsible for the lack of large property investors in 
Australia. Residential property investment is characterised by a dominance 
of 'mum and dad' investors who mainly own one investment property 
(Berry 2000). In 2006–07, 1,542,712 individuals declared an interest in at 
least one rental property; 77 per cent had an interest in only one rental 
property and 91 per cent in one or two properties...21 
Possible stamp duty and land tax reforms 
6.24 The Henry Review recommended the removal of stamp duties and, in 
recognition of the revenue needs of the states: 
…a switch to more efficient taxes, such as those levied on broad 
consumption or land bases. Increasing land tax at the same time as reducing 
stamp duty has the additional benefit of some offsetting impacts on asset 
prices.22  
6.25 The Henry Review further recommended that given the efficiency benefits of 
a broad land tax, 'it should be levied on as broad a base as possible.'23 
6.26 Both the UDIA and the REIA recommended replacing stamp duty with 'more 
efficient' taxes, such as a broader GST.24 While arguing in favour of abolishing stamp 
duty, the REIA took issue with the Henry Review's recommended replacement of 
stamp duty with a broad-based land tax:  
The Henry Review recommended that a land tax was an efficient means of 
replacing the revenue forgone from abolishing state stamp duties. In reality 
this is not the case. In practice it is likely that a significant proportion of the 
economic incidence of the tax is passed forward to consumers or backwards 
to investors adding distortions and reducing the efficiency of the tax and 
detracting from the claimed simplicity, equity and sustainability of the 
tax.25 
20  Professor Jago Dodson, Professor of Urban Policy, RMIT University, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 13. 
21  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 8. 
22  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), p. 263. 
23  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), p. 263. 
24  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 5; Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief 
Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, 
p. 72. 
25  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 14. 
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6.27 While acknowledging that stamp duty is a major source of revenue for state 
governments, the HIA maintained that it is nonetheless a 'highly inefficient tax'. It 
suggested the:  
…implementation of reforms which remove inefficient taxes that 
specifically affect housing, such as stamp duty on conveyancing, and 
replace the government revenue with more efficient taxes, improve housing 
affordability. Furthermore, such reforms are also likely to have broader 
economic benefits that deliver higher living standards to Australian 
households. 
A national tax reform agenda should develop a strategy and timeframe to 
replace stamp duty with more efficient taxes such as a broader based and/or 
higher rate of GST or a well-designed land tax. A Federally-led tax reform 
strategy is the only option for ensuring such change occurs.26 
6.28 AHURI argued that replacing stamp duties with reformed land taxes would 
improve the efficiency of the housing market and housing affordability generally. 
Such reforms would: 
…speed up development in areas that are more expensive and reduce land 
values in the inner cities making purchases in these areas cheaper...27 
6.29 Mr Eslake also called for a shift from stamp duties to broad-based land 
taxation, with a view to encouraging the more efficient use of land: 
That would include replacing stamp duty on land transfers (which are 'bad' 
taxes on many grounds, including that they discourage people from 
changing their dwellings as their needs change) with more broadly-based 
land taxes (ie, no exemptions for owner-occupiers, but with appropriate 
transitional provisions) and possibly higher rates for undeveloped vacant 
land in established urban areas.28 
6.30 AHL Investments Pty Ltd ('Aussie') recommended a reduction in stamp duty 
over time, potentially shifting to a broad property tax to replace the revenue lost by 
state and territory governments. Aussie suggested, however, that this transition would: 
…need to be progressively implemented to minimise the impact on existing 
property owners. This would require special consideration to be given to 
houses of lower value and to those that have recently paid stamp duty under 
a different rate regime.29 
6.31 Prosper Australia recommended abolishing stamp duties and implementing a 
broad-based land tax that should be levied at a federal level and then fully rebated to 
26  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 7. 
27  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, pp. 20–21. 
28  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 15. 
29  AHL Investment Pty Ltd (Aussie), Submission 186, p. 4. 
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the states.30 Appearing before the committee, Prosper Australia was asked how a land 
tax would apply in situations where an income-poor person owned a family home on 
high-value land. The example of a pensioner sitting on $1 million block of land but 
not earning any income from it was put to Prosper Australia, and whether a land tax 
would price that pensioner out of her home. Mr David Collyer, Prosper Australia's 
Policy Director, replied: 
Not necessarily. We, collectively, could remove the burden from her either 
by deferring it or by increasing pensions if that proved to be an issue. You 
cannot do these things in isolation. The idea is not to impose a new tax on 
everybody and not change other taxes. The purpose of a land tax is to give 
you the opportunity to remove other taxes that we know are very bad for us. 
We are not trying to increase the government tax take; we are trying to 
rebalance or reposition taxation.31 
The phasing out of stamp duty in the ACT 
6.32 As noted by Mr  Hawkins, while state and territory governments have 
generally not embraced stamp duty or land tax reform in response to the Henry 
Review, the ACT Government has moved to replace stamp duties over time with 
'more efficient and fairer charges on land values'.32 Following the Henry Review, the 
ACT Government in fact conducted its own taxation review, with the final report 
released in May 2012. Like the Henry Review, the ACT Taxation Review was highly 
critical of stamp duty: 
This tax is fundamentally unfair, in that it raises around a quarter of the 
total taxation revenue of the Territory from around 9 per cent of the people 
whose circumstances may impose the necessity to move to different 
accommodation. For this tax, around 38 cents of the economic value is lost 
for every dollar raised.33 
6.33 The ACT Taxation Review recommended that stamp duty be abolished, with 
the revenue replaced by a broad-based land tax. The Review further recommended the 
application of a transition period of 10 to 20 years, 'to ameliorate the impact of the 
change on households'.34 Subsequent to the Review, the ACT Government announced 
that it would abolish stamp duty over a 20 year period starting from mid-2012, with 
30  Mr David Collyer, Policy Director, Prosper Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, pp. 2–4. 
31  Mr David Collyer, Policy Director, Prosper Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, p. 5. 
32  Mr John Hawkins, Submission 105, p. 3. 
33  ACT Government, ACT Taxation Review (May 2012), p. 3. 
34  ACT Government, ACT Taxation Review (May 2012), pp. 7–8. 
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the revenue foregone to be replaced by an increased land tax (in the form of general 
rates, which the ACT Government, unlike other states and territories, levies itself).35 
Committee view 
6.34 The committee believes stamp duties are an inefficient, productivity-
damaging form of taxation, which ultimately increase barriers to home ownership. As 
has been established across multiple inquiries and reviews, including the Henry 
Review, stamp duties discourage land from being allocated to its most efficient use, 
distort housing choices and undermine housing affordability. The committee also 
notes evidence that stamp duties reduce peoples' choice and flexibility in relation to 
their housing situation—including to downsize as circumstances change, move closer 
to work, and so on. This, in turn, damages labour mobility and hurts economic 
productivity more generally.  
6.35 Currently, stamp duties constitute a significant source of revenue for the states 
and territories, and it would be unrealistic and even irresponsible to advocate their 
abolition without acknowledging that a replacement source of revenue would be 
required. The committee considers the Henry Review recommendations a good 
foundation for discussion on the need to move from stamp duties to broader, more 
efficient forms of taxation. As part of this discussion, the committee believes that 
states and territories should consider broadening the base of existing land taxation.  
6.36 The committee further notes that such issues will likely be addressed in the 
forthcoming Tax White Paper. On the assumption that it is likely the White Paper will 
also underline the inefficiencies associated with stamp duties, the committee 
acknowledges that that the White Paper's authors may be better positioned to 
recommend reform directions. With this caveat in mind, the committee notes that it 
has heard no compelling arguments for maintaining stamp duties in their current form. 
On the basis of evidence received, the committee also believes that the phasing out of 
stamp duties should probably occur in tandem with land tax reforms so that the impact 
to state revenue is neutralised.  
6.37 Beyond the political challenge of any transition from stamp duties to broad-
based land taxation, the committee acknowledges that such changes would likely 
involve significant equity issues, not least for 'asset rich, income poor' households and 
retirees. This in itself is no reason to eschew reform in this area. The ACT 
Government's recent stamp duty reforms may provide a template—or at least a 
starting point—that other governments might consider in pursuing stamp duty reform. 
Moreover, while issues of equity are not insignificant, they are by no means 
insurmountable. Mechanisms for deferring land tax liabilities, or exemptions for 
owner-occupiers who would be unfairly affected by a broadening of the tax, are 
35  John A. McLaren, 'The Australian Capital Territory has adopted measures to abolish stamp 
duty and impose a land tax on all real property: will this approach be adopted by other states in 
Australia?' Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 8, No. 1 (2013), pp. 101-116. 
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available to governments. Indeed, liquidity relief provisions that allow for the deferral 
of land value tax liabilities are already sometimes used in relation to local government 
rates. 
6.38 Meaningful reform is difficult, but it is no less important for being so. The 
committee believes that if the will exists, it will be possible to phase out stamp duties 
in a way that is revenue neutral, equitable and has a positive impact on housing 
affordability.   
6.39 While reform in this area is in the final analysis a matter for the states and 
territories, the committee believes the Commonwealth needs to engage with (and, as 
appropriate, provide leadership to) the states and territories in a coordinated reform 
process. This engagement would be based on a recognition that the implementation of 
such reforms should ideally take place as part of a broader process of taxation reform, 
possibly in response to the Tax White Paper. 
Recommendation 5 
6.40 The committee recommends that state and territory governments phase 
out conveyancing stamp duties, and that as per the recommendations of the 
Henry Review, this be achieved through a transition to more efficient taxes, 
potentially including land taxation levied on a broader base than is currently the 
case. 
Infrastructure charges on new housing developments 
6.41 For new housing developments, the costs of supplying infrastructure are 
substantial, and often add significantly to the price paid by the homebuyer. The 
question of who should bear these costs, and how and when, was raised by a number 
of witnesses. For many, current infrastructure charging regimes, as administered by 
state and local governments, appeared inequitable and inefficient.  
6.42 Infrastructure charges, as defined in the final Housing Supply and 
Affordability Reform (HSAR) report produced by the intergovernmental HSAR 
Working Party, are: 
…fees levied on developers (or purchasers in some instances) by local 
government as well some state governments to fund basic (or nexus) 
infrastructure (such as local roads and water mains) necessary for land 
development. In some instances, infrastructure charges are also levied for 
major infrastructure (arterial roads and pumping stations) and social 
infrastructure (parks and libraries). Local councils are generally empowered 
through planning and development legislation to collect contributions from 
developers for infrastructure. 
There are two main types of infrastructure: 'social' and 'economic'. 
Economic infrastructure can be further categorised as 'basic' or 'major/trunk' 
infrastructure. Who pays for the infrastructure, and how, should be 
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determined by the type of infrastructure and whether the costs can be 
accurately apportioned to those who benefit from the infrastructure.36 
6.43 In its submission, AHURI explained how developers were required to cover 
infrastructure costs (directly or indirectly), and how in turn these costs added to the 
overall costs of new housing: 
Developers may be required to pay significant levies and contributions to 
councils either for basic infrastructure (such as roads, water, sewerage, gas 
and electricity connections), which may be constructed by the developer 
and handed over to the relevant authority, or for costs incurred by the local 
government in providing new infrastructure, or by requiring developers to 
contribute land for public open space or facilities. 
Developer infrastructure contributions represent the largest quantifiable 
planning related cost in Australia, exceeding $100 000 per lot in designated 
metropolitan growth areas of NSW and around $45 000 per lot in parts of 
Queensland (Gurran et al. 2009). These costs have increased markedly in a 
number of capital cities—in Sydney they have increased from around 
3.5 per cent of the cost of a house price in the mid-1980s to 16.9 per cent in 
2007 (Gurran et al. 2009).37 
6.44 In their joint submission, Mr Borrowman, Associate Professor Frost and 
Dr Kazakevitch also pointed to research that quantified the costs associated with the 
shift towards user-paid infrastructure funding approaches in new housing 
developments. This research showed the cost burden was particularly pronounced in 
Sydney: 
Hsieh, Norman, and Orsmond (2012) estimate that in 2010 government 
charges (excluding GST) levied on developers amounted to around $60,000 
per greenfield dwelling in Sydney, and between $20-30,000 per greenfield 
dwelling in other cities.38 
6.45 The UDIA told the committee that the current means of funding infrastructure 
placed the cost burden on the new homebuyer up-front, when in fact that infrastructure 
had a long-lasting benefit to the community as a whole. The issue, it argued, was one 
of equity, balance and transparency.39 Similarly, Aussie argued that under current 
infrastructure funding regimes, the initial purchasers were in effect required to fund 
36  COAG Housing Supply and Affordability Reform Working Party, final report, Housing Supply 
and Affordability Reform (July 2012), p. 14. 
37  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 7. 
38  Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23, p. 7. 
39  Mr Liam Foley, Policy Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 67. 
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the benefits of future residents.40 Dr Lawson and Professor Berry also expressed 
concern regarding: 
…the high development costs of new housing on a constrained urban 
fringe, where revenue strapped local governments lack the capacity to 
develop infrastructure in advance. Upfront development fees directly 
impact 'first generation' purchasers, rather than being shared across a wider 
spatial area and longer time frame.41 
6.46 In its submission, the HIA provided a detailed argument against existing 
arrangements for funding social and community infrastructure through what it 
regarded as a 'complex array of levies charged throughout the residential development 
process'. In doing so, the HIA drew a distinction between 'development-specific 
infrastructure items' within the boundaries of a development, such as local roads, 
drainage, sewerage, power supplies and so on—which it agreed should be provided by 
the developer as part of the cost of development—and community and regional 
infrastructure which is 'ancillary to the direct provision of housing for a larger 
population and provides a benefit to the broader community'. This latter category, the 
HIA argued, should not be funded by developer contributions: 
The excessive costs levied from the developer are passed on to new 
homebuyers who in effect partially or wholly fund infrastructure items from 
which the whole community derives benefit. The cost of community 
infrastructure should be met by general revenue rather than an inequitable 
tax levied on new homebuyers. 
Removal of the excessive infrastructure charges incurred during the 
production of new homes will lower the final purchase price to consumers, 
thereby improving the relative cost differential between new and 
established housing and increasing demand for new homes. The additional 
supply of housing would assist to restore the housing supply imbalance.42  
6.47 The UDIA argued that developer contributions should be 'charged 
proportionately to the benefit received by the beneficiary of the infrastructure, and 
should be transparent in their calculation and application'. It suggested that currently 
this was often not the case, with excessive infrastructure charges undermining housing 
affordability: 
Developer contributions are frequently opaque and unjustified in their 
application, and there may be no clear connection between the cost of the 
infrastructure provided and the contribution, to the extent that the 
contribution may be well in excess of the cost of the infrastructure it is 
supposed to pay for. Additionally in many cases developer contributions are 
used to pay for infrastructure that benefits the wider community (for 
40  AHL Investments Pty Ltd, Submission 186, p. 4. 
41  Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, Centre for Urban Research, RMIT University, 
Submission 24, p. 7. 
42  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, pp. 7–8. 
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example trunk roads and utilities infrastructure upgrades). In this case, 
developers and ultimately new home buyers are being forced to subsidise 
the rest of the community.43 
6.48 The UDIA argued that a further problem with current approaches to 
infrastructure funding was that sometimes there was an incentive for local 
governments to: 
…set unnecessarily high engineering and construction standards in order to 
minimise their ongoing maintenance and replacement costs. Where these 
reduced costs aren't reflected in lower council rates, new home buyers 
effectively end up paying for their infrastructure twice, once through a 
higher up front house price, and again through recurring rates.44 
6.49 According to Mr Eslake, state and local governments' policies for charging for 
the provision of suburban infrastructure were a key reason for the failure of the 
housing stock to keep pace with population growth in recent years. These policies, 
Mr Eslake suggested, 'have made it increasingly difficult for the private sector to 
supply new housing, especially at the more affordable end of the spectrum'. In 
particular, onerous requirements on developers for the provision of infrastructure and 
services in new housing estates, and the shift from a debt-financed to up-front model 
of funding this infrastructure, had priced home buyers out of developments that would 
otherwise be affordable:  
While this is consistent with a 'user pays' philosophy, and appeases the 
growing voter aversion to public debt, it has meant (especially in New 
South Wales, where developer charges have risen to much higher levels 
than in other States) that developers find it increasingly difficult to produce 
house-and-land packages at prices which are affordable for first-time buyers 
and still make a profit, so they have reacted by building a smaller number 
of more expensive houses targeted at the trade-up market.45 
6.50 JELD-WEN argued that the high fees and charges on new land purchases, 
many of which had been imposed in the years since 2000, had: 
…distorted home buyer preferences away from job-generating new housing 
to established housing. In the mid-1990s, more than a quarter of owner-
occupiers opted for a new dwelling; by the late 2000s, the share of 
purchases for new housing had almost halved.46 
Proposals for new approaches to infrastructure funding  
6.51 Professor Beer explained that in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland 
the homebuyer will pay substantial amounts toward off-site infrastructure, an 
43  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, pp. 12–13. 
44  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 13. 
45  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, pp. 5–6. 
46  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 7. 
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approach which on the one hand adds to housing costs, but on the other ensures the 
adequate provision of infrastructure. In South Australia, however, the opposite 
situation prevailed, where in many cases no adequate infrastructure was provided. 
Professor Beer suggested new thinking was required as to how 'we can finance 
infrastructure over the life of the property rather than putting all the costs either on the 
general taxpayer or on the first home buyer'.47 Professor Beer suggested, for example, 
that local councils should be able to raise bonds to fund infrastructure: 
They can raise a bond—which obviously they get at a very low rate relative 
to some forms of commercial credit—which they can pay off over time. So, 
there is intergenerational equity, because it is not the first generation of 
home purchasers who have to pay that enormous cost; it is actually spread 
over the 20, 30, 40 or 50 years of the life of that infrastructure. It is 
equitable spatially, because those who are living at the fringe and choosing 
to move into that housing and are getting the benefit of that new housing 
pay for it. It can also be equitable for those living in the city areas, because 
they are not paying for it and also, if they are going through a process of 
urban regeneration, they can actually create their own bond and pay for the 
redevelopment of their urban infrastructure in ways that may be needed by 
using a similar sort of device. And it is not one generation that pays for it, 
because they are not the only generation to benefit.48 
6.52 Similarly, Mr Michael Basso argued that the shift toward developers paying 
for infrastructure in new estates, rather than local councils, had: 
…a significant impact on the price of land, which has flowed through to the 
cost of existing properties, pushing prices up across the board. Developers 
obviously build these infrastructure costs into their prices meaning buyers 
need to pay significantly more upfront, money that will generally be 
borrowed and cost them significantly more in interest over time. Given the 
flow-on effect into existing house prices, every property buyer is essentially 
paying this extra amount in perpetuity and this is ultimately ending up in 
the banks' coffers through interest charged on the loans. It would make a lot 
more sense for councils to absorb this cost through some form of 
development bond and have residents repay the cost through council rates.49 
6.53 While much of the evidence received was focused on the costs imposed on 
developers by current infrastructure charging arrangements—and in turn the impact 
this had on housing prices—the Brisbane City Council argued that it was required to 
bear much of this cost itself. Specifically, the Council told the committee that the 
imposition of state-wide regulated maximum infrastructure charges in Queensland 
47  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 16. 
48  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 20–21. 
49  Mr Michael Basso, Submission 209, p. 5. 
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placed the Council under considerable fiscal pressure.50 It suggested that under the 
prevailing arrangements in Queensland, the Council was effectively subsidising 
infrastructure costs: 
At the present time, council subsidises new house lots by an average of 
some $10,000 to $15,000. The standard charge has been set across the state 
at $28,000 by the state government. We are currently charging $27,000 per 
allotment. As I said, we believe the user pays charge would be in the order 
of about $35,000 for a lot of housing but in some parts of Brisbane the user 
pays charge is in the order of $55,000 to $65,000. So in that regard we are 
subsidising development using general rates revenue. While it does add to 
the cost of housing, without the supply of essential infrastructure such as 
water, sewerage and access to transport, there is no product that can be sold 
so it is something that really adds value. If it is not there, the development 
has no value whatsoever.51 
6.54 The HIA suggested that alternative infrastructure funding mechanisms could 
provide better affordability outcomes for new home buyers. Mechanisms suggested by 
the HIA included government infrastructure bonds and the Tax Increment Financing 
model, wherein government is able to draw tax revenues from increases in value 
within prescribed Tax Increment Financing areas to cover the up-front costs of 
infrastructure.52 Mr Eslake also suggested that an alternative approach to 
infrastructure funding might to use 'levies on the increments to the value of the land 
which result from such investments'.53 
6.55 Youth Action NSW referred to the McKell Institute 2012 report, Homes for 
All, which argued that the levies and charges charged to developers by local 
governments were, in Youth Action NSW's words, 'dramatically impacting on the 
housing supply in New South Wales'.54 Drawing on the McKell Institute's report, 
Youth Action NSW argued: 
Tax Increment Finance (TIF) schemes should be implemented in order to 
redistribute infrastructure costs. A TIF scheme allows local authorities to 
borrow money in order to advance infrastructure growth. The money can be 
50  These limits are set out in Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, State 
Planning Regulatory Provision (adopted charges) (July 2012), 
http://www.dsdip.qld.gov.au/resources/laws/state-planning-regulatory-provision/sprp-ict.pdf. 
51  Mr Kerry Doss, Manager, City Planning and Economic Development, City Planning and 
Sustainability Division, Brisbane City Council, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, 
p. 2. 
52  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, pp. 9–10. On TIF, see 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, draft report for the Property Council of Australia, 'Tax Increment 
Financing to fund infrastructure in Australia' (April 2008), 
http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/public_submissions/published/files/486_propertycou
ncilofaustralia_sub2.pdf. 
53  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 15. 
54  Youth Action NSW, Submission 51, pp. 81–82. 
 
                                              
 91 
sourced from the public or private sector. The construction of infrastructure 
will increase site values and local tax revenues, along with providing 
incentives for local communities to support growth.55 
6.56 In order to improve equity and affordability outcomes, the UDIA 
recommended that governments: 
…favour funding and financing approaches that spread the cost of 
infrastructure out over extended time frames, rather than impose it up front, 
such as through developer contributions.56 
6.57 Similarly, BIS Shrapnel argued that the cost of infrastructure associated with 
new development is often borne by developers and thus new residents, despite the 
benefit being enjoyed by the broader community. It argued: 
A shift in focus could result in a more equitable sharing of infrastructure 
costs across all who benefit from them. There exists a role for government 
to play in funding and providing the necessary infrastructure here and the 
right balance must be struck between developers and government as to who 
foots the bill. This would help reduce developer contribution costs and thus 
help limit the ultimate cost of new housing development.57 
Previous reviews of infrastructure charges 
6.58 It should be noted at this point that the issues raised in this inquiry regarding 
infrastructure charges have been covered extensively in previous review processes, 
including the HSAR final report and the Henry Review. 
6.59 The Henry Review addressed infrastructure charges in some detail. It found 
that infrastructure charges 'can be an effective way of encouraging the efficient 
provision of infrastructure where it is of greatest value and of improving housing 
supply'. However, it also found that poorly administered infrastructure charges—
particularly charges that are complex, non-transparent or excessive—'can discourage 
investment in housing, which can lower the overall supply of housing and raise its 
price'. The Henry Review recommended that COAG review infrastructure charges to 
ensure they were transparent and 'appropriately price infrastructure provided in 
housing developments'.58 
6.60 The issue of infrastructure charges was subsequently reviewed by COAG's 
HSAR Working Party. In 2012, COAG agreed to the recommendation made in the 
HSAR final report that infrastructure charges should be consistent with four principles 
agreed by the HSAR Working Party, covering efficiency, transparency and 
accountability, predictability, and equity (as outlined below). COAG also agreed to 
55  Youth Action NSW, Submission 51, p. 84. 
56  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 5. 
57  BIS Shrapnel, Submission 16, p. 3. 
58  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), pp. 423–29. 
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note the best practice guidelines for applying the infrastructure charging principles, as 
developed by the HSAR Working Party.59 
6.61 The HSAR report suggested that infrastructure charges should only be used 
when infrastructure serviced a particular development, or when the infrastructure 
serviced a number of developments but it was nonetheless possible to apportion costs 
based on the demand each development placed on the infrastructure. It suggested that 
infrastructure should be funded through general revenue in the instance it serviced a 
number of developments, and it would be 'extremely difficult or not possible to 
accurately apportion the costs because the benefits of the infrastructure are widely 
distributed'. It also suggested that such charges should not be levied in cases where 
direct user charges could be applied. 
6.62 The final report recommended that to the extent infrastructure charges were 
used, they should at least be: 
• efficient—charges should be for infrastructure required for the proposed 
development or for servicing a major development; 
• transparent and accountable—charging regimes should be supported 
by publicly available information on the infrastructure subject to 
charges, the methodology used to determine charges and the 
expenditure of funds;  
• predictable—charges should be in line with published methodologies 
and charging schedules (with clarity around the circumstances in which 
charges can be modified after agreement); and 
• equitable—where the benefits of infrastructure provision are shared 
between developers (land owners), the infrastructure charges levied on 
the developer should be no higher than the proportional demand that 
their development will place on that infrastructure.60  
Committee view 
6.63 The committee notes that many of the issues raised and recommendations 
made by witnesses in this inquiry regarding infrastructure charges have been 
canvassed in previous inquiry reports, including the Henry Review and the HSAR 
final report that COAG agreed to in 2012. The committee also recognises that the 
question of how infrastructure is funded raises complex equity issues. Expressed in 
the most basic terms, these issues come down to who should pay for new 
infrastructure and when they should pay it: should new home buyers bear the cost, 
59  COAG Housing Supply and Affordability Reform Working Party, Final Report, Housing 
Supply and Affordability Reform (July 2012), pp. 14–15. The best practice guidelines are 
included in the final report at Appendix B. COAG agreed the report recommendations out-of-
session in July 2012. https://www.coag.gov.au/node/451. 
60  COAG Housing Supply and Affordability Reform Working Party, Final Report, Housing 
Supply and Affordability Reform (July 2012), p. 15. 
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either up-front or over time? Or should the broader community bear the cost, 
particularly when it is established that the benefits from that infrastructure are shared 
by the wider community?  
6.64 There are no simple answers to these questions. However, the committee does 
note that the final HSAR report recommended that COAG agree to the HSAR 
Working Party's four principles for infrastructure charges—efficiency, transparency 
and accountability, predictability, and equity—and that COAG note the associated 
best practice guidelines produced by the Working Party. In light of COAG agreeing to 
this recommendation, the committee believes it would be beneficial for state and 
territory governments to report through COAG (and preferably through the 
recommended ministerial council for housing and homelessness) on what changes, if 
any, they have since made to ensure infrastructure charges are consistent with these 
four principles. This would help ensure that progress is being made in this area, and 
encourage transparency, information sharing and the take-up of best practice 
approaches to infrastructure charges.    
6.65 Several submitters raised the possibility of using Tax Increment Financing or 
bonds to fund infrastructure in new housing developments. The committee believes 
that, if nothing else, alternative approaches to infrastructure funding may merit further 
consideration by state and local governments.    
Recommendation 6 
6.66 The committee recommends that all states and territories report to the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG), preferably through a new 
ministerial council on housing and homelessness (see recommendation 2), on 
what policy changes, if any, have been made to ensure infrastructure charges are 
consistent with the four principles agreed through COAG in July 2012. 
Recommendation 7 
6.67 The committee recommends that state and local governments investigate 
the possibility of using Tax Increment Financing and other innovative finance 
mechanisms to fund infrastructure for new housing developments.  
 

  
Chapter 7 
Zoning, planning and approval processes 
7.1 This chapter considers the effect of zoning, planning and approval processes 
on housing supply and affordability.  
7.2 A number of witnesses suggested the lack of an adequate supply response to 
housing demand in Australia, and by extension poor housing affordability, was in 
large part due to inefficient zoning and planning processes. For instance, some argued 
that the rate of release of new land for development to the market can have a 
significant effect on the cost of new homes on the urban fringe. Other witnesses, 
however, countered that housing affordability is not necessarily improved simply 
through greater land release. Indeed, they argued that to the extent that new housing 
developments are not supported by adequate infrastructure and services, this can add 
hidden housing costs, which may not be reflected in traditional measures of 
affordability. This chapter weighs and assesses these different viewpoints.  
7.3 This chapter further considers the influence of development assessment 
processes on the supply of housing stock, and by extension on housing affordability. 
Some witnesses expressed concern that the success of urban infill developments and 
densification projects were too often subject to the whims of a small number of 
existing residents (or, to use the common pejorative, 'nimbys') or narrow special 
interest groups. The incidence and associated costs of third party appeal and objection 
rights, according to these witnesses, underlined the need for development assessment 
reform.  
7.4 These concerns, along with the broader question of the Commonwealth's role 
in urban planning and development, are addressed in this chapter.  
Planning systems and housing affordability 
7.5 The Henry Review, which recommended that COAG review institutional 
arrangements to ensure zoning and planning do not unnecessarily inhibit housing 
supply and housing affordability, outlined the occasional tension between the need for 
planning systems and housing affordability: 
Features of the planning system intend to enhance the efficiency of land use 
in two ways: by managing or preventing perceived negative spillovers from 
development activities that may extend beyond the site of the development 
itself; and by facilitating positive spillovers through the provision of public 
goods. However, planning can also add costs, such as where the regulations 
are not well-targeted and lengthy development assessment processes are 
involved. The key question is whether the benefits outweigh the costs.1  
1  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), p. 420.  
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7.6 Some witnesses argued that Australian planning systems, on balance, imposed 
costs that were not commensurate with the benefits they provided. The HIA, for 
example, argued that in many instances planning systems in Australia were 'acting as 
a disincentive, or worse still, a barrier to growth' in housing supply. It submitted that 
while planning systems are the responsibility of the states and territories, the 
Commonwealth 'can have a significant influence in the delivery of streamlined 
approval processes and in encouraging greater standardisation across borders'.2 
7.7 Similarly, BIS Shrapnel submitted that 'uncertainty over the planning 
provisions in various jurisdictions will act as a constraint on dwelling supply'.3 The 
REIA focused on apparent delays in the approvals process for new land release, and 
the effect this had on housing affordability.4 The UDIA raised similar concerns, 
suggesting that overly complex and restrictive planning regimes at the state and local 
government levels: 
…are often a major barrier to the supply of new housing, and can contribute 
considerably to the affordability problem by increasing costs. 
The holding costs involved in the urban development process are often very 
high, which means that development projects are usually very sensitive to 
time delays, as they blow out holding costs. Unfortunately planning, zoning 
and approvals processes in many cities can be extremely slow, adding 
considerably to the cost of new housing. The 2011 Productivity 
Commission Report on planning, zoning and development assessment 
found that across Australia's five largest cities, it can be as long as a decade 
from the commencement of rezoning to subdivision approval and the 
installation of infrastructure, indicating the need for planning system 
reform. 
There is an urgent need for state and local governments around the country 
to work together to undertake major planning system reform, to increase the 
supply of urban land and reduce delays and uncertainty associated with 
zoning, planning and approvals processes.5 
7.8 Professor Beer told the committee that it was often the case that a particular 
planning regulation may have once served a purpose, but has since become outdated 
and an impediment to the development of affordable housing. He argued that there 
was a need for policy flexibility in this regard, with planning legislation reviewed 'to 
achieve better outcomes in terms of affordability'.6 
2  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 11.  
3  BIS Shrapnel, Submission 16, p. 4.  
4  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 11.  
5  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, pp. 10–11.  
6  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 15.  
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7.9 According to Professor Beer, local councils 'at the sharp end of the planning 
system' were not always concerned with housing affordability. Instead, he suggested, 
they tended to: reflect local interests; be tactical, not strategic; be affected by 
nimbyism; and de-prioritise housing affordability.7 
7.10 JELD-WEN recommended the Commonwealth provide financial incentives 
for state and local governments that 'embrace planning reforms that support economic 
growth': 
In recognition of the financial constraints operating on the federal budget, it 
might be appropriate to consolidate existing housing funds into a renewed 
national competition payments system to reward States and Local 
Government that facilitate new housing development through the release of 
land and reduced development assessment and approval times.8 
7.11 While some witnesses submitted that inefficient regulations were adding to 
housing costs, others reminded the committee that regulations serve a range of policy 
purposes that extend beyond housing affordability. In its submission, the RBA 
acknowledged that planning and approval processes could create delays that in turn 
add to housing costs. However, it also pointed out that such issues: 
…are not specific to Australia and many of these regulations are intended to 
promote other social goals, such as ensuring buildings are constructed 
safely and that neighbouring residents do not have costs and inconveniences 
imposed upon them about which they are not consulted.9 
7.12 Housing researchers from Swinburne University of Technology argued calls 
for planning deregulation sometimes had less to do with a genuine interest in 
affordability, and more to do with increasing profitability through lower regulatory 
compliance costs. They submitted: 
There is some logic in the planning reform arguments but we argue that this 
is not about deregulation per se, it is about better performance which could 
require in some cases more regulation [in] parallel with deregulation.10  
7.13 Mr Cameron Murray also challenged the idea that local government planning 
regulations were acting as a constraint on housing supply. Mr Murray—who more 
broadly disputed the underlying assumption that housing affordability in Australia had 
deteriorated in recent decades—referred to this as the 'planning constraint myth'. If 
constraints on development type and scale through local government planning 
regulations existed, Mr Murray argued, then this would show up as an increase in 
rents commensurate with house prices, and a reduction in the stock of approved but 
7  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 18–19.  
8  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 8.  
9  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 8.  
10  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 6. 
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undeveloped housing sites. Mr Murray presented evidence suggesting neither 
phenomena existed, including evidence that local councils in Queensland had, in fact, 
approved 'far more dwellings than can [be] absorbed into the market'.11 
Land release and rezoning 
7.14 Some witnesses argued that the failure of governments and other parties to 
release land for housing development was a key reason housing supply was not 
keeping pace with demand. JELD-WEN expressed concerns regarding planning 
strategies adopted by state governments to limit greenfield development and contain 
urban expansion. It argued that these strategies, combined with higher infrastructure 
contributions from developers, 'have seen marked increases in the cost of supplying 
serviced land for new housing, causing purchasers to shift buyer activity towards 
existing dwellings'.12  
7.15 BIS Shrapnel explained that improved land release did not only mean 
releasing new land on city fringes, but could also include: 
…rezoning existing commercial and industrial land that may be more 
valuable as residential or increasing the height and density limits of sites. 
Implementing taxation reform to discourage 'land banking' and encourage 
the development of available land would also assist in increasing the supply 
of new dwellings. This would serve to limit future increases in the cost of 
land and ultimately improve the affordability of new housing.13 
7.16 MBA, meanwhile, recommended that local governments should be required to 
develop individual land release plans with a ten-year horizon, 'with greater roles for 
market signals and the private sector'.14 
7.17 In its submission, WALGA submitted that the inadequacy of land release was 
not simply due to inaction by state and local governments, but was also partly 
attributable to developers and investors withholding land from market: 
In examining issues concerning housing affordability, the WA State 
Government's Community Development and Justice Standing Committee 
found that 'undeveloped land in Western Australia is relatively plentiful 
[and] 25,000 subdivided and undeveloped lots are being withheld from the 
market in the Perth region by developers.' Whilst many of these lots are 
being withheld from the market by large scale property developers and 
investors, a large number of lots are being withheld by small scale 'mum 
and dad' investors, speculating in increases in the value of land. These 
investors are attracted by the existing tax regime which offers deductions 
11  Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, p. 5.  
12  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 8. 
13  BIS Shrapnel, Submission 16, p. 2.  
14  Master Builders Australia, Submission 48, p. 13.  
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for expenses such as loan interest and council rates on land that is bought 
with the intention of constructing a rental property.15 
7.18 Similarly, Professor Dalton suggested there was some evidence that 
developers in Victoria were preventing the release of land to the market. Noting that 
there are about 8 to 11 large land companies releasing land in master-planned estates 
on the fringes of Melbourne, Professor Dalton suggested there were: 
…some hard questions to be asked of the companies that are operating in 
that area about the way in which they approach supply. Essentially, they are 
not going to be releasing lots of land into the market that interferes with 
their long-term projections about their profits. So there is some institutional 
behaviour within the land companies themselves—the people who are not 
doing the building but actually releasing the land on the fringe, and that is 
the area we are concentrating on for the moment—that I think needs a bit 
more questioning. We saw a policy initiative that started in the 1970s—the 
nationally supported land development companies run by state 
governments, some of which still exist in various forms—to challenge that 
oligopolistic behaviour on the fringes. I think that oligopoly still exists to 
some extent and needs investigation.16 
7.19 A key focus of the HIA's submission was what it regarded as the need for a 
more effective, efficient and transparent land supply pipeline in Australia. To meet 
this need, the HIA recommended the establishment of a mandatory national reporting 
framework for land supply. This recommendation and the reasoning underlying it, is 
worth quoting at length: 
The assessment, development and delivery of new land to market can take 
over 10 years, yet accurate and holistic information about Australia's land 
supply pipeline is scarce. HIA recommends the federal government 
establish a mandatory national reporting framework for land supply as a 
matter of priority. 
State and territory governments collect and publish information on land 
supply. However, in several instances it is not timely, in some cases it is not 
accurate, and in all cases it is not related to the projected housing delivery 
commitments envisaged in capital city metropolitan strategies. 
The federal government needs to play a role in the co-ordination of this 
information, which is critical to supporting the delivery of homes to meet 
Australia's growing population. 
The accurate collection of data on land supply needs to capture all stages of 
the land supply pipeline. This should include nationally consistent 
definitions to describe the various stages of the land supply pipeline. 
Timely periodic reporting should include information on land that has 
15  Western Australian Local Government Association, Submission 37, p. 2.  
16  Professor Tony Dalton, Professor of Urban and Social Policy, RMIT University, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 15.  
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received 'works approvals' to more accurately identify any blockages in the 
planning process. 
Much of the information needed to achieve a holistic grasp of land, 
infrastructure and housing supply is captured variously by local and 
state/territory governments. However, the scope of data collection and its 
interpretation lacks consistency and is rarely compiled and shared across 
agencies. HIA supports the establishment of a national unit within  
Commonwealth Treasury with a sole focus being to collect, analyse, 
interpret and report on both housing and land supply pipelines, with a terms 
of reference similar to those of the Indicative Planning Council for 
Housing, which undertook this important function during the 1990s.17 
Land release and challenges in outer suburban areas 
7.20 In contrast to some of the arguments summarised above, a number of 
witnesses told the committee that increased land releases were not a panacea for 
affordability issues. Professor Carolyn Whitzman discussed Melbourne's experience in 
recent decades to illustrate the point: 
It has essentially been a supply-side approach for the last 20 years. The 
urban growth boundary of Melbourne was expanded four times under the 
rationale that there was a need for an increased land supply, which would 
create an increased housing supply and somehow that, through magic 
fingers, would turn into affordable housing. But affordable housing is far 
worse than it ever was, including in the growth areas. That is not affordable 
housing. In 2011 there were 70,000 properties available in greater 
Melbourne and three per cent of them were affordable to median income 
earners. Over 50 per cent of them were unaffordable to anyone but the 
highest quintile of earners. Affordability through supply has not worked.18 
7.21 Poorly managed new land releases could, some witnesses warned, create new 
problems, and in some cases actually damage housing affordability. Professor Wilkins 
added that land supply decisions should not be made without proper reference to the 
need for land to be appropriately located and supported by quality infrastructure and 
services: 
When we are talking about available supply, it is not a simple matter of 
more land being available for building houses on. As we all know, the price 
of housing is very location determined. What are the factors that are driving 
location-based price differentials? It is things like proximity to services, 
jobs and the like. Any supply response has to be thinking in terms of supply 
of housing that is proximate to where people want to be. It is probably 
pretty affordable to build a house in the middle of nowhere, 
notwithstanding some difficulties in getting workers to go out there and 
build it. What this really suggests is that you cannot divorce this from 
17  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 10–11.  
18  Professor Carolyn Whitzman, Professor of Urban Planning, University of Melbourne, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 15.  
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infrastructure development and in particular transport infrastructure, and I 
am speaking of both public and private infrastructure.19 
7.22 Like Professor Wilkins, a number of witnesses told the committee that real 
affordability on the urban fringe was dependent on the adequate provision of 
infrastructure and services. For instance, the National Growth Areas Alliance argued 
that while population growth rates in outer urban areas were twice the national 
average, there had been no corresponding growth in infrastructure. This lack of 
infrastructure, it told the committee, resulted in higher costs of living, particularly in 
terms of transport costs. Inadequate service provision in outer urban areas, meanwhile, 
contributed to poorer educational and employment outcomes for residents. To some 
extent then, the greater availability of affordable housing options on the urban fringe 
was negated by these hidden costs. What might at first appear to be affordable 
housing, as the Chief Executive of the Alliance, Ms Ruth Spielman, explained, 
'quickly becomes unaffordable living.'20  
7.23 Ms Spielman continued that the funding and creation of supporting 
infrastructure needed to be more strategic and integrated than was currently the case. 
Rather than the states putting their priorities to the Commonwealth and having 
projects assessed on a project-by-project basis, the various levels of government 
needed to identify region-wide infrastructure needs.21 
7.24 Professor Dodson raised similar issues in his appearance before the 
committee, highlighting the problem of spatial disadvantage apparent in outer 
suburban areas where most 'affordable' housing was located. Inadequate infrastructure 
in those areas, and a lack of health, education and employment services and 
opportunities relative to core areas, was a dimension of housing affordability that was 
not, Professor Dodson suggested, 'coordinated very well within our policy 
architecture'.22  
7.25 Other witnesses, including Professor Pawson, expressed concern that people 
on low incomes were being pushed to the urban fringe in search of affordable housing. 
He argued that because employment opportunities were relatively poor in many of 
these areas, this had the effect of entrenching spatial disadvantage.23 Similarly, 
19  Associate Professor Roger Wilkins, Principal Research Fellow, Melbourne Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, pp. 15–16.  
20  Ms Ruth Spielman, Executive Officer, National Growth Areas Alliance, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 62.  
21  Ms Ruth Spielman, Executive Officer, National Growth Areas Alliance, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 62.  
22  Professor Jago Dodson, Professor of Urban Policy, RMIT University, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 13.  
23  Professor Hal Pawson, Associate Director, City Futures Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 35.  
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housing researchers from Swinburne University of Technology noted that the housing 
affordability problem in Australia 'has an evolving and deepening spatial dimension'. 
Households on low to moderate incomes are forced to live in areas with poor access to 
employment, transport, services and facilities. Ultimately, a housing market which: 
…pushes low income households generally, and families specifically, to the 
urban edge may create major issues of workforce opportunity and 
participation and social connectedness.24 
7.26 The Swinburne researchers added that higher rates of land release on the 
urban fringe would not improve affordability if it placed 'more households in areas of 
poor employment and social service': 
This spatial polarisation issue is one reason why the simplistic arguments 
about releasing more land on the urban fringe as a solution to the 
affordability problem are in themselves problematic; the existing evidence 
suggests it will inevitably create highly polarised cities with social and 
political dysfunction and lack of liveability for many.25 
7.27 Professor Frank Stilwell, while suggesting that Australia's housing 
affordability problems were a function of the land price inflation, argued that simply 
releasing more land on the urban fringe was unlikely to provide an effective solution. 
Developments on the urban fringe, he argued, are 'quickly absorbed into the overall 
working of the metropolitan land and property markets'. Whereas other witnesses 
argued that developments in outer urban areas required better supporting infrastructure 
and services, Professor Stilwell argued that policymakers should instead focus on 
creating new cities in regional and rural Australia. These new population centres:  
…would both 'take the heat off' the metropolitan areas and give a much 
needed boost to regional localities that currently need economic stimulus. It 
is essential that any such decentralization programs should also focus on 
policies for job-creation or job-transfer to those non-metropolitan regions: 
so housing development must be integrated with urban and regional 
economic policy.26 
Commonwealth land supply 
7.28 Generally speaking, responsibility for the release or rezoning of land for 
residential development lies with state and territory governments. However, several 
witnesses, including the UDIA, the REIA and JELD-WEN, suggested that the 
Commonwealth should look to release the surplus land it owned. It was argued that 
the release of this land, including substantial Department of Defence land holdings 
24  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 4.  
25  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, pp. 4, 6–7.  
26  Professor Frank Stilwell, Submission 25, pp. 3–4.  
 
                                              
 103 
near or within capital cities, would help improve housing supply and go some way 
toward improving affordability outcomes.27 
7.29 It is worth noting at this juncture that the Department of Finance maintains a 
Register of Surplus Commonwealth Land Potentially Suitable for Housing and 
Community Outcomes on its website. However, as the National Commission of Audit 
(NCOA) noted, there appears to be no complete whole-of-government public register 
of Defence and non-Defence Commonwealth-owned property. The NCOA suggested 
that a 'central register of the Commonwealth estate would benefit planning and 
strategies to improve the use of property, including identifying properties with 
potential for sale'.28 
Infill development and densification 
7.30 JELD-WEN questioned the underlying contention of supporters of urban 
consolidation that there is substantial under-utilised capacity in existing urban 
infrastructure to accommodate a marked increase in population densities in established 
areas. It pointed instead to evidence of an infrastructure renewal gap in established 
areas, with infrastructure deteriorating due to under-spending on maintenance and 
improvement.29 
7.31 Housing researchers from Swinburne University of Technology questioned 
the effect of higher density developments on affordability outcomes. They argued that 
while developers often pushed for planning deregulation to allow higher density 
developments: 
…without some parallel interventions the effect more often than not is to 
push land prices up not down making residential property more expensive 
for everyone including ordinary home purchasers. 
Increasing density means a developer will make a judgment on how much 
yield can be obtained from each unit and therefore how much is to be paid 
for the land. What we have got out of this process to date is (a) many, often 
large scale, small and poor quality one and two bedroom apartments 
catering for singles and childless couples who have the residual income to 
afford to buy a small apartment. (b) An increase in land values in all those 
areas where developers believe that they can maximise the density and yield 
from each dwelling, notably in the inner and middle ring suburbs of major 
cities. The land takes on the value of the potential yield so the more density 
controls are relaxed the more the value of land increases.30 
27  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 10; Real Estate Institute of 
Australia, Submission 88, p. 9; JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 9. 
28  National Commission of Audit, Toward Responsible Government: Appendix to the Report of 
the National Commission of Audit, Vol. 2 (February 2014), p. 188. 
29  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 8. 
30  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, pp. 6–7.  
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7.32 However, some witnesses, such as Professor Beer, argued that higher density, 
infill developments would help increase the range of affordable housing options 
available to people.31 
7.33 The RBA drew the committee's attention to a growing trend in Australia 
toward higher-density housing, with more than 40 per cent of new residential building 
approvals for medium-density and higher-density housing. This compared, the RBA 
reported, to about 25 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s. As well as gradually bringing 
the composition of Australia's housing stock more into line with that in other 
countries, this shift meant there were a wider range of housing types to satisfy diverse 
needs. While per dwelling construction costs were higher and construction lags longer 
for multistorey developments, denser construction nonetheless: 
…allows households to choose to economise on the amount of land they 
consume, rather than being restricted to larger (and more expensive) blocks 
and detached structures.32 
Urban renewal and housing affordability 
7.34 Several submitters pointed to the potential to improve housing affordability 
through urban renewal activities that are properly supported by government. For 
instance, the CFRC argued that Commonwealth support for major urban infrastructure 
initiatives, especially in relation to transport investment and linked to urban renewal 
outcomes, 'offers significant opportunities to support the supply of new affordable 
housing'. The CFRC emphasised the need for Commonwealth affordable housing 
investments (a subject discussed in the second part of the report) to be properly 
integrated with state and territory planning policies in order to ensure affordable 
housing is provided 'in locations close to the accessible jobs, services and transport 
that these new infrastructure investments will provide'. The CFRC concluded that: 
…there is a significant opportunity to integrate Commonwealth investment 
in new urban infrastructure and ongoing Commonwealth subsidies for 
affordable and private sector housing with State and Territory planning 
policies for new affordable housing supply via urban renewal projects. In 
this way, public investment across these three policy domains could be 
made to work much better at generating new affordable housing provision 
in accessible urban locations. At present, this opportunity is being 
squandered.33 
The Commonwealth's role in urban planning and development 
7.35 Like many other supply-side issues, there was a general recognition from 
witnesses that urban planning arrangements were primarily the responsibility of state 
31  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 14.  
32  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 10.  
33  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, pp. 16–17. 
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and local governments. Mr Luke Foley from the UDIA acknowledged, for instance, 
that the Commonwealth's ability to influence policy in this space was limited. He 
noted, however, that the now disbanded major cities unit in the Department of 
Infrastructure had been doing some good work in this area: 
It was bringing the Commonwealth into that space and was contributing 
positively to that arena as far as providing direction and getting the 
perspective from different parts of the country and building that into a 
broader plan for cities.34 
7.36 The committee notes that in the past the Commonwealth has been actively 
involved in the urban planning and development policy space. Notably, in 2011 the 
Labor Government released the National Urban Policy (NUP), Our Cities, Our 
Future. According to the NUP's foreword by the then Minister for Infrastructure and 
Transport, the Hon Anthony Albanese MP, the NUP:  
…establishes the Australian Government’s objectives and directions for our 
cities as we prepare for the decades ahead. It recognises the critical roles of 
State, Territory and local governments, the private sector and individuals, in 
planning, managing and investing in cities. It also highlights that the 
Australian Government makes decisions that impact upon urban Australia. 
This is the first time that an Australian Government has sought to outline its 
overarching goals for the nation’s cities and how we will play a role in 
making them more productive, sustainable and liveable.35 
7.37 The committee further notes that in January 2012, the Labor Government 
established the Urban Policy Forum to provide advice to the government on the 
implementation of the NUP. The Forum consisted of members from all levels of 
government, industry and academia, and was chaired by the Secretary of the 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport.36  
'Nimbyism' and the delivery of new housing stock 
7.38 Several housing industry participants and peak bodies expressed concern that 
new housing developments, and in particular infill and higher density developments, 
often do not proceed or proceed at higher cost than necessary due to excessive weight 
given to third party appeals and objections. Asked how to find a balance between 
empowering local communities and ensuring this power was not misused, MBA 
emphasised the need for long term master-planning for cities to provide certainty to 
residents, the community and investors. MBA also pointed to the need for streamlined 
34  Mr Liam Foley, Policy Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 69–70. 
35  Australian Government, Our Cities, Our Future: A national urban policy for a productive, 
sustainable and liveable future  (2011), p. 2.  
36  The Hon Anthony Albanese, media release, 'Urban Policy Forum to provide stakeholder advice 
on cities', 20 January 2012, http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/urban-policy-forum-to-provide-
stakeholder-advice-on-cities.  
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appeal processes, to prevent people 'maliciously' using the appeals process 'to thwart 
all sorts of developments for whatever reason'.37 MBA argued that while citizens 
should have a right to influence policy, this should not mean that: 
…if one person opposes a development and 90,000 people approve it, that 
the whole thing collapses. In terms of institutional frameworks and public 
policy, you might set thresholds above which that one individual cannot 
object—they can object but it is not necessarily given the credence that it 
deserves.38 
7.39 MBA also told the committee there was a need to distinguish between 'the 
interested party' and 'the impacted party' in appeal processes. In this regard, MBA 
explained that its concern was not so much with people directly impacted by a 
development being able to object, but rather with 'someone having the capacity to 
object to a development that is totally on the other side of their town'.39  
7.40 Nimbyism, according to MBA, was also an obstacle to building the high-rise 
development that Australia needed to meet the diverse needs of its growing 
population.40 
7.41 The HIA told the committee of its frustrations with regard to nimbyism and 
the uncertainty it created for the construction industry in making decisions about 
where to add additional housing stock. This uncertainty, it contended, ultimately 
added extra costs to the delivery of new housing stock.41 These costs, the HIA told the 
committee, were currently entrenched in the planning system: 
I think we [have] a legacy of the objections that have taken place over the 
last decade or two where planning schemes, requirements for reports, 
assessments, analysis and so on have been required over the years and they 
have become embedded into the planning process. Not only is the planning 
process at risk of being frustrated by nimbies, or objectors, today; it is 
already frustrated by the residual of objectors of the past where they have 
made certain positions and those positions become embedded into planning 
policies at a council level, or that the councillors at a local level sell that 
37  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 35.  
38  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 36.  
39  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 37–38; Dr Brent Davis, National Director, Industry 
Policy, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 38–39. 
40  Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 38.  
41  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 48. 
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particular issue and developers know that in that particular council these are 
the issues that apply.42   
7.42 The HIA told the committee that despite a commitment on the part of every 
state and territory government to increase the density of housing within major cities, 
even 'low and medium scale housing developments such as dual occupancies, villas 
and townhouses, require two approvals, public notification and in many jurisdictions 
are open to third party appeals.43 
7.43 Like MBA, the HIA told the committee that urban master-planning (or 
'metropolitan planning') would ensure the rights of local communities were preserved 
while providing developers with the certainty they needed to deliver new housing 
stock: 
In having that helicopter view and feeding that down into the councils, in a 
form of code-compliant type development so that we all know what 
development is going to be in our area—we all know that it is going to be a 
house or apartment or high-rise apartment—the people have an opportunity 
to contribute at the strategic stage, at the metropolitan-development stage. 
Once that has been resolved, and there is a great opportunity there for the 
population to understand that it is not just about them, it is about the greater 
population, then there is less opportunity for there to be objection at the 
local site-by-site level.44 
7.44 Concerns regarding the impact of third party objections and appeals on 
housing supply were not limited to housing industry bodies. For example, Mr Eslake 
noted: 
[M]etropolitan planning authorities and inner-city local governments have 
made it increasingly more time-consuming and onerous to undertake 
higher-density or 'infill' developments on 'brownfields' sites—in particular 
by imposing tighter planning controls, and by providing more opportunities 
for objections to and appeals against planning decisions.45 
7.45 Mr Eslake expressed sympathy with the 'desire of residents in established 
areas to prevent developments which detract materially from their quality of life 
(and/or from the value of their properties)'. However, Mr Eslake also argued there is a 
need to reduce the: 
…cost, complexity and regulatory uncertainty associated with 'brownfields' 
and 'infill' developments in established areas—which doesn't have to mean 
traducing the property rights of other property owners, but which should 
42  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 50.  
43  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 11.  
44  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 45.  
45  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 6.  
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mean clearer and more uniform planning rules, with fewer opportunities for 
frivolous or vexatious objections and appeals.46 
Development assessment and approval processes 
7.46 To reduce the costs associated with third party objections to new housing 
developments, and generally improve the efficiency of development assessment 
processes, some witnesses argued for limiting the types of developments subject to 
third party objections and appeals. In particular, some witnesses recommended the 
wider use of code-based frameworks for assessing residential development 
applications—that is, where developments of a certain type in certain locations meet 
measurable requirements (or 'tick the boxes'), they are considered compliant and 
generally exempt from public notification or third-party objection and appeal 
processes. Others recommended a broader harmonisation of development assessment 
systems across or within jurisdictions.   
7.47 For example, to address the abovementioned disconnect between the goal of 
higher density housing development and what it regarded as the excessive influence of 
opponents of new developments, the HIA recommended the implementation of: 
…a nationally consistent single approval process for detached housing and 
low scale housing development, including dual occupancy housing 
developments. The application assessment process should be underpinned 
by a domestic code compliance mechanism based on transparency, certainty 
and plain language criteria.47 
7.48 Several state and local governments or government agencies told the 
committee that they had taken or were taking steps to improve planning and 
development assessment processes. Brisbane City Council, for instance, noted that it 
has funded improved development assessment processes aimed at supporting 
affordable housing by cutting red tape and reducing the assessment time for 
development applications: 
These efficiencies translate directly to financial benefits for the housing 
industry, including reduced holding costs and reduced application printing 
costs. The community has benefited through faster decision times for social 
infrastructure projects, making these projects more affordable and 
expeditious and therefore more feasible. Efficiencies realised by developers 
as a result of electronic processing should also have been passed on to 
members of the wider community through consultancy fees and cost of 
housing products. More efficient and simplified processes have also meant 
less time and confusion for 'one off' developers when navigating the 
development assessment process for the first time, improving affordability 
for home makers.48 
46  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 15.  
47  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 11.  
48  Brisbane City Council, Submission 121, p. 2.  
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7.49 Mr Kerry Doss from the Brisbane City Council informed the committee that 
the Council had 'calibrated' its planning scheme: 
…so that zones which are set aside for unit type approvals have a level of 
process and approval that is commensurate with that. For instance, if we 
have zoned land for multi-unit development, we have code assessable 
development for that, which takes out third party appeal rights and the 
opportunity for submissions. We have gone through our planning scheme 
and lowered the level of assessment to calibrate different land uses to the 
zone within which they fit, and that is all about cutting red tape and 
simplifying processes. We have also modified our approval processes to 
streamline for efficiencies.49 
7.50 Housing Tasmania pointed to the need for state and local governments to 
balance the need for robust planning and development assessment regulations against 
the time and cost such regulations can add to housing developments. It reported that 
the Tasmanian Government had, to this end: 
…committed to reform the current situation of multiple planning systems to 
a single State planning system with Regional Land Use Strategies [and a] 
streamlined planning and approval process with the view to increasing 
development.50 
7.51 The Department of Housing and Public Works, Queensland, told the 
committee that the Queensland government had made some progress in introducing 
some simplicity into planning schemes. The shift 'away from prescriptive approaches' 
to planning, it reported, 'allowed for a greater level of autonomy by local governments 
to actually make changes to planning schemes and to do things like release land'.51 
7.52 BIS Shrapnel commended the fact that the New Planning System for NSW 
reforms had included a streamlined approvals process, and specifically provision for 
code assessment in growth areas. However, after passing the Legislative Assembly, 
the legislation for the new system was withdrawn from the Legislative Council in 
November 2013, leaving the future of the reforms uncertain. BIS Shrapnel suggested 
that with the reform process on hold, 'supply may not reach its full potential'.52  
7.53 The committee notes that in responding to the NSW Government's proposed 
planning reforms, the then Shadow Minister for Planning and Infrastructure, 
the Hon Luke Foley MLC, indicated that the Opposition believed the code assessment 
proposals would strip community members of their 'rights to have their say about how 
49  Mr Kerry Doss, Manager, City Planning and Economic Development, City Planning and 
Sustainability Division, Brisbane City Council, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, 
p. 1.  
50  Housing Tasmania, Submission 217, p. 3.  
51  Mr Damien Walker, Deputy Director-General, Department of Housing and Public Works, 
Queensland, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 44. 
52  BIS Shrapnel, Submission 16, p. 5.  
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their neighbourhood is developed, meaning high rise can be built without community 
members able to object'.53 
Committee view 
7.54 Increased land supply per se, either in greenfield sites or infill developments, 
is not a panacea for poor housing affordability. The committee believes land release 
should align with long-term urban planning and must be targeted to the needs of 
housing buyers, including access to employment opportunities, health and education 
services and high quality transport infrastructure. While these matters are primarily 
the responsibility of the states and territories and local governments, the committee 
believes the Commonwealth can provide leadership in ensuring best-practice urban 
planning approaches are adopted in all jurisdictions. Moreover, because the 
Commonwealth has a role in funding and building supporting infrastructure for new 
housing developments, the committee suggests the Commonwealth needs be actively 
engaged on the issue of city planning and development, including urban regeneration.    
7.55 The committee also agrees that greater transparency regarding land supply 
pipelines could provide for the more efficient delivery of housing stock to the market. 
As such, the committee suggests that the proposed COAG ministerial council on 
housing and homelessness (as at recommendation 2) consider ways to improve the 
consistency, timeliness and utility of government-collected and published information 
about land supply across jurisdictions.  
7.56 The committee notes that a number of submitters argued the case for 
improved development assessment processes, including the introduction of code based 
assessments. While the committee agrees that code based assessments promise greater 
efficiency in the delivery of housing supply, it also notes public concerns that code 
assessment risks disempowering local communities and limiting their ability to shape 
how their neighbourhoods are developed. The committee believes that states and 
territories should continue to seek improved development assessment processes, and 
seek new efficiencies without unduly infringing on the right of local communities to 
register their legitimate concerns regarding housing developments. 
Recommendation 8 
7.57 The committee recommends that the proposed new Council of Australian 
Governments ministerial council on housing and homelessness (see 
recommendation 2) investigate ways to improve the consistency, timeliness and 
utility of government-collected and published information about land supply 
across jurisdictions.   
53  The Hon Luke Foley MLC, Shadow Minister for Planning and Infrastructure, media release, 
'Labor Opposition forces 46 amendments to O'Farrell Government's planning bill', 
27 November 2013, 
http://www.scca.org.au/Pdf%20links/2013PDFLinks/ShadowMinFoleyPlanningBill.pdf.  
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Recommendation 9 
7.58 The committee recommends that the Australian Government: 
(a) show leadership in regard to national urban planning policy and 
urban regeneration, given the role both can play in improving and 
driving housing affordability outcomes across Australia's major 
urban centres; 
(b) reinstate the National Urban Policy and Major Cities Unit given the 
former role both played in driving housing affordability policy and 
outcomes at the national level; and 
(c) show leadership in its policy capability and engagement with the 
states and territories with regard to urban planning policy.  
Recommendation 10 
7.59 The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider 
developing a long-term strategy for regenerating Australia's urban centres and 
transport corridors. This strategy might be incorporated into a revised national 
urban policy, and would provide for an intergovernmental and coordinated 
approach to infrastructure delivery, including upgrades to social infrastructure, 
and the identification of redevelopment opportunities for government-owned 
land (as outlined in recommendation 11).  
7.60 The committee further recommends that the Australian Government 
consider re-establishing the Urban Policy Forum, reconnecting with key 
stakeholders from the public and private sectors, academia and the community, 
and including responsibility for reviewing jurisdictional performance against 
targets relating to urban regeneration. 
Recommendation 11 
7.61 Government-owned land, whether state or Commonwealth-owned, 
represents a potential land supply for affordable housing. Current governance, 
transparency and divestment arrangements could be improved so that this 
potential might be realised. The committee recommends: 
(a) the creation of a transparent, public, up-to-date register of 
government land and buildings that are considered 'surplus' or on 
the divestment program, including the location and size of this land, 
and any development restrictions attached to it; 
(b) the direct involvement of the Commonwealth agency with housing 
policy responsibility in any asset divestment programs, and the 
possible application of affordable housing targets in divestment 
programs;  
(c) the development of innovative partnerships involving public, not-
for-profit, community and private consortiums that develop 
affordable and diverse housing on government land and buildings; 
and 
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(d) the exploration of innovative models, such as community land trusts, 
on government-owned land where the government retains the land 
or a share in the development, but a community or not-for-profit 
housing provider develops affordable housing. 
 
  
Chapter 8  
Innovation and the building industry  
8.1 On average, construction costs constitute the single largest component of new 
dwelling costs, both for infill and greenfield developments. Indeed, according to the 
former NHSC, construction costs generally account for more than half of the costs of 
new dwellings across Australia.1 In light of the overall significance of construction 
costs, this chapter considers whether the use of new construction methods and 
materials, or the adoption of more efficient regulatory settings as they apply to the 
construction industry, could help improve housing affordability.  
8.2 In addition to considering these issues, this chapter also examines the 
influence of energy efficiency on housing affordability, and the need to build housing 
that is accessible, adaptable and culturally appropriate.  
Construction costs 
Building codes and regulations 
8.3 Australia's on-site construction requirements are consolidated in a single code, 
the National Construction Code (NCC). The NCC covers the Building Code of 
Australia (BCA) and the Plumbing Code of Australia, and is managed by the 
Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB). The committee received evidence from the 
Chairman of the ABCB and a number of housing industry bodies regarding the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the NCC, and its relationship to housing affordability.  
8.4 Put simply, the NCC, as the ABCB website explains, 'provides the minimum 
necessary requirements for safety, health, amenity and sustainability in the design and 
construction of new buildings (and new building work in existing buildings) 
throughout Australia'. The NCC is not a regulation itself, but 'model regulation' that 
the states and territories agree to use as the basis for their building control legislation.2  
8.5 The NCC is a 'performance-based code', meaning builders and other 
participants in the construction industry have flexibility in how they comply with the 
NCC. In addition to mandatory Performance Requirements, the NCC includes 
Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions (prescriptive solutions), which can be used to comply 
with the Performance Requirements. According to the ABCB, as a performance-based 
1  Looking at the five mainland state capitals in its second State of Supply Report in 2010, this 
was true of infill developments in all markets, and greenfield developments in all markets 
except Sydney, where construction costs were 38 per cent of the total costs (with land costs 
constituting a higher proportion of greenfield development costs in Sydney). National Housing 
Supply Council, 2nd State of Supply Report (2010), pp. 119, 121. 
2  Australian Building Codes Board, 'About the National Construction Code', 
http://www.abcb.gov.au/about-the-national-construction-code.aspx.  
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code, the NCC encourages innovation. Mr Neil Savery, General Manager of the 
ABCB, explained the difference between performance-based standards and 
prescriptive standards:  
A performance requirement does not tell you the solution. It says, 'This is 
the minimum thing we expect of you, but how you achieve it, how you 
solve it, is up to you.' And there are different ways you can have [to] 
demonstrate it—through a 'deemed to satisfy' provision; through a 
verification method, if they exist; through expert judgement, which can be 
your qualified building surveyor, your architect, your fire engineer et cetera. 
As opposed to, if it were a prescriptive solution, not only would we be 
telling you the measure you have to achieve, we would be telling you the 
way in which you had to achieve it and there is no alternative.3 
8.6 Mr Savery told the committee that one step being taken to improve 
compliance with the NCC, and thereby reduce construction costs, was making the 
NCC a free document as of 2015.4  
8.7 Mr Savery explained the relationship between improved access and 
compliance with the NCC and the upfront and ongoing costs of a house: 
If we can lift productivity through increasing or improving access, 
awareness and understanding of the National Construction Code, we 
believe that we can improve compliance. If you improve compliance, you 
reduce cost. Cost should not be seen just in the context of the initial 
construction, be it a new house, the renovation of an existing house or an 
addition to an existing house. There are flow-on effects from not having to 
have disputations with builders and not having to go back and repair tardy 
workmanship and all of those things if we lift compliance.5 
8.8 Conversely, Mr Savery argued, poor compliance with the NCC could add 
significantly to construction costs. Mr Savery explained that often local governments 
did not adequately understand the NCC, or understood it but nonetheless used 
planning scheme powers to introduce building requirements that exceeded its 
minimum national standards. Mr Savery provided the example of floor-to-ceiling 
height standards to highlight how such departures from the NCC could add to housing 
costs: 
The National Construction Code sets the minimum standards; and in some 
local governments they insist that, say for a typical apartment building, the 
floor-to-ceiling heights be different. Apart from the fact that that exceeds 
the minimum standard, a lot of building practice is geared to the standards 
3  Mr Neil Savery, General Manager, Australian Building Codes Board, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 3. 
4  Mr Neil Savery, General Manager, Australian Building Codes Board, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 2.  
5  Mr Neil Savery, General Manager, Australian Building Codes Board, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 November 2014, pp. 1–2.  
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that have been set. When someone comes along and says, 'Ignore that, we 
want to set something different,' they have to go and customise designs, 
customise factory production processes. The other I will call it an absurdity 
is that you might simply be separated by a road that delineates two council 
areas. The council on the right abides by the National Construction Code 
and the council on the left does not. The builder is potentially building in 
both council areas and has to adjust to both construction requirements. That 
adds to cost.6  
8.9 Asked to quantify the cost of local governments implementing standards in 
excess of the NCC minimums, Mr Savery pointed to a report by the Centre for 
International Economics suggesting 'local government variations that exist across the 
country are probably costing about $300 million per annum'.7 
8.10 The HIA also referred to the costs added by governments applying building 
standards that exceeded the national minimum standards, and recommended 
restricting the ability of governments to do so.8 
8.11 Whereas Mr Savery and the ABCB Chairman's submission argued that the 
NCC had a positive impact on housing costs, the HIA suggested that the frequency of 
revisions to the BCA—which constitutes Volumes One and Two of the NCC—made 
it 'difficult for industry participants to maintain efficient operating processes'; this, in 
turn, imposed 'unnecessary costs, barriers and administrative burdens on business'. 
Changes to the BCA, the HIA argued, should be limited to every five years: 
…to allow time for the residential building industry to interpret and apply 
the changes and to allow time to update internal administrative processes. 
The stringencies in the code should also be maintained over longer periods 
to allow the manufacturing sector to develop new and innovative product to 
meet these standards in more cost effective ways.9 
New construction methods and materials 
8.12 A number of submitters drew the committee's attention to new design and 
construction methods and building materials with the potential to reduce building 
costs and thereby improve affordability outcomes.  
8.13 For example, Lend Lease informed the committee of alternative building 
materials it was pioneering in Australian housing construction, and how this was 
6  Mr Neil Savery, General Manager, Australian Building Codes Board, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 3.  
7  Mr Neil Savery, General Manager, Australian Building Codes Board, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 3. 
8  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, pp. 12–13.  
9  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, pp. 12–13. Mr Savery informed the committee 
that member governments have agreed that as of 2016 changes will be introduced on a three-
year cycle. Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 7.  
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shortening construction time and cost. The use of pre-fabrication, it suggested, had 
two particular cost advantages: 'it can be concurrently processed without any site 
constraints, and more importantly, it benefits from an assembly-line method of 
production as opposed to a cellular in-situ method.'10 Lend Lease added: 
It is important to note that innovations in design, alternative materials and 
pre-fabrication such as these often need the early and explicit support of 
Governments. The lead time for adoption of innovative technologies and 
methods by markets and regulatory regimes can often be compressed with 
such support. This becomes less necessary over time as standardisation and 
economies of scale are achieved.11 
8.14 The HIA submitted that the availability of competitively priced imported and 
locally produced building products assists in containing building costs, and ultimately 
improving housing affordability. The globalisation of building products, it suggested, 
was 'providing builders and consumers with access to a wider choice of products as 
well as new products that are being utilised to meet more complex construction 
requirements.' At the same time, it warned that it was imperative that competition be 
on a fair and level playing field, and building standards and requirements for the 
performance and safety of building materials and products must be adhered to by both 
local and imported products: 
At HIA's 2012 Housing Summit—Building Products: a compliance free 
zone, industry representatives and government officials agreed that ensuring 
building products and components used in the Australian housing industry 
comply with codes and standards was an important matter for consumers, 
regulators and policy makers as well as for builders and designers. 
The cost of failure and subsequent replacement of substandard materials—
and the damage they can cause—will invariably outstrip any initial savings 
on the original purchase, and in the case of structural materials, sanitary and 
electrical components particularly, the potential cost to the health and safety 
of staff or customers is far greater. The recent example of non-complying 
electrical wiring highlights this point.12 
8.15 WALGA underlined the need for 'innovation in the use of building materials 
and construction methods' that could reduce the cost of developing new homes. Yet 
despite this need, WALGA suggested there was: 
…very little evidence to suggest that innovative construction design and 
methods are being sought by the development industry in response to 
declining affordability of homes. The majority of those companies within 
the housing industry responding to affordability do so through reducing 
dwelling and lot sizes, changing dwelling product and sourcing cheaper or 
more efficient materials that reduce time (and therefore costs) on site. The 
10  Lend Lease, Submission 170, p. 1.  
11  Lend Lease, Submission 170, p. 2.  
12  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 12.  
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bulk of any change that has happened in the building process involves a 
modification or refining of traditional construction techniques rather 
wholesale change.13 
8.16 Similarly, Professor Shane Murray remarked that, in terms of its delivery of 
stock, the housing industry remains essentially 'a cottage based industry which lacks 
innovation and sophistication in its delivery'. He argued that, at present, there was a 
'type of extreme binary' in the forms of housing delivery, 'which are either high-rise 
apartments or detached low-density dwellings'. In order to deliver better affordability 
outcomes, he called for a greater emphasis on innovation 'through the industrialisation 
of the construction of housing—modularised delivery, off-site construction'.14 
8.17 Asked about the tension between affordability and building quality, Mr Mills 
from the City of Melbourne cautioned that smaller apartment sizes or more cheaply 
designed and built dwellings did not necessarily equate to better affordability 
outcomes: 
If you have poor-quality apartments without much light and ventilation, 
there are therefore life cycle costs of running that apartment, with more 
energy being used for light and mechanical ventilation, not to mention the 
health implications of living in a bedroom without a window. It is not any 
cheaper.15 
8.18 Asked how flexible the NCC was in relation to new building materials and 
techniques, Mr Savery told the committee that one of the advantages of having a 
performance-based code was its flexibility. He noted the challenges innovation 
sometimes presented for regulators setting standards, yet told the committee: 
Even though all regulators, all code writers and standards writers struggle 
with the fact that innovation comes along and it takes you time to move 
your processes through, if you have a performance-based code it at least 
allows people to come up with a performance-based solution to your 
minimum performance requirement, whilst you are working your way 
through with alternative standards.16 
Energy efficiency and housing affordability 
8.19 In large part, commentary about energy efficiency and its relationship to 
housing affordability during the inquiry focused on the 6-star requirements introduced 
13  Western Australian Local Government Association, Submission 37, p. 12.  
14  Professor Shane Murray, Dean, MADA, Monash University Faculty of Art Design & 
Architecture, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 14.  
15  Mr Adam Mills, Senior Strategic Planning, City of Melbourne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, p. 32.  
16  Mr Neil Savery, General Manager, Australian Building Codes Board, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 7. Also see The Hon John Thwaites, Chairman of the 
Australian Building Codes Board, Submission 19, pp. 8–9.  
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in the BCA in 2010. Under the revised requirements, new standard residential 
buildings must meet a 6-star energy efficiency rating (with a minimum of 5 and an 
average of 6 stars for multi-residential), instead of the previous 5-star rating. In his 
submission, the Chairman of the ABCB conceded that the higher standard might add 
'a small amount to the initial construction cost of dwellings', but maintained that 'over 
the life of the building significant savings are returned to householders by increasing 
efficiency standards through lower energy costs resulting in a net benefit to the 
householder'. This was particularly true, the Chairman wrote, in light of increasing 
energy prices in recent years.17  
8.20 AHURI pointed to research showing that after a few years of occupancy, the 
energy efficiency savings resulting from the higher star rating requirement outweighed 
the higher build costs. 'In other words', AHURI wrote, '[6-star building] energy 
efficiency pays when compared with "business as usual" 5-star designs'.18 In its 
submission, WALGA also noted that improving the sustainability and energy 
efficiency of a home was an important factor in improving that home's ongoing 
affordability.19  
8.21 Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive of the Council on the Ageing (COTA), told the 
committee that for renters, particularly those on a tight income stream such as aged 
pensioners, a lack of energy efficiency could add significantly to affordability 
pressures.20 Aged and Community Services Australia (ACSA) also pointed to the 
significance of energy efficiency in determining housing affordability for older 
people, including people wanting to age in their homes: 
An enhanced focus on environmental sustainability will have a positive 
impact on housing running costs and affordability levels. The development 
of energy efficient homes for older people in Australia in particular will 
provide positive outcomes for all, the ongoing running costs of homes will 
be reduced and older people with fixed incomes will be able to remain in 
their homes at an affordable cost.21 
8.22 ACSA recommended that the various energy efficiency programs currently 
administered at the state level (running in South Australia, New South Wales and 
Victoria at the time of ACSA's submission), be folded into a National Energy Saving 
Initiative. This initiative, ACSA suggested, 'could directly accommodate these [state] 
schemes in a nationally consistent framework and deliver economies of scale'.22 
17  The Hon John Thwaites, Chairman of the Australian Building Codes Board, Submission 19, pp. 
9–10.  
18  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 28.  
19  Western Australian Local Government Association, Submission 37, p. 12.  
20  Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive, Council on the Ageing, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 22 
21  Aged and Community Services Australia, Submission 111, p. 6. 
22  Aged and Community Services Australia, Submission 111, p. 6. 
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8.23 The Equality Rights Alliance also submitted that 'energy efficiency and 
household running costs need to be a central consideration in the provision of 
affordable housing'. Noting the barriers that prevent people on low incomes from 
investing in improved energy efficiency, and the inability of tenants to improve the 
energy efficiency of their homes, the Equality Rights Alliance endorsed the following 
recommendations made in a 2013 ACOSS report: 
• Energy efficiency standards for rental properties, and landlord tax 
incentives for energy efficiency measures to improve energy efficiency 
of rental properties. 
• Additional funding for targeted retrofits of the worst performing social 
housing where health, climate and hardship risks are greatest.23 
8.24 Mr Alan Pears AM noted that the HIA-CBA housing affordability indicator (a 
variation of the '30 per cent rule' applied to mortgage repayments), does not allow for 
reduced housing costs from improved energy efficiency. On this basis, Mr Pears 
suggested the indicator is simplistic and 'seriously distorts housing policy'. Mr Pears 
told the committee that the indicator was used by some in the building industry to 
argue against higher energy efficiency standards on grounds of affordability. The 
problem, Mr Pears argued, is that the indicator: 
…ignores all other living costs. So, where the sustainability features of a 
home reduce ongoing living costs and enhance capacity to repay the 
mortgage and enhance resale value, their contribution to capacity to make 
repayments is ignored.24 
8.25 The HIA argued that energy efficiency regulations for new residential 
buildings, and in particular the 6-star energy efficiency standards under the BCA, 
were excessive: 
Energy efficiency standards were first introduced in the BCA from 2003, 
with complementary requirements for some fixed services introduced in 
2010. The standards have been increased twice in six years. Based on 
federal government research regarding the 2010 changes, the higher level 
stringency delivers a benefit/cost ratio of less than 1:1. Although analysis 
clearly demonstrated that the regulation imposed a net cost on the 
community, this additional cost was imposed on all new homes.25 
Housing that is accessible, adaptable and appropriate 
8.26 A central theme in much of the evidence received by the committee is that 
meaningful housing affordability requires that housing is also accessible, adaptable 
and appropriate to occupant needs. Dr Wendy Stone told the committee that in 
addition to structural reforms to enable people to afford housing, greater attention 
23  Equality Rights Alliance, Submission 95, p. 15.  
24  Mr Alan Pears AM, Submission 67, pp. 1–2.  
25  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, pp. 12–13.  
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needed to be given to ensuring 'the housing that people have must be adequate in size 
for families, and also in nature for disabled and elderly people.'26 Similarly, 
Dr Maree Petersen from the University of Queensland's Institute for Social Science 
Research stressed that 'affordable housing for older people has to be accessible as 
well, because that brings the security'.27 
8.27 COTA noted that it was often the case that 'the only affordable housing is not 
appropriate, either because of its design, or its geographic position and lack of 
proximity to necessary services'. With regard to older people, COTA wrote that in 
order for people to be able to age in place successfully, the house they live in needs to 
be appropriate to their changing needs. For this reason, COTA had been involved in 
developing the Liveable Housing Design Guidelines.28 The nationally-endorsed 
Guidelines were developed by Liveable Housing Australia, a not-for-profit partnership 
between community and consumer groups, government and the residential building 
industry. The Guidelines are intended to ensure homes are safe and accessible for all 
occupants and better anticipate and respond to the changing needs and abilities of the 
people who live in the home.29 
8.28 Mr Yates told the committee that COTA was keen to see the Guidelines more 
widely adopted.30 In its submission, COTA noted that while take-up of the standards 
had been slower than anticipated, at this stage COTA 'does not support making the 
standards mandatory but believes there need to be more initiatives developed to 
encourage their adoption by both consumers and the building industry'.31 
8.29 The Residential Development Council (RDC), part of the Property Council of 
Australia, also recommended that the government work with industry members to 
encourage adoption of the Guidelines, and to support industry with training and 
education to this end. The RDC also suggested the government require that all new 
homes built using Commonwealth incentives were consistent with the Guidelines.32  
8.30 National Seniors Australia told the committee that its research indicated that 
36 per cent of over-50s live in housing that does not have design features suitable for 
26  Dr Wendy Stone, private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 18.  
27  Dr Maree Petersen, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Institute for Social Science Research, 
University of Queensland, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 14.  
28  COTA Australia, Submission 191, p. 6. 
29  Liveable Housing Australia, 'About the Guidelines', 
http://www.livablehousingaustralia.org.au/86/about-the-guidelines.aspx.   
30  Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive, Council on the Ageing, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 22. 
31  COTA Australia, Submission 191, p. 6. 
32  Residential Development Council, Property Council of Australia, Submission 212, p. 14.  
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ageing.33 National Seniors Australia told the committee that the Liveable Housing 
Guidelines were potentially effective in improving housing accessibility, but: 
…legislative impediments exist at local council and state levels. It would be 
great to see them in the building codes or, to some extent, if builders or 
architects could be educated on how they could nicely be put into a home at 
a good cost and the benefits of doing that for the landlords of those homes 
through private rentals. They would be accessible to so many different 
people, and obviously a long-term tenancy as well could help that.34 
8.31 RI Australia and the Australian Network for Universal Housing Design 
expressed concern regarding the 'questionable' commitment of the housing industry to 
the Guidelines. They recommended that if the targets set by Liveable Housing 
Australia were not met, then the minimum access requirements should be incorporated 
into the NCC/BCA for all new and extensively modified housing.35 The Disability 
Advocacy Network Australia, Ethnic Disability Alliance and Australian Federation of 
Disability Organisations also questioned how effective voluntary measures were, and 
suggested that until 'stronger measures are taken, many people with disabilities will 
find their needs unmet by the property market and housing stocks'. These 
organisations also recommended incorporation of the Guidelines into the BCA.36 
8.32 ACSA called a National Older Persons Housing Strategy that would 'focus on 
enabling older people to make housing adjustments and choices that enhance ageing in 
place, wellbeing and lifestyle'. In addition to increasing the supply of affordable rental 
housing and addressing the changing support needs of older tenants, ACSA submitted 
that a National Older Persons Housing Strategy would promote the development of 
adaptable housing, including a change to building standards, and provide for the 
expansion of home maintenance and modification programs.37  
Committee view 
8.33 The committee welcomes steps taken to improve access, awareness and 
understanding of the NCC, and notes advice from the ABCB that these steps will help 
improve compliance and reduce construction costs.  
8.34 The committee also notes evidence suggesting new, innovative building 
materials and construction methods have considerable potential to bring construction 
costs down and improve housing affordability. In particular, the committee notes the 
33  Ms Marie Skinner, Senior Policy Adviser, National Seniors Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 9.  
34  Mrs Kylie Ullman, Policy Adviser, National Seniors Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 14.  
35  RI Australia and Australian Network for Universal Housing Design, Submission 221, p. 14. 
36  Disability Advocacy Network Australia, National Ethnic Disability Alliance and Australian 
Federation of Disability Organisations, Submission 202, pp. 9–10, 18.  
37  Aged and Community Services Australia, Submission 111, p. 4.  
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potential of modular, pre-fabricated housing, which can be delivered in less time and 
at lower cost than conventional housing, and may also have sustainability benefits. 
Modular and prefabricated housing is a core part of an emerging new sector in the 
Australian building industry, and could potentially stimulate the development of a 
high-skilled and cross-sectoral 'home grown' supply chain from forest to factory. 
8.35 The committee encourages the Australian Government to engage with the 
building industry to ensure regulatory frameworks are conducive to the use of such 
materials and construction methods. The committee further believes that the issue of 
pre-fabricated housing deserves greater attention, and to this end recommends a 
separate parliamentary inquiry into the role of the prefabricated housing industry. 
8.36 The committee acknowledges the importance of energy efficiency as an 
indirect housing cost. It notes that some progress has been made in recent years in 
ensuring new housing stock is more energy efficient. 
8.37 Given the importance of ensuring housing is accessible, adaptable and 
appropriate to occupant needs, the committee is concerned by reports regarding the 
slow take-up of the Liveable Housing Guidelines. This is a matter that deserves close 
monitoring, and the committee would encourage the Australian Government to liaise 
with industry on how to ensure the wider adoption of the Guidelines.  
Recommendation 12 
8.38 The committee recommends a separate parliamentary inquiry into the 
Australian prefabricated housing industry, and its potential role in improving 
housing affordability and stimulating new activity in the manufacturing sector. 
This inquiry should consider, among other things: 
(a) the development of a comprehensive approach to creating a 
sustainable prefabricated building and insulated panel production 
industry; 
(b) the possibility of Commonwealth prefabricated housing targets in a 
national affordable housing plan (see recommendation 4); 
(c) the possibility of a Commonwealth prefabricated modular housing 
industry package to provide support for research and development, 
skills and training, assistance to establish new production and 
manufacturing facilities, and world class demonstration projects. 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 9  
Commonwealth taxation settings 
9.1 A major focus of this inquiry was the relationship between Commonwealth 
taxation settings and housing affordability. 
9.2 Investors in real estate, like investors in other asset classes, are able to deduct 
losses from their investment, including interest paid on borrowings, against other 
assessable personal income. This arrangement is commonly known as 'negative 
gearing'. Again, like investors in other asset classes, property investors are also 
generally able to claim a 50 per cent discount on any realised capital gain on an 
investment property, so long as that property has been held for more than 12 months.  
9.3 This chapter examines the various arguments made by witnesses regarding the 
effect on housing affordability of negative gearing arrangements and the capital gains 
tax (CGT) discount, or indeed the two taken together. Broadly speaking, critics of 
negative gearing and the CGT discount told the committee that current settings 
distorted demand and had an inflationary impact on purchase affordability. In contrast, 
other witnesses contended that the existing tax treatment of investor housing was 
consistent with the tax treatment of other asset classes, and moreover served to 
stimulate housing supply and contain rental prices. After canvassing these different 
arguments, this chapter outlines options for reform that might be investigated be the 
government.  
9.4 Although not attracting as much attention as the tax treatment of the investor 
housing, some submitters focused on the exemption of owner-occupied housing from 
CGT. The CGT exemption, these witnesses argued, encouraged Australians to 
'overinvest' in their housing, placing further upward pressure on prices, thus favouring 
existing home owners at the expense of would-be first home buyers. This chapter 
considers these arguments. 
The tax treatment of investor housing 
Understanding negative gearing and the CGT discount 
9.5 In Australian tax law, investors have a right to offset non-capital losses from 
an income producing asset against their personal income, and can thereby reduce the 
overall amount of personal income tax payable. 'Negative gearing' is commonly taken 
to refer to the ability of landlords to deduct losses from mortgage-financed rental 
property, including interest paid on borrowings to acquire the property, from their 
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overall assessable income (including labour income).1 It is important to note, 
however, that other assets, such as shares, are subject to the same tax treatment. The 
ability to negatively gear a residential investment property is not, in other words, a 
housing-specific exception to or departure from the broader Australian tax law, even if 
it is often perceived as such.  
9.6 Of course, even for income earners in the higher marginal tax brackets, 
discounted losses are still losses. However, property investors generally pursue a 
negative gearing strategy in the expectation that a property's capital appreciation will 
more than make up for the losses they incur from holding the property. While capital 
gains are subject to taxation (except for gains on assets acquired prior to the 
introduction of CGT in September 1985), this tax is only payable when a capital gain 
is realised—for instance, when an asset, such as an investment property, is sold. And 
whereas capital gains are taxed at the same rate as a taxpayer's other income, a CGT 
discount, which reduces the taxable gain by 50 per cent, applies for an asset held for 
more than 12 months. In this sense, an investor may pursue a negative gearing strategy 
with a view to not only deferring their tax liability, but indeed permanently reducing it 
by, in effect, converting income gains into discounted capital gains.  
9.7 Prior to 1999, capital gains were adjusted for inflation then taxed at the 
taxpayer's full marginal rate. Since 1999, CGT has been levied on nominal capital 
gains, with individuals and trusts (but not companies) eligible for the aforementioned 
50 per cent discount.2 The changes to the CGT reforms, according to the 1999 Review 
of Business Taxation ('the Ralph Report') in which they were proposed, were intended 
to 'increase the international competitiveness of Australian business and to encourage 
greater investment by Australians'.3  
9.8 According to Mr Eslake, whatever the original intent the combined effect of 
the 1999 CGT changes and already extant negative gearing arrangements has been to 
create a vehicle for permanently reducing, rather than simply deferring, personal 
income tax liability.4  
1  As the ATO puts it, a 'rental property is negatively geared if it is purchased with the assistance 
of borrowed funds and the net rental income, after deducting other expenses, is less than the 
interest on borrowings'. ATO, 'Expenses you can deduct in the income year incurred', 
https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Property/Residential-rental-properties/Expenses-you-can-
claim/Expenses-you-can-deduct-in-the-income-year-incurred/. 'Negative gearing' is taken in 
this chapter to refer to when taxpayers use losses from a negatively geared asset to reduce their 
overall assessable income. 
2  For assets acquired before the new arrangements were introduced in September 1999, investors 
can calculate their capital gains liability using either the old indexation method or the current 
CGT discount method. 
3  Review of Business Taxation, John Ralph AO (Chair), A Tax System Redesigned: More 
Certain, Equitable and Durable (Canberra 1999), p. 14. 
4  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 10. 
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9.9 Other witnesses also drew the committee's attention to the asymmetric 
treatment of expenses and capital gains for housing investors, and the incentive this 
creates to invest in housing as a means of minimising tax liability. As ACOSS 
explained: 
While deductions for investment expenses are a well-established and 
legitimate feature of the income tax system, deductions for 'negatively 
geared' investments in assets that yield capital gains (including property, 
shares and collectables) are not properly matched (in timing or in value) 
with the related income stream. Taxpayers receive immediate deductions at 
their current marginal tax rate against future income that mainly takes the 
form of capital gains.5 
9.10  Mr Eslake suggested that the increase in landlords claiming losses since 1999 
underlined the growth in popularity of negative gearing as a tax strategy since the 
abovementioned changes to the CGT regime: 
In 1998–99, when capital gains were last taxed at the same rate as other 
types of income (less an allowance for inflation), Australia had 1.3 million 
tax-paying landlords who in total made a taxable profit of almost 
$700 [million]. By 2010–11, the latest year for which statistics are presently 
available, the number of tax-paying landlords had risen to over 1.8 [million] 
(or 14% of the total number of individual taxpayers), but they collectively 
lost more than $7.8 [billion], largely because the amount they paid out in 
interest rose more than fourfold (from just over $5 [billion] to almost 
$23 [billion] over this period), while the amount they collected in rent 'only' 
slightly less than trebled (from $11 [billion] to $30 [billion]), as did other 
(non-interest) expenses.6               
9.11 The Henry Review observed that around 70 per cent of property investors in 
2006–07 were negatively geared, up from 58 per cent in 2001–02.7 AHURI also 
highlighted the popularity of negative gearing. In its submission, it pointed to figures 
from the ATO showing two-thirds of individuals deriving rent had a net rental loss 
from their property.8 
5  Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 108, pp. 3–4. Also see City Futures Research 
Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 11. 
6  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 10. According to AHURI sponsored research, the 50 per cent 
CGT discount will not always result in a lower capital gains tax liability for property investors 
than the pre-1999 application of CGT on real capital gains. This research suggests if 'house 
prices appreciate at less than twice the rate of inflation investors have lower after-tax returns 
under current than pre-1999 capital gains tax arrangements. While many if not most landlords 
will end up paying more capital gains tax under current arrangements, the real issue for many is 
the failure to tax real rather than nominal gains.' Gavin Wood, Rachel Ong and Clinton 
McMurray, 'The impacts of the Henry Review recommendations on the private rental market: 
Savings income discount and rent assistance,' AHURI Final Report No. 175 (September 2011), 
pp. 3–4. 
7  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), pp. 69–70. 
8  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 5. 
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9.12 Other AHURI sponsored research, however, has suggested that this figure 
may be significantly overstated for a range of reasons, and estimated that the 
proportion of residential landlords claiming rental losses might only be one-third.9 
The Australia Institute, while concerned at the prevalence of negative gearing, 
conceded that in a low interest environment the proportion of landlords claiming 
overall losses had declined.10 
The Henry Review and the tax treatment of investment housing 
9.13 It is worth noting at this juncture that the Henry Review included 
recommendations directed toward providing for a more consistent tax treatment of 
gains and losses from savings. The review found that the inconsistent treatment of 
household savings led to significant arbitrage opportunities: 
The different treatment of capital gains as against other savings income and 
related expenses is an important driver of these opportunities. This creates 
significant distortions in how rental properties, in particular, are financed 
and for the rental property market.11 
9.14 To this end, the review recommended applying a 40 per cent discount to most 
interest income, net residential rental property income, capital gains and certain 
interest expenses (recommendation 14). In addition to allowing for a 40 per cent 
discount on (among other things) rental income, this would also mean that only 
40 per cent of interest (and other expenses) could be claimed as deductions, and the 
current 50 per cent capital gains discount would be reduced to a 40 per cent discount. 
The Henry Review explained how these changes were expected to impact investment 
in housing: 
The current personal income tax system favourably treats capital gains and 
amplifies this benefit when investments are geared. By discounting net 
rental income at the same rate as capital gains, the tax treatment of investor 
housing will be less responsive to gearing levels and capital gains, creating 
a more neutral treatment of different forms of saving… 
The proposed reforms would reduce the bias in favour of the capital gains 
generated in rental properties by treating it more neutrally compared to 
rental yield. Over the long term, this is likely to change investor demand 
toward housing with higher rental yields and longer investment horizons. 
This may also result in a more stable housing market, as the current 
incentive for investors to chase large capital gains in housing would be 
reduced.12 
9  Gavin Wood, Rachel Ong and Clinton McMurray, 'The impacts of the Henry Review 
recommendations on the private rental market: Savings income discount and rent assistance,' 
AHURI Final Report No. 175 (September 2011), pp. 15–16. 
10  Ms Molly Johnson, Researcher, The Australia Institute, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 63. 
11  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), p. 70. 
12  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), pp. 417–18. 
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9.15 As Professor Yates pointed out, the tax treatment of investor housing was 
recognised in the Henry Review as 'amongst the greatest tax-induced biases to the 
savings choices of households'.13 However, the Henry Review acknowledged that its 
recommended reforms could have an adverse short-term impact on the level of 
investment in housing in Australia. As such, it recommended that the reforms as they 
related to investor housing should only be implemented after the delivery of separate 
reforms relating to the supply of housing and the provision of housing assistance.14  
9.16 Regardless, on release of the report the then government announced that it 
would not implement certain recommendations in the report 'at any stage', including 
recommendation 14. The government further announced that it would not consider 
reducing the CGT discount or applying a discount to negative gearing deductions.15 
Negative gearing and purchase affordability 
9.17 Using the 2010–11 losses declared, Mr Eslake estimated a cost to revenue 
from negative gearing of $5 billion; this was, he contended, a 'pretty large subsidy 
from people who are working and saving to people who are borrowing and 
speculating'. More than that, he continued: 
…it's hard to think of any worthwhile public policy purpose which is served 
by it. It certainly does nothing to increase the supply of housing, since the 
vast majority of landlords buy established properties: 92% of all borrowing 
by residential property investors over the past decade has been for the 
purchase of established dwellings, as against about 72% of all borrowing by 
owner-occupiers. 
Precisely for that reason, the availability of 'negative gearing' contributes to 
upward pressure on the prices of established dwellings, and thus diminishes 
housing affordability for would-be home buyers.16 
9.18 Making a similar point, ACOSS submitted that not only did the benefits of 
negative gearing skew heavily toward higher income earners, but that it served to 
inflate housing costs and fuel 'speculative booms in the housing market'. This, ACOSS 
suggested, was a function of the fact that 90 per cent of investment in negatively 
geared housing stock applies to existing properties.17 
13  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 6. 
14  Treasury, Australia's Future Tax System Review final report (Canberra 2010), pp. 71, 418. 
15  The Hon Wayne Swan MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer, and the Hon Kevin 
Rudd MP, Prime Minister, joint media release, 'Stronger, Fairer, Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our 
Future', 2 May 2010, 
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/028.htm&pageID=0
03&min=wms&Year. 
16  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 10. 
17  Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 108, pp. 3–4. 
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9.19 Referring to the tax treatment of investor housing (and owner-occupied 
housing, as discussed later in this chapter), the CFRC also argued that tax settings 
such as negative gearing lowered the cost of housing for investors. This in turn 
reinforced: 
…factors that add to housing demand and compound dwelling price 
pressures in the presence of supply inelasticities. Given their typically pro-
cyclical effect they enhance rather than counteract market volatility and can 
lead to lower rates of growth.18 
9.20 Referring to the interaction between negative gearing and CGT arrangements, 
the Executive Officer of National Shelter, Mr Adrian Pisarski, told the committee that 
these tax arrangements served to inflate demand in a system with inadequate supply. 
In this sense, the current taxation treatment of investor housing reinforced the barriers 
to market entry for would-be homebuyers: 
We have a well-documented undersupply of housing overall and an even 
larger documented undersupply of affordable housing. Lots of people want 
to get into home ownership in Australia but cannot afford to, and they are 
being out-competed by people who have a pocketful of tax incentives. You 
cannot create a properly effective, equal, free market if you distort it in such 
ways. We have these massive distortions that really advantage investors 
over people who want to purchase to occupy a property.19 
9.21 Likewise, the Australia Institute argued that the taxation treatment of investor 
housing favoured property investors at the direct expense of people looking to 
purchase their first home: 
High income households are particularly favoured as they have the financial 
capacity to purchase property and a larger taxable income to deduct losses 
from. Through providing such generous tax benefits government policy has 
increased the demand for investment housing. First home owners, who 
often have less financial capacity, must now compete against investors for 
properties. These tax concessions are inequitable and further reinforce the 
intergenerational and income gap between home owners and first home 
buyers or renters.20 
9.22 Other witnesses, including NT Shelter, Uniting Communities, Tenants Union 
of Victoria and Youth Action NSW also argued that the current taxation treatment of 
18  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 5. 
19  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 34. 
20  The Australia Institute, Submission 92, p. 8. Also see Mr David Baker, Director of Research, 
The Australia Institute, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 62. 
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investor housing created speculative demand, forcing prices higher and making it 
more difficult for first home buyers to buy a home at a price they could afford.21 
9.23 In contrast, the REIA told the committee that it was a strong proponent of 
negative gearing because it adds to housing supply. Given negative gearing stimulated 
housing supply, the REIA argued, it was questionable whether it did, in fact, add to 
the cost of housing.22 The HIA made a similar argument, writing that negative gearing 
was being blamed for distortions in the housing market that were in fact caused by 
supply constraints: 
Under current policy settings as they apply to Australia's housing industry, 
there are a number of distortions to the housing market which are causing 
an undersupply of housing and placing an undue upward pressure on rents. 
Negative gearing does not fall into this category. 
Independent economic modelling commissioned by HIA finds that reducing 
negative gearing concessions in the current housing policy environment 
would exacerbate existing distortions and reduce housing affordability.23 
9.24 Treasury was asked by the committee to comment on a just-released Moody's 
report suggesting the existence of negative gearing adds about 9 per cent, or $44,000, 
to the cost of an average home in markets with high incomes. Mr Rob Heferen, 
Executive Director of Treasury's Revenue Group, indicated that he was not yet 
familiar with the report. Nonetheless, Mr Heferen explained why such findings needed 
to be treated with a degree of caution: 
[O]ften when these exercises are done they are done in an 'all other things 
being equal' kind of scenario. You limit interest deductions on investor 
properties to rental income. The negative gearing that comes from those 
interest deductions can be used to offset against other income. So, if you 
limit it to rental income, what is the change in the return that the investor 
gets and then taking that away? Often what those sorts of exercises do not 
do—and it is no surprise they do not do it, because it is extraordinarily 
complex—is to work out, if that money goes away, where it will then be 
invested and what is then the effect on the macro-economy. So that 
feedback loop that goes into more of a general equilibrium kind of thinking 
is something that is extraordinarily difficult. Often when it is small amounts 
of money it is largely irrelevant, but I suspect that, once it gets up into 
several billions of dollars, that is the kind of time when those secondary 
effects or the feedback effects become more important. That kind of 
modelling capacity is very unusual. It is quite rare. Certainly we in the 
21  NT Shelter, Submission 118, p. 5; Mr Simon Scrapel, Chief Executive, Uniting Communities, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 32; Mr Mark O'Brien, Chief Executive Officer, 
Tenants Union of Victoria, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 48; Youth Action 
NSW, Submission 51, pp. 58–68. 
22  Mr Jock Kreital, Manager, Policy, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 75. 
23  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 8. 
 
                                              
130  
Treasury attempt to get and maintain some expertise in that, but it also 
becomes very assumption driven. If the return is not there for an investor, 
where would they put that dollar?24 
Negative gearing and rental affordability 
9.25 In 1985, the Australian Government enacted legislation that 'quarantined' 
losses made from owning rental properties, so that losses from rental properties could 
only be deducted from rental income. In contrast to the arrangements which prevail 
today, during the quarantine period these losses could not be used to reduce tax on 
other sources of assessable income. Losses could, however, be carried forward to 
offset future rental profits and capital gains from the sale of such investments. The 
changes only applied to real estate purchased after 17 July 1985.   
9.26 In 1987, the decision to quarantine negative gearing was reversed (with effect 
from 1 July 1987). The decision was ostensibly made for two reasons. First, ending 
the quarantine would result in uniformity of tax treatment of interest costs for all types 
of investment. Second, the government concluded the tax benefit to high income 
earners offered by negative gearing was adequately countered by other tax reform 
measures introduced subsequent to the enactment of the quarantine, notably the 
introduction of the CGT regime in September 1985.25 However, some students of the 
decision have suggested it was, in the main, a response to political pressure. This 
pressure, they argue, came from a housing industry that argued (rightly or wrongly) 
that the quarantine had driven up rents as landlords were forced to pass the cost of the 
higher tax burden on to their tenants.26 
9.27 The committee heard a variety of views regarding the impact of negative 
gearing on rents, and various interpretations of the effects of the quarantine. As noted 
above, the REIA argued that negative gearing added to housing supply, including the 
supply of rental accommodation. It contended that changing negative gearing rules, 
including along the lines suggested by the Henry Review, would place added pressure 
on supply in an already tight market. Implementing the Henry Review 
recommendations, the REIA calculated, would add 2 per cent to the rental cost of a 
median three bedroom house. The REIA also highlighted the 1980s quarantine as 
proof of the risks associated with any move to limit the application of negative gearing 
for investment property. According to the REIA, in the two years the quarantine was 
24  Mr Rob Heferen, Executive Director, Revenue Group, The Treasury, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 21. 
25  Jim O'Donnell, 'Quarantining Interest Deductions for Negatively Geared Rental Property 
Investments', eJournal of Tax Research 3, no. 1 (2005), p. 70. 
26  Pasqualina Callea, 'Negative Gearing: should we move towards the United Kingdom system?' 
ConTax Newsletter (September 2012), p. 8, 
http://www.taxinstitute.com.au/files/dmfile/Feature_Article_Negative_Gearing_Contax_Sept20
121.pdf. 
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in place, rents increased by 57.5 per cent in Sydney, 38.2 per cent in Perth and 
32 per cent in Brisbane.27 
9.28 In contrast, AHURI suggested that on the whole the recommendations of the 
Henry Review would improve rental affordability. This, it suggested, was because 
while the after-tax economic costs for negatively geared investors would increase, the 
costs for equity investors would decline. These lower costs would flow through: 
…into long term average annual rents, which would fall by just over 
$300 per year (Wood 2011). This would have a mixed effect on investors' 
willingness to retain investments: unleveraged and equity oriented investors 
would likely be more inclined to retain investments under the reforms while 
negatively geared investors would be more likely to realise their 
investments. Because these supply responses would offset each other, a 
'flight of investors' from private rental housing seems unlikely.28 
9.29 Mr Eslake also disputed the idea that the abolition of negative gearing would 
force up rents. The alleged 'landlords strike' of the mid-1980s, he argued, was based 
on an erroneous reading of history: rents had only risen rapidly in two markets, 
Sydney and Perth, because both cities had unusually low rental vacancy rates at the 
time. Yet in other capital cities, where vacancy rates were higher, growth in rents were 
either unchanged or, in the case of Melbourne, actually slowed. Mr Eslake continued 
that notwithstanding this history, if a large number of landlords were to sell their 
properties in response to the abolition of 'negative gearing', this would not necessarily 
be a bad thing for renters: 
That would push down the prices of investment properties, making them 
more affordable to would-be home buyers, allowing more of them to 
become home-owners, and thereby reducing the demand for rental 
properties in almost exactly the same proportion as the reduction in the 
supply of them. It's actually quite difficult to think of anything that would 
do more to improve affordability conditions for would-be homebuyers than 
the abolition of 'negative gearing'. 
There's no evidence to support the assertion made by proponents of the 
continued existence of 'negative gearing' that it results in more rental 
housing being available than would be the case were it to be abolished…29 
9.30 In broad terms, Mr John Hawkins put forth a similar argument, challenging 
the notion that the abolition of existing negative gearing arrangements would result in 
a 'calamitous reduction in the supply of rental housing': 
It has been claimed that after the restoration of negative gearing [in 1987] 
there was an increase in residential housing investment. But correlation 
does not prove causation. The stock market collapsed in late 1987 and it 
27  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 12–13. 
28  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 6. 
29  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 11. 
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was this more than the restoration of negative gearing that made property 
investment appear more attractive. 
The common claim that, were concessional capital gains tax and negative 
gearing to be removed, investors would push up rents to ensure they receive 
an adequate return does not stack up. What is more likely is that the price of 
houses would fall until the rate of return on them is back to an adequate 
return (ie comparable in risk-adjusted terms to that on other investments).30 
9.31 Mr Pisarski of National Shelter, also felt that it was necessary to directly 
address what he regarded as misconceptions about the effects of the quarantine:  
[The quarantine] happened to coincide with an increase in the share market 
at the time, and therefore capital moved from the sector of housing into the 
sector of shares, and negative-gearing changes that [Treasurer Paul] 
Keating introduced were blamed for that shift. It would have happened 
anyway. It was not to do with any negative-gearing changes, but a whole 
mythology has grown up that therefore negative gearing is a sacred cow and 
if you touch that we will suddenly have a collapse of the rental market. That 
is just not so. And if we did have people selling off lots of properties in the 
rental market because they no longer saw it as a good investment, then who 
would they sell them to? Presumably it would be to people who wanted to 
occupy them and live in them. Would that be a bad thing?31 
9.32 Some witnesses not only took issue with the contention that negative gearing 
helped contain rents, but also contended that negative gearing actually served to 
distort the rental market in such a way as to undermine rental affordability. For 
example, the Tenants' Union of NSW suggested that negative gearing fuelled the 
speculative pursuit of capital gains by property investors, and made investors 
relatively indifferent to rental yield. The Tenants' Union of NSW further argued that 
this had on negative effect on the availability of affordable rental properties:  
In particular, the amount of low-cost rental stock has declined, both 
relatively and, at the lowest end of the market, absolutely. 
This is because landlords in pursuit of speculative gains tend to purchase 
existing stock with high prospects of capital gain, and high values – and 
hence high rents. When low-prospect, low-value, low-rent stock comes up 
for sale, speculator landlords tend to pass over it, and it drops out of the 
rental market—and such stock as remains becomes scarcer, and less cheap 
to rent.32 
9.33 Professor Beer made much the same point, telling the committee that one of 
the most damaging perverse outcomes of the current negative gearing regime was that 
it encouraged investors to seek capital gains over yield. In pursuit of capital gains, 
30  Mr John Hawkins, Submission 105, p. 2. 
31  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 36. 
32  Equality Rights Alliance, Submission 95, p. 8. 
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investors overinvested in high-end property, and underinvested in low-end rental 
property 'where there is the greatest need'. The flip-side of the same dynamic was that 
investors tended to underinvest in smaller or depressed markets where the capital 
gains appeared less reliable.33  
9.34 Other witnesses argued that because negative gearing privileges capital gains 
over yield, it had the unintended consequence of discouraging institutional investment 
in the housing system. This is because unlike individual (or 'mum and dad') investors, 
institutional investors require steady, reliable yields to justify debt financing. For 
instance, ACOSS submitted that the current tax treatment of investor housing: 
…skews investment in housing towards individual investors (rather than 
institutions) and towards investments yielding capital gains (rather than a 
stable rental income stream).34 
9.35 Similarly, Mr Cameron Murray also suggested that negative gearing: 
…incentivises private rental housing provision by wage earners with high 
marginal tax rates, to the exclusion of institutional investors who 
successfully provide large shares of rental housing stock in much of Central 
Europe.35 
9.36 Other submitters, including the Equality Rights Alliance and Youth Action 
NSW, also disputed the claim that negative gearing arrangements helped to contain 
rental prices.36 Some witnesses, such as United Communities and Tenants Union of 
Victoria, suggested that negative gearing and the CGT discount actually worked to 
push rental prices higher, with the increased cost of home ownership flowing through 
to increased competition (and thus prices) for rental accommodation.37 
9.37 Rather than underpinning the steady and affordable provision of rental 
accommodation supply, AHURI pointed to research suggesting negative gearing 
added to volatility in the rental market: 
Modelling by AHURI suggests that one-in-four property investments are 
withdrawn from the rental market within 12 months (Wood 2010). Thus 
tenants of approximately one quarter of all rental properties occupy 
insecure accommodation. Low-income, and negatively geared property 
investors, are more likely to make early exits from the rental housing 
market: in one year, 50 per cent of negatively geared investors in the study 
33  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 19. 
34  Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 108, pp. 3–4. 
35  Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, p. 3. 
36  Equality Rights Alliance, Submission 95, p. 8; Youth Action NSW, Submission 51, pp. 69–70. 
37  Mr Simon Scrapel, Chief Executive, Uniting Communities, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 30; Mr Mark O'Brien, Chief Executive Officer, Tenants Union of Victoria, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 48. 
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sample sold the property, by comparison with 20 per cent of all investors 
(Wood 2010). Negatively geared investors also appear to move in and out 
of property investments, in a 5 year period 13 per cent had repeat spells in 
home ownership (Wood 2010).38 
9.38  When asked by the committee about the relationship between negative 
gearing and rental affordability, Treasury was somewhat equivocal in its response: 
Mr Heferen told the committee that while he assumed the removal of negative gearing 
would lead to rental increases, it remained a matter of conjecture as to whether this is 
what had happened in the mid-1980s.39 
Should negative gearing serve housing policy?   
9.39 According to the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), 
the policy rationale of negative gearing is to encourage investment in those assets it 
applies to: 
With respect to residential property, a deduction is only available to the 
extent that the property is made available for rent, reflecting the policy 
rationale to increase the stock of available rental property.40 
9.40 The question of how well negative gearing serves this purpose, and whether 
the taxation treatment of investor housing should be designed to support housing 
supply and affordability more broadly, was a key focus of many critics of negative 
gearing during this inquiry. For instance, Anglicare Australia argued that while the tax 
settings for investor housing may have once played a role in encouraging investment 
in the housing market, these settings: 
…no longer serve a purpose for the common good but rather serve to 
benefit a select group. The negative gearing and capital gains tax 
mechanisms need to be put back on the table, have their utility assessed and 
then reformed as necessary to support the supply of new housing or 
affordable housing to those most in need.41 
9.41 Mr Pisarski of National Shelter also told the committee that while he did not 
necessarily think negative gearing or CGT discounts should be abolished altogether, 
'if we are going to provide these tax incentives we ought to get a public good out the 
other side'.42 ACOSS also approached the issue of negative gearing by suggesting the 
Commonwealth was 'spending' $8 billion every year on investor housing tax 
38  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 6. 
39  Mr Rob Heferen, Executive Director, Revenue Group, The Treasury, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 22. 
40  The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission 130, p. 2. 
41  Anglicare Australia, Submission 159, p. 4. 
42  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, pp. 36–37. 
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concessions, with half of that amount 'going to expenditure on negative gearing'. 
Ms Jacqueline Phillips, ACOSS Director of Policy, told the committee: 
I think it is really important that we as a community ask ourselves what we 
are getting for that money. We are not getting any new affordable housing 
stock. We know that 92 per cent of investment in negatively geared 
properties is in existing stock. We are not getting affordable rental 
properties.43 
9.42 Drawing out the link of its characterisation of negative gearing as a tax 
expenditure on housing, ACOSS suggested that savings from the grandfathering of 
negative gearing (a recommendation discussed below) should be directed in part 
toward investment in affordable housing programs.44 
9.43 AHURI, meanwhile, noted research indicating that the beneficiaries of tax 
expenditures on investor housing (and, as discussed later in this chapter, owner-
occupied housing) were disproportionally high income earners and people over 
45 years old.45  
9.44 The RDC, however, noted that ATO statistics suggested that 72.3 per cent of 
all loss-making properties in 2010–11 were owned by individuals on an annual 
income below $80,000. Indeed, the RDC argued that negative gearing had 'created a 
positive relationship of mutual dependence between low and middle income 
Australians'. According to the RDC, the majority of negative gearing benefits flowed 
to middle-income Australia, which in turn provided a 'steady supply of essential, 
affordable housing for low income families'.46 
9.45 Characterising negative gearing as it applies to residential investment property 
as a 'tax expenditure' is problematic. The government's Tax Expenditures Statement 
2014 explains that tax expenditures arise: 
…where the actual tax treatment of an activity or class of taxpayer differs 
from the benchmark tax treatment. 
Tax expenditures typically involve tax exemptions, deductions or offsets, 
concessional tax rates and deferrals of tax liability.47 
9.46 What is and is not considered a 'tax expenditure' by the government depends 
on how the benchmark is specified. According to the Treasury, a 'benchmark should 
43  Ms Jacqueline Phillips, Director of Policy, Australian Council of Social Service, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 29. 
44  Ms Jacqueline Phillips, Director of Policy, Australian Council of Social Service, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 29. 
45  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, pp. 4–5. 
46  Residential Development Council, Property Council of Australia, Submission 212, p. 13. 
47  The Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 (January 2015), p. 3, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/TES-2014. 
 
                                              
136  
represent the standard tax treatment that applies to similar taxpayers or types of 
activity'. However, it may also 'incorporate certain elements of the tax system which 
depart from a uniform treatment of taxpayers where these are fundamental structural 
elements of the tax system'. As could be inferred from this explanation, determining 
the benchmark is not always clear cut and does involve, in Treasury's words, 'an 
element of judgement'.48 
9.47 The ability to deduct expenses incurred in earning income is considered a 
structural feature of the tax system. In this sense, negative gearing on investment 
property—and indeed other assets—is not regarded as a departure from the 
benchmark taxation treatment. As such, negative gearing is not included in the annual 
Tax Expenditures Statement released by the government. (However, the 50 per cent 
discount on CGT for assets held longer than 12 months, including investment 
properties, is regarded as a tax expenditure.)  
9.48 Because Treasury treats losses on negatively geared property as regular 
deductions, rather than tax expenditures, it was unable to quantify the cost to 
revenue.49 It might also be noted that even if Treasury's non-recognition of negative 
gearing as a tax expenditure were set aside, the use of 'revenue forgone' methods of 
estimating the value of investor housing-related negative gearing may not properly 
represent the cost to the Budget. This is because taxpayers would almost certainly 
adjust their behaviour if negative gearing on investor housing were not allowed. As 
the Tax Expenditures Statement explains, 'Introducing a tax expenditure may create 
incentives for taxpayers to change their behaviour to utilise (or avoid) the new tax 
provision. Removing the tax expenditure (so that the benchmark tax treatment 
prevailed) would remove this incentive and may cause a corresponding change in 
taxpayer behaviour.' Such behavioural changes could mean taxpayers seek to make 
use of other tax expenditures, meaning actual revenue gain might be considerably 
lower than simple 'revenue forgone' estimates would suggest.50  
9.49 Putting aside the definitional issues, and the exact cost to revenue of investor 
housing-related negative gearing, several witnesses took issue with the idea that 
negative gearing constituted a 'loophole' or departure from the broader taxation 
system. These submitters argued that any change to the ability of property investors to 
claim losses on an investment property against income (whether earned against that 
property or otherwise) would amount to a distortionary departure from Australia's 
established taxation framework. For instance, the REIA argued that amendments to 
negative gearing provisions for housing would amount to: 
48  The Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 (January 2015), p. 129, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/TES-2014. 
49  Mr Rob Heferen, Executive Director, Revenue Group, The Treasury, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 21. 
50  On the difference between the 'revenue forgone' and 'revenue gain' approaches to calculating 
tax expenditures, see Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 (January 2015), pp. 4–5, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/TES-2014. 
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…treating real estate differently to other asset classes and create a distortion 
on the investment landscape and result in a resource misallocation.51 
9.50 Dr Harley Dale, the Chief Economist of the HIA, made a similar point, 
arguing that the HIA's modelling of the impact of removing or restricting negative 
gearing provisions as they applied to investor housing was based on the fact that 
negative gearing applies to many asset classes, not just residential property. As such, 
the HIA believed that removing or restricting negative gearing provisions as they 
applied to housing would have two damaging effects: 
The first is that you would get a decline in Australian living standards, 
because you would be placing an additional tax distortion on what is 
already the second most highly taxed sector of the Australian economy. 
Second, you would be providing a disincentive to invest, so you would see 
a decline in rental property and an increase in rental prices.52  
9.51 The HIA was keen to draw attention to what it regarded as the popular 
misconception that negative gearing is a housing-specific tax arrangement: 
The ability to offset investment expenses against income in establishing 
gross taxable earnings is a key tenet of the Australian tax system. Beyond 
the sphere of residential property the appropriateness of this fundamental 
feature of Australia's tax system is rarely questioned. However, it is a 
highly contentious issue with respect to residential property, particularly 
with regard to a focus on possible influences it has on the purchasing 
behaviour of investors and owner occupiers.53 
9.52 Similarly, Mr Rob Johnson contended that it was incorrect to argue that 
negative gearing had undermined the equity and integrity of the income tax system, or 
that the tax laws gave specific preference to property investment. There were, he 
argued, 'no loopholes, no rorts, no special provisions—there are simply no advantages 
given to investment in property under the tax laws'.54 
9.53  Although some submitters suggested that the policy rationale of existing 
negative gearing arrangements as they applied to housing was to stimulate housing 
supply (as distinct from suggesting that these arrangements should be designed to do 
so), Treasury explained that this was not strictly correct. Rather, negative gearing as it 
applied to housing investment was no different to how it applied to other asset classes; 
in this sense, Treasury explained, it would be misleading to suggest that the 'policy 
justification' of negative gearing was to increase housing supply: 
51  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 13. 
52  Dr Harley Dale, Chief Economist, Housing Industry Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 51. 
53  Housing Industry Association, Submission 178, p. 8. 
54  Mr Rob Johnson, Submission 155, p. 3. 
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In one sense there is no policy justification for negative gearing. From a tax 
point of view we have two sorts of income, if you like: we have 'income' 
income and then we have capital gains. So capital losses can be only 
quarantined to use against capital gains. 
[…] 
But on income that is not capital gains income, basically all costs are 
deductable against all income. So it is not as if there is an explicit decision 
to say, 'Yes, there will be a decision to allow people to deduct interest costs 
from, say, salary and wage income or other business income.' That does not 
really occur. It is a question of what is allowed. Then the policy 
intervention is: 'Okay; that is what the law allows; should the law be 
changed to deny people the capacity to claim that deduction?'55 
Negative gearing: recommendations for change 
9.54 Some witnesses advocated limiting the application of negative gearing 
provisions with a view to stimulating the supply of new housing stock. For instance, 
the Australia Institute told the committee that despite its aforementioned concerns 
about the impact of negative gearing on housing affordability, it was: 
…not proposing that we take out negative gearing. Negative gearing is a 
policy that works for families, in the way that companies are able to write 
off tax against profit losses as well. There is an advantage for people as 
well. But the opportunity exists for the negative-gearing policy to be a tool 
in addressing the issue of housing affordability. Targeting the application of 
negative gearing rather than saying, across the board, 'Any property is open 
to negative gearing,' would be one way of maximising the benefit of the 
resources that the government provides through the concessions of negative 
gearing.56 
9.55 Baptist Care Australia made a similar recommendation, suggesting that 
negative gearing might be limited so that it only applied to the construction of new 
homes or for investment in social housing (including Defence Housing).57 Meanwhile, 
Mr Borrowman, Associate Professor Frost and Dr Kazakevitch, in a joint submission, 
recommended that negative gearing be restricted to new housing stock for a limited 
period of time, 'to provide incentives for investment in new housing, which may be 
riskier than other forms of housing investment'.58 The Victorian Public Tenants 
Association and the Equality Rights Alliance also provided submissions 
55  Mr Rob Heferen, Executive Director, Revenue Group, The Treasury, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 22. 
56  Mr David Baker, Director of Research, The Australia Institute, Proof Committee Hansard, 
30 July 2014, p. 62. 
57  Baptist Care Australia, Submission 134, p. 15. 
58  Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23, p. 8. 
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recommending that negative gearing only be allowed for new housing (with both 
suggesting that current arrangements might be grandfathered).59 
9.56 AHL Investments Pty Ltd (the 'Aussie' financial group) recommended the 
introduction of limits on the number of properties that could be negative geared or a 
ceiling on the amount of losses deductible in any given year. This approach, it argued, 
would 'limit exploitative use of these concessions (such as individuals claiming 
deductions on high-value or multiple properties), rather than target those diversifying 
savings for retirement'.60  
9.57 For its part, ACOSS recommended that deductions of expenses for all 'passive 
investments'—by which it meant 'housing, shares, collectibles and similar assets'—
should be 'quarantined to offset income received from those assets, including capital 
gains realised on their subsequent sale'. ACOSS recommended that the current 
taxation arrangements be grandfathered for existing investments, so that the effect on 
housing investment would be gradual.61 This change, ACOSS suggested, would 
constitute a 'first step to improving housing market outcomes and reducing the fiscal 
and social cost of this tax break'. Further, ACOSS recommended that half the revenue 
saved from this change should be 'earmarked for the introduction of an Affordable 
Housing Growth Fund and [the] proposed expansion of NRAS to promote fresh 
investment in affordable housing'.62  
9.58 Mr Eslake stressed that his preference was not that negative gearing only be 
abolished for property investors, but that it be abolished for all investors. Thus, 
interest expenses: 
…would only be deductible in any given year up to the amount of 
investment income earned in that year, with any excess 'carried forward' 
against the ultimate capital gains tax liability, rather than used to reduce the 
tax payable on wage and salary or other income (as is the case in the United 
States and most other 'advanced' economies).63 
9.59 Mr Eslake continued that, as a second-best option, the government should 
implement the recommendations of the Henry Review bearing on the taxation of 
investments (as outlined earlier in this chapter). Mr Eslake noted that implementing 
these recommendations: 
…would not amount to the abolition of 'negative gearing'; it would just 
make it less generous than it is at the moment. It would be likely, as the 
59  The Victorian Public Tenants Association, Submission 40, p. 2; Equality Rights Alliance, 
Submission 95, p. 8. 
60  AHL Investments Pty Ltd (Aussie), Submission 186, pp. 2–3. 
61  To be precise, ACOSS's submission, made in March 2014 with a view to the 2014–15 Budget, 
suggested the change only apply to investments made after 1 January 2015. 
62  Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 108, pp. 3–4. 
63  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 13. 
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Henry Review suggested, 'to change investor demand toward housing with 
higher rental yields and longer investment horizons [and] may result in a 
more stable housing market, as the current incentive for investors to chase 
large capital gains in housing would be reduced'.64 
9.60 Existing arrangements, Mr Eslake 'grudgingly' accepted, might need to be 
grandfathered so as not to directly disadvantage current housing investors.65 
9.61 The Tenant's Union of NSW floated a range of possible approaches to 
reforming negative gearing and CGT arrangements for investor housing. These 
included requiring that losses incurred from owning an asset could only be set against 
income from that asset class. Drawing on the recommendations of the Henry Review, 
the Tenants' Union of NSW suggested an alternative approach might be to make 
income from a (non-business) asset subject to a tax discount, 'reducing (but not 
eliminating) the deductibility of losses against other sources of income and the 
preferential treatment of speculative gains'. Yet another approach, it suggested, might 
be to only allow negative gearing arrangements for new housing stock. The common 
thread uniting these recommendations was the need, according to the Tenants' Union 
of NSW, to restrain speculation in the housing market:  
This means resetting the tax settings that give preferential treatment to 
owner-occupied housing, and that encourage people to lever up and 
speculate as landlords.66 
Taxation of investment housing capital gains: recommendations for change  
9.62 Focusing specifically on the 50 per cent discount on CGT, Professor Wilkins 
suggested the pre-1999 system of adjusting CGT payable for inflation was preferable 
to the current discount on CGT liabilities. The previous regime, he argued was 'very 
sensible' and not too administratively complex, and allowed for a more neutral 
treatment of capital gains.67 
9.63 Mr Cameron Murray also turned his attention to the CGT discount, 
recommending that it be abolished altogether for residential property, or at least 
limited so that it only applied to property held for more than ten years. He wrote: 
The CGT discount encourages speculative investment in residential 
property and merely amplifies the housing cycle. A much longer qualifying 
period, or the removing of the CGT discount from residential property 
64  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 13. 
65  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 13. 
66  Tenants' Union of NSW, Submission 120, pp. 12–13. 
67  Associate Professor Roger Wilkins, Principal Research Fellow, Melbourne Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, pp. 27–28. 
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would reduce investors' willingness to pay for housing, and therefore make 
owner occupation a more attractive choice.68 
9.64 Housing researchers from Swinburne University of Technology also 
recommended removing the 50 per cent CGT concession for investment properties.69 
Committee view 
9.65 Few of the issues raised during this inquiry were as contentious as negative 
gearing. The committee accepts that negative gearing likely encourages higher levels 
of investment in residential housing than would be the case if it did not exist in its 
current form (for instance, if losses on investment housing could only be deducted 
against rental income). This, in turn, likely has a detrimental effect on home purchase 
affordability. On the basis of evidence received during the inquiry, the committee was 
unable to clearly determine what effect negative gearing had on rental affordability; it 
notes, however, that most witnesses who spoke to the issue challenged the idea that 
negative gearing helps contain rents, and some also argued that it actually serves to 
undermine the availability of affordable rental stock.  
9.66 The committee believes it is problematic to characterise negative gearing as a 
tax 'loophole'—indeed, the deductibility of losses against assessable income is a long-
standing feature of the tax system in Australia. Popular belief aside, negative gearing 
is not a feature specific to housing assets, although it is overwhelmingly used in 
relation to investment housing.  
9.67 Regardless, the committee is disappointed that Treasury was unable to 
quantify the effect of the negative gearing arrangements on housing prices, or provide 
clear guidance on the relationship between negative gearing and rental affordability.  
9.68 With this in mind, the committee suggests that, as a minimum starting point, 
an informed public debate about the taxation treatment of investment housing requires 
a full and frank assessment of how negative gearing and the 50 per cent CGT discount 
affects house prices and the rental market. This assessment would include the cost to 
revenue of negative gearing and the CGT discount, and what impact, if any, these 
arrangements have on economic productivity. The committee has also concluded that 
it would be useful for the Treasury to provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
effect on purchase and rental affordability of various possible changes to the taxation 
treatment of investment housing. This assessment should also examine the 
administrative practicality of various changes, and the effect such changes would have 
on revenue and economic activity more broadly.  
9.69 The committee anticipates that the taxation treatment of investment housing 
will likely be addressed as part of the White Paper on the Reform of Australia's Tax 
68  Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, p. 7. 
69  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 9. 
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System. Any study by Treasury would necessarily have reference to and, as 
appropriate, build on the policy directions set out in White Paper.   
Recommendation 13 
9.70 The committee recommends that, to the extent such matters are not 
addressed by the White Paper on the Reform of Australia's Tax System, the 
Treasury should prepare and publish a study of the influence of negative gearing 
and the capital gains tax discount on home purchase affordability and on the 
rental market (including the effect on security of tenure for renters), the effect of 
these arrangements on revenue, and their effect (if any) on economic 
productivity. This study should examine the likely effects of alternative taxation 
treatments of investor housing. Alternative approaches considered in this study 
(including, where appropriate, in combination) should include: 
(a) a housing-specific 'quarantine' approach, wherein losses for 
investment properties can only be deducted against rental income, 
with provision for losses in excess of rental income to be carried 
forward and deducted against future rental income and capital 
gains;  
(b) a broader 'quarantine' approach, wherein interest expenses on all 
investments, including but not limited to housing assets, are only 
deductible in any given year up to the amount of investment income 
earned in that year, with provision for losses in excess of this 
amount to be carried forward and deducted against future 
investment income and capital gains;  
(c) limiting the application of negative gearing arrangements to new 
housing stock, or designated new affordable housing stock;  
(d) limiting the application of negative gearing to a certain number of 
properties (assessing options for various limits in this regard);  
(e) options for phasing out negative gearing on investment housing; 
(f) applying the savings income discount recommended in the Henry 
Review to investment housing, with consideration given to the 
impact of this approach both with and without the implementation 
of the Henry Review's recommendations in relation to housing 
supply and housing assistance; and 
(g) reducing or removing the capital gains tax discount for investment 
properties, or reverting to the pre-1999 system of taxing real rather 
than nominal capital gains on investment assets.  
Tax and the family home 
9.71 A number of submitters argued that the exemption of owner-occupied housing 
from CGT (and, indeed, state land tax, as discussed in chapter five) encouraged 
overinvestment in housing as a form wealth creation. As a result, house prices were 
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pushed higher than they otherwise would be, providing a benefit to existing home 
owners but serving to make it more difficult for would-be first home owners to enter 
the market.70  
9.72 Owner-occupied housing in Australia is exempt from CGT and other income 
taxes; further, as was discussed in chapter six, it is exempt from state-based land tax. 
Professor Yates, in research cited in AHURI's submission, estimates that the tax 
benefit to owner-occupiers was worth $45 billion in 2005–06. The lion's share of this 
amount, $29.8 billion, is derived from the CGT exemption. The non-taxation of 
imputed rent—that is, the rent which owners would need to pay themselves if they 
rented their own houses at market rates—accounts for $6.9 billion of the total.71 The 
exemption of imputed rent from GST accounts for a further $4.8 billion of Professor 
Yates' total, with the remaining $3.5 billion attributed to the exemption of owner-
occupied housing from state-based land taxes.72 
9.73 Referring to tax expenditures in relation to owner-occupied housing, the 
CFRC noted that policy settings targeted toward support for home owners are 
generally underpinned by 'contentions about the perceived economic and social 
benefits' associated with home ownership. However, according to the CFRC, the 
structure of indirect tax expenditures to owner-occupiers fails to assist people into 
home ownership: 
Instead, the greatest support goes to existing home owners, with young 
lower income home purchasers and renters receiving the least assistance. 
Indeed, given the contribution of such support to what some analysts argue 
is a substantially over-valued market (OECD 2013), these forms of 
assistance actively debar access to moderate income and lower income 
groups. The implicit subsidies provided through the tax system benefit 
home owners, not home ownership.73 
9.74 Mr John Hawkins made a comparable point, suggesting that the CGT 
exemption cost the budget $30 billion per year, and in the process served to entrench 
economic inequality: 
As well as driving up house prices the tax treatment is regressive, 
discriminating against those, generally poorer, people who spend their lives 
as renters not owners.74 
70  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 6. 
71  This total is arrived at by estimating the benefit from the non-taxation of imputed rent, less 
operating costs and a cost for the non-deductibility of mortgage interest. 
72  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, pp. 2–3. The source AHURI 
refers to is Judith Yates, Tax Expenditures and Housing, AHURI Research Paper (September 
2009). 
73  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 5. 
74  Mr John Hawkins, Submission 105, p. 3. 
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9.75 Similarly, NT Shelter submitted that the preferential tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing—including the CGT exemption, the exemption from state land 
taxes (as discussed in chapter six), and the exclusion of the family home from the 
pension assets test (discussed in chapter twelve)—worked to the benefit of existing 
home owners, rather than people seeking to enter the market: 
While it could be argued that these advantages assist moderate income 
households to access home ownership, it seems more likely that their effect 
over the long term has been to inflate house prices and encourage over 
investment in owner-occupied housing.75 
9.76 Professor Yates made the broader argument that tax expenditures on housing, 
and in particular the exemption of owner-occupied housing from CGT, raised issues 
of distributional and intergenerational equity: 
Distributional analyses of these concessions highlight the extent to which 
older, higher income households with high housing wealth benefit 
disproportionately compared with younger, lower income households who 
are most in need of assistance. The somewhat lower benefits for older, 
lower income households are reinforced by the exemption of the family 
home from asset testing for the age pension (higher income households are 
less affected because they will be excluded by the income test). This 
provides an incentive for households potentially eligible for the pension to 
maintain a high proportion of their wealth in the family home in the same 
way as tax incentives encourage older higher income households to do the 
same.76 
9.77 Taking a different view, Mr Eslake noted that while the family home was 
exempt from CGT, it was also the case that taxpayers were not able to deduct the costs 
associated with acquiring and holding the home. Mr Eslake wrote that he did not 
favour the removal of the CGT exemption for owner-occupied housing because: 
…consistency with other parts of the tax system would require that 
mortgage interest payments be deductible. That would in turn almost 
certainly encourage people to take on more debt, and would thus inflate the 
demand for housing, putting further upward pressure on prices. And it 
could well end up being revenue negative.77  
9.78 Professor Yates, however, noted that while interest expenses and maintenance 
costs are not deductible, owner-occupiers are not subject to tax on imputed rent.78 
75  NT Shelter, Submission 118, p. 5. 
76  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 6. The 
exemption of the family home from the aged pension assets test is discussed in chapter twelve. 
77  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 15. 
78  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 6. As the 
Productivity Commission noted in its 2004 report on first home ownership, the tax treatment of 
imputed rental income is not unique to housing, and individuals do not pay tax on imputed 
income from other assets, such as motor vehicles. Productivity Commission 2004, First Home 
Ownership, Report no. 28, Melbourne, p. 77. 
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While not advocating the taxation of imputed rent, which she suggested was probably 
'unrealistic', Professor Yates did not agree that removing the CGT exemption would 
require the introduction of interest deductibility.79  
Committee view 
9.79 The committee does not believe taxing capital gains on owner-occupied 
housing would be constructive. While removing the CGT exemption could potentially 
improve affordability, this would be achieved at significant cost to home owners. 
Moreover, taxing the capital gains on a person's home would be inconsistent with the 
broad community consensus that a person's home should not be treated as simply 
another investment asset.  
79  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney's Senior Visiting Fellow 
Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 43. 
 
                                              

  
Chapter 10  
Housing finance, investor activity and macroprudential 
policy 
10.1 During the inquiry the committee considered the relationship between housing 
finance and housing affordability, repayment affordability and 'mortgage stress'. This 
chapter considers whether Australians are unduly constrained in accessing housing 
finance, and the relationship between access to housing finance and housing 
affordability. The relationship between increasing house prices and the incidence of 
'mortgage stress' is also examined.  
10.2 In addition, this chapter weighs concerns expressed by some witnesses that 
excessive borrowing by investors is fuelling a speculative boom in housing prices, and 
fostering a build-up of risk in the financial sector more broadly. These concerns 
focused in particular on the Sydney and Melbourne housing markets, and the strong 
growth in investor activity in those markets. In considering these concerns, the 
committee also assessed what role, if any, macroprudential tools might play in helping 
to contain excessive speculative activity by housing investors.  
10.3 This chapter also includes some brief observations regarding the impact of 
limited recourse borrowing for residential property by Self-Managed Superannuation 
Funds (SMSFs). 
10.4 During the inquiry, the committee also received evidence suggesting problems 
in the availability of finance for affordable housing and urban regeneration projects. 
These issues are considered in chapter 23. 
Access to finance and the mortgage industry 
10.5 The ability of Australians to access housing finance was not a major focus of 
this inquiry. Nonetheless, the committee did receive some evidence suggesting that 
over-concentration in the housing finance sector might be limiting the product choices 
available to some consumers. In particular, the Mortgage and Finance Association of 
Australia (MFAA), pointed to the dominance of the 'Big Four' banks in the housing 
loan market as an impediment to innovation in the housing finance sector: 
MFAA submits that lack of wide-spread competition across the housing 
lending sector is an inhibitor of the development of innovative mortgage 
products focussing on new buyers.1 
10.6 Although not addressing these concerns directly, the RBA told the committee 
that it was confident access to finance was not a significant problem for most 
1  Mortgage and Finance Association of Australia, Submission 42, p. 2. 
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homebuyers. Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor (Financial System), told the 
committee that Australians enjoyed good levels of access to housing finance and that 
households are:  
…not artificially constrained from borrowing as much as they can 
reasonably be expected to repay. I have already made the point that 
perceptions of affordability will differ across different types of households, 
but if there is a perceived affordability problem in Australia it is not due to 
a lack of finance.2 
10.7 The RBA did acknowledge that tighter lending standards generally prevailed 
in Australia compared to the situation prior to the Global Financial Crisis. However, it 
maintained that these tighter standards were not an unreasonable constraint on would-
be borrowers, but rather a welcome shift to more sustainable lending practices: 
The experience of the United States in the lead-up to the financial crisis 
demonstrates that it is not in the long-term interest of either borrowers or 
lenders to boost 'affordability' by enabling households to borrow ever-larger 
amounts. Lending standards in the Australian mortgage market were not as 
loose as those seen in the United States in the years leading up to the crisis. 
There were, however, some instances of risky practices in Australia, which 
have become less prevalent in recent years. This is a welcome development 
and should not be seen as an unwarranted constraint.3 
Committee view 
10.8 On the basis of evidence received, the committee is satisfied that Australians 
are not unreasonably impeded in accessing finance to purchase a home. The 
committee also notes advice from the RBA that, to the extent mortgage finance is 
generally not as easy to access as it might have been prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis, this reflects a welcome improvement in lending standards. This is not to 
suggest that some Australians do not have difficulty accessing housing finance. As 
discussed further in the next chapter, some groups of people, including low-to-
moderate income first home buyers, may have particular difficulty in accessing 
housing finance. However, the evidence received in this inquiry does not appear to 
suggest that these issues are symptomatic of systemic failures in the housing finance 
market. 
Owner-occupier mortgages and mortgage stress 
10.9 Despite improvements in mortgage lending practices, a number of witnesses 
expressed concern that some households are taking on excessive levels of mortgage 
debt due to house price growth. While levels of mortgage stress appear relatively well 
contained in the current low interest rate environment, these witnesses cautioned that 
2  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 2. 
3  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 5. 
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increasing numbers of households are likely to be exposed to significant financial 
difficulty when monetary policy inevitably tightens. 
10.10 Trends in overall repayment affordability, as DSS noted, are largely governed 
by changes to household income and interest rates.4 In the last two decades interest 
rates have been relatively low and income growth relatively strong, which has 
somewhat benefited repayment affordability.5 The RBA told the committee that on the 
measure of repayment costs on a typical new housing loan expressed as a ratio of 
disposable income, affordability had 'fluctuated around a broadly stable average over 
the past three decades, with average repayments varying between about 
20 and 30 per cent of disposable incomes'. As Dr Edey explained: 
…the ratio of housing prices to incomes now is at the top of its historical 
range but over time this has been more than offset by falls in financing 
costs, so that the typical repayment burden as a share of income is currently 
not particularly high.6 
10.11 In April 2014, the ABA observed that despite historically low interest rates 
for variable and fixed rate home loans, there had been little movement in the size of 
the average home loan made by banks to owner-occupiers in the three years to the end 
of 2013. It should be noted, however, that the same source used by the ABA to make 
this point also showed significant increases in average mortgage sizes between the 
mid-1990s and 2009.7  
10.12 The RBA suggested that while some households would always struggle to 
meet their repayment obligations, the available evidence suggested that mortgage 
stress was not widespread. Nor was there evidence of systematic excessive lending 
beyond what borrowers could afford to repay: 
Arrears rates are low and have fallen since their 2011 peak. Most personal 
bankruptcies are unrelated to mortgage debt, and they have also declined in 
recent years, as have home repossessions. Lenders have been willing to 
extend hardship relief to households that face temporary difficulties in 
repaying their loans, for example due to the floods in Queensland in late 
2010 and early 2011. In addition, many households have built up buffers of 
excess repayments through offset and redraw facilities. These buffers 
provide those households with a cushion of prepayments that can be drawn 
down to avoid falling into arrears. By implication, these households' 
4  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 11. 
5  Ms Felicity Hand, Deputy Secretary, Disabilities and Housing, Department of Social Services 
Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 1. Ms Hand's comments related to lower interest 
rates since the early 1990s, and did not refer to income growth. 
6  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, pp. 1–2. 
7  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 5. 
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required mortgage repayments are affordable given their current financial 
circumstances.8 
10.13 In its most recent Financial Stability Review, released on 25 March 2015, the 
RBA noted that indicators of household financial stress remain at low levels, with 
borrowers continuing to take advantage of low interest rates to pay down debt more 
quickly than contractually obliged and build up 'mortgage buffers'.9 
10.14 However, the RBA also acknowledged that household financial stress could 
'start to increase if labour market conditions weaken further than currently 
envisaged'.10 Moreover, as Dr Edey told the committee, the general stability in 
repayment affordability did not mean that particular types of households in particular 
markets were not experiencing affordability problems.11 Similarly, DSS noted that the 
'absolute increase in the size of mortgages, as opposed to simply the amount that is 
required to pay off a mortgage, has significantly increased the level of risk taken on by 
households entering the housing market'.12 
10.15 Some witnesses suggested that the current low interest rate environment was 
in fact disguising the extent to which many Australians were exposed to severe 
repayment affordability issues. For example, Professor Stilwell underlined what he 
regarded as the risks created by households engaging in excessive borrowing in a low 
interest rate environment to chase ever-rising home prices. Such behaviour, he 
suggested: 
…has some awesome historical equivalents, such as the sub-prime 
mortgage market collapse in the United States that precipitated the global 
financial crash of 2007–8. That was the terrible fallout of a process that 
involved people on modest incomes seeking to borrow to buy houses—and 
vigorously encouraged by lending institutions to do so—without due regard 
to their capacity to service the debt. Where future incomes are unreliable, 
especially because of insecure jobs, this can be a disastrous recipe for the 
individuals and families caught up in this process, as well as for the 
macroeconomic situation more generally.13 
10.16 The committee also heard from a number of community service and housing 
providers who reported growing levels of mortgage stress, particularly in suburbs on 
the urban fringe of major cities. For instance, a submission from community legal 
centres located in Melbourne's outer-western suburbs referred to high rates of 
8  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission 14, p. 6. 
9  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review (March 2015), pp. 2, 37, 39. 
10  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review (March 2015), pp. 2, 37, 39. 
11  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, pp. 1–2. 
12  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 11. 
13  Professor Frank Stilwell, Submission 25, p. 1. 
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mortgage stress being experienced in its local communities. Some of the reasons for 
this, the centres offered, included 'unscrupulous lenders, interest rate increases, 
unemployment, family breakdown, death of a spouse, illness or injury'. The centre 
recommended that the Commonwealth fund 'mortgage stress clinics made up of 
[community legal centres] and financial counsellors to assist residents suffering 
mortgage stress'.14 
Borrowing by housing investors and potential macroprudential tools 
10.17 As discussed in earlier chapters, a large number of submissions expressed 
concerns that highly leveraged housing investors were driving up house prices and 
pricing first homebuyers out of the market.  
10.18 In response to heightened investor activity in certain housing markets, the 
RBA has indicated a degree of concern that housing investors are assuming too much 
risk. For example, in early September 2014 Governor Glenn Stevens noted that a 
monetary policy stance aimed at encouraging business investment and generating 
employment amid global economic weakness also creates increased risk in the 
housing market:  
As for things that monetary policy should try to avoid, we are also 
cognisant of the fact that monetary policy does work initially by affecting 
financial risk-taking behaviour. In our efforts to stimulate growth in the real 
economy, we don't want to foster too much build-up of risk in the financial 
sector, such that people are over-extended. That could leave the economy 
exposed to nasty shocks in the future. The more prudent approach is to try 
to avoid, so far as we can, that particular boom-bust cycle. It is stating the 
obvious that at present, while we may desire to see a faster reduction in the 
rate of unemployment, further inflating an already elevated level of housing 
prices seems an unwise route to try to achieve that.15 
10.19 The RBA also told the committee that while it was mainly concerned with the 
imbalance in the Sydney and Melbourne markets, it was not confident that other 
markets would not suffer in the event of a downturn in those markets: 
[W]e would see the imbalance as being primarily in the Sydney and 
Melbourne markets. But of course what we do not know is whether the 
down-swing will be quite so concentrated. … [A]t the moment the increase 
in house prices is primarily concentrated in those two cities. To be honest in 
some other parts of Australia house prices are rising a little bit faster than 
incomes but not by a whole lot and not by the kind of growth rates that 
would cause you to be too concerned. But it is part of a general cycle in 
14  The Western Community Legal Centres (Wyndham Legal Service, Footscray Community 
Legal Centre, Brimbank Melton Community Legal Centre and Western Suburbs Legal 
Service), Submission 44, pp. 12–13. 
15  Governor Glenn Stevens, Address to CEDA Luncheon, 'The Economic Scene', Adelaide, 
3 September 2014, http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2014/sp-gov-030914.html. 
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house prices and we are worried about what the downside of that house 
price cycle might look like.16 
10.20 In late September 2014, with the release of its Financial Stability Review, the 
RBA indicated that it was in discussions with the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) regarding the potential use of macroprudential tools to counter 
excessive speculative activity by housing investors, particularly in Sydney and 
Melbourne (as discussed below). Whereas traditional prudential policy, often referred 
to as 'microprudential', focuses on the safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions, macroprudential policy is concerned with the stability of the financial 
system as a whole. To this end, macroprudential policy seeks to use regulatory 
instruments, referred to as macroprudential tools, to reduce systemic risks that can 
develop in boom-bust financial cycles.17 Such tools, as they apply to housing finance, 
can include loan-to-value limits (LTV; or, commonly, 'LVR', for 'loan-to-value ratio') 
and debt-to-income (DTI) limits.18  
10.21 Statements in recent years from the RBA have hinted at a general scepticism 
regarding the value of macroprudential tools in limiting housing price growth. For 
example, a 2013 paper by Dr Luci Ellis, the RBA's Head of Financial Stability, 
concluded that LTV and DTI restrictions are generally insufficient to counteract the 
price effects of low or falling interest rates.19 In July 2014, Dr Ellis stated: 
By now it should be clear that the Australian authorities' views on this 
supposedly new toolkit are a bit different from those in some other 
jurisdictions. We view macro-prudential policy as something to be 
subsumed into the broader financial stability framework. We recognise that 
16  Dr Luci Ellis, Head, Financial Stability, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
2 October 2014, p. 8. 
17  Luis I. Jácome and Erlend W. Nier, 'Macroprudential Policy: Protecting the Whole', Finance 
and Development 49, no. 1 (March 2012), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/macropru.htm#author. Dr Luci Ellis, the 
RBA's Head of Financial Stability, is critical of this supposed dichotomy between 
microprudential and macroprudential regulation, and suggests that most 'supposedly 
macroprudential policy tools are in fact the usual prudential tools long used by ostensibly 
"micro" prudential supervisors'. Luci Ellis, address to the Paul Woolley Centre for Capital 
Market Dysfunctionality Annual Conference, 'Macroprudential Policy: A Suite of Tools or a 
State of Mind?' 11 October 2012, http://www.afr.com/rw/2009-
2014/AFR/2012/10/10/Photos/7acdc298-1333-11e2-b1c0-
1b3f887c6e6e_Ellis%20speech%20on%20macroprudential%20policy.pdf. 
18  Deniz Igan and Heedon Kang, IMF Working Paper, 'Do Loan-to-Value and Debt-to-Income 
Limits Work? Evidence from Korea' (December 2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11297.pdf. 
19  Dr Luci Ellis, Head of Financial Stability Department, Reserve Bank of Australia, 
'Macroprudential policy: What have we learned?' http://www.rba.gov.au/foi/disclosure-
log/pdf/131413.pdf. 
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quantitative restrictions were already tried in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
didn't always work so well.20 
10.22 In August 2014, Governor Stevens himself referred to 'dreaded 
macroprudential tools' as the 'latest fad, internationally' during his appearance before 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics. However, he also 
noted that he did not rule out the use of macroprudential tools or asking APRA to use 
them, if needed. That possibility, he stated, would 'remain on the table'.21 
10.23 While Governor Stevens had at no point ruled out the possibility that 
macroprudential tools may be used, the RBA's September 2014 Financial Stability 
Review nonetheless suggested a shift in the RBA's thinking on the subject. The review 
noted a strong pick-up in growth in lending for investor housing, particularly relative 
to growth in lending for owner-occupied housing and businesses. It stated that with 
the strong growth in lending for investor housing: 
…the composition of housing and mortgage markets is becoming 
unbalanced, with new lending to investors being out of proportion to rental 
housing's share of the housing stock. Both construction and lending activity 
are increasingly concentrated in Sydney and Melbourne, where prices have 
also risen the most.22 
10.24 The Financial Stability Review also discussed the risks associated with the 
strong growth in lending to housing investors, measures announced by APRA to help 
manage this risk, and discussions between APRA and the RBA on further measures 
that might be considered:  
In the first instance, the risks associated with this lending behaviour are 
likely to be macroeconomic in nature rather than direct risks to the stability 
of financial institutions. Property investors in Australia have historically 
been at least as creditworthy as owner-occupiers, and mortgage lending 
standards remain firmer than in the years leading up to the financial crisis. 
Even so, a broader risk remains that additional speculative demand can 
amplify the property price cycle and increase the potential for prices to fall 
later, with associated effects on household wealth and spending. These 
dynamics can affect households more widely than just those that are 
currently taking out loans: the households most affected by the declines in 
wealth need not necessarily be those that contributed to heightened activity. 
Furthermore, the direct risks to financial institutions would increase if these 
high rates of lending growth persist, or increase further. In this 
environment, recent measures announced by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) [through the release of a draft Prudential 
20  Luci Ellis, Head of Financial Stability Department, Reserve Bank of Australia, address to the 
University of Adelaide, 'Why Financial Stability Matters, and What We Can Do About It', 
4 June 2014, http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2014/sp-so-fs-040614.html. 
21  Mr Glenn Stevens, Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 
20 August 2014, p. 21. 
22  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, September 2014, p. 1. 
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Practice Guide for housing] should promote stronger risk management 
practices by lenders. The Bank is discussing with APRA, and other 
members of the Council of Financial Regulators, additional steps that might 
be taken to reinforce sound lending practices, particularly for lending to 
investors.23 
10.25 These 'additional steps' were taken by observers to potentially include the use 
of macroprudential tools. Comments by Governor Stevens made in late 
September 2014 provided further insights into the RBA's evolved thinking on the 
potential introduction of macroprudential tools. Asked about his characterisation in 
August of macroprudential tools as a 'fad' and whether his views had changed, 
Governor Stevens responded:   
[I]nvestment finance is growing at double-digit rates. It's nearly half the 
flow of new approvals. A lot of this is interest-only lending in an 
environment of rising house prices, especially in Sydney and Melbourne. I 
think it is perfectly sound and sensible to ask ourselves whether we might at 
least lean on that a bit. I see not much downside of doing so. The worst that 
could happen is that it doesn't have that big an effect, but if it had some, and 
that helps us to square in some small way all the conflicting things that we 
have going on, that is worth a try. I'm not naïve enough to believe that these 
kind of tools are, you know, any kind of panacea or a permanent solution. 
I'm old enough to remember the lessons of regulation in the past. But that 
doesn't mean you shouldn't use them for a period, if at the margin they 
might be helpful, and that's the kind of thing that's in my mind, nothing 
more. I don't think that's any kind of change of tune really. I've always said 
I have certain scepticism about macroprudential tools as a panacea, but I 
remain open to using them if it seems sensible to do so, and that's the kind 
of thing we have in mind right now.24 
10.26 On 2 October 2014, following the release of its Financial Stability Review, the 
RBA appeared before the committee and explained the thinking underlying the 
comments in the review: 
The rate of growth of investor finance is significantly outpacing the growth 
in household incomes. Loans to investors currently account for close to 
50 per cent of new housing loan approvals. Investor activity has been 
particularly concentrated in New South Wales and Victoria. In New South 
Wales, investor loan approvals have increased by about 90 per cent over the 
past two years. It is against this background that the bank said in its 
Financial Stability Review last week that the composition of housing and 
mortgage market activity is becoming unbalanced. The review also 
indicated that we are discussing with APRA steps that might be taken to 
23  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, September 2014, pp. 1–2. 
24  Governor Glenn Stevens, Address to the Melbourne Economic Forum, University of 
Melbourne, 'Financial System Reform and the Monetary System', 25 September 2014, 
http://www.brrmedia.com/event/127406/sp-gov-250914. 
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reinforce sound lending practices, particularly for investor finance although 
not necessarily limited to that. 
I emphasise that the banks in Australia are resilient and mortgage lending in 
this country has historically been relatively safe. APRA has, however, 
noted a trend to riskier lending practices and over the past couple of years 
has been seeking to temper these through its supervisory activities. There 
are also broader concerns with the macroeconomic risks associated with 
excessive speculative activity, since this activity can amplify the property 
price cycle and increase risks to households. Our discussions with APRA 
and other agencies on these matters are ongoing and there will be more to 
say about them in due course.25 
10.27 Asked about Governor Stevens description in August 2014 of 
macroprudential tools as an international 'fad', Dr Edey explained that the Governor 
was rightly expressing scepticism (as both he and Dr Ellis had previously) about 
'highly prescriptive and overegineered approaches that are being advocated in some of 
the international debate'. Dr Edey emphasised, however, that the Governor had also 
stated that the RBA did not rule out the use of macroprudential tools in Australia.26 
Dr Edey added: 
You have had people talking about setting up entirely new frameworks 
where you have new institutional arrangements and new oversight 
committees, trying to almost mechanise the relationship between 
instruments and objectives in a way that we think is unrealistic. We have 
talked in very sceptical terms about those kinds of approaches to policy. 
That is why I emphasise the continuity between what we are doing now and 
what we have said in the past. What we have always said is that we do not 
need a radically new approach in Australia. We have the tools and we have 
institutional arrangements that are capable of dealing with systemic risks as 
they arise. What we believe has happened over the past year is that a 
concentration of risk in the housing market has come up, it has gradually 
become more severe and, as that has happened, we have turned up the dial 
in the response to that, both in our rhetoric and in the way that we have 
engaged with APRA as to the sorts of supervisory responses that are 
needed.27 
10.28 However, the RBA also indicated in the same hearing that LVRs were 
'unlikely to be in the tool kit' being considered by APRA, as they would be targeted at 
the wrong segment of the market. It further indicated that the tools that were being 
25  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 2. 
26  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 4. 
27  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 4. 
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considered would be directed toward the apparent imbalance 'in the form of excessive 
activity by investors in the market'.28 
10.29 Asked how macroprudential tools would be deployed given the diverse 
conditions in housing markets throughout Australia—that is, how such tools could be 
used to contain investor activity in Sydney or Melbourne without adversely affecting 
flat or depressed housing markets—Dr Edey responded: 
I think we do need to be mindful of that issue. That is why I emphasised 
earlier that any measures we take have to be well targeted. Exactly how that 
is done will become evident in due course when the final decisions are 
made. We have to strike a balance between being overly prescriptive and 
trying to micro-manage the market and coming up with measures that could 
be broadly effective. I would just make the mathematical point that most of 
the growth in investor finance at the moment is coming out of lending into 
the Sydney and Melbourne market, so any measure that targets investor 
finance in total is going to have its major impact there because that is where 
most of the activity is. Whether we need to do something even more than 
that to target it even more tightly is something we will need to think about. 
As a general proposition, something that is targeted at the investor market is 
going to have its main impact in the areas where the largest imbalances are 
at the moment.29 
10.30 Subsequently, Dr Edey told the committee that the RBA was not hostile to 
housing investors, and any tools used would need to be directed specifically to 
addressing the 'excessive growth in risk exposure in the investor market':30 
I think there are a few principles that have to be kept in mind. One is that it 
has to be targeted. We have already talked a bit about what that means: 
identifying what the problem is and designing measures that specifically 
address that problem. It has to be proportionate. We are not trying to kill the 
investor market. We are not against investors; we are just against 
imbalance, so it has to be proportionate. Yes, I think those are the two main 
things really. It has to be well targeted. It has to be commensurate to the 
problem that we are facing.31 
10.31 The committee received evidence from a number of witnesses (all of it 
received prior to the release of the September 2014 Financial Stability Review) 
arguing that the RBA and APRA should implement (or at least consider 
implementing) macroprudential tools to dampen speculative activity in the housing 
28  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 3. 
29  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 6. 
30  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 12. 
31  Dr Malcolm Edey, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 October 2014, p. 9. 
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market. For example, in order to address what it regarded as a speculative property 
bubble driven in part by excessive borrowing, Prosper Australia recommended 
carefully considered macroprudential regulation to 'restrain our current debt appetite'. 
Prosper Australia did stress, however, that the detail of such macroprudential tools 
would be critical: 
The quality of those macroprudential regulations is everything. It is all very 
well to announce them and say that you have got some, but they need to be 
effective as well.32 
10.32 Professor Burke, meanwhile, expressed his frustration at the RBA's apparent 
unwillingness to countenance macroprudential interventions in the housing market. 
According to Professor Burke, while he RBA appeared to be solely focused on the 
interest rate, in countries including China, Malaysia and New Zealand the respective 
central bank: 
…is actually interfering in the lending regimes of finance institutions to 
avoid housing bubbles. China, for example, has restricted finance to new 
supply. It has said that there will be no funds for investors who already own 
more than one dwelling. New Zealand has capped financing by private 
finance institutions for home loans at no more than 80 per cent of the value 
of the property. They are temporary arrangements that they put in place at 
the time of housing bubbles. We do not seem to have any discussion about 
the potential for those sorts of levers being used by the Reserve Bank and it 
almost looks as if you cannot touch the housing market. That puzzles me 
somewhat, that the Reserve Bank does not do that, except for jawboning 
saying we should not be investing because it could be risky. That does not 
seem adequate to me.33 
10.33 Other countries have in recent years introduced macroprudential measures 
directed toward reducing risk in the housing market. Notably, in May 2013 the 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) and the New Zealand 
Minister for Finance signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding 
macroprudential policy and operating guidelines. This MoU covered the application 
and operation of macroprudential policy. It provided that the RBNZ could intervene 
and apply macroprudential tools where 'significant risks are judged to be emerging'. 
The available macroprudential instruments included countercyclical capital buffers, 
adjustments to the minimum core funding ratio, sectoral capital requirements, and 
restrictions on high LTV ratio residential mortgage lending.34 In response to rising 
house prices, in August 2013 the RBNZ intervened in the market by introducing a 
LTV ratio limit, so that residential mortgage lending with LTV ratios higher than 
32  Mr David Collyer, Policy Director, Prosper Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
9 September 2014, pp. 1–2. 
33  Professor Terry Burke, private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 25. 
34  Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 'Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of 
Finance and Governor of Reserve Bank of New Zealand', 13 May 2013, 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/financial_stability/macro-prudential_policy/5266657.html. 
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80 per cent are capped at 10 per cent of a bank's new residential mortgage lending 
(subject to some exemptions).35 
10.34 In May 2014, the RBNZ conducted a counterfactual analysis of the effect of 
the LTV ratio limit on the housing market. It found that six months after its 
introduction, the LTV ratio limit appeared to have moderated house price inflation and 
credit growth. It also estimated that without the LTV ratio limit, or any other housing-
specific shocks, house price inflation and household credit growth could have been 3.3 
and 0.9 percentage points higher respectively. The analysis noted, however, that it was 
undertaken only six months after the implementation of the LTV ratio limit. As such, 
the analysis acknowledged that the findings probably reflected a transitional period, 
during which market participants may have reacted quite rapidly to the policy. New 
market participants, it added, might grow accustomed to the policy, and housing 
activity could consequently rebound leading to smaller effects over the first year.36 
10.35 Other countries that have also introduced macroprudential tools in recent 
years in response to house price inflation include Canada in 2008, and South Korea at 
various points between 2002 and 2010.37 
10.36 The RDC argued that while macroprudential tools could be used to manage 
systemic risk, they were only effective if the nature of the risk was properly 
understood. The RDC suggested that in New Zealand, decisions about 
macroprudential tools had been taken in the absence of adequate data on the levels of 
housing investment, and in particular foreign investment. As such, housing prices had 
continued to rise, and the macroprudential tools deployed had simply served to slow 
growth in the first homebuyer market: 
The point is that, if we are to make those decisions, we need to do that not 
in the absence of the data that understands where we are heading in terms of 
the investment patterns, the supply that is coming through, the demand that 
is likely to be there and the foreign investment numbers. Those inputs into 
the equation need to be there if we are going to implement some of those 
macroprudential tools.38 
35  Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 'Limits for high-LVR lending', 20 August 2013, 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/news/2013/5406716.html. 
36  Gael Price, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Analytical Note, 'How has the LVR restriction 
affected the housing market: a counterfactual analysis', May 2014, p. 13, 
http://rbnz.govt.nz/research_and_publications/analytical_notes/2014/an2014_03.pdf. 
37  See Ivo Krznar and James Morsink, IMF Working Paper, 'With Great Power Comes Great 
Responsibility: Macroprudential Tools at Work in Canada' (May 2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1483.pdf; and Choongsoo Kim, 
'Macroprudential policies in Korea: Key measures and experiences', Bank of Korea, April 2014, 
https://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/FSR18_Kim.pdf. 
38  Mr Nicholas Proud, Executive Director, Residential Development Council, Property Council of 
Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 54. 
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10.37 For its part, Home Loan Experts complained that current LVR limits were 
already too restrictive, and cautioned again moves to tighten the limits further: 
Currently APRA has placed significant policy constraints on the banks. If 
they are required to reduce maximum LVRs (Loan to Value Ratio) similar 
to New Zealand, this will make it harder for first home buyers to enter the 
market since most tend to borrow around 90% of the property value. 
Limiting the LVR to 80% would require buyers to save up double the 
amount of deposit to make a purchase.39 
10.38 In contrast, Mr Cameron Murray argued in favour of New Zealand-style LVR 
limits, in order to reduce the effect of high-risk investors on the housing price cycle.40 
Recent developments regarding prudential policy and housing finance 
10.39 In December 2014, APRA announced new measures to reinforce sound house 
lending practices following discussions with member agencies of the Council of 
Financial Regulators (CFR; including the RBA, which chairs the CFR). As the RBA 
explained, the measures: 
…outline prudential expectations of ADIs' [Authorised Deposit-taking 
Institutions] lending behaviour regarding: the extent of higher-risk 
mortgage lending; the pace of growth in investor housing lending; and the 
interest rate buffers and floors used in loan serviceability assessments. The 
benchmarks specified are not intended to be hard limits, but rather to serve 
as a trigger for more intense supervisory action, potentially including 
additional capital requirements.41 
10.40 In an appearance before the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics on 20 March 2015, the Chairman of APRA, Mr Wayne Byres, discussed 
the 'triggers' for intensified supervisory action by APRA, and the kind of actions the 
regulator might take to curb the growth of lending to property investors. Mr Byres 
indicated that APRA was considering an increase in capital levels for particular banks 
whose growth in lending to investors continued to exceed 10 per cent: 
In this current exercise, we are going through, we are targeting those ADIs 
that are pursuing the most aggressive lending strategies and, to the extent 
there are additional capital requirements imposed, they will be imposed on 
those housing portfolios where the risks are and not on the other lending 
books that banks have.42 
39  Home Loan Experts, Submission 5, p. 1. 
40  Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, p. 7. 
41  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review (March 2015), p. 45. 
42  Mr Wayne Byres, Chairman, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 March 2015, p. 23. 
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10.41 As some have observed, this would likely be achieved through a lifting of the 
prudential capital ratio, which APRA sets according to the risks for each institution.43 
However, such moves would not be publicly disclosed. Mr Byres suggested that such 
'below the radar' prudential regulation was important in maintaining public confidence 
in the banks.44  
10.42 Meanwhile, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC; 
also a member of CFR) announced in December 2014 that it would conduct a review 
of interest-only housing lending. The review has been prompted by concerns by 
regulators about higher-risk lending following strong house price growth in Sydney 
and Melbourne. Interest-only loans, ASIC noted in announcing the review, have 
reached a new high of 42.5 per cent of new housing loan approvals in the 
September 2014 quarter (including loans for both owner-occupied and investment 
housing). ASIC Deputy Chairman Peter Kell stated that while 'house prices have been 
experiencing growth in many parts of Australia, it remains critical that lenders are not 
putting consumers into unsuitable loans that could see them end up with unsustainable 
levels of debt'.45 
10.43 In its most recent Financial Stability Review, released on 25 March 2015, the 
RBA explained that the recent steps by APRA and ASIC were directed at managing 
increased risks associated with the recent run-up in housing prices and increased 
housing investor activity:  
In this environment of low interest rates and strong demand, it is important 
that lending standards do not decline, and the measures announced by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission in December are designed with that intent. 
While it is too early to see the effects of these measures in overall housing 
lending activity, the authorities will be monitoring an array of information 
in the period ahead to help ensure that the current risk profile in the 
mortgage market does not deteriorate.46 
Committee view 
10.44 The committee notes and shares the concerns expressed by the RBA regarding 
what may be excessive levels of investor activity in the Sydney and Melbourne 
housing markets. As the RBA explained, it would appear that lending to investors has 
recently been growing out of proportion to rental housing's share of the market in the 
43  James Eyers, 'APRA keeps macroprudential strictures on bank lending secret', AFR, 
20 March 2015. 
44  Mr Wayne Byres, Chairman, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 March 2015, p. 7. 
45  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, media release 14-329MR, 'ASIC to 
investigate interest-only loans', 9 December 2014, http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-
centre/find-a-media-release/2014-releases/14-329mr-asic-to-investigate-interest-only-loans/. 
46  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review (March 2015), p. 2. 
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two capitals, and this imbalance is inflating house prices and fostering a build-up of 
risk in the financial sector more broadly. 
10.45 While the risks inherent in this situation are of concern, the committee would 
have serious reservations about the use of any overly blunt macroprudential 
regulations, including the use of LTV ratios such as these recently deployed in New 
Zealand. Throughout the inquiry, witnesses emphasised that there is not one 
Australian housing market, but rather many Australian housing markets, and indeed 
markets within markets. As such, the committee welcomes advice from the RBA that 
it is unlikely anything other than carefully targeted macroprudential tools would be 
deployed in Australia, and APRA would be quite unlikely to consider broad New 
Zealand-style LVR limits.  
Limited recourse borrowing for property by SMSFs 
10.46 Some observers have suggested investment in housing by SMSFs, including 
through the use of limited recourse borrowing, may be partially responsible for recent 
increases in house prices.  
10.47 The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) noted in its 
submission that the number of properties purchased by SMSFs in 2011–12 was 
possibly as low as 3000 out of a total 360,000 to 400,000 residential property sales 
that year. Moreover, the exposure of assets in SMSFs financed by limited recourse 
borrowings as at June 2012 was not particularly large at $2.26 billion, at least relative 
to overall SMSF assets of $438 billion (nor would all of this borrowing be for 
residential property). Nonetheless, ASFA noted that the amount of limited recourse 
borrowing by SMSFs was growing rapidly, from $665 million in June 2010. ASFA 
further observed that these figures were based on ATO data available as of June 2012, 
and that since that time 'there appears to have been an increase in the activity of 
"property spruikers" strongly pushing residential real estate purchases by SMSFs'.47  
10.48 The committee also notes that in its September 2013 Financial Stability 
Review, the RBA suggested that the growth in property investments by SMSFs 'is a 
new source of demand that could potentially exacerbate property price cycles'.48 
Committee view 
10.49 The purchase of residential property by SMSFs, including through limited 
recourse borrowing, was not a major focus of the committee's inquiry. As such, the 
committee is not in a position to assess the effect on housing affordability of property 
investment by SMSFs, including investments funded by limited recourse borrowing. 
Still, the committee believes this issue justifies close and ongoing observation, not 
47  The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission 130, pp. 3–4. 
48  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review (September 2013), p. 49. 
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least because of anecdotal evidence of increasing activity by 'property spruikers' 
pushing real estate investments by SMSFs.  
 
  
Chapter 11 
Home ownership 
11.1 Home ownership has long been the preferred tenure type of a majority of 
Australians. However, as the committee heard from a broad range of witnesses 
throughout the inquiry, with home prices growing well above the rate of incomes, the 
'Australian dream' is drifting out of reach for a growing number of people. This is 
particularly the case for low-to-moderate income earners and younger people 
generally, with many struggling to build a deposit sufficient to secure a home in a 
rising market.   
11.2 For the most part, witnesses told the committee that governments should set 
policies that encourage or even facilitate home ownership, not least because it has 
numerous financial and social benefits relative to other tenure types. However, the 
committee was cautioned by a number of housing policy experts and industry bodies 
that even well intentioned policies to encourage home ownership could be of limited 
use or counterproductive if they are poorly designed and directed. Many witnesses 
argued that demand-side measures, and in particular direct subsidies to homebuyers, 
often did nothing more than bring forward purchases that would have occurred 
anyway, rather than increase home ownership levels. Worse still, if direct subsidies 
are not adequately targeted, they may end up being capitalised into home prices, 
compounding the housing affordability problems they were ostensibly designed to 
address.   
11.3 Despite the challenges of implementing policies to directly facilitate home 
ownership, the committee received promising evidence regarding the potential of 
several schemes, including shared equity and credit support schemes, currently in 
place in several Australian and foreign jurisdictions.  
11.4 In this chapter, the committee considers the benefits of home ownership and 
the effect of housing affordability on home ownership trends in recent years. This 
chapter also analyses the merits or otherwise of various government policies and 
programs, both existing and potential, to help people who want to become home 
owners enter and remain in the market.  
The benefits of home ownership 
11.5 Australian governments have long recognised and indeed sought to encourage 
the general Australian preference for home ownership over other tenure types. The 
resulting policy approaches have varied, and indeed since the 1970s the 
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Commonwealth has shifted away from directly providing housing supply to encourage 
home ownership.1 Still, as Mr Eslake wrote: 
Australian Governments of all political persuasions have long purported to 
attach a great deal of significance to goals such as promoting home 
ownership, improving housing affordability, and increasing housing 
supply.2 
11.6 According to many witnesses, the Australian preference for home ownership 
over other tenure types is understandable, given the substantial financial and social 
benefits that can accrue from home ownership. For example, HomeStart Finance told 
the committee that promoting home ownership was sound policy for government 
given that ownership: 
…provides security of tenure and helps a family to build roots and 
connections within their community. Research shows that home ownership 
contributes to wellbeing, feelings of financial security, community pride 
and better educational and health outcomes for families.3 
11.7 UDIA echoed these points in its submission, arguing that the Australian 
preference for home ownership, and the popular acceptance of access to affordable 
home ownership as a fundamental and desirable facet of modern Australian society, 
was well based. Home ownership, the UDIA argued: 
…offers greater security, financial self-sufficiency, enhanced social capital 
and a greater sense of connection to the community. Affordable housing 
and home ownership is essential to the health, wellbeing and ongoing 
sustainability of Australian communities.4 
11.8 AHURI suggested that although it is becoming progressively harder for low-
to-moderate income earners to purchase a home, home ownership still provides 
financial benefits to people on low incomes and those living in outer suburbs. It 
pointed to research suggesting that:  
…low–moderate purchasers buying in outer urban areas will have financial 
advantages compared to continuing to rent, which can be realised in some 
cases within four years of purchase.5 
11.9 Noting that home ownership rates in Australia are among the highest in the 
world at 67.5 per cent in 2012 (although this is only slightly above the OECD 
average), the ABA explained that it believed: 
1  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, pp. 2–3; Reform of the Federation White Paper, Issues Paper 
No. 2, Roles and Responsibilities in Housing and Homelessness (December 2014), p. 5. 
2  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 2.  
3  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 2.  
4  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 4. 
5  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 5. 
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…home ownership is an important part of achieving financial and social 
wellbeing and economic and social participation. Home ownership is an 
important financial goal and lifestyle aspiration for many Australians and 
an important mechanism for wealth accumulation.6 
11.10 In light of the apparent benefits of home ownership, the ABA argued that 
'policies which facilitate affordable and sustainable home ownership must remain at 
the centre of Australia's housing policy agenda.'7 However, the ABA also noted that 
'home ownership may not be suitable for all and housing policy should take account of 
alternative and complementary policies designed and implemented to ensure 
appropriate housing solutions for all'.8 
11.11 While not taking a position on whether an objective of government policy 
should be to achieve home ownership for all who seek it, the Australia Institute noted 
the multiple benefits of home ownership relative to renting: 
Home ownership provides many benefits, both social and economic. In 
contrast to the rental market where leases may be terminated or not 
renewed, home ownership provides people with more secure tenure. This 
security has the associated benefits of creating a stable base for 
participation in work and education. 
Home ownership also has large economic benefits and reduces housing 
costs in the long term. Unlike renting which has constant ongoing costs, 
housing costs are very low for home owners once mortgages have been paid 
off. This is a desirable situation for those who are entering retirement and 
have less earning potential. Homes are also an investment and provide 
people with an asset against which they can borrow. Home ownership gives 
people more purchasing power and many people re-mortgage their homes 
for upgrades, restorations or other purchases.9 
11.12 Some submitters also noted that, for better or worse, the aged pension system 
in Australia was largely predicated on the assumption that people would own their 
own home by retirement (an issue addressed in chapter twelve). As National Shelter 
explained to the committee, this meant the decline in home ownership was cause for 
concern, at least to the extent that corresponding reforms to the rental sector were not 
implemented: 
We have a long-term intergenerational headache that is really starting to 
grow and grow. Australia's pension system is predicated on the basis that 
people retire owning a property; therefore, the pension is adequate to live if 
you have achieved home ownership. If you have not achieved home 
ownership, and this is increasingly the experience of many low-income 
households, then the private rental market is a brutal place if you are on a 
6  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 1–3.  
7  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 9.  
8  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 9.  
9  The Australia Institute, Submission 92, p. 3.  
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fixed income or even a pension, and a pension is probably the best of those 
income support payments that you can be on.10 
11.13 While by no means suggesting the government should focus on home 
ownership at the expense of other tenure types, Uniting Communities noted that when 
ownership was accessible this relieved demand on the rental sector. Thus, while home 
ownership might not be within reach for everyone, policy measures that helped move 
people into ownership would nonetheless ease the pressure on the private rental 
market and thereby assist some of the most vulnerable households in rental 
accommodation.11  
11.14 Similarly, Professor Yates advised that declining home ownership would 
likely translate into added pressures in other parts of the housing system: 
While a declining rate of home ownership might not be perceived as a 
negative in its own right, it will almost certainly place additional demand 
pressure on the private rental market, increase rents substantially and place 
additional pressure on the already overwhelmed social housing system.12 
11.15 While most witnesses noted the advantages of home ownership, some 
suggested that the focus on home ownership by governments often occurred at the 
expense of attention to other tenure types, particularly rental housing. As 
Dr Emma Baker from the University of Adelaide's Centre for Housing, Urban and 
Regional Planning told the committee: 
I think in the past we have been myopic in just looking at home ownership, 
and I think renters of all variations are really important in terms of housing 
affordability.13 
11.16 The CFRC took this point further, suggesting that declining rates of home 
ownership (as discussed in the next part of this chapter) were unlikely to be reversed 
by government policy. Rather than attempting to expand the size and significance of 
the first home buyer market, the CFRC argued, the government should instead focus 
on the policy and regulatory issues in the rental sector that were emerging due to 
declining home ownership rates.14  
10  Mr Adrian Pisarski, Executive Officer, National Shelter, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 33.  
11  Mr Simon Schrapel, Chief Executive, Uniting Communities, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 32. 
12  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 3.  
13  Dr Emma Baker, Deputy Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide , Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 19.  
14  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 8.  
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Home ownership trends in Australia 
11.17 Overwhelmingly, the evidence received during this inquiry suggested that 
fewer Australians are becoming home owners, with the trend most evident in 
declining rates of first home buyers and younger age cohorts generally as a proportion 
of the home ownership market.  
11.18 Appearing before the committee, the REIA referred to an 'exodus' of first 
home buyers from the housing market. It pointed to a number of indicators that fewer 
and fewer people were making the decision to purchase their first home: 
In May [2014] the number of first homebuyers as a proportion of the 
owner-occupied finance commitments was 12.6 per cent. This is actually a 
slight rise from the figure of 12.3 per cent for November 2013 and April 
2014, where the level was at its lowest since the ABS started collecting data 
in July 1991. Among the many factors behind this appalling statistic is 
economic sentiment amongst potential first homebuyers. Market confidence 
among first homebuyers has fallen, with the General Homebuyer 
Confidence Index slipping to 82.3 in March 2014, driven by fears around 
unemployment. The figure is at its lowest since 2007 and is significantly 
lower than the March 2004 figure of 99.15 
11.19 In its submission, the REIA observed that while financing approvals had 
increased as interest rates had declined, the proportion of first home buyers receiving 
housing finance was declining, with the increase largely due to investors and 
changeover buyers.16 
11.20 The REIA further noted that the decline in first home buyers was, 
unsurprisingly, translating into lower home ownership levels overall: 
Over the five years to 2011, home ownership declined by 1.1 percentage 
points to 67.0% of occupied private dwellings. The drop was evident across 
all states and territories and was most pronounced in the 35 to 54 age group. 
In the decade to 2011, home ownership dropped by 4.5 percentage points 
for the 35 to 44 age group and by 5.5 percentage points for the 45 to 54 age 
group. The National Housing Supply Council, in its 2012-13 report, showed 
that it seemed certain that the rate of home ownership would drop further.17 
11.21 Mr Eslake noted that the decline in home ownership rates had occurred in 
recent decades despite on-average lower mortgage interest rates: 
What is also noticeable about the last twenty years is that—despite 
mortgage interest rates having been substantially lower, on average, over 
this period (7.59% pa over the past 20 years, compared with 11.95% over 
15  Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 72.  
16  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 3.  
17  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 2.  
 
                                              
168  
the preceding 20), and despite unprecedented expenditure on grants to first 
home buyers—the overall home ownership rate has actually declined by 
5 percentage points, to 67% at the 2011 Census, its lowest figure since the 
1954 Census…18 
11.22 Declining home ownership rates, AHURI noted, were most pronounced for 
younger people. Whereas 61 per cent of 25 to 34 year olds and 75 per cent of 35 to 
44 year olds were home owners in 1981, by 2011 these figures had fallen to 
47 per cent and 64 per cent respectively.19 Professor Yates also told the committee 
that the declining trend in home ownership could only be properly understood by 
assessing ownership trends by age group. She explained: 
Although the aggregate home ownership rate in Australia has remained 
relatively stable at around 70% for the past 50 or so years, this can be 
attributed primarily to the effect of the ageing of a population that gained 
access to home ownership before the structural factors outlined above [in 
Professor Yates' submission] limited first time home purchase to moderate 
to high income households (often two-earner households) or those willing 
or able to live in less accessible locations. Between 1981 and 2006, home 
ownership rates for households aged between 25 and 34 years old declined 
by 10 percentage points and by seven percentage points for those between 
35 and 44 years old. ABS survey data from 2009–10 suggest this trend has 
continued with age-specific home ownership rates falling a further 
5 percentage points for each of these key age groups since 2006.20 
11.23 Referring to Professor Yates' research on the issue, Mr Eslake suggested that 
the decline in home ownership rates for younger people was due in part to changing 
preferences. These changing preferences included 'partnering and having children at 
older ages, and greater importance attached to proximity to employment or 
entertainment venues'. Nonetheless, Mr Eslake maintained that declining housing 
affordability was 'undoubtedly' a more important driver of the trend away from home 
ownership for younger age groups.21 
11.24 Similarly, Uniting Voice suggested that the main reason the rate of young 
home owners had declined was declining affordability: 
Taking as an example a qualified childcare worker who earns the modern 
award rate of pay, Census data from the past decade…reveals that the cost 
of an average first home mortgage repayment has increased from 
approximately 44% to 61% of the workers' wage. It is no surprise that 
15 per cent fewer 25 to 44 year olds are purchasing houses today compared 
to twenty years ago.22 
18  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, pp. 6–7. 
19  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. ii.  
20  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 2. 
21  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, pp. 6–7. 
22  United Voice, Submission 169, p. 5.  
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First Home Owner Grants (FHOGs) 
11.25 First home owner grants (FHOGs) are a demand-side direct subsidy intended 
to encourage home ownership. FHOGs, in one form or another, are a long established 
mechanism by which governments provide direct assistance to first home buyers.23 
Currently, each state and territory in Australia provides FHOGs, although the terms 
and conditions attached to the grants vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (see 
Figure 11.1). In most jurisdictions, FHOGs now include value caps (that is, they 
cannot be used for homes over a certain value) and are generally restricted to new 
housing, although in Western Australia a reduced grant is still available for 
established homes ($3000, instead of the $10,000 for new housing). The efficacy of 
FHOGs in improving housing affordability was a key concern for many witnesses in 
this inquiry. 
11.26 The CFRC contended that demand-side subsidies to facilitate home 
ownership, if poorly designed, were inequitable, ineffective and inefficient:  
• inequitable, to the extent they were utilised by higher income earners rather 
than lower income earners who remained in the rental market;  
• ineffective, inasmuch as they only brought forward purchases that probably 
would have occurred anyway; and  
• inefficient, in the sense they compounded price pressures, exposing 
vulnerable households to repayment stress and heightening macroeconomic 
risks.24 
11.27 Mr Eslake was also highly critical of FHOGs. He suggested that despite some 
$22.5 billion (in 2011-12 dollars) being provided under various first home buyer 
schemes between 1964 and 2011, such grants had failed to improve housing 
affordability for first home buyers. In fact, Mr Eslake noted, home ownership rates 
had never increased above 70 per cent since peaking at 72 per cent in 1961. He argued 
that it was: 
…hard to think of any government policy that has been pursued for so long, 
in the face of such incontrovertible evidence that it doesn't work, than the 
policy of giving cash to first home buyers in the belief that doing so will 
promote home ownership.25 
11.28 Indeed, Mr Eslake argued, rather than improving affordability for first home 
buyers, first home owner cash grants actually served to:  
23  For background on FHOGs in Australia, see Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, 
Submission 93, p. 2 
24  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 4.  
25  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 7. Mr Eslake's findings were endorsed by the Australia 
Institute. The Australia Institute, Submission 92, p. 8. 
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…exacerbate the already substantial imbalance between the underlying 
demand for housing and the supply of it. 
In those circumstances, cash handouts for first home buyers have simply 
added to upward pressure on housing prices, enriching vendors (and 
making those who already [own] housing feel richer) whilst doing precisely 
nothing to assist young people (or anybody else) into home ownership. For 
that reason, I often think that these grants should be called 'Existing Home 
Vendors' Grants'—because that's where the money ends up—rather than 
First Home Owners' Grants.26 
11.29 Despite this criticism, Mr Eslake welcomed the fact that in recent years every 
state and territory had either abolished or substantially reduced grants to first home 
buyers purchasing existing dwellings. He added: 
I have no doubt that some of the increased grants to first time buyers of new 
homes will end up boosting developers' or builders' profits: but I accept that 
at least some of it will induce a supply side response to any resulting 
increase in demand for new homes, while considerably fewer taxpayers' 
dollars will be wasted inflating the prices of existing homes.27 
11.30 Other submitters also provided evidence suggesting that FHOGs should not be 
available for existing housing stock. Noting that FHOGs had been introduced in 2001 
to offset the impact of GST on new houses for first home buyers, JELD-WEN argued 
that the 'chronic' mismatch between housing demand and supply indicated that: 
…demand-side grants and subsidies for the purchase of existing housing, 
such as the First Home Owners Grant (FHOG) should be eschewed.28 
11.31 JELD-WEN continued that because the FHOG (as introduced in 2001) had 
been made available for established as well as new homes—despite established homes 
not incurring GST—more purchase activity had shifted from new housing to 
established housing. This, according to JELD-WEN, demonstrated that: 
…demand-side subsidies to reduce deposit gaps can be self-defeating if 
subsidies become capitalised into house prices, particularly in supply-
constrained markets.29 
 
 
 
26  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 9.  
27  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 9.  
28  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 4.  
29  JELD-WEN Australia, Submission 54, p. 4. 
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 Table 11.1: Summary of First Home Owner Grants by jurisdiction 
Source: The Treasury (NSW), Interstate Comparison of Taxes 2014-15, Research and Information 
Paper (November 2014), pp. 17-18.  
 
11.32 According to AHURI, the fact that FHOGs are not subject to means testing 
means that in effect they tend to be utilised by first homebuyers who would have 
entered the market eventually anyway.30  The Equality Rights Alliance also argued 
30  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 4. 
Jurisdiction Arrangements 
NSW From 1 July 2014, the value cap for the $15,000 FHOG for new homes was lifted to 
$750,000. The grant reduces to $10,000 from 1 January 2016. The grant is available to 
Australian citizens and permanent residents and is subject to a six month principal place 
of residence requirement. 
VIC Since 1 July 2013, first home buyers of new homes have been entitled to a $10,000 
grant on purchases valued up to $750,000. 
QLD Since 12 September 2012, a $15,000 grant has been available for the purchase of 
eligible new homes valued up to $750,000. 
WA Since 25 September 2013, a $10,000 grant has been available for the purchase or 
construction of a new home. A grant of $3,000 is available for the purchase of an 
established home. 
 
The grant is capped up to the value of $750,000 for homes below the 26th parallel or 
$1,000,000 above the 26th parallel. 
SA On 15 October 2012, the FHOG was increased to $15,000 for purchases of eligible 
new homes. At that point the FHOG for eligible established homes was reduced to 
$5,000, and abolished on 1 July 2014. From 17 September 2010, a property value 
cap of $575,000 applies for properties otherwise eligible for the FHOG. 
TAS In addition to the $7,000 FHOG, a First Home Builder Boost of up to $8,000 was 
available to eligible first home buyers who entered into a contract to purchase or build 
a new dwelling in the period 1 January 2013 to 30 June 2014. A further boost of 
$23,000 was available to first home buyers who built or bought a new home in the 
period 1 July 2014 to 31 December 2014. From 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2015, the 
total assistance available to eligible first home buyers is $20,000 and from 1 July 2015 
onwards, eligible first home buyers will receive total assistance of $10,000. The 
FHOG for first home buyers of established homes ceased on 30 June 2014. 
NT From 13 May 2014, the FHOG was increased to $26,000 for new homes, and the value 
cap was removed for new homes. The first home owner grant for established homes 
ceased on 1 January 2015.  
ACT From 1 September 2013, FHOGs are only available on the purchase of a new or 
substantially renovated property. A grant of $12,500 per eligible application is 
available, with a property cap of $750,000. 
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that FHOGs would be more effective if they were better targeted through means 
testing, rather than through value caps. It noted that the 2004 Productivity 
Commission report on first home owners had found that the lack of targeting of 
FHOGs resulted in the bulk of assistance going to 'families who might otherwise have 
purchased a house before too long, even without assistance'.31 NT Shelter also 
recommended means testing FHOGs for the same reason.32 
11.33 A number of submitters recommending abolishing FHOGs and redirecting the 
funding to more effective and efficient housing affordability measures. The Victorian 
Public Tenants Union suggested FHOGs should be abolished and replaced with 
'significant stamp duty discounts and/or other incentives to attract first time new home 
purchasers'.33 Tamworth City Council, meanwhile, suggested that direct subsidies to 
first home buyers should be reconsidered, with the funding perhaps better spent by 
being reinvested 'back into affordable housing schemes'.34 In a joint submission, a 
group of housing researchers from Swinburne University of Technology argued that 
FHOGs should be scrapped, with the savings rolled into the NAHA and used to 
expand home equity programs such as Western Australia's Keystart Home Loan 
program (which is discussed further below).35 
11.34 Not all witnesses were critical of FHOGs, and some questioned whether it 
was appropriate or necessary to limit the availability of such grants to new housing. 
Asked for its view on how FHOGs impacted on the housing market, HomeStart 
Finance (a South Australian Government-created financial institution that, as noted 
later in this chapter, provides finance for affordable home ownership) conceded that 
such grants probably did inflate house prices. However, HomeStart also considered 
FHOGs a useful contribution to the equity first homebuyers could use to move into 
home ownership. HomeStart further noted that it had not seen any evidence that the 
recent removal of the $5000 first home buyer's grant for established houses in South 
Australia had led to a commensurate fall in home prices.36 
11.35 The REIA argued in support of FHOGs generally and their availability for 
established homes specifically. That availability, REIA argued, was an important short 
term means of encouraging first homebuyers into the market until longer term supply 
side issues were addressed.37 
31  Productivity Commission, First Home Ownership, Australian Government, Canberra, 2004, as 
cited in Equality Rights Alliance, Submission 95, p. 5. 
32  NT Shelter, Submission 118, p. 4. 
33  The Victorian Public Tenants Association, Submission 40, p. 4. 
34  Tamworth Regional Council, Submission 12, p. 2.  
35  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 9.  
36  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 4.  
37  Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 72.  
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11.36 In addition to noting that only a small proportion of first home buyers 
purchased new homes (18.6 per cent in 2011-12), the REIA also suggested that even 
when first home buyers purchased established dwellings, there was a positive supply 
effect: 
Another dynamic of the housing market is that sales of established homes to 
first home buyers in many cases lead to purchases of new housing by the 
sellers. In these cases the multiplier and employment effects are probably 
greater than where a first home buyer purchases a new house. Furthermore 
first home buyers of established homes usually embark on a program of 
home improvement and renovation providing a stimulus to the building 
sector.38 
11.37 The REIA conceded that econometric work showed that at times FHOGs 
could lead to price increases. However, it noted that this effect depended on 'the sort 
of elasticity of the supply curves and the response of the supply to increased demand 
from these schemes.' It suggested that by and large FHOGs had helped first home 
buyers rather than inflating prices. It further observed that prices had continued to rise 
in Sydney since the withdrawal of FHOGs for existing housing.39 
11.38 Home Loan Experts also argued in favour of first home owner grants, 
suggesting they were effective in helping new buyers, and in particular young buyers, 
into home ownership as well as driving new construction.40 
First Home Saver Accounts 
11.39 The now-defunct First Home Saver Account (FHSA) scheme was introduced 
in 2008 to help prospective home owners save for a deposit. FHSAs were provided by 
ordinary financial institutions, and account holders received a 17 per cent contribution 
from the government on the first $5,000 they deposited in each year that contributions 
were made. Certain conditions needed to be met before the money could be accessed, 
including that the account needed to be open for at least four years. If a FHSA account 
holder built or bought a home before four years had passed, the account would 
become inactive, and the funds could be paid against the account holder's mortgage 
after the four year qualifying period was reached. Account monies could also be rolled 
into superannuation at any time. As of June 2014, there were 49,400 FHSAs, 
containing $616.8 million.41 
11.40 In the 2014–15 Budget, the government announced the abolition of the FHSA 
scheme.  
38  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 5.  
39  Mr Jock Kreitals, Manager, Policy, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 75–76.  
40  Home Loan Experts, Submission 5, p. 1.  
41  Figures from APRA, First Home Saver Accounts, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/crossindustry/FHSA/Pages/default.aspx.  
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11.41 In a submission made prior to the abolition of the FHSA scheme, the ABA 
explained that the complexity of FHSAs, and the restrictions placed on them, meant 
that many banks had decided not to offer them and would-be home buyers had not 
taken them up in great numbers. As such, the ABA had recommended removing the 
four-year qualifying rule to 'make these products simpler and more customer 
focused'.42  
11.42 Speaking after the abolition was announced, the REIA made a similar point, 
telling the committee that the FHSA scheme had been 'unnecessarily complex', and 
the four-year qualifying rule had meant take-up rates were relatively low. 
Nonetheless, the REIA suggested that the 'concept was good but some of the details 
needed revisiting'.43 
11.43 The Customer Owned Banking Association, in a submission made prior to the 
abolition of the scheme, informed the committee that its members viewed FHSAs as 
'vital in encouraging and supporting' first home buyers. It suggested, however, that the 
restrictions that applied to the scheme should be significantly revised.44 
Access to superannuation for a home deposit 
11.44 Several witnesses argued that there might be merit in allowing first home 
buyers to access their superannuation to build a home deposit.  
11.45 HomeStart Finance, for instance, suggested that most people would aspire to 
have two assets by the time they retired: superannuation, sufficient to finance a 
comfortable retirement; and a home that they owned.45 On the basis that a home 
constitutes a form of retirement wealth, HomeStart Finance argued that it might be 
worth considering a scheme that allowed would-be homebuyers to access part of their 
superannuation to enter the home ownership market. Specifically, HomeStart referred 
to a Canadian scheme which allows first-home buyers to access up to $25,000 of their 
superannuation, which in turn they would need to repay to their superannuation 
account over a period of no more than 15 years.  
[I]n looking wider than Australia and endeavouring to find a solution to the 
key issue of raising a deposit, we do believe there is merit in considering 
the Canadian Home Buyers' Plan, which allows Canadian first-home buyers 
to have access to a capped portion of their retirement plan or 
superannuation to assist [in the] purchase [of] a house.46 
42  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 12.  
43  Mr Jock Kreitals, Manager, Policy, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 73. 
44  Customer Owned Banking Association, Submission 146, pp. 3–4.  
45  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 5. 
46  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 2; HomeStart Finance, Submission 72, pp. 17–18.  
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11.46 The REIA was supportive of the idea of allowing first homebuyers to access 
their superannuation to purchase a home, and argued that such schemes have 'proven 
to be successful in Canada, New Zealand and Singapore'.47 Like HomeStart Finance, 
the REIA argued that superannuation and home ownership: 
…are both components of a retiree's 'nest egg' and not competing products. 
By buying earlier in life retirees have every prospect of having a higher 
equity on retirement and a larger 'nest egg' on downsizing. 
Furthermore, access to superannuation for the purchase of a first home by 
helping reverse the trend of falling home ownership, addresses the looming 
large policy problem of large numbers of long-term renters aged 45 years 
and over remaining in the rental sector and possibly requiring rental support 
in later years.48 
11.47 Asked about the possibility of allowing people to access their superannuation 
to purchase a home, Mr Simon Schrapel from Uniting Communities told the 
committee that any moves that brought 'additional capital into the market would help, 
and superannuation is certainly one form [of capital]':  
If it can be freed up—with certain controls, obviously, so that people still 
have a retirement income upon their retirement—and it can be used more 
productively during their working years, when they need housing, then I 
think it is worthwhile pursuing.49 
11.48 The Victorian Public Tenants Association argued that one of the main barriers 
to home ownership for many people was their inability to build a deposit. It argued: 
Allowing access to one's own superannuation investment would help 
address this particularly where the ongoing mortgage repayment is 
affordable and replaces the rent being paid. The other benefits of such an 
arrangement include freeing up some additional rental stock—lessening the 
competition for affordable rental properties and providing a greater 
stimulus to the economy via increased building and related services.50 
11.49 In contrast, ASFA argued against allowing an early release of superannuation 
savings for the purpose of acquiring property, suggesting that for the superannuation 
system to be effective 'any payments made from it should be in the form of income in 
retirement' (except in the event of death, disability or extreme financial hardship). In 
addition to suggesting the early release of superannuation would undermine the 
compounding effect on the value of savings, it could also be argued that any early 
47  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, pp. 5–6; Ms Amanda Lynch, Chief Executive 
Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 72–73.  
48  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, pp. 5–6.  
49  Mr Simon Schrapel, Chief Executive, Uniting Communities, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 32.  
50  The Victorian Public Tenants Association, Submission 40, p. 2.  
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release 'would only serve to further inflate house prices and make housing less 
affordable than it is at present'.51  
Shared equity schemes 
11.50 Shared equity schemes were raised by numerous witnesses as a promising 
means of helping people on low and moderate incomes purchase a home. In shared 
equity arrangements, 'the consumer shares the capital cost of purchasing a home with 
an equity partner in return for a share of any home price appreciation that occurs'.52 
Shared equity schemes are often government-administered or supported, although in 
Australia a number of unsubsidised, private sector-led shared equity products also 
exist. As an AHURI research paper explained, shared equity arrangements can have 
certain advantages over conventional mortgage arrangements for low to moderate 
homebuyers, including enhancing affordability by reducing both deposit requirements 
and ongoing housing costs.53 
11.51 Western Australia's Keystart Shared Ownership Home Loan Scheme was one 
existing shared equity scheme commended by several witnesses. Keystart is designed 
to assist low to moderate income earners purchase a share in a home. The Western 
Australian Department of Housing co-owns the property up to a 40 per cent share 
depending on the buyer's income and household size. Later, when the buyer can afford 
it, they may be able to purchase all or part of the Department of Housing's share in the 
property and become an outright owner.54 As the Department of Housing explained to 
the committee, Keystart began in 1989, and is funded through state debt, with its 
profits returned to the Department. (Keystart has been profitable for 24 of its 25 years 
of operation, having only made a loss in 1999.) Keystart operates as a low-deposit 
scheme, and is only available to people under a certain income threshold. It is not, 
however, a low-interest scheme, and rates are set to an average of the rates of the big 
four banks.55  
11.52 The Department of Housing told the committee that Keystart had proven 'a 
wonderful success story'. In addition to helping more than 85,000 Western Australians 
51  The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission 130, p. 7. 
52  Simon Pinnegar, Hazel Easthope, Bill Randolph, Peter Williams and Judith Yates, AHURI 
Final Report No. 137, 'Innovative financing for homeownership: the potential for shared equity 
initiatives in Australia' (August 2009), pp. 1–2. 
53  Pinnegar et al., 'Innovative financing for homeownership', pp. 1–2.   
54  See http://www.keystart.com.au/home-loans/shared.  
55  Mr Grahame John Searle, Director-General, Department of Housing, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 11 November 2014, pp. 4–5. 
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become home owners over a period of 25 years56, Keystart borrowers had lower than 
average rates of arrears. The Department explained the likely reasons for this:  
Keystart has got really robust and solid processes coming in for education 
of mortgagors, understanding their personal debt limits; understanding their 
saving programs; working really hard to support those tenants so that as 
they transitioned into homeownership they knew what they were getting 
themselves in for; and then a rigorous follow-up program as soon as people 
looked like they were in trouble to make sure they respond appropriately. 
We think some of this is because these people know this is their only 
chance. This is the one chance they are going to get and, if they do not grab 
this with both hands and make the most of it, they are not going to get a 
second chance. We think that is reflected in their mortgage repayments.57 
11.53  The Department of Housing explained that its SharedStart loans—one of the 
loans offered under Keystart—was in part directed toward helping would-be home 
owners provide a deposit: 
One of the big market problems—not at the bottom quartile, but it will get a 
lot of people out of rental—is the issue of deposits. The difference between 
rent and mortgage payments is not huge. It is relatively small. But the 
problem is, with a median house price at $450,000, who can save $45,000 
for a deposit? Even on good incomes, who can save that money in a short 
period of time? One of the really interesting things to come out of our 
review of Shared Start by PricewaterhouseCoopers and AHURI was their 
estimate that it got people into home ownership 11 years earlier. That is a 
huge period of time.58  
11.54 The ACT Government noted that its own shared equity scheme for public 
housing tenants was helping facilitate 'successful transitions into home ownership' 
while releasing 'valuable public housing resources for allocation to people in greatest 
need'.59 The ACT Government also referred to its Land Rent Scheme as a 'prime 
example' of its innovative housing affordability programs: 
The scheme, which has proven extremely popular, reduces the entry costs 
for moderate income households to enter the home buyer market by 
allowing purchasers to initially rent a block of land from the Government, 
rather than purchasing it outright when building their home.60 
56  This is noted on http://www.keystart.com.au/about-us/about-us. The Department of Housing 
told the committee that over 25 years 57,545 loans had been issued. Ms Tania Loosley-Smith, 
General Manager, Strategy and Policy, Department of Housing, Proof Committee Hansard, 
11 November 2014, p. 5. 
57  Mr Grahame John Searle, Director-General, Department of Housing, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 5. 
58  Mr Grahame John Searle, Director-General, Department of Housing, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 8.  
59  ACT Government, Submission 162, p. 1.  
60  ACT Government, Submission 162, p. 1.  
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11.55 Housing Tasmania explained to the committee that most states and territories 
already offered shared equity schemes in one form or another, especially for public 
housing tenants. It noted: 
Housing Tasmania has two homeownership assistance programs, 
HomeShare and Streets Ahead. HomeShare was introduced by the 
Tasmanian Government in December 2008 to assist Tasmanians on low to 
moderate incomes with home ownership. It supports first home ownership 
and stimulates new housing constructions. The program allows a home 
buyer to purchase an existing home owned by the Director of Housing or 
newly constructed homes. Under HomeShare, the Director retains 
approximately 25 per cent equity share in the purchase property or a 
maximum contribution of up to $50,000 towards the purchase price. By 
sharing the costs of purchase, households are able to buy properties which 
otherwise would be unaffordable. 
Streets Ahead provides financial assistance up to $7,000 and other support 
to households on low and moderate incomes to become homeowners. The 
additional support includes independent financial council, free independent 
building report and advice on property valuation information. An Essential 
Maintenance Package is also available to Streets Ahead purchasers to 
provide financial assistance worth up to $2,000 for major maintenance 
items such as hot water cylinders.61 
11.56 A number of witnesses spoke in support of shared equity schemes such as 
Keystart. For instance, Mr Eslake called for: 
…expanding or replicating programs like Western Australia's 'Keystart' 
scheme which assist eligible people to become home owners on a 'shared 
equity' basis, with eligibility being subject to a means test, and which 
creates a 'revolving fund' as the 'shared equity' is returned to the State 
Government upon sale.62 
11.57 More broadly, AHURI told the committee that state government-operated 
shared equity schemes had been effective in facilitating home ownership for people on 
low incomes. AHURI pointed to research demonstrating that shared equity schemes 
were more effective than FHOGs at helping low-income earners to become home 
owners. AHURI noted that the success of shared schemes was likely contingent on 
certain design features, including allowing shared equity owners to 'step up' their 
equity over time to become outright owners: 
Such schemes are predicted to increase (in the short run) the share of home 
ownership taken up by lower income households by 8.8 percentage points. 
However, capping the proportion of equity taken by the limited partner 
significantly reduces the number of tenant income units predicted to enter 
shared equity home ownership arrangements. Reluctance by financial 
61  Housing Tasmania, Submission 217, pp. 3–4.  
62  Mr Saul Eslake, Submission 2, p. 15.  
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institutions to purchase high equity shares would severely limit the short-
term effectiveness of a shared equity scheme.63 
11.58 AHURI also noted that while most government housing policies are not tied 
to new supply, shared equity schemes could be designed to promote new housing 
stock. For instance, SharedStart loans in Western Australia are 'explicitly linked to 
new build thereby promoting increased supply'.64 
11.59 Some witnesses suggested that shared equity schemes were a potentially 
useful means by which vulnerable groups with particular housing needs might be 
assisted into home ownership. For instance, Carers Victoria recommended that the 
Commonwealth government give careful consideration to: 
…the scaling up of mixed equity schemes. Planning and analysis…is likely 
to show that there is a significant population of people with a disability (and 
their families) who have a small source of capital. This may be sufficient to 
exclude them from access to social housing but be insufficient to allow 
them to purchase a home, given that incomes of people with a disability are 
often low. There may be significant cost-benefits for the government in 
providing assistance in the form of equity to allow home purchase.65 
11.60 The committee also heard that some commercial banks and financial 
institutions were offering shared equity products in cooperation with social housing 
providers and government agencies. The ABA informed the committee that shared 
equity loans offered by the some banks 'allow borrowers to secure higher finance for a 
purchase, but share the increase in value when the property is sold or refinanced.'66 
11.61 Rismark told the committee that in 2007, in conjunction with Bendigo and 
Adelaide Bank, it had launched the Equity Finance Mortgage (EFM). EFMs, Rismark 
explained: 
…provide households a means of financing homeownership without regular 
interest and debt servicing payments in return for sharing a minority portion 
of the capital gains in their home. The EFM provides finance for 20% of the 
value of a home. When it is repaid at maturity, or any earlier time at the 
borrower's election without penalty, the borrower must repay the initial 
principal borrowed plus 40% of the appreciation in the property during the 
term of the EFM. 
From the home owner's perspective, they obtain 100% of the benefit of 
living in the home (otherwise known as imputed rental income) and 60% of 
63  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, pp. 3–4.  
64  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, pp. 8–9.  
65  Carers Victoria, Submission 110, p. 6.  
66  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, pp. 10, 16.  
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the appreciation in the home, while the EFM funder receives zero rent, but, 
40% of the appreciation.67 
11.62 Some witnesses noted that shared equity schemes had also proven successful 
overseas. In its submission, the REIA referred to a shared equity scheme in the United 
Kingdom for first home buyers: 
The UK also has an equity scheme for first time buyers, although directed 
at new dwellings valued to £600,000. Buyers need a 5% deposit. The 
government then contributes 20% interest free for five years with the 
remaining 75% being a conventional mortgage. After five years the 'equity 
loan' attracts a fee of 1.75% of the loans value, which is adjusted each year 
to the CPI. The 20% loan has to be paid back when you sell.68 
Financing support, including HomeStart Finance 
11.63 The committee also considered financing support options for low to moderate 
income home buyers, including support provided by South Australia's HomeStart 
Finance. HomeStart is a South Australian statutory corporation which provides home 
loans to low and moderate income earners, including finance on concessional or 
special terms. Approximately half of HomeStart's loans are made to first home buyers, 
many of whom are not in full-time work or receive Centrelink benefits.69 While 
HomeStart issues loans to customers who would not typically meet the income or 
deposit requirements of mainstream lenders, it maintains that its loans are not 'low 
doc' or 'subprime'; rather, it has strict credit and documentation criteria. Importantly, 
while the arrears rate for HomeStart mortgages sits above that of mainstream prime 
mortgages, HomeStart noted that this rate is 'materially better' than that experienced 
by subprime lenders.70 Mr John Oliver, HomeStart's Chief Executive Officer, told the 
committee: 
We provide finance to people who can afford the loan, have good credit 
history and have shown over the years they are willing to make sacrifices to 
ensure they attain homeownership rather than rely on private, public or 
social rental housing. To emphasise this point, over our 25 years we have 
lent more than $6 billion for housing. Our loan losses are less than $30 
million—quite an outstanding achievement if you reflect on the fact that 
our customer base was initially not good enough for a bank loan.71 
11.64 HomeStart advised the committee that since its creation in 1989 by the South 
Australian Government, it has helped 64,000 households become home owners, and 
67  Rismark International, Submission 64, p. 4.  
68  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, p. 8.  
69  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 7. 
70  HomeStart Finance, Submission 72, pp. 1–13. 
71  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 2.  
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HomeStart estimates that 80 per cent of those households would not have been able to 
access finance from a mainstream lender. HomeStart has a current loan portfolio of 
$1.9 billion (as of 2014), and has returned a profit in every year of its operation.72  
11.65 HomeStart Finance explained to the committee that it helped homebuyers 
overcome up-front costs and enhance their borrowing power, with the ultimate aim of 
transitioning customers to mainstream financial institutions once they had sufficient 
equity in their home. It further explained that it did not compete with the private 
sector, which would not provide housing finance for the niche market it operated in. 
HomeStart told the committee: 
There is little discussion about the actual financing options available that 
contribute to homeownership because of an apparent belief that the private 
sector—that is, mainstream financial institutions—provide the answer to 
that issue. We do not believe that is always the case. There exists a group of 
people who do not fit the bank criteria but who are creditworthy, capable of 
homeownership and deserve a hand up rather than just a handout—and 
there exists our niche.73 
11.66 Asked why there was not a niche private market for the product that 
HomeStart provided, given the low default rates and the fact that HomeStart avoided 
taking on too high a risk profile, HomeStart explained that it offered high LVR loans 
without charging mortgage insurance, something private lenders would not do: 
We play at the pointy end of the lending margins. A lot of the lending we 
do is at the upper end of the loan-to-valuation scale. We are here for people 
who have low deposits but who are creditworthy. With most banks and 
other financial institutions if you need to borrow more than 80 per cent you 
have to pay lenders mortgage insurance. That is a significant cost. … If you 
go through a bank, on a $300,000 loan the lenders mortgage insurance is 
something like $8,000 to $10,000. We self-insure. We have a loan 
protection charge and that caps out for us at $2,500. So on that particular 
transaction the cost to the borrower, depending on their loan to valuation 
ratio, is probably around $1,500.74 
11.67 HomeStart explained that whereas most banks will allow borrowers to only go 
to a 95 per cent LVR (with mortgage insurance), HomeStart would lend up to 
97 per cent LVR for some borrowers—for instance, graduates and people with certain 
trade qualifications.75 
72  HomeStart Finance, Submission 72, p. 1.  
73  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 1–2.  
74  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 3.  
75  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 3.  
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11.68 HomeStart Finance argued that it would be relatively simple and inexpensive 
to replicate HomeStart in other jurisdictions. Mr Oliver told the committee: 
You simply need some capital and then you obviously have to have the 
systems, the processes and the infrastructure behind that. We basically run 
HomeStart as a stand-alone financial institution. I liken us to the credit 
union type philosophy, if you like. We have 95 people. We self-insure. We 
run our own technology. Our loan products are quite different from the way 
banks normally look at loan products—for example, the way they calculate 
repayments and the way they work through interest rate cycles. It is 
eminently replicable, and we have 25 years that say and show that it can be 
done. It does not take hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars, and you 
are not necessarily putting the state to any degree of unsustainable financial 
risk.76 
11.69 HomeStart conceded that the difficult history of state-owned financial 
institutions perhaps made other states reluctant to set up HomeStart-type schemes. 
However, Mr Oliver argued that this reluctance was not well grounded: 
I was in New South Wales when HomeFund failed and cost the state 
government there something like $800 million. We do tend to run under a 
little bit of the shadow here of the failure of the State Bank of South 
Australia. That said, the state bank here did not lose one single, solitary cent 
on home mortgages; it lost it all on commercial lending. We only lend for 
mortgages. There certainly seems to be a view within bureaucrat world, for 
want of another way of saying it, that governments should not own 
financial institutions. I think we prove that they can and that they can be 
very, very successful.77 
11.70 The HomeStart model received support from a number of witnesses. These 
included researchers from the University of Adelaide's Centre for Housing, Urban and 
Regional Planning, who told the committee that research they had undertaken had 
found that 'HomeStart has a very positive impact on the wellbeing of the recipients of 
their mortgages'.78 The Victorian Public Tenants Association suggested that other 
state governments should replicate the HomeStart scheme.79   
11.71 Some witnesses also referred to international approaches to credit support that 
might be worth considering in Australia. For example, WALGA referred to the 'Local 
Lend a Hand' mortgage scheme launched in the UK by one the main banks, Lloyds 
TSB: 
76  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 7.  
77  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 7.  
78  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 10.  
79  The Victorian Public Tenants Association, Submission 40, p. 3.  
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Local Governments work in partnership with the bank to help 'first buyers' 
borrow with a lower deposit than is usually needed. In summary, the Local 
Government acts as a guarantor whilst earning interest on their investment, 
an arrangement benefiting both parties. To date 53 schemes have been 
launched with 47 Local Governments helping more than 1,100 first-time 
buyers get on the property ladder, kick starting local property chains. Three 
quarters of councils say the scheme has a demonstrable impact on local 
areas.80 
Indigenous home ownership 
11.72 Indigenous home ownership participation is currently 37.4 per cent, well 
below the average for other Australian households of 69.6 per cent. Indigenous 
Business Australia (IBA)81 detailed systemic barriers to home ownership faced by 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in its submission. These barriers are both 
financial and non-financial, general (that is, experienced by non-Indigenous people) 
and unique to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people.82  
11.73 Barriers to Indigenous home ownership also differ substantially from region 
to region, and community to community. As the ABA pointed out in its submission: 
For Indigenous peoples living in very remote and remote locations, home 
ownership will necessarily require greater support through Indigenous-
targeted strategies and public housing programs. For Indigenous peoples 
living in regional areas, home ownership will likely involve support 
promoting the engaged and informed participation of Indigenous peoples in 
the mainstream property market as well as promoting the capacity of 
Indigenous peoples to develop a real property market on Indigenous lands. 
For Indigenous peoples in urban areas and major cities, home ownership 
will likely involve support through Indigenous-targeted and non-targeted 
strategies and initiatives aimed at housing affordability.83 
11.74 There are currently a range of government and government-supported 
programs aimed at addressing the barriers to affordability for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander home buyers. In addition to the Commonwealth's Indigenous Home 
Ownership Program, which is administered by the IBA and provides concessional 
loans and case management support to clients who do not qualify for bank finance,84 
there are also: 
80  Western Australian Local Government Association, Submission 37, p. 13.  
81  IBA is an Australian Government statutory authority created to assist and enhance the 
economic and development opportunities of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. It 
operates economic development programs spanning home ownership, business development 
and larger scale investments. Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, p. 9. 
82  For detail on these barriers, see Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, pp. 11–16. 
83  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 19.  
84  For detail, see Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, pp. 20–29. 
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…a range of State and Territory government targeted programs that assist 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander home buyers, such as stamp duty 
exemptions or discounts, shared equity schemes, concessional interest 
loans, and public housing tenant sales schemes. Additionally, there are 
specific strategies in place in some jurisdictions to address the particularly 
complex barriers to home ownership on Indigenous land and discrete 
Indigenous communities.85 
11.75 IBA noted that FHOGs and stamp duty concessions have been particularly 
important in helping a large number of Indigenous Australians move into home 
ownership. IBA expressed concern that: 
…decisions by some jurisdictions since 2011 to change their First Home 
Owners Grants and stamp duty concession schemes, especially by reducing 
or abolishing the grant for the purchase of existing homes, has had a 
significant adverse impact on the ability of Indigenous Australian to obtain 
finance from commercial lenders and/or IBA.86 
11.76 With regard to recent moves by some jurisdictions to restrict the use of 
FHOGs to the construction of new dwellings, IBA expressed its concern that this was: 
…impacting on home ownership opportunities for a significant segment of 
potential Indigenous home owners by excluding the option of purchasing 
existing properties with a minimal deposit. There will be a particular 
disadvantage to potential Indigenous home owners seeking to purchase a 
home in rural and remote areas that have high construction costs and 
limited access to suitable land.87 
11.77 Given Indigenous people make up a relatively small proportion of the overall 
population (3 per cent), with potential homebuyers in this segment smaller still, IBA 
suggested that this direct assistance 'would not have the inflationary and other 
distortionary effects on the housing market as has been argued in relation to the 
general application of concessions and subsidies'. Conversely, to the extent fewer 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are able to access finance from the IBA 
or the banks, IBA argued, this would impose: 
…a significant opportunity cost in terms of the economic and social 
benefits that would have accrued through increased rates of Indigenous 
home ownership. In the long term, this cost is compounded by the 
intergenerational effect—including retarding wealth accumulation and 
retirement savings.88 
11.78 IBA recommended that all jurisdictions: 
85  Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, pp. 4–5.  
86  Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, p. 5. 
87  Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, p. 31.  
88  Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, pp. 5–6. 
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…target application of the First Home Owners Grants and stamp duty relief 
to low to medium income Indigenous Australians regardless of whether 
they are purchasing an existing or new home. This will facilitate more 
Indigenous Australians being able to access home loans from mainstream 
financial institutions, in addition to those who may qualify for IBA 
assistance.89 
11.79 IBA also addressed the need to improve pathways from social housing to 
home ownership for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, recommending that 
states and territories: 
…strengthen the focus on support mechanisms that facilitate transfer of 
social housing into private ownership. Moreover, IBA encourages closer 
collaboration between state and territory government programs and loan 
providers, including IBA, to strengthen the pathway between social housing 
rental and home ownership.90 
11.80 For its part, the ABA outlined a wide range of measures that the Australian 
Government might implement to assist Indigenous people who wish to become home 
owners. Such measures, ABA wrote, might include financial supports, such as 
subsidies, security guarantees, concessional loans and loan support schemes, shared 
equity schemes, and so on.  The ABA noted that the government could also assist 
Indigenous home buyers with financial literacy, counselling and mentoring services, 
and the like.91  
11.81 The ABA also suggested that banks themselves should review their product 
offerings with a view to providing products that both meet Indigenous peoples' needs 
and the banks' commercial interests and legal responsibilities. It recommended that: 
…given the complexity of the factors surrounding Indigenous home 
ownership and social and financial inclusion, the Federal Government 
should task the Indigenous Advisory Council to develop policies on home 
ownership and housing options for Indigenous Australians, and more 
broadly strategies to address rental and housing affordability for Indigenous 
Australians across regions.92 
Committee view 
11.82 While governments should devote their attention to improving affordability 
outcomes for all types of housing tenure, the committee considers that it is appropriate 
for governments to promote home ownership. The committee agrees with the point 
made by a number of submitters that home ownership can be an important means for 
89  Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, p. 6.  
90  Indigenous Business Australia, Submission 203, p. 6.  
91  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 20. 
92  Australian Bankers' Association, Submission 197, p. 20. 
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people to achieve financial and social wellbeing, and that high rates of home 
ownership also provide broader economic and social benefits to the community. 
11.83 The committee notes recommendations from some witnesses that first home 
buyers should be allowed to draw on or borrow from their superannuation balances to 
contribute to a home deposit. While recognising the positive intent underlying such 
proposals, the committee believes providing first home buyers with access to their 
superannuation would significantly add to demand-side pressures, with the extra 
money available to first home buyers ultimately capitalised into higher housing prices. 
Moreover, such moves would leave Australian workers with less money at retirement, 
and more broadly compromise the integrity of Australia's retirement savings system. 
11.84 The committee believes that the government should, however, give 
consideration to other schemes that may help would-be first home buyers build a 
deposit or otherwise access finance (with the important caveat that such schemes 
should not facilitate access to debt that home buyers cannot service). In particular, the 
committee believes that shared equity schemes are a particularly promising 
mechanism for helping low to moderate income earners purchase their first home, and 
notes the success of government-backed schemes such as HomeStart in South 
Australia and Keystart in Western Australia in responding to purchase affordability 
constraints. The committee also welcomes the emergence of private-sector shared 
equity products, and believes such products have the potential to become an important 
means in helping more Australians own their home. The committee also notes that 
specialised shared equity schemes may help specific groups of people, such as 
Indigenous Australians, become home owners.  
11.85 The committee is less convinced that first home buyer grants are an equitable, 
efficient or effective means of assisting first home buyers. To the extent that states 
continue with such schemes, the committee believes they should be subject to value 
caps and limited to new housing stock (as many now are). Exceptions to the new 
housing stock requirement might be appropriately applied for certain groups of home 
buyers where there is a compelling policy case to do so, such as for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander home buyers in rural and remote areas where new housing stock 
is prohibitively expensive. The committee further believes that the positive effect of 
first home owner grants would likely be enhanced if they were better targeted through 
the use of appropriate means testing.  
Recommendation 14 
11.86 The committee recommends that, to the extent state and territory 
governments maintain first home buyer grants, they apply appropriate value 
caps and limit their availability to new housing stock (with appropriate 
exceptions for certain groups of buyers), and consider introducing means testing 
to ensure that the grants are appropriately targeted.  
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Recommendation 15 
11.87 The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider 
introducing a scheme designed to assist first home buyers save for a home 
deposit, drawing as appropriate on the experiences of the First Home Save 
Account scheme.  
Recommendation 16 
11.88 The committee recommends that all governments, through the proposed 
ministerial council on housing and homelessness (see recommendation 2) or 
another appropriate intergovernmental forum, investigate ways to expand 
shared equity programs, including both government-backed and private-sector 
backed programs. The committee further recommends that, as part of this 
process, consideration be given to other mechanisms to facilitate affordable home 
ownership, such as community land trusts, rent to buy schemes, and the like, and 
consider the inclusion of such mechanisms within the national affordable housing 
plan proposed at recommendation 4, or the National Affordable Housing 
Agreement.  
 

  
Chapter 12 
Older people and home ownership 
12.1 Dr Debbie Faulkner, a research fellow at the University of Adelaide's Centre 
for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, told the committee that housing 
affordability issues for older people are often overlooked, 'because we just assumed 
they have home ownership'. However, home ownership rates for older Australians, 
like home ownership rates overall, are trending lower, from 81 per cent of over-65s 
today to a projected 55 per cent by the middle of the century. This trend, Dr Faulkner 
told the committee, is being driven not only by people not taking on home ownership, 
but by people falling out of home ownership for a range of reasons.1 
12.2 In part, the declining trend in home ownership rates for older Australians 
underlines the importance of ensuring the rental market, community housing and 
housing services are able to meet their needs (subjects addressed in the next section of 
this report). However, to the extent the decline is correlated to worsening 
affordability, it also reinforces the need to address home purchase affordability. This 
is particularly the case given Australia's retirement income system is to a large degree 
predicated on the assumption that most retirees will own their own home outright and 
therefore have relatively low housing costs.  
12.3 This chapter considers the importance of home ownership as a form of wealth 
in retirement, the merits of continuing to exclude owner-occupied housing from the 
aged pension means test, and the need for policies to remove potential barriers to 
downsizing (or 'rightsizing') by older homeowners.  
Home ownership as a form of wealth in retirement 
12.4 Home ownership, as noted previously in this report, is a significant form of 
private wealth in Australia, and this is particularly apparent for older home owners. As 
Mr Borrowman, Associate Professor Frost and Dr Kazakevitch noted in their joint 
submission: 
…older Australians are less likely to be in residual housing stress than 
younger Australians. This is driven by the length of working lives and the 
housing cost advantages of having paid off a mortgage. Home ownership is 
a form of saving that allows households to draw on home equity if their 
situation changes. Households that are able to enter and remain in home 
1  Dr Debbie Faulkner, Research Fellow, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, pp. 11–12. Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry pointed to research that 
suggested outright ownership for over 65s would likely decline by 10 per cent by 2046. Dr Julie 
Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, Centre for Urban Research, RMIT University, Submission 
24, p. 5. COTA reports that 78 per cent of over 65s own their home outright, and 6.5 per cent 
have a mortgage. COTA, Submission 191, p. 1. 
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ownership are much better off in older age than those who rent. This is 
further encouraged by the family home being exempt from means testing 
for the aged pension.2  
12.5 Australia's retirement income system is in large measure based on the 
assumption that people will own their home by the time they retire. As the CFRC 
explained in its submission, Australia's relatively low pension rates, when considered 
against rates in other OECD countries, reflect typically lower housing costs resulting 
from higher levels of outright home ownership. As home ownership levels decline, 
however, so too will the adequacy of the aged pension.3  
12.6 The Combined Pensioners & Superannuants Association of NSW (CPSA) 
noted that Australia's retirement income system is often characterised as having four 
pillars: the age pension, superannuation, voluntary savings and the family home. 
Whether a person owned their own home in retirement, it suggested: 
…can mean the difference between getting by and abject poverty. For this 
reason, CPSA is gravely concerned about the decline in home ownership 
among people entering retirement.4 
12.7 Anglicare Australia submitted that because aged care and pension systems in 
Australia are, in effect, designed for home owners: 
…after-housing poverty rates are consequently higher for non-home 
owning older households. It also means those people have less capacity to 
modify their homes as they get older and, in most cases, are unable to find 
more suitable housing in the private market. One of the consequences is the 
increasing isolation and disability that older people in unsuitable or 
inaccessible housing face. Another related trend is for people in those 
circumstances to move into residential aged care at an earlier age as there 
are no other options available to them, which can also be as costly, if not 
more so than private rental.5 
12.8 The UDIA noted that home ownership was a major factor in limiting the 
demands of an ageing population on government finances: 
Government spending on pensions in Australia is able to be considerably 
lower than in many other countries, because high levels of home ownership 
amongst retirees have made their housing costs very low. Increasing 
numbers of people entering retirement reliant on social housing or private 
rental as a result of their inability to achieve home ownership will result in 
rapidly escalating costs for government.6 
2  Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23, p. 10.  
3  City Futures Research Centre, UNSW, Submission 152, p. 9.  
4  Combined Pensioners and Superannuants Association of NSW Inc., Submission 164, p. 3. 
5  Anglicare Australia, Submission 159, p. 3.  
6  Urban Development Institute of Australia, Submission 190, p. 7.  
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12.9 Similarly, Dr Vivienne Milligan from the CFRC suggested that if home 
ownership for older people declined, then this would likely mean that 'pensions are 
going to have to rise very significantly or rent assistance for pensioners is going to 
have to rise very significantly'. The potential cost to the Commonwealth, Dr Milligan 
argued, was itself reason enough for the Commonwealth to be deeply engaged in 
addressing home purchase affordability.7 Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive of the 
HIA, told the committee that with the proportion of Australians entering retirement as 
non-homeowners rising, home ownership as a form of wealth in retirement was 'a 
very, very important issue for the government today and for payments and social 
security going into the future'.8 
12.10 Also noting that importance of home ownership in Australia's retirement 
income system, the Equality Rights Alliance drew the committee's attention to the 
difficulties experienced by older non-homeowners. Beyond the financial disadvantage 
experienced by older renters, the Alliance noted that non-homeowners had poorer 
outcomes in terms of social integration and participation. It was particularly concerned 
about the growing cohort of older women who did not own their own home as they 
moved towards or entered retirement age: 
Using figures from the 2011 Census, we estimate there are 222,958 women 
who are over the age of 45, single, on low to median incomes and paying 
off a mortgage. More than half of these women are over the age of 55 and 
one quarter of these women are already experiencing mortgage stress. 
119,844 men are in the same situation. Australia has recently seen a large 
increase in the proportion of those aged 50–64 carrying mortgage debt and 
older women in particular are less able to maintain home ownership at this 
age. This is particularly concerning when we consider that older women 
have lower levels of workforce participation and face intersecting age and 
sex discrimination in the labour market.9  
12.11  COTA recommended that the government create a facility to enable older 
Australians to borrow against the equity in their home to pay for aged-care services 
costs. COTA noted that the Productivity Commission had in fact recommended the 
establishment of such a scheme in its Caring for older Australians report (2011).10 
The scheme proposed by COTA would be HECS-like in its design, in the sense that as 
people incurred their bills, they would be set against the equity in their home: 
Unlike HECS, where we do not have a guarantee of recovery, in this type of 
scheme you certainly would have a guarantee of recovery, because 
7  Dr Vivienne Milligan, Associate Professor, City Futures Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 40.  
8  Mr Graham Wolfe, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing Industry 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 46.  
9  Equality Rights Alliance, Submission 95, p. 12.  
10  On the Productivity Commission's proposed Australian Aged Care Home Credit scheme, see 
Productivity Commission, Caring for older Australians, Vol. 1 (2011), p. xxxvii. 
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generally speaking we all die. It is a way of using your house as a line of 
credit without doing something really clunky like a big reverse mortgage 
which then becomes a loan you have to repay.11 
Pension eligibility and home ownership 
12.12 While most federal income support payments are subject to an asset test, the 
value of a person's principal home (or, colloquially, the 'family home') is exempt from 
inclusion in the asset test of most transfer payments, including the aged pension. This 
means that pensioners can still access the pension irrespective of the value of their 
principal residence. When a person sells their home, the proceeds are exempt from the 
asset test for up to 12 months, as long as they are intending to buy another home. 
However, the interest earned on sale proceeds is counted under the income test, and if 
a cheaper home is bought any surplus cash is included in the test.  
12.13 While owner-occupied housing is not included in the asset test, the asset 
threshold above which the full pension is reduced is higher for non-homeowners than 
for homeowners.12 
12.14 AHURI suggested that while the exemption of the family home from the aged 
pension asset test encouraged 'ageing in place', it might also work to: 
…undermine incentives to downsize or sell the house if this serves to 
reduce access to pension entitlements (Ong 2012). Judd et al. (2014) 
showed that older people tend to occupy larger houses than suggested by 
their household size suggesting some inefficiency according to typical 
standards of occupancy. While most older people desired to stay in their 
homes, downsizing may also have benefits in terms of better fitting needs 
as people age and releasing equity.13 
12.15 Similarly, Associate Professor Yates argued that the asset test on pensions can 
create 'lock-in' effects that may discourage the sale of housing, even when a retiree 
might wish to move to more suitable accommodation.14 
12.16 WALGA, stressing the importance of the family home as a store of wealth for 
retirees, argued that for its continued exemption from the aged pension means test: 
11  Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive, Council on the Ageing, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 25. 
12  As of March 2015, the lower thresholds (that is, the thresholds above which the full pension is 
gradually reduced) are $202,000 and $286,500 for single and couple combined homeowners 
respectively, and $348,500 and $433,000 for single and couple combined non-homeowners 
respectively. Department of Human Services, 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/enablers/assets/.  
13  Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 3.  
14  Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney, Submission 53, p. 6. 
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This recognises the attachment many Australians have to their family 
homes and the benefits of allowing retirees to age in place. It also enables 
older Australians to stay in communities they may have spent most of their 
lives in. Furthermore, owner-occupied housing is an important source of 
wealth and financial security for older Australians. 
Within the context of housing affordability, the exemption of the family 
home from the Age Pension means test probably lowers turnover in the 
housing market and, as such, contributes to unaffordability. Nonetheless, 
given the importance of the family home to retirees, the Government should 
not punish this group of Australians for remaining in owner-occupied 
housing through measures such as including their homes in means testing. 
Instead, disincentives for retirees to downsize could be addressed. For 
example, when a retiree sells their home and downsizes to a smaller 
dwelling, the means test exemption should apply not only to their new 
dwelling but also to the proceeds from the sale of the original home. By 
'quarantining' these funds, downsizing retirees will not be penalised relative 
to those who choose to keep living in their family home.15 
12.17 Similarly, both COTA and Seniors Australia expressed opposition to 
including the family home in the assets test.16 Seniors Australia submitted: 
Seniors whose only source of income is an age pension or annuity tied to 
superannuation have no capacity to generate additional income other than 
divesting themselves of the family home. This would lead to additional 
pressure on the private housing rental market and social and public housing, 
and increase the risk of homelessness.17 
12.18 COTA did, however, suggest there might be scope: 
…for increasing the difference between the asset holding of home and non-
homeowners but this would need to be done in a way that does not offer too 
much of an incentive for older people to sell their homes and move into 
rental accommodation.18 
12.19 However, Mr Michael Basso argued that the best way to address the existing 
disincentive to downsizing to more appropriate accommodation, thereby 'freeing up 
larger homes for new families', was to include the principal residence in the aged 
pension means test.19 
15  Western Australian Local Government Association, Submission 37, p. 7.  
16  National Seniors, Submission 165, p. 4; COTA Australia, Submission 191, p. 5. 
17  National Seniors, Submission 165, p. 4.  
18  COTA Australia, Submission 191, p. 5. 
19  Mr Michael Basso, Submission 209, p. 5.  
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Downsizing, resizing, 'rightsizing' 
12.20 A number of witnesses explained that while many older people might prefer 
to move out of the family home and into more appropriate accommodation, financial 
and other barriers sometimes prevented them from doing so.  
12.21 It might be noted while witnesses generally talked about 'downsizing', COTA 
told the committee that it preferred the term 'rightsizing'. The term 'downsizing', 
COTA Chief Executive Mr Ian Yates told the committee, could be taken to mean: 
… that you want to put all older people into single-bedroom [residences], 
because they are old and they do not need more than a single bedroom. The 
reality, of course, is that in later life your home is also your workplace, and 
older Australians contribute to our society in all sorts of ways, including 
that they might look after grandchildren, including that they might have 
hobbies and voluntary activities that require space in the home. So it is 
often more about getting rid of the big garden than [it] is about not needing 
more than one bedroom. Indeed, many need two or three bedrooms for 
those kinds of reasons. So it is about right-sizing.20 
12.22 The committee believes COTA raises a useful point in this regard, and 
believes the policy discourse might benefit from reframing the issue to be about 
'rightsizing'. However, for the purposes of this report, the term 'downsizing' is used, 
given this was the term generally used by witnesses and because it has a commonly 
understood meaning.    
12.23 While noting that older Australians who owned their home were better off 
than older Australians in rental accommodation, Mr Borrowman, Associate Professor 
Frost and Dr Kazekevitch outlined obstacles to downsizing that meant some people 
remained in unsuitable accommodation. They noted, in particular, that would-be 
downsizers were often discouraged by substantial transaction costs attached to 
changing houses. As such, they recommended exempting downsizers from stamp 
duties, which would 'help them to release some of the funds for supporting their 
incomes and contribute to the supply of established housing for younger growing 
families'.21 
12.24 CPSA noted there were several barriers that often inhibited people from 
downsizing, including the cost of stamp duties (except in the ACT where over 65s are 
exempt from stamp duty). It therefore recommended that states and territories remove 
stamp duty for pensioner home owners.22 
20  Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive, Council on the Ageing, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 23.  
21  Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23, p. 10 (emphasis in source).  
22  Combined Pensioners and Superannuants Association of NSW Inc., Submission 164, p. 13. 
 
                                              
 195 
12.25 As KinCare acknowledges in its submission, existing government policy is 
based on a recognition that most older Australians are living at home, and many older 
Australians have a preference to remain in their home for as long as they can. The 
Australian Government has committed almost $1 billion over five years to help older 
people stay at home through a range of measures, including an increased number of 
home support packages.23 
12.26 National Seniors Australia's research, as relayed to the committee, has shown 
that two-thirds of older Australians want to stay in their own home or, if they have to 
move, to at least remain in their local area.24    
12.27 Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive of COTA, told the committee that oftentimes 
retirees:  
… actually do not necessarily want to live in the family home but they do 
want to stay connected to the networks and the services and so on, and 
converting from one form of housing to another in your same area is 
frequently a significant challenge, both financially and in terms of things 
like planning laws and all that. As a society, I think we need to get our head 
around that a bit better.25   
12.28 In its submission, COTA noted the benefits of rightsizing, both for older 
people and in terms of the availability of housing stock more broadly: 
Right sizing allows older people to accommodate their life as it changes, 
frees up housing stock for the broader community and can reduce the cost 
of ongoing service delivery. For homeowners there need to be some 
incentives to encourage them to 'right size' so that their accommodation 
better meets their later life needs.26 
12.29 Ms Mary Wood, Executive Director of Retirement Living Council, part of the 
Property Council of Australia, told the committee that because sale of the family home 
could negatively impact a person's access to the aged pension: 
…a very large number of seniors end up staying much longer than they 
want to in their family home, which is full of trip hazards and [leads to] 
social isolation, which is a huge problem and an expensive problem. They 
lose some control over their life, thereby making it much more likely that 
they will end up being admitted into a residential aged-care facility, which 
for many people is the very situation they want to avoid. They are also 
23  KinCare, Submission 76, p. 3. 
24  Ms Marie Skinner, Senior Policy Adviser, National Seniors Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 9.  
25  Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive, Council on the Ageing, Proof Committee Hansard, 
28 July 2014, p. 23.  
26  COTA Australia, Submission 191, p. 6. 
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precluded from using proceeds from their home sale to help pay for the 
health and other supports that they need.27 
12.30 The Productivity Commission addressed the adverse effect the sale of a 
residential home might have on a retirees access to the pension in its 2011 report, 
Caring for Older Australians. The Productivity Commission recommended the 
government establish: 
…an Australian Age Pensioners Savings Account scheme, for those on a 
full or part-rate Age Pension who wish to deposit all or some of the 
proceeds of the sale of their principal residence. The real value of the 
savings account would be maintained by consumer price indexation, and be 
excluded from the Age Pension assets and income tests. The savings 
account could be drawn down flexibly by the account owner for any 
purpose.28   
12.31 However, the scheme recommended by the Productivity Commission would 
have been part of a broader package of reforms, including the removal of the 
exemption of a person's principal residence for the aged pension assets test. The 
former government, in its Living Longer Living Better aged care reforms, did not take 
up the Productivity Commission's recommendation for an Australian Age Pensioners 
Savings Account scheme.29 
12.32 However, in the 2013–14 Budget the then government announced its intention 
to implement the Housing Help for Seniors pilot program, with a commencement date 
of 1 July 2014. Had the pilot been implemented, it would have allowed a homeowner 
who had lived in their home for at least 25 years to sell their home and have at least 
80 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of the home (that is, the sale price less any 
valid encumbrance such as a mortgage, and less the purchase price of the new home), 
up to a cap of $200,000, quarantined in a special account so that it was not considered 
as part of the aged pension asset test. The money in the account plus any interest 
earned would be exempt from the asset test for up to ten years, providing there were 
no withdrawals during the life of the account. The exemption was to be available to 
people assessed as home owners who moved into a retirement village or a granny flat, 
but would not have been available to people moving into residential aged care. The 
program, according to the budget papers, would have cost $112.4 million over the 
forward estimates period.30 
27  Ms Mary Wood, Executive Director, Retirement Living Council, Property Council of Australia, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, pp. 46–47.  
28  Productivity Commission, Caring for older Australians, Vol. 1 (2011), p. xl. 
29  Parliamentary Library, Research Paper No. 3, 2012–13, Budget Review 2013–14 (May 2013), 
p. 175.   
30  Budget Paper No. 2, Budget Measures 2013–14, p. 152. Also see Parliamentary Library, 
Research Paper No. 3, 2012–13, Budget Review 2013–14 (May 2013), pp. 175–76.  
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12.33 Mr Yates explained that COTA was supportive of the Housing Help for 
Seniors pilot. While it was a modest scheme, COTA nonetheless believed it should be 
trialled and evaluated, and it might then form the basis for a broader set of initiatives 
directed toward encouraging rightsizing.31  
12.34 National Seniors Australia informed the committee that its surveys of aged 
pensioners indicated that 28 per cent thought the proposed pilot scheme would have 
influenced any decision they made to downsize. National Seniors did note its concerns 
regarding restrictions within the scheme, including the inability of pensioners to 
access the money set aside in a special account for medical costs, housing repairs or 
modifications, and emergency bills. However, it told the committee it 'would have 
welcomed attempts by the current government to address some of the shortcomings of 
the pilot rather than disband it completely'.32 
12.35 The RDC (part of the Property Council of Australia), suggested the scheme 
was too restrictive, both because it was limited to pensioners who had owned their 
own home for 25 years and because the equity released could not be spent, even on 
health or care services. Writing prior to the government's announcement that it would 
not proceed with the scheme, the RDC suggested that the scheme be redesigned so as 
to: 
• limit the trial to Australians aged 75 and over—i.e. move to age based 
eligibility rather than the length of home ownership test; 
• limit eligibility to those Australians who qualify for the full rate age 
pension; and 
• allow Australians who take advantage of this initiative to use the non-
means tested funds held in their special account for a range of approved 
health and age-related service costs (up to $25,000 per year on health 
and wellbeing costs including private health insurance, community care, 
meals-on-wheels and cleaning).33 
12.36 Ms Wood outlined how the Property Council's proposal for 'unlocking home 
equity' would work. It would, she told the committee, be limited to full-rate aged 
pensioners aged 75 and over 'so that you are not getting into welfare creep by part-
pensioners or people who want to plan their affairs to qualify for a part-pension'. 
Pensioners would be able to access a capped amount of proceeds from the sale of their 
home—Ms Woods suggested $150,000—for health and wellbeing expenditures 
without affecting their pension eligibility. The scheme would, Ms Woods argued: 
…remove this major barrier to downsizing and unlock home equity for 
productive economic purposes, including allowing spending by age 
31  Mr Ian Yates, Chief Executive, Council on the Ageing, 28 July 2014, Proof Committee 
Hansard, p. 23; COTA Australia, Submission 191, p. 7. 
32  National Seniors Australia, answer to a question on notice from a public hearing held in 
Brisbane on 10 September 2014, received on 13 October 2014, p. 2.  
33  Residential Development Council, Property Council of Australia, Submission 212, p. 12. 
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pensioners on health and wellbeing services that otherwise the taxpayer 
would need to fund or that they just do not get and so end up living an 
impoverished life in every sense of the word.34 
12.37 CPSA, however, thought the scheme was too restrictive, and unlikely to 
encourage many pensioners to downsize.35 
Committee view 
12.38 For a majority of Australians, the family home remains their most valuable 
asset, even with the introduction of compulsory superannuation in the early 1990s.  
12.39 The committee notes that some witnesses argued for inclusion of the family 
home in the aged pension assets test. However, the committee believes such 
recommendations do not afford sufficient weight to the attachment many people have 
to their home, or recognise the benefits of allowing people to age in place.  
12.40 It may be that the exemption of the family home from the aged pension means 
test encourages some overinvestment in housing and, in some cases, discourages 
people from moving to accommodation better suited to their needs. However, 
improved housing affordability achieved through policy which pressures older 
Australians to sell their homes to access capital, potentially disrupting their ties to 
family, friends and community, would be a hollow achievement. The committee 
believes a better approach would be to explore innovative and affordable policies that 
allow retirees to downsize (or 'rightsize') when they wish or require to do so, without 
the sale proceeds necessarily jeopardising their pension eligibility. Programs such as 
the Housing Help for Seniors program, announced by the former government in the 
2013–14 Budget but abandoned by the current government in the 2014–15 Budget 
before it was legislated, would be worth exploring in this regard.      
12.41 More generally, the committee believes there is currently a lack of overall 
strategy to facilitate 'rightsizing' and ageing in place. As such, governments should 
consider including measures in the national housing affordability plan proposed at 
recommendation 4 to ensure the housing market properly meets the needs of older 
Australian homeowners. 
Recommendation 17 
12.42 The committee recommends that the government investigate new policy 
settings that will address barriers to downsizing (or 'rightsizing') by retirees, 
including schemes along the lines of the Housing Help for Seniors pilot.  
34  Ms Mary Wood, Executive Director, Retirement Living Council, Property Council of Australia, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 47. On the proposal, see Property Council of 
Australia, 'Unlocking home equity solution to ageing population', 6 March 2015, 
https://www.propertyoz.com.au/Article/NewsDetail.aspx?p=16&id=10665.  
35  Combined Pensioners and Superannuants Association of NSW Inc., Submission 164, p. 13.  
 
                                              
  
 
 
 
Part II 
The committee has looked at home ownership and noted the gradual decline in the 
number of people who own their own home and the increasing challenge for aspiring 
first home owners to achieve the goal of home ownership. In the second part of this 
report, the committee's focus turns to those who through necessity must rent—those 
whose circumstances do not extend to home ownership. It considers the Australian 
rental market, its changing profile and the challenges and difficulties that low-income 
earners experience in accessing suitable accommodation. The committee also looks at 
public and community housing, at people with particular housing needs and the 
homeless.   
 
 

Chapter 13 
Affordable rental market  
13.1 A number of submitters noted that, in the context of affordable housing, much 
attention has been given to home ownership but considerably less to renting.1 For 
example, Ms Molly Johnson, the Australia Institute, stated: 
While barely a week goes by in which the issue of housing affordability is 
not in the news, the effect on renters seldom makes the headlines.2 
13.2 In her view, the expense of buying a house was only one aspect of the housing 
affordability issue. The cost of housing for those who rent was equally part of the 
problem.3 In this chapter, the committee considers Australia's private rental market, 
the supply of rental properties, the costs of renting, the growing disparity between 
rents and income, the changing profile of the rental market, rental stress and tenancy 
laws. 
Supply of rental properties 
13.3 In its 2012 update on Australian housing, the National Housing Supply 
Council (NHSC) recorded that the housing gap increased by 28,000 dwellings over 
the year to end-June 2011, taking the cumulative shortage of dwellings since 2001 to 
228,000. Assuming that historic demographic and supply trends continued, the 
Council projected that the national shortfall in houses would increase to 370,000 
dwellings by 2016, 492,000 by 2021 and 663,000 by 2031.4  
13.4 Dr Harley Dale, HIA, noted that Australia had produced on average around 
156,500 new homes per annum. Based on a projected 35 million population target by 
2050, he suggested that: 
Under the most conservative of estimates that one could come up with, we 
need to average 180,000 dwellings per annum between now and the year 
2050 if we are to adequately and successfully house our growing and 
1  See for example, Professor Hulse, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 11; 
Dr David Baker, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 19. 
2  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 60.  
3  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 60.  
4  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability—Key indicators, 2012, 
p. vi, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2012/NHSC 
(accessed 4 March 2015). 
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ageing population. The difference is very wide and it is growing almost by 
the day.5 
13.5 In his view, the 180,000 figure was a bare minimum.6 Clearly, as the 
Department of Social Services stated, 'Australia does not build enough houses for its 
growing population'.7 
13.6 This shortfall in the construction of new homes not only affects potential 
home owners but also those who rent. In this regard, the NHSC reported in its 2012 
update on housing supply in Australia that there was a lack of properties that were 
affordable and available for lower income renters. The Council estimated that there 
was a deficit of 539,000 affordable rental properties available for this group. Available 
rental properties included some that were affordable for less affluent households but 
were already occupied by higher income earners. Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane 
had the 'greatest absolute and relative shortages'.8 For example, in Sydney there was 
one affordable and available rental property for every 15 very low-income 
households.9  
13.7 Moreover, the trend is toward further deterioration in the availability of 
affordable rental properties.  
Increasing house prices and rising rents 
13.8 As noted in the first part of this report, house prices in Australia have risen 
considerably over recent decades. In summary, median house prices had increased 
from around three times average household earnings in the early 1990s to around five 
5  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 43–44. Using an average annual rate of growth in 
the population of 1.3 per cent, the intergenerational report projected that Australia’s population 
would rise to 39.7 million by 2054-55. It noted, however, that population projections are 
particularly sensitive to assumptions about the rate of net overseas migration. The 2015 
Intergenerational Report, Australia in 2055, p. 3, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/2015-Intergenerational-
Report (accessed 23 March 2015).  
6  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 44.  
7  Submission 198, p. 4. 
8  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability—Key indicators, 2012, 
p. vii, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2012/NHSC 
(accessed 4 March 2015). 
9  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 3, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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times in 2009. The 2009 Henry Review noted that higher house prices reduced rental 
affordability, as rents need to increase if investors were to maintain their rental yield.10  
13.9 This continuing shortage of rental properties and rising rents have affected 
low-income households in particular. A low-income household is defined as a 
household whose equivalised gross income falls in the lowest 40 per cent of the 
population.11 Further, such a household is deemed to have an affordability problem if 
their housing costs exceed 30 per cent of their income because it has less money to 
spend on essentials.12 The NHSC explained: 
These households have less choice than more affluent groups because they 
face binding affordability constraints, have less ability to absorb increased 
housing costs, and are often displaced from affordable existing housing by 
established households and those higher up the income spectrum.13 
13.10 According to the NHSC, lower income renters faced a worsening situation 
between 2007–08, most notably in the capital cities. In the Council's view, this trend 
highlighted the fact that those at the lower end of the income distribution, many of 
whom would be in the private rental market, were likely to be most affected by 
constrained housing availability. It stated further: 
Given that rents have continued to rise, and outstripped house price growth 
in 2011, rental affordability may have continued to deteriorate, at least in 
comparison to the situation faced by home owners.14 
10  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2 p. 413, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
11  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 83, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033  
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
12  See for example, Maryann Wulff, Margaret Reynolds, Dharmalingam Arunachalam, Kath 
Hulse and Judith Yates, Australia’s private rental market: the supply of, and demand for, 
affordable dwellings, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Swinburne-Monash 
Research Centre, May 2011, p. 6, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/search.asp?ShowSearch=False&Direction=DESC&Searc
h=Properties&Keywords=Maryann+Wulff&Search-
Author=True&Sort=Search%2DTitle&CurrentPage=3 (accessed 4 March 2015). 
13  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability—Key indicators, 2012, 
p. 3, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2012/NHSC 
(accessed 4 March 2015). 
14  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability—Key indicators, 2012, 
p. 5, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2012/NHSC 
(accessed 4 March 2015). 
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Growing disparity between income and rents 
13.11 In addition, increases in income have not kept pace with rises in rent. 
The Henry Review observed the growing gap between the cost of renting and 
household income. In 2009, the ratio of rents to average weekly earnings had risen to 
its highest level since the late 1980s. The review explained: 
As at 5 June 2009 there were 418,000 individuals and families paying more 
than 30 per cent of their income in rent even after receiving Rent 
Assistance; 129,000 of these were paying more than 50 per cent of their 
income. Many of these people, especially age pensioners and disability 
support pensioners (who make up around one-quarter of Rent Assistance 
recipients) are likely to have limited capacity to increase their incomes. The 
number of Rent Assistance households paying more than 30 per cent of 
their income in rent is at its highest level since 2000.15 
13.12 The range of affordability measures calculated from the NHSC's 2009–10 
Survey of Income and Housing show that: 
• In 2009–10, 60 per cent of lower income private renters faced direct housing 
costs of more than 30 per cent of their income, an increase from 57 per cent in 
2007–08. 
• A larger proportion of lower income renters in capital cities faced housing 
costs of more than 30 (and 50) per cent of income than did low-income renters 
outside those cities. 
• New South Wales, followed by Queensland, had the highest proportion of 
lower income renters paying more than 30 (and 50) per cent of income.16 
13.13 In a more recent publication, the NHSC found that compared to a decade ago, 
the average nominal rent paid had increased by 75.8 per cent for houses and 91.8 per 
cent for other dwellings (mostly flats/apartments). In contrast, average earnings had 
risen by 57 per cent over the same period. It also noted that vacancy rates remained 
low at around 2 per cent—a further factor suggesting that the rental market remained 
tight.17 Overall, the Council concluded: 
15  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2, p. 413, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
16  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability—Key indicators, 2012, 
p. vii, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2012/NHSC 
(accessed 4 March 2015). 
17  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, p. 7, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 22 August 2014).  
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More than ever, Australia's supply challenge is not simply to add to housing 
stock but also to achieve substantial growth in the supply of affordable 
rental stock where it is needed most. With a decline in home ownership 
rates, likely to be exacerbated as the Baby Boomers (who have high 
ownership rates) move on, pressure on the private rental market is likely to 
increase in the years to come.18 
13.14 Many submitters referred to the growing disparity between income growth 
and increases in rent and how this gap made it much harder for low-income earners to 
find affordable and appropriate rental properties. For example, Mr Ian Pritchard, 
Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast, referred to a report on housing 
affordability on the Gold Coast, which revealed considerable disparity between 
income growth and housing cost growth. Between 2006 and 2011, the median 
household income increased by approximately 13 per cent whereas rental payments 
increased by approximately 35 per cent.19 
13.15 Mr Mark O'Brien, Tenants Union of Victoria, similarly noted that the cost of 
renting to income ratios had increased substantially over the last 20 to 25 years. He 
gave the following example: 
At the moment in Melbourne only about 0.4 per cent of lettings are 
affordable for a low-income household, so fewer than one in 100 lettings 
are affordable for a low-income household.20 
13.16 Anglicare also highlighted the scarcity of affordable rental properties for low-
income earners. To determine how many properties are available for people on very 
low incomes, Anglicare conducts an annual one-weekend review of the private rental 
market. In 2014, it found 13,000 private rental market properties available for rent of 
which only 23 would have been affordable for people on low incomes.21 In its 
submission, the National Affordable Housing Consortium spoke of a 'strong and 
consistent unity of message across the board', which contended: 
…the long term relationship between incomes and house prices has been 
seriously eroded over the past 20 years and, without action to address the 
underlying factors, this trend will continue to create serious affordability 
18  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, pp. xi 
and 129, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
19  The report was intended to inform stakeholders within the region of issues relating to housing 
affordability. The project was commissioned by MacroPlan Dimasi to undertake the research 
and the report was completed in March 2014. Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, 
p. 24. 
20  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 42. 
21  Dr Burgmann, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 11.  
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problems, particularly for those households in the bottom 40% of income 
distribution.22 
13.17 Ms Felicity Hand, Department of Social Services, told the committee that 
low-income households face affordability challenges and limited choices in the private 
rental housing market, which had been exacerbated by a period of higher than CPI 
rent growth between 2007 and 2013. According to Ms Hand, between 2007 and 2013 
private rental costs, on average, had grown significantly faster than CPI. Most 
recently, however, growth in rents had slowed and in the year to June 2014, rents had 
risen more slowly than CPI for the first time since 2006.23 
Changing profile 
13.18 Australia's private rental market has been changing from its traditional role as 
a transitional phase for households moving into home ownership or social housing to a 
long-term sector for a significant number of households.24 Mr O'Brien stated that it 
was never contemplated that the private rental sector would continue to be as big as it 
is. He explained further: 
It was anticipated that most people would achieve home ownership and the 
few who could not would be housed by the government. So, in effect, the 
system would become a two-part system.25  
13.19 Ms Johnson, the Australia Institute, observed that the growing number of 
renters and increasing house prices in Australia was making it difficult for aspiring 
home owners to enter the property market and was driving up the cost of renting.26 
Likewise, Dr Wendy Stone noted the changing profile of the rental market with 
tenants renting for longer terms and the sector no longer serving as a transition into 
home ownership for many Australians. She informed the committee that: 
The number of renters who have rented for more than 10 years has 
increased quite significantly in the last 15 years largely because we now 
have people living in the private rental sector long term who once would 
have had social housing or access to home ownership through being able to 
22  Submission 101, p. [1]. 
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 1. 
24  See Kath Hulse, Terry Burke, Liss Ralston and Wendy Stone, The Australian private rental 
sector: changes and challenges, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, July 2012, 
p. 6,  
https://www.melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/hilda/Bibliography/Other_Publications/2012/H
ulse_etal_The_Australian_private_rental_sector_changes_and_challenges.pdf 
(accessed 15 January 2015). 
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 45. 
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 60.  
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afford a home. The pressure in the system is great for low- to moderate-
income households, spatially and in other ways.27 
13.20 Professor Kath Hulse referred to the 'boiling frog' of the private rental sector. 
In her view, home ownership had attracted 'a lot of attention' with social housing 
receiving some interest, but the reality was that the private rental sector was 'growing'. 
According to Professor Hulse, the sector grew by 18 per cent between 2006 and 2011, 
which was twice the rate of household growth in Australia.28 She noted in particular 
that while there was a range of people on different household incomes in the sector, 
there were many people on low incomes who were private renters.29  
13.21 Also, Mr O'Brien indicated that discussions about rental housing affordability 
were often bedevilled by the assumption that it was about young singles, when the 
largest proportion of households in the rental market were families with children. He 
pointed out: 
They are the people who are also confronting these affordability problems 
and are being forced to make difficult decisions about…their children's 
future and trying to find an affordable place in the market so that they can 
prosper as a family. 30  
13.22 Importantly, he underlined the fact that the market creating such difficulties 
for renters was 'a very mainstream housing market' and not confined to special 
groups.31 
Higher income earners now renting 
13.23 One of the notable shifts in the profile of those in the private rental market has 
been the increasing number of higher income earners occupying a significant 
proportion of the private rental market. With supply already stretched, this tendency 
has intensified competition in the market.32 In its submission, the Council to Homeless 
Persons referred to the phenomenon of households 'renting down', that is higher 
income households occupying low rent properties. It suggested that this trend 
demonstrated that the problems faced by low-income renters were not simply 
'a problem of housing affordability, but a problem of housing allocation'.33 
27  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 11. Dr Stone gave evidence in a private 
capacity.  
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 10. Professor Hulse gave evidence in a private 
capacity. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 11.  
30  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 44–45.  
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 44–45.  
32  See, for example, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Submission 93, p. 32; 
Council to Homeless Persons, Submission 179, p.2.  
33  Submission 179, p. 2. 
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Professor Hulse also noted that much of the problem with access to an affordable 
private rental property was around competition. Referring to research she had 
undertaken, Professor Hulse informed the committee that there had been an increase 
in higher income renters during the period 2006 to 2011—so there was pressure in the 
sector. Further, Professor Hulse explained that people letting properties were making a 
risk assessment and renting the property to higher income households rather than the 
lower-income ones if they thought there was a risk.34 Indeed, an AHURI study on 
affordable dwellings in Australia's private rental market found that: 
…even if the private rental market worked perfectly and allocated all 
affordable rental dwellings to low-income households, there are simply not 
enough affordable private dwellings to go around. The fact that much of 
this stock is taken up by higher income households only worsens the 
situation.35 
13.24 Elaborating on this trend for higher income earners to rent, 
Professor Hal Pawson, City Futures Research Centre, noted that some people who 
could afford to own a home do not necessarily elect for home ownership. Rather than 
purchase a small unit or house on the outskirts of metropolitan areas, which is 
affordable, they choose to rent closer to the city to meet their housing needs. They 
then squeeze out of the rental market those for whom renting is the only choice.36 As 
Associate Professor Judith Yates explained: 
…as our cities become more and more pressured by population pressures, 
affordable housing moves out and so people would rather have the lifestyle 
preferences of rental housing which they can access closer to the amenities 
they want, and, particularly for two-income households, two-earner 
households, have access to more jobs.37 
13.25 Dr Chris Martin, Tenants' Union of New South Wales, similarly observed that 
some higher-income earners preferred to rent for lifestyle or labour market decisions 
and occupied stock that might otherwise be affordable to low-income people. He also 
noted the growing number of people renting longer into their 'higher-income-earning 
years'.38 This tendency, in combination with limited rental stock, exacerbated the 
problem for low-income earners finding affordable housing.39 Indeed, Dr Martin 
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 25. 
35  See for example, Maryann Wulff, Margaret Reynolds, Dharmalingam Arunachalam, Kath 
Hulse and Judith Yates, Australia’s private rental market: the supply of, and demand for, 
affordable dwellings, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Swinburne-Monash 
Research Centre, May 2011, p. 13, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/search.asp?ShowSearch=False&Direction=DESC&Searc
h=Properties&Keywords=Maryann+Wulff&Search-
Author=True&Sort=Search%2DTitle&CurrentPage=3 (accessed 4 March 2015). 
36  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 35. 
37  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 37. 
38  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 62. 
39  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 66. 
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argued that the shape of the rental market had altered 'particularly to the disadvantage 
of low-income renters'.40 The Department of Housing and Public Works, Queensland, 
likewise observed the increasing numbers of people on medium to high incomes 
choosing to rent in order to save a deposit to buy.41 This subsequent demand for 
affordable rental housing creates additional pressure on low-income renters. 
Rental stress 
13.26 Housing stress is a measure of housing affordability where the proportion of 
household income spent on basic housing costs (that is, rent or mortgage) is 
calculated. Rental stress, therefore, is a situation where a household's housing costs 
(excluding government rent assistance) exceeds 30 per cent of the gross household 
income. According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), any 
household spending 50 per cent or more is said to be in severe housing stress.42 
Dr Martin stated bluntly: 
What we call 'housing stress' is poverty by another name.43  
13.27 The AIHW found that the proportion of low-income households paying more 
than 30 per cent of their income in rent had risen. In 2007–08, 37 per cent of low-
income households were in rental stress compared to 44 per cent in 2011–12. The 
proportion of rental stress was higher (60 per cent) for the lowest 10 per cent of 
households by income in 2011–12.44 It noted that of the 1.2 million low-income 
households across Australia, 44 per cent were in rental stress in 2011–12, an increase 
from 42 per cent in 2009–10 and 37 per cent in 2007–08.45 Other witnesses agreed 
that the national picture for households in the bottom income brackets had 
deteriorated.  
13.28 Professor Hulse noted that not only had the situation worsened for low-
income earners but had extended further up the income scale. She cited the stark 
housing shortages that occurred in towns and regional centres in Queensland and 
40  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 62. 
41  Queensland Government, Submission 215, p. 2. 
42  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, pp. 83 and 85, 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
43  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 66.  
44  Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, p. ix, 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 12 January 2015). 
45  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 3, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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Western Australia due to the mining boom and the concomitant escalation in demand 
for housing.46 
13.29 Drawing on their experiences or from their own region or state, a number of 
submitters highlighted the fact that many low-income earners were under rental 
stress.47 For example, Mr Adam Mills, City of Melbourne, cited statistics indicating 
that the median rent in the City of Melbourne exceeded income growth by 150 per 
cent. Currently, half of the city's renters were in housing stress, paying greater than 
30 per cent of their gross income on rent.48 He went on to explain that there was poor 
access to affordable housing for low-income essential service workers with only 
10 per cent of all rental housing affordable to this group within the City of Melbourne, 
which only improved marginally to 18 per cent within a 56-minute commute.49 
13.30 Mr Pritchard, Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast, referred to a 
commissioned report completed in March 2014 that clearly illustrated the extent of 
housing stress in the Gold Coast region. It also showed that the majority of those in 
housing stress were low-income renters. Essentially, the report found that based on 
2011 figures, of the 46,000 households spending in excess of 30 per cent of their 
income on housing costs on the Gold Coast, approximately 35,000 of them were low-
income households. Of the 80,000 low-income households on the Gold Coast, 35,000 
households, or about 43 per cent, were in housing stress. Of these 35,000 households, 
approximately 24,000 were in rental stress and about 11,000 in mortgage stress.50 
More broadly, the National Council of Women of Australia maintained that rental 
affordability for households on the lowest incomes continued to worsen. It stated: 
The impact of the housing crisis on lower income households is more acute 
because of a lessened capacity to compete for housing. For the lowest 10% 
of households by income, rental stress jumped from 49.2% in 2007–8 to 
60.8% in 2009–10.51 
13.31 It should be noted that while the figure of 30 per cent of income is generally 
accepted as a measure of rental stress, the burden of paying such a sizeable sum on 
rent falls more heavily on some. In this regard, Regional Development Australia, Gold 
Coast, observed that the 30 per cent ratio did not take account of other relevant factors 
such as the number of people per household and disposable income.52 Along similar 
lines, and as discussed in chapter two, Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate 
Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman argued that this ratio approach did not 
46  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 25. 
47  See for example, Mr Myers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 51. 
48  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 29.  
49  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 29.  
50  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 24. 
51  Ms Findlater Smith, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 55.  
52  Submission 74, pp 3–4. 
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capture the 'dynamics of housing stress for different compositions of households' and 
failed to reflect the complex nature of housing and its interrelated nature with other 
costs. They suggested that:  
Housing is the major item in many households budgets and for low-income 
groups the financial situation after housing costs have been met is a 
pressing issue.53  
13.32 As a more accurate reflection of rental stress, they supported using the 
residual stress measure, which was based on the level of disposable income that 
remained after housing costs had been met.54 As noted earlier, HomeGround also 
favoured this approach, arguing that: 
…for people on very low incomes, ratio measures of affordable housing are 
meaningless. When someone pays 25% of their income in rent and still 
cannot afford other basic necessities such as food and clothing, the result is 
extreme poverty, residual measures of housing affordability at least make 
allowances for the cost of other necessary purchases in calculating what is 
affordable.55 
13.33 Mr Andrew Mills, HomeStart Finance, also acknowledged that the definition 
of housing affordability varied for every household and was dependent 'on particular 
life circumstances, such as childcare costs, whether you need to own a car, travel to 
work'.56 He conceded, however, that from a broad policy perspective, it was not 
possible, in a practical sense, to evaluate different circumstances for every household 
and accepted that the 30 per cent threshold provided a useful benchmark for policy.57 
13.34 The committee understands the practicality of using the 30 per cent 
benchmark as a measure of housing stress but notes the importance of keeping in mind 
the different composition and circumstances of individual households and that some 
will bear the burden of renting more heavily.  
Level of hardship 
13.35 Organisations providing assistance to people under rental stress understand 
the level of hardship that high rents are causing. Mr Simon Schrapel, Uniting 
Communities, informed the committee that those working in the organisation's 
financial counselling services regularly see people who are paying not 30 per cent but 
upwards of 50 per cent of their disposable income in private rental accommodation.58 
Drawing on Shelter SA's experiences, Dr Alice Clark noted that Shelter SA's 
53  Submission 23, p. 4.  
54  Submission 23, p. 2.  
55  Submission 70, p. 5.  
56  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 29. 
57  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 29.  
58  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 29–30.  
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consultations with people living in the community also show that people living on low 
incomes pay 50 per cent or more of their income just on their house. She went on to 
comment: 
So if you are on a very low income that leaves you practically nothing to 
buy necessities—things like medicines and health care, school excursions 
and indeed food.59 
13.36 Anglicare WA explained that the emergence of a group of private renters 
routinely accessing financial support services was 'a relatively new phenomenon' and 
indicated strongly that the lack of affordable housing was affecting a widening 
proportion of the community and 'increasing their vulnerability'.60 Mr James Bennett, 
Tenants Union of Victoria, stated simply that workers with the Union 'often see 
people on average weekly earnings now struggling to meet average rent in a number 
of areas'.61 This statement ties in with the observation that the difficulties for 
Australian renters were very much a product of today's mainstream rental market.  
Additional housing costs 
13.37 When considering housing stress, it is important to recognise that the actual 
expenditure on rent is not the only drain on the household housing budget. There are 
additional costs associated with housing that further eat into a household's finances. 
Energy, in particular, is a major source of expenditure. Mr Schrapel indicated that 
some renters, notably people on the lowest income, were paying upwards of 10 per 
cent of their remaining disposable income on energy. He explained further: 
In a lot of rental homes landlords have not traditionally made their 
properties particularly energy-efficient or put in appliances that have 
allowed that sort of comfort level to be realised.62 
13.38 Also, based on his experience as CEO of Uniting Communities, Mr Schrapel 
observed that low-income housing tends to be located on the fringes. He explained 
that it is 'the costliest place to live in terms of transport and everything else, so you 
have a displacement effect which has a compounding impact on low-income 
households'.63 Mr Schrapel suggested that when 60 per cent of a person's disposable 
income is consumed on those essential things there is not much left for necessities 
such as food. In his assessment, a lot of low-income people were 'experiencing 
extreme housing stress'.64 
59  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 32.  
60  Submission 161, p. 7. 
61  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 42. 
62  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 30.  
63  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 41. 
64  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 29–30. 
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13.39 Mr Ian Yates, COTA, likewise noted that housing affordability encompassed 
other costs. For example, Mr Yates observed, and as Mr Schrapel mentioned, people 
in the rental market not only had significant rental outlays but were also frequently 
living in housing that was not energy efficient. He stated further: 
Because there is not a lot of incentive for a landlord to make a house energy 
efficient, pensioners are paying higher gas and electricity bills out of a tight 
income stream because they are not in efficient housing.65  
13.40 In addition, Mr Yates referred to renters living long distances from where they 
needed to be and highlighted the cost of transport, which, he argued, should be 
considered part of the affordability of housing issue.  
Affordable and appropriate housing 
13.41 Many submitters stressed the importance of recognising that affordable 
housing must also be appropriate housing. In its submission, COTA observed that too 
often the only affordable housing was not appropriate, 'either because of its design, or 
its geographic position and lack of proximity to necessary services'.66  
Proximity to transport, services, jobs, schools 
13.42 Some witnesses referred to the families and individuals on limited incomes 
who, unable to find affordable, appropriate and secure housing, were increasingly 
being forced to relocate to areas on the urban fringe without adequate services and 
infrastructure and removed from their social supports.67 For example, Mr O'Brien, 
Tenants Union of Victoria, noted that the natural consequence of cities such as 
Melbourne commanding high rents meant that low-income people were being driven 
further away from good-amenity suburbs around the inner city and even the middle-
ring suburbs. He suggested: 
So the less than one per cent of lettings that are affordable in Melbourne are 
now located in a sort of ring around the outer fringes of the city. It has also 
forced low-income households to occupy housing in places like Dromana, 
which is an old holiday destination. You have people now living 
permanently in places that were never really intended that way in housing 
that was never intended for permanent occupancy.68 
13.43 The committee has referred to the costs of transport for those living on the 
periphery of metropolitan areas. But being relegated to the outskirts of cities has 
implications that go beyond higher transport expenses. Indeed, the move to the outer 
65  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 22. See also Jane Berry, Home Sweet Home—Act 
for the house not the tenant, Footscray Community Legal Centre Inc, 2013, pp. 8 and 10–11. 
The issue of energy efficiency and housing affordability was also discussed in chapter 8. 
66  Submission 191, p. 6. 
67  See, for example, Hobsons Bay City Council, Submission 39, p. 3.  
68  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 44. 
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suburbs, according to Mr O'Brien, effectively forces people on benefits to areas that 
have less access to employment, services and transport thereby creating an 
environment for future social problems. In his view, such a development does nothing 
to avoid the 'intergenerational transmission of poverty or inequality', which happens 
simply by the normal processes of the market.69 Drawing on her work with Shelter 
SA, Dr Clark also noted that people at the lowest end of the rental market were being 
forced from where they want and need to live, which might be near work or family:  
We see people being pushed out and away from services and infrastructure, 
and also the quality of those homes—the private rental properties—is 
deteriorating. Landlords don't care. They have got a line of tenants waiting 
to inhabit their places and they are not doing maintenance, so there are 
serious issues for private renters.70 
13.44 Professor Pawson also spoke of the working poor being pushed increasingly 
towards the fringes of Australia's capital cities—places remote from 'the jobs-rich 
inner areas'. Likewise, Ms Jacqueline Phillips, Australian Council of Social Service, 
referred to a spatial segregation driven by access to affordable housing that: 
…creates marked inefficiencies in lower paid labour markets and imposes 
high transport costs on often quite low-income households.71 
13.45 In her view, housing should be seen not only in an economic context but also 
as part of Australia's infrastructure.72 As Associate Professor Wilkins, University of 
Melbourne, noted, you cannot divorce affordable housing from 'infrastructure 
development and in particular transport infrastructure, both public and private'.73 
Indeed, Professor Jago Dodson, RMIT University, spoke of spatial and social 
polarisation and the differentiation in housing markets between the core of Australian 
cities, the middle suburbs and the outer suburbs, where housing is most affordable for 
those on low incomes. He argued: 
The combined impacts of those locational processes affect access to 
employment and access to public and social services such as health and 
education services, which compounds not just affordability problems but 
also liveability or wider opportunity questions for households in the lower 
income brackets. These issues then need to be picked up in other portfolio 
areas such as health, education, welfare assistance and that sort of thing. 
That dimension is another issue that we have not coordinated very well 
within our policy architecture.74 
69  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 44.  
70  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 41.  
71  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 24. 
72  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 24.  
73  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 16. 
74  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 13. The issue of spatial disadvantage was also 
addressed in chapter 7. 
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13.46 This lack of access to transport, services, education and jobs also has 
productivity implications for Australia. In this regard, Mr Adrian Pisarski, National 
Shelter, indicated that Australia would 'suffer major productivity consequences 
because the country's workforce will not be located where it is needed'. He observed 
that people who want opportunities to educate themselves or receive medical services 
or get a job would not be close enough to do it. So, in his view, Australia had in the 
making, 'a really major productivity issue over the long term'.75  
Security of tenure 
13.47 Professor Andrew Beer, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning 
(CHURP), referred to the growing trend of Australians remaining in private tenancy 
for longer periods of time throughout their life. He told the committee that, in reality, 
renting for many people was no longer a transitional phase but a stage that would 
occupy most of their lifetime. Although people may stay in the private rental market, 
they often move from dwelling to dwelling and in many cases unwillingly. In this 
regard, Professor Beer observed:  
We found that involuntary moves were a major reason why people moved 
from one tenancy to the next—that is, they are being evicted because the 
landlord either wants the property back for another purpose, or they have 
been deemed to be a poor tenant, or the rent has gone up and they are being 
forced to move…But that is only one of the reasons people move.76 
13.48 According to Professor Beer, there was an attempt several years ago to 
introduce seven-year leases but he did not think that the proposal 'ever really took off 
in any substantial way'. He explained further: 
The structure of our housing industry supply for the private rental market is 
such that most landlords are investing in the private rental market in order 
to achieve capital gains rather than returns on investment. This therefore 
means that they want to be able to liquidate their asset at any point in time, 
and so they are unwilling to give longer term leases.77 
13.49 In its submission, the Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of 
Technology, also commented on the structure of the Australian private rental market. 
It stated: 
…lease lengths are typically very short, rents can be increased at regular 
intervals, and tenants have little control over their home, and in most 
jurisdictions can be asked to leave with very little notice compared with 
many developed countries.78 
75  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 33. 
76  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 12–13. 
77  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 13. 
78  Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 86, p. 3. 
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13.50 Indeed, many witnesses referred to uncertain tenure as a major concern.79 In 
its submission, National Shelter suggested that the rental market 'was not currently set 
up to meet the needs of long term tenants'. It noted that investors were mainly small 
households with only a marginal attachment to the rental market, which meant that 
they were unable to provide any level of security for their tenants. Furthermore, the 
regulation of the industry was based around short-term tenancies and short notice 
periods for eviction, even where there was no breach of tenancy conditions.80 
13.51 In this context, Dr Stone recorded that 40 per cent of renters move three or 
more times in a five-year period, which represented eight per cent for all households.81 
She stated further: 
The private rental sector at the moment is creating disadvantaged 
households, wearing them down through move after move after move, and 
not enabling the sort of maintenance that social housing once did or the 
growth that home ownership provided to households.82 
13.52 Lower income tenants experience these disruptions most keenly, particularly 
vulnerable groups such as disability tenants, families with children and indigenous 
households.83 
Cost of moving 
13.53 In its submission, the National Affordable Housing Consortium noted that one 
thing often overlooked in the regular tenancy law reviews was the personal and 
systemic costs that resulted from a bias to short term lets and a disaggregated rental 
investment market. In its view, these were 'really national housing policy matters 
rather than residential tenancy law matters'.84 A number of submitters have similarly 
referred to this lack of security in tenure and the associated costs of moving borne by 
the people who least could afford it. Dr Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Frost and 
Mr Borrowman voiced the views of many other witnesses when they stated that 
lower-income groups were the sector of the rental market least able to cope with the 
cost of moving: 
Repeated moving reduces their ability to cope with these burdens, eats into 
savings and depletes stocks of social capital that have been built up in a 
current location.85  
79  See for example, Ms Molly Johnson, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 60 and 
Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman, 
Submission 23.  
80  Submission 78, pp. 4–5. 
81  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 11. 
82  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 11–12. 
83  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 11. 
84  Submission 101, p. [5].  
85  Submission 23, p. 11. 
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13.54 Mr Pisarski highlighted some of the costs incurred for a family changing 
schools, doctors, and pharmacists:  
When you rent a property, every time you are asked to vacate the property 
all of those networks that you build in a local community need to be 
changed. That is a really major problem and a major cost for tenants over 
the long term. If you have to do that, even once every two years, and you 
are a tenant for 10 years or more—as most are now—then that is five major 
moves that you have to pay for. That is a huge cost impost on tenants.86 
13.55 In a similar vein, HomeGround Services referred to the financial and practical 
hardships caused by frequent moves.87 It noted the difficulties that the lack of security 
of tenure in private renting can pose for vulnerable tenants, including having to bear 
the costs of frequent moves and exposure to unfair dealings by landlords. According 
to HomeGround, Australian jurisdictions, compared to other countries, provide very 
low levels of secure tenancy, imposing significant social costs on tenants and the 
wider community.88 Importantly, the additional costs of relocating and the disruption 
to education, employment, and social networks and services may mean that a 
household decides that a move is economically unviable or, for personal reasons, 
unpalatable. Mr O'Brien noted that the high cost of moving may mean that a tenant is 
prepared to settle for a higher rent rather than exercise the choice of changing houses. 
In his view, tenants will tolerate rent rate increases to a significant degree, even low-
income tenants. He observed: 
The amount of money that low-income tenants are spending on rent is 
extraordinary. It is no wonder they have no money left for other essentials. 
People will tolerate a lot for the security that their housing affords them.89 
13.56 Clearly, households under rental stress are forced to make difficult choices 
between expenditure on necessities—whether to cut back spending on heating, 
education, health services or even food.90 Housing stress is indeed another name for 
poverty.  
Rights of tenants 
13.57 This matter of insecure tenancy in Australia introduces the issue of tenants' 
rights. Mr David Chandler OAM, an independent industry adviser and advocate for 
Australia's construction and housing industry, believed there were flaws in the private 
rental market, which he described as: 
86  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39.  
87  Submission 70, pp. 4–5. 
88  Submission 70, p. 5. 
89  Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 46.  
90  Dr Kazakevitch, Professor Frost and Mr Borrowman, Submission 23, p. 12.  
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…opportunist, often volatile and in some instances landlords do not meet 
reasonable expectations.91 
13.58 In this regard, Professor Beer referred to what he termed 'clear analysis by 
legal scholars working in this area' that showed that the rights of tenants in virtually 
every jurisdiction in Australia compared to Europe and other places were 'relatively 
weak'. From his perspective, Australian tenancy legislation favoured the landlord 
rather than the tenant.92 He referred to early research when evictions in South 
Australia were around 10,000 a year. In part, he attributed this high figure to the 
tendency of tenants to accept that they had to move on. Professor Beer explained: 
Even though they could take the landlord to the Residential Tenancy 
Tribunal when the landlord was trying to move them on, most tenants 
simply did not even bother to turn up to the hearings. So there is a culture 
of accepting the relative powerlessness of tenants in the rental market.93 
13.59 In his view, people accepted this lack of power and the belief they had few 
rights. Furthermore, according to Dr Beer, the fact that most tenancies were for either 
a six-month or a 12-month period also contributed to evictions.94 Dr Martin agreed 
with the proposition that tenancy was 'unnecessarily insecure'.95 He explained that 
rental occupancy was insecure because 'tenancy laws, in every Australian state and 
territory, allow for tenancies to be terminated without grounds'.96 Mr Pisarski 
informed the committee that at the moment landlords were able to evict tenants 
without cause at the end of any lease. Consistent with the evidence of other witnesses, 
he stated that most leases in Australia were typically signed for six or 12 months.97  
13.60 On this same matter, Dr Stone noted the wealth of evidence in Australia 
concerning problems created by structural conditions at access points for tenants in 
terms of competition policies, which included discriminatory letting, frequent rent 
increases and poor standards. She referred to an industry that basically supported such 
practices including landlords increasing the rent regularly. She also spoke about 'an 
environment of fear in which tenants cannot report problems without being evicted or 
having rental increases'. Importantly, she drew attention to forced and unwanted 
movement in rates which were far in excess of other countries considered as good 
models.98 
91  Submission 27, p. 4.  
92  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 13. 
93  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 13. 
94  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 13. 
95  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 63.  
96  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 63. 
97  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39. 
98  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 11. 
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13.61 One group of submitters, Dr Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Frost and 
Mr Borrowmann, added weight to the contention that the Australian rental market did 
'not provide the same level of protection to renters as in other Western countries', 
which particularly disadvantaged long-term tenants.99  
13.62 A number of other submitters also mentioned discrimination by landlords and 
estate agents when selecting tenants and how low vacancy rates and increasing 
competition between potential tenants only make the situation worse for low-income 
renters or groups with particular housing needs.100 For example, the Tenants' Union of 
NSW noted the high number of renters (both low income and otherwise) who were 
reluctant to assert their tenancy rights. The Tenants' Union referred to a recent survey, 
which suggested that 79 per cent of tenants had put up with a problem rather than 
assert their rights.101 The Western Community Legal Centres registered the same 
concern that 'in a climate where the vacancy rate is low', tenants were reticent to 
exercise their rights under the relevant state tenancy laws or seek help. They gave the 
example of tenants not requesting repairs to be carried out or not taking landlords to 
the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) over unfair rental increases 
for fear of eviction.102 
Benefits of affordable, appropriate and secure housing 
13.63 Secure tenancy, affordable rents and appropriate housing have a critical role 
in setting the foundations for a healthier and more productive population, which in 
turn contributes to a strong economy and to government savings.103 Dr Kazakevitch, 
Associate Professor Frost and Mr Borrowman contended: 
Access to housing is a cornerstone of economic development and welfare. 
Once a household has secured adequate housing, further important life 
decisions can be made with more degrees of freedom.104  
99  Submission 23, p. 3. See also the Western Community Legal Centres, Submission 44, p. 11, 
which stated: 'It is important to note that in a climate where the vacancy rate is low, tenants are 
often reluctant to exercise their rights under the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (RTA) or to 
seek help. For example, tenants may not request repairs to be done or take landlords to VCAT 
over unfair rental increases for fear of facing evictions'.   
100  See, for example, Tamworth Regional Council, Submission 12, p. 3. 
101  Submission 120, p. 11. 
102  Submission 44, p. 11. Also see Jane Berry, Home Sweet Home—Act for the house not the 
tenant, Footscray Community Legal Centre Inc., 2013, 
http://www.footscrayclc.org.au/images/stories/home_sweet_home__-
_act_for_the_house_not_the_tenant_report_2013.pdf (accessed 19 February 2015.  
103  See, for example, Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, RMIT University, Submission 
24, p. 3; Western Australian Local Government Association, Submission 37, p. 2; National 
Foundation for Australian Women ACT, Submission 38, p. 2; JELD-WEN Australia, 
Submission 54, p. 2; Inner South Rooming House Network, Submission 58, p. 1; HomeGround 
Services, Submission 70, p. 2.  
104  Submission 23, p. 4.  
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13.64 Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, RMIT University, stated simply 
that few material concerns were more important to Australians than the homes they 
live in: 
Secure, affordable housing contributes to our sense of security, individual 
wellbeing, health and supports family stability.105 
13.65 Drawing on the research on secure occupancy in rental housing, they stated 
that: 
The rental market has the potential to provide a refuge, oasis and stepping 
stone for an increasing number of households. However, compared to other 
advanced economies Australia's rental housing is the least secure and most 
neglected pillar of our housing system.106  
13.66 Mr Scott Langford, Junction and Women's Housing, argued that people who 
might be experiencing social and economic disadvantage need access to appropriate 
services, so they can sustain their tenancy. According to Mr Langford, secure tenancy 
was the bedrock of building capacity for social and economic participation. In a policy 
context, he urged consideration be given to such matters so that the policy design and 
solutions do not focus only on the bricks-and-mortar aspect.107 
13.67 Professor Pawson also underscored the benefits of having access to long term 
tenure that provides continuity, security and predictability.108 As did Mr Rod Astbury, 
Western Australian Association for Mental Health, who suggested that safe and secure 
housing reduces the likelihood of mental ill health. He argued that stable tenure: 
…contributes to effective recovery, and it maximises the opportunity for 
people with mental health issues to lead fulfilling and contributing lives.109 
13.68 Ms Maria Palumbo, Community Housing Council of South Australia, noted 
the results from a preliminary survey on the benefits to the community stemming from 
long term tenure. She reported that, according to conservative estimates based on 
calculations on 15 people so far, the benefits range from 'something like a $5,000-per-
year return to the community up to about $60,000 per year'. She explained: 
For the program we are running, if you think about costs, it is about an 
$8,000 package of support per person. In the case of homelessness, that is 
actually considered expensive, but that is because we have run on this 
transitional model that is about $3,000 a person and that is about churn. 
This works on a housing-first model that is a lot more long term. It costs 
about $8,000 a person, but compared with institutional care it is actually 
105  Submission 24, p. 5. 
106  Submission 24, p. 6. 
107  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 30.  
108  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 41. 
109  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 34.  
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really cheap. It prevents people from returning to institutional care, 
hospitalisation and the like.110 
13.69 She conceded that the best return comes when people get jobs. She noted: 
Where they are moving from welfare into employment, those returns can be 
quite large, and in fact we have had those outcomes. But then there are 
other returns to the community, where people have become more 
productive. Those people are not as costly, if you like, because they are not 
using services as much—they have reduced their need for services. And 
they are more productive in that they are volunteering more and are 
involved in community. So, for each different case the return is different, 
because people have different capacity. There are people who are never 
going to be able to work, but there is still a return that we can actually 
calculate and value. And there are people we can move into a place where 
they are actually employed and contributing, where the return is quite 
high.111 
13.70 Conversely, inadequate and insecure housing may give rise to escalated 
domestic violence and overcrowding and poor educational, employment or health 
outcomes.112 
13.71 Dr Baker, CHURP, referred to research that looked at the difference between 
being in precarious, unaffordable and insecure housing versus equally uncertain 
employment. She explained that when comparing the two, it was housing that 'really' 
affected mental health within the household.113 Dr Maree Petersen, University of 
Queensland, also linked secure housing with the health and wellbeing of tenants. She 
stated simply: 
The amount of anxiety and stress that is associated with the threat of 
eviction is extraordinary. If you have other issues in your life as well, like a 
very limited income and limited resources, that all adds up.114 
13.72 Likewise, in their publication, Exploring the Bi-directional Relationship 
between Health and Housing, Dr Emma Wood and colleagues drew a similar direct 
and positive connection between health and housing and housing and health.115  
110  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 39.  
111  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 39 
112  See, for example, Professor Haslam McKenzie, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, 
p. 39.  
113  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 17. 
114  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 15. 
115  Dr Emma Wood et al, 'Exploring the Bi-directional Relationship between Health and Housing 
in Australia', Urban Policy and Research, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 71–84. 
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Overseas experiences—security of tenure 
13.73 A number of witnesses referred to the stable rental markets in countries such 
as Germany. For example, Mr Pisarski noted that in some European countries, a 
tenancy can be entered into lasting over a decade or 20 years or more with 'really solid 
rights' within that agreement. This practice, which favours long-term tenancy, means 
that institutions were more likely to invest in residential property because they have 
long-term certainty as well. In his view, it was 'a win-win for everybody'.116 
13.74 The National Affordable Housing Consortium also noted that other countries 
had achieved the goal of renters being able to enjoy stability and longevity and with a 
greater measure of control in rented housing.117 Dr Vivienne Milligan, City Futures 
Research Centre, contrasted the different approaches to renting: 
If you are a renter in Germany you can choose and put in your own kitchen. 
If you are in Australia you cannot put a pot plant on the carpet in case it 
leaks.118 
13.75 Professor Beer was another witness who cited Germany as an example of a 
country with a much larger private rental market where government subsidies 
supported and underpinned long-term tenancies. He remarked that both German and 
Austrian leases were often for 10 years.119 Also drawing on overseas experiences, 
Ms Marie Coleman, National Foundation for Australian Women, noted that in a 
number of European nations and in Britain people expected to have very considerable 
security of tenure in their rental arrangements. She stated: 
It is one of the reasons why so many people are very happy to live in a 
rental situation—because they know it is unlikely that the house that they 
are living in is going to be sold out from underneath them.120  
13.76 Ms Coleman contended that if Australia were to have more long-term housing 
investments, which may be group housing or apartment living, satisfactory outcomes 
for long-term renters would be far more likely.121 Mr O'Brien also cited overseas 
countries where tenure arrangements worked largely with indefinite tenancies. He 
explained: 
They do not have a fixed term. They do not have any term in particular, 
because the presumption is that the tenant will remain in occupation and it 
116  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39. 
117  Submission 101, p. [5]. 
118  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 41.  
119  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 13. 
120  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57. 
121  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57.  
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is actually difficult for a landlord to get back possession. The circumstances 
under which a landlord can get back possession are very limited.122  
13.77 In his view, that approach to long term tenancy 'actually changes the culture 
of thinking about how tenancy arrangements should work for everybody involved, 
including people involved in a policy sense'.123 
Evictions and rent increases  
13.78 Dr Petersen, University of Queensland, undertook a national study in 2013, 
which revealed that, in some cases, people who had conventional lives found 
themselves facing homelessness. In her view, these situations arose as a result of 
evictions under Australia's tenancy laws. She cited people being given a notice to 
vacate, people whose housing was inaccessible or who were not able to remain in their 
rental property because the landlord was unwilling to make modifications. People may 
have fallen into rent arrears or events had happened in their lives—such as ill health or 
loss of a spouse—which meant there was only the one pension from which to pay that 
rent.124 In some instances, tenants unwilling to move may be forcibly evicted. 
According to Dr Petersen, in some European countries there was a right to housing, 
unlike in Australia where there was no such right. She explained that if people do 
become homeless in some European countries, they do not remain homeless—they 
have that right to be housed:125  
…people can have leases for six years and they cannot have more than one 
rent increase a year. Those kinds of things are inbuilt. But the countries in 
Europe that have that also are a part of international treaties. So there is not 
only a very different culture but a very different law and a very different 
social housing system. There is an acceptance of private rentals. There are 
lots of differences there.126 
13.79 For example, in contrast to this form of stable tenure, landlords in Victoria 
can increase rents every six months with 60 days' notice, unless a fixed term tenancy 
is in place. In its submission, the Tenants Union of Victoria referred to tenants facing 
eviction after being in arrears for more than 14 days.127 
Security of tenure—solutions 
13.80 There was general agreement that current practices in Australia of short-term 
tenancies and the ability of landlords to raise rents and to terminate a tenancy work 
122  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 45. 
123  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 45. 
124  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
125  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2015, p. 15. 
126  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 13. 
127  Tenants Union of Victoria, Submission 119, p. 5.  
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against the interests of low-income earners in the rental market. Evidence pointed to a 
number of areas where improvements could be made. One of the many witnesses who 
referred to the lack of security in tenure, Mr Pisarski, called for tenancy law reform. 
He saw the need to create law in Australia that would provide tenants with the sort of 
certainty that European tenants enjoy.128 Also, from Mr Yates' perspective, the 
challenge was to create an environment in which there was security on both sides. He 
suggested: 
At the moment we do not have that legislative facility so it would be about 
working out how to create the opportunity for it to happen rather than 
forcing it to. I certainly think there would be significant upheaval if you 
suddenly said people must have 10-year leases. That would not suit either 
side. But create the opportunity for longer-term arrangements to be 
developed because, on the developer side, that would create some certainty 
too in financing arrangements and so on…the possibility that we would 
bring tenancy legislation up to the federal level.129  
13.81 To overcome the legal insecurity, Dr Martin maintained that Australia needed 
to have tenancy laws that would 'provide for termination on a reasonable set of 
prescribed grounds and do away with no-grounds terminations'.130 
Change in mindset for long term tenancies  
13.82 Some of the witnesses favoured a gradual shift in attitudes in Australia toward 
accepting long term-tenancies. Dr Stone argued that a key objective would be to 
change the culture so that Australia would have a private rental sector that would be 'a 
good place to be for all households', including lower-income and highly vulnerable 
lower-income households. In her view, 'If we make it [renting] a good place to be for 
everybody, the problems at the lower end will also be resolved'.131 Dr Stone suggested 
that over time, changes in regulation, if they were substantial and well supported, 
would hopefully 'change the culture of renting and the culture of landlordism'. She 
referred to some of the excellent overseas models and how they could be applied in 
the Australian context.132  
Small investors and estate agents 
13.83 Professor Dodson spoke of the need to review the duration of tenancies and 
the procedures around rolling over or cancelling leases. He was particularly interested 
in the current structure of Australia's rental market: 
128  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39. 
129  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 27.  
130  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 63. 
131  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 26. 
132  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 26. 
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Anecdotal evidence I have heard suggests that the increased number of 
investors in the rental market who are absentee landlords—in the sense that 
they allow real estate agents to manage their property rather than have a 
direct relationship with the tenants—has created an incentive on the part of 
the real estate agents to roll over short-term leases and charge a fee to the 
landlord so that they are generating income from their part of the 
business—obviously there is a rational incentive to do that—but that leads 
to shorter duration leases for tenants and increasing interaction with the real 
estate agents because of the need to inspect properties on a three-monthly 
basis and that sort of thing, which has issues…in terms of privacy and those 
sorts of things. 133  
13.84 According to Professor Dodson, consideration should be given to the way 
rental tenancies operate in terms of the renewal and length of leases 'to provide for 
more medium-term security'. In this regard, he advocated reducing 'the incentives for 
agents within the market to extract income from a process that was of limited value to 
landlords and to tenants'.134 
13.85 Dr Martin also referred to the rental market as structurally insecure because of 
the many smallholding landlords in the market on a speculative basis with the strategy 
of being able to sell the property into the owner-occupier market at a time that was 
optimal for them. He explained that in order to sell into such a market, the landlord 
needed to be able to sell without a tenant.135 Dr Martin suggested that reform was 
required to encourage a different sort of landlord—one who holds property on the 
basis of receiving a steady trickle of rental income. In his words, there was a need to 
attract 'an institutional landlord with a long-term view and less interested in chasing 
speculative gains'.136 
13.86 Dr Ian Winter, AHURI, was of the view that longer term tenancies could be 
achieved through regulation of the smaller mum-and-dad investors. But, according to 
Dr Winter, the best way of getting secure, long-term tenure at affordable rents would 
be to grow the housing association sector.137  The committee looks at the community 
housing sector in a chapter 15.  
Tenant protection 
13.87 National Shelter noted the importance of tenants having the 'kind of legal 
protections that are appropriate for a long-term housing option'. It conceded that 
tenancy law was primarily a state and territory responsibility, but argued that at the 
133  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 26–27. 
134  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 26–27. 
135  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 63. 
136  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 63.  
137  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 27.  
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national level the main focus could be on coordinating legislation and developing best 
practice models.138 It recommended that: 
• the Australian, state and territory governments work together to develop best 
practice standards for tenancy legislation; 
• these standards be geared towards developing a framework for longer-term 
leases as opposed to the current focus on short-term tenancies; and 
• these best practice standards include 
• improved coverage of marginal forms of housing such as boarding 
houses and caravan parks, 
• better protection against eviction, including removal of 'without grounds' 
evictions (with careful codification of appropriate grounds) and 
consideration of extended notice periods, 
• ongoing regulation of residential tenancy databases, 
• minimum standards of safety and habitability, and 
• mitigation of excessive rent increases.139 
13.88 As noted earlier, the Western Community Legal Centres noted that in a 
climate where the vacancy rate was low, tenants were often reluctant to exercise their 
rights or to seek help.140 They recommended that the State Government legislate for 
an independent body such as an ombudsman or Consumer Affairs Victoria to have 
special powers under the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) to act for the tenant and 
pursue the landlord for costs.141 
13.89 The Tenants Union of Victoria suggested that state governments need to do 
better with their laws regulating rents in the private rental market. The Union was not 
necessarily referring to rent control, but the current arrangements at a state 
government level, which were very focused on allowing the market to run its course. 
In its view, that approach has clearly had the effect of locking many low-income 
households out of the market.142 
13.90 Dr Petersen thought that there were some lessons to be learnt from 
considering the tenancy laws. She mentioned, however, the importance of keeping in 
mind the differences in jurisdictions when considering policy transfer.143 
138  Submission 78, p. 12. Dr Petersen was of the view that there were some lessons to be learnt 
from considering the tenancy laws. Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 15. 
139  Submission 78, p. 12. 
140  Western Community Legal Centres, Submission 44, p. 11.  
141  Western Community Legal Centres, Submission 44, p. 3. 
142  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 43.  
143  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 15.  
 
                                              
 227 
Conclusion  
13.91 There is a chronic shortage of affordable rental properties for low- to 
moderate-income earners. Rents are increasing at a rate above that of household 
incomes and this widening gap shows no discernible signs of abating. Australia's 
private rental market is not only growing and becoming a 'very mainstream housing 
market' but its profile is changing with increasing numbers of higher-income earners 
opting to rent and to rent longer. This shift means that there is greater competition in 
the private rental market with people better able to afford the high rents crowding out 
lower income earners who have no choice but to rent.  
13.92 The number of landlords whose primary interest is with capital gains and tax 
advantages from their investment rental property means that home maintenance and 
repairs and having an energy-efficient building and appliances are not a priority. 
Renters are then faced with expensive gas and electricity bills that add to the already 
high cost of their housing. 
13.93 Low-income renters not only struggle to pay high rents and associated 
housing costs but are also subject to involuntary moves. The rental market in Australia 
is structured around short-term tenancies and it is the lower income tenants who 
experience these disruptions most keenly, particularly vulnerable groups such as 
disability tenants, families with children and Indigenous households.  
13.94 The changing nature and composition of Australia's rental market has had a 
profound effect on lower income households, many of which are families with 
children. Single people on low incomes also face difficulties accessing affordable and 
appropriate housing. Indeed, the number of households under housing stress and 
severe housing stress is increasing. As Dr Martin noted, 'what we call "housing stress" 
is poverty by another name'.144 With rent eating into their disposable income, families 
and individuals have to make hard choices. They must decide whether to disrupt their 
lives and bear the costs of moving to a cheaper location with fewer services, isolated 
from social networks, and with increased transport costs or to stay put, continue to pay 
higher rents and forgo expenditure on education, health and other essentials. 
13.95 A number of witnesses identified the need for cultural change in Australia—a 
gradual shift in attitudes—that would favour longer term tenancies as a high-level 
objective. This aspirational goal of having longer, stable and secure tenancy with 
reasonable rent rises is certainly desirable but more concrete action must be taken to 
reform tenancy laws to ensure that the rights of low-income renters are appropriately 
protected.  
13.96 The committee is also of the view that the Commonwealth should be taking 
an active part in driving the process of attitudinal change that would produce a general 
acceptance and encouragement of longer term tenancies in Australia. 
144  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 66. 
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Recommendation 18 
13.97 As a national policy issue, affordable home ownership tends to 
overshadow affordable renting even though many Australians struggle to access 
affordable and appropriate housing in the rental market. With this in mind, the 
committee recommends that the Australian Government recognise affordable 
renting as a mainstream form of tenure in Australia and place it prominently on 
the national policy agenda.  
13.98 Given that renting will be the only form of housing for many Australians, 
one of the key challenges for government is to change the traditional view of 
renting as a short-term transitional phase. The committee recommends that the 
Australian Government in collaboration with the states and territories, through 
the recommended ministerial council on housing and homelessness within 
COAG, start the urgent process of turning around this acceptance of short-term 
insecure tenure as normal. As a first step, the committee recommends that the 
proposed ministerial council consider tenancy regulations in the various 
jurisdictions with a view to delivering greater security for long-term renters.  
13.99 Renters in a very tight rental market and with little bargaining power are also 
in a weakened position when it comes to protecting their rights as tenants. Current 
tenancy practice and laws leave them vulnerable.  
13.100 The committee acknowledges that this area of law is the responsibility of the 
states. Nonetheless, it urges them to consider carefully their tenancy laws with a view 
to putting in place a framework underpinned by that aspirational goal of creating 
longer, safer and secure tenancies with reasonable rent rises.  
13.101 The committee believes that the Australian Government has a definite 
leadership role in supporting the states and territories to establish best practice tenancy 
requirements that would include: 
• minimum standards of safety and habitability, including dwellings that are 
comfortable to live in and efficient to heat and cool; 
• stability and fairness of rent prices (and what constitutes reasonable rent 
increases);  
• security of tenure (including fair and just eviction laws); and  
• better protection for vulnerable groups in marginal housing such as boarding 
houses and caravan parks.  
13.102 Furthermore, the committee believes that tenants should also have access to a 
dispute resolution body and be able to pursue their cause without fear of recrimination 
from their landlord.  
13.103 Evidence presented to this inquiry indicated strongly that affordable renting 
must be recognised as a mainstream form of tenure in Australia's housing system. 
With an increasing proportion of Australians now seeing renting as their only option, 
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including the emergence of 'renters for life' and an increasing number of renters under 
pressure from a lack of choice and unaffordability, improving the conditions of rental 
stock as well as the rights of tenants is now considered overdue. There is no national 
standard that governs the rental market, and very little advocacy or support provided 
to tenants, in an asymmetrical market where the owner or landlord holds most of the 
power. More than 95 per cent of the rental housing market is provided by the private 
market, and as such, strong protections of consistent, national standards is appropriate. 
The committee notes there are national standards that govern education and healthcare 
services, work safety and even bike parking facilities. The private rental market 
should not be an exception. 
Recommendation 19 
13.104 Considering the evidence presented to this inquiry, the committee 
recommends that the states and territories review their tenancy laws to ensure 
that all rental properties are required to meet minimum standards.  
Recommendation 20 
13.105 The committee also recommends the Australian Government: 
• together with the states and territories, investigate national minimum 
standards that would set specific minimum standards including security 
of tenure, stability and fairness of rent prices, a new efficiency and 
comfort standard, safety and security of the home, and better protection 
for groups in marginal housing;  
• review (and increase) funding levels and access to tenancy advice 
services; 
• in recognition of the value of tenancy advice services, make funding 
through NAHA conditional on the states and territories ensuring that 
they have in place adequate tenancy advisory services; and 
• include as a priority for the re-established Housing Supply Council (see 
recommendation 2) to review and publish detail on the current national 
rental affordability gap. 
Recommendation 21 
13.106 Recognising the reluctance of tenants to exercise their rights under the 
respective residential tenancies legislation in each state, the committee 
recommends that the states review their existing system for settling tenancy 
disputes. The committee recommends further that the states consider 
establishing an independent body such as an ombudsman or giving specific 
powers to their consumer affairs agencies to act for tenants. Again, the 
committee recommends that the Australian Government act as a catalyst 
through the COAG process to encourage the states and territories to establish 
dispute resolution bodies that provide easier and less expensive access to a 
mechanism for the resolution of tenancy matters.  
 

  
Chapter 14 
Social Housing 
14.1 In 2011–12, there were 2.6 million households renting either privately, which 
accounted for 30 per cent of all Australian households, or through social housing 
programs, which amounted to five per cent of all Australian households.1 The 
committee has noted the critical role that the private rental market has in providing 
affordable and appropriate housing. In this chapter, the committee examines social 
housing in Australia and its contribution to the supply of affordable houses. The focus 
of this chapter is on public housing as a component of social housing. The committee 
considers community housing as the second component of social housing in the 
following chapter.  
Definitions  
14.2 In this report, the committee draws on the definitions of social, public and 
community housing used by the Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). 
Social housing  
14.3 Social housing is rental housing that is funded or partly funded by 
government; owned or managed by government or a community organisation; and let 
to eligible persons. This includes public rental housing, state owned and managed 
Indigenous housing, mainstream and Indigenous community housing and housing 
provided under the Crisis Accommodation Program.2 Social housing refers to both the 
government and community sectors that collectively provide more than 400,000 
dwellings, usually at below-market rents, to low-income households and other 
Australians in need.3  
Public housing 
14.4 Public housing is rental housing provided and managed by state and territory 
governments and includes households living in public rental dwellings where the 
dwelling is either: 
1  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 1, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015).  
2  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 86, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
3  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 2 and 8, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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• owned by the housing authority; 
• leased from the private sector or other housing program areas and used to 
provide public rental housing; or 
• leased to public housing tenants.4 
Community housing  
14.5 Community housing (mainstream) is housing provided for low- to moderate-
income or special needs households, which community-based organisations manage. 
Community housing models vary across jurisdictions with a variety of groups, 
including government, owning the housing stock.5 
Statistics—social housing 
14.6 Recent AIHW figures record that at 30 June 2013 around 414,000 households 
were living in social housing.6 According to the Institute, projections indicate that in 
2021, relative to 2009, demand for social housing would increase across most states 
and territories. As an example, it was projected that Hobart would experience a rise in 
demand of approximately 19 per cent and Perth 55 per cent.7 The statistics compiled 
by the Institute also show the number of applicants waiting for social housing, 
including those on the public housing waiting list, is continuing to grow with supply 
failing to keep up with the growing demand.8 According to the AIHW, as at 30 June 
2013, there were over 217,000 households on public rental housing, state owned and 
managed Indigenous housing and mainstream community housing waiting lists across 
Australia.9 
4  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 85, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
5  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 81, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
6  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. ix, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 12 January 2015). The Institute also records that in 2013, there were around 421,000 
social housing dwellings across Australia, see p. 28. 
7  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 3, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
8  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. ix, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 12 January 2015). 
9  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. ix, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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Public housing 
14.7 In Australia, public housing has traditionally provided the safety net for 
people unable to find affordable accommodation in the private sector. Although each 
respective state sets the rent payable, generally it is assessed at 25 per cent of the gross 
household income.  
14.8 Professor Beer suggested that public housing accounted for around four per 
cent of housing stock but it varied significantly on a state-by-state basis. He noted that 
the United Kingdom had a much larger social housing stock than Australia—roughly 
18 per cent of its housing stock.10 According to Professor Beer, even the United 
States, which is thought of as the classic neoliberal state, tends to have on average a 
social housing stock no smaller than Australia. Dr Lawson and Professor Berry, RMIT 
University, also observed that Australia had one of the lowest rates of social housing 
amongst advanced economies, including the US.11 Stellar Living  similarly suggested 
that investment in affordable housing, including public and social housing, in 
Australia was one of the lowest in the more advanced 'first world' countries.12 
According to the Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, 
at a minimum public housing should be around 6 per cent of stock but preferably 
more.13 
Fall in number of public houses 
14.9 In June 2013, the number of public rental dwellings stood at around 328,340, 
which equated to 78 per cent of the total social housing stock. The number of new 
allocations to public housing, however, has declined over the past five years from 
almost 31,000 in 2003–04 to 20,000 in 2009–2010.14 Even though there have been 
new allocations of rental properties to the public stock (though less than allocations 
made in previous years), the overall numbers of public dwellings fell by 
approximately 13,000 between 2006 and 2013. This reduction has led to 'an increased 
10  Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 16. 
11  Submission 24, p. 9.  
12  Submission 3, p. 1. 
13  Submission 86, p. 3.  
14  National Regulatory System for Community Housing Providers, a Joint Initiative of 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments, Decision Regulation Impact Statement, p. 5, 
http://ris.dpmc.gov.au/files/2013/05/NRS-Community-Housing-DRIS.pdf 
(accessed 19 January 2015). 
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rationing of public housing, with three quarters of the 20,000 newly allocated tenants 
of public rental housing in 2009–2010 classified as being in greatest need'.15  
14.10 The Women's Housing Company referred to the 'chronic underinvestment' 
over the years in new or renewed public housing, which, in its view, resulted in a 
failing system that would continue to deteriorate without 'substantially increased 
investment'.16 Using South Australia as an example, Dr Clark, Shelter SA, referred to 
the statistics showing the decrease in public housing over the last 10 years. In the 
years 1990 to 1991 there were 62,027 occupied dwellings in South Australia which, 
by 2009–10, had dwindled to 43,856 resulting in about 20,000 fewer social houses.17 
Mr Schrapel, Uniting Communities, also noted the significant reduction in South 
Australia's public housing stock. He stated: 
…taking 20,000-plus properties out of public housing and not replacing 
them with the same number of properties and community housing is putting 
a lot of pressure, particularly on people on low incomes who are having to 
rely on the private rental market.18  
14.11 More generally, Master Builders Australia noted that public housing was 
'stepping back from providing social housing, with community housing taking on an 
increasing workload'.19 
Waiting Lists 
14.12 As the pool of public houses shrinks, the waiting list grows. At 30 June 2013, 
there were 158,971 applicants registered for access to public rental housing (up from 
147,065 at 30 June 2009).20 Master Builders Australia ACT noted that the number of 
greatest needs applicants on waiting lists quadrupled in the three years to 2010–11, 
with waiting times for public housing rising in 2011–12 to an average of 2.6 years for 
those in greatest need, and 7.7 years for all applicants on the waiting list.21 
15  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 1, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015) and National Regulatory System for Community Housing 
Providers, a Joint Initiative of Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments, Decision 
Regulation Impact Statement, p. 5, http://ris.dpmc.gov.au/files/2013/05/NRS-Community-
Housing-DRIS.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
16  Submission 52, p. 1.  
17  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 29.  
18  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 29.  
19  Submission 48, p. 18. 
20  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p.58, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
21  Submission 48, p. 18. 
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14.13 As an example of the size of this waiting list, Mr Grahame Searle, Department 
of Housing, Western Australia (WA), informed the committee that in his state there 
were about 19,000 families (down from 24,000) or 44,000 people on the waiting list. 
Western Australia also has a priority list with 2,800 applicants representing about 
5,000 people. Mr Gregory Cash, Department of Housing, WA, explained that to be on 
the crisis list a person had no alternative options other than public housing, and had 
'no demonstrated ability to access other forms of housing relatively easily'.22 They 
would 'largely be staying with family and making interim and transitory arrangements 
and some would be in short-term accommodation'.23 Women on the list endeavouring 
to escape domestic violence may be housed in hostels and shelters or similar 
dwellings.24  
Public housing—housing of last resort 
14.14 While previously the focus of social housing in Australia had been to provide 
affordable housing to low-income families, attention has increasingly shifted toward 
catering for the housing needs of the most disadvantaged in the community.25 
According to AIHW figures, in 2012–13, 77 per cent of allocations to public rental 
housing went to people in greatest need—particularly those who were homeless or at 
risk of homelessness.26 The AIHW also recorded that households where at least 
one member had a disability made up more than 133,000 households in public rental 
housing or 41 per cent of total stock.27 
14.15 Professor Dodson cited the long-run withdrawal of federal and state 
governments from the provision of new social housing supply as one of the factors 
contributing to the 'concentrated disadvantage effect'. In his view, this retreat from 
funding public housing has meant that 'under fiscal processes the targeting of 
assistance available through social housing supply has gone to those who have 
multiple forms of disadvantage'.28 Also looking at the availability of public housing, 
the Department of Social Services suggested that: 
22  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 2.  
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 2.  
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 2.  
25  See for example, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 
2014, Canberra, 2014, p. 27, 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 (accessed 18 
January 2015). 
26  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. ix, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
27  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 37, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 18. 
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The role of public housing in the provision of affordable accommodation in 
Australia may become more limited in future given the ongoing trend to 
transfer the management of public housing to community housing 
providers. In future, the sole focus of public housing may be on those 
people with special and high needs rather than low-income Australians.29 
14.16 This trend, however, is already well established. Mr Jonathan Leitch, 
Department of Housing and Public Works, Queensland, informed the committee that 
about 95 per cent of their clients in public housing were high-needs.30 Drawing on its 
experience, the Kingsford Law Centre similarly noted that public housing was now 
available only to people with severe and multiple disabilities. This situation had made: 
Public housing more than ever, the housing of last resort and remains 
unavailable to most people, even people who have chronic health problems, 
are experiencing extreme poverty and have no real prospect of being able to 
find safe and affordable housing in the private sector.31 
14.17 Professor Beer referred to 'a rather macabre natural experiment' conducted in 
South Australia over the last 20 years, where the government's involvement in housing 
supply had receded through the sale of land originally associated with the South 
Australian Urban Land Trust. He explained further that South Australia had: 
…also curtailed the role of what was then the South Australian Housing 
Trust and then Housing SA. So we have actually taken the floor away from 
the rental market. Households that were once able to find accommodation 
relatively easily in public housing no longer can gain access to public 
housing. If you look at the reports of Housing SA, they increasingly talk 
about their clients as being people who may not be, to use the euphemism, 
'tenancy ready'. These are very challenging households, and to get into 
Housing SA increasingly it is people with multiple and complex needs, 
people with multiple disabilities et cetera.32  
14.18 Noting that many of the people seeking social housing were high needs, 
Professor Beer suggested Australia's affordability problems were significant, and there 
was very limited social housing stock.33 Mr Michael Myers, National Affordable 
Housing Consortium, also referred to the trend whereby governments of all 
29  Submission 198, p. 29. 
30  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 44.  
31  Submission 68, p. 3. See also Mr Keith Jacobs, who observed that the reduction in the public 
sector stock had led to state authorities restricting the allocation of available properties to those 
in acute need, Submission 33, p. 2. Ms Christine Allison similarly noted that access to social 
housing was dependent on eligibility and eligibility depended on remaining disadvantaged. In 
her view that was no incentive to improve and improvement for example, finding a job could 
mean ineligibility. Submission 35, p. 2. 
32  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 16. 
33  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 16. 
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persuasions at a state level had moved down the road of allocating public housing to 
those most in need. He elaborated: 
It could well be argued that they did that because of things like de-
institutionalisation, long-term pockets of disadvantage, social exclusion and 
unemployment and a rising demand from people with a disability and 
others. So they have moved the social housing system from what was partly 
an industry type support thing—you get cheap housing near where the jobs 
are and the workers will come and you can help them—to this new 
transition of the welfare safety net. Nobody really understood the economic 
consequences of that fully…You are moving for the right reasons, to say 
that you cannot leave people homeless, you cannot leave people with a 
disability without housing.34  
14.19 As a consequence, however, the costs of public housing increases and revenue 
decreases because people on lower and lower incomes were being accommodated. 
Mr Myers explained the problem created by having only high needs tenants in public 
housing: 
They are using the dwellings more, so there is more cost involved. The 
dwellings need more management, so there is more management involved. 
You end up with a downward spiral in the system.35 
14.20 Likewise, Shelter WA suggested that the 'reorientation of social housing 
towards housing higher-need households had placed increasing financial pressure on 
the system'.36 
Incentives to remain in public housing 
14.21 Recent figures produced by the AIHW show that, at 30 June 2013, the 
majority of the surveyed tenants in social housing were satisfied with the services that 
their housing organisation provided (74 per cent for community housing and 65 per 
cent for public rental housing).37 Further, it recorded that two in five or 40 per cent of 
people in public rental houses had been in the same tenancy for over ten years.38 This 
stable tenancy stands in stark contrast to the short-term leases that characterise the 
private rental market. 
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
36  Submission 174, p. 18. 
37  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. ix, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 12 January 2015). 
38  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p.41, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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Disparity in rents between private and public housing 
14.22 As noted earlier, a key feature of public housing is that rents payable are 
based on income, which is generally 25 per cent of total household income. But with 
increases in market rent outstripping increases in household income, the rent paid by 
people in public housing continues to lag behind those paying market-based rents. As 
an example of the disparity between rents charged for social housing and for private 
rental dwellings, Mr Searle cited a single age pensioner in one of their units 
(Department of Housing Western Australia) paying $95 per week in rent in a market 
where the median rent is probably $350 per week.39 
14.23 An interim report of the review of the welfare system referred to tenants in 
public housing benefiting from this lower rate of rental increase.40 It noted, however, 
that charging rents at a proportion of total income could be a 'disincentive for people 
to work, because their rents will increase if they earn more'.41 According to the 
welfare reform interim report: 
The first perverse incentive is that people consider public housing more 
attractive than living in private rental accommodation. A key reason is that 
income based rents are lower than the net rents paid by private tenants in 
the private rental market. Because demand for public housing is high and 
waiting lists are long, public housing is only allocated to those who can 
demonstrate a low income and poor capacity to obtain private rental 
accommodation. This may result in prospective tenants on the waiting list 
being reluctant to improve their circumstances, for example gaining 
employment, because this may jeopardise their claim for a public housing 
tenancy. 
A second potential perverse incentive applies to those already in public 
housing, who seek to improve their circumstances through paid work. 
Because public housing rents are set as a proportion of income (typically 
39  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 6.  
40  In December 2013, the then Minister for Social Services, the Hon. Kevin Andrews MP, 
commissioned a review of the welfare system. The purpose was to identify improvements to 
ensure the system was sustainable, effective and coherent, and encouraged people to work. The 
Minister appointed an independent Reference Group to lead the review. Mr Patrick McClure 
AO chaired the Reference Group. The other members are Mr Wesley Aird and Ms Sally 
Sinclair. 
41  A New System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, pp. 30 
and 70, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). Note that a final report was released in February 2015, 
A New System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Report of the Reference Group on 
Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Final Report, February 2015, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/02_2015/dss001_14_final_report_access_
2.pdf (accessed 2 April 2015). 
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25 per cent), any extra earnings result in higher rent charges. This can 
disrupt financial arrangements and erode the rewards that income support 
recipients might otherwise gain from working. This effect is not 
experienced by income support recipients in the private rental market.42 
14.24 The welfare reform interim report stated further that government assistance to 
people in the private rental market (via rent assistance) was 'less generous than 
assistance provided to people in public housing'. The review concluded: 
People in the private rental market receive a lower subsidy through Rent 
Assistance and pay higher rents than people in public housing. They may 
also have less stable tenancies. This can create an incentive for people to try 
to change to public housing. 
However, public housing is limited and waiting lists are generally very 
long. Public housing is usually only for those most in need. This can create 
an unintended incentive for some people not to look for work as it could 
jeopardise their eligibility for public housing.43 
14.25 The Department of Housing and Public Works, Queensland, also suggested 
that the slower growth rate of income-based rents in public housing created 'a less 
attractive proposition for people to transition from social housing to the private rental 
market'.44 Similarly, Mr Myers, National Affordable Housing Consortium, indicated 
that at the moment there was almost a perverse disincentive for people to move out of 
public housing because 'the gap between what they get now and what they would need 
to pay in the market is so big'. In other words, that they would 'do anything to hang on 
to what they have got'.45 Mr Myers argued that the gap had been allowed to get too 
big.46 
42  A New System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014,  p. 70, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). The final report indicated that consultations on the 
interim report reinforced the need 'to address poor work incentives for public housing tenants 
(caused by income-based rents) and the discrepancies in government support between public 
and private tenants'. A New System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Report of the 
Reference Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Final Report, 
February 2015, p. 20, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/02_2015/dss001_14_final_report_access_
2.pdf (accessed 2 April 2015).  
43  A New System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 30, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
44  Queensland Government, Submission 215, p. 2. 
45  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
46  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
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14.26 In the context of deliberations on future directions for state and territory 
public and community housing, the welfare system interim report recommended that: 
…consideration could be given to moving away from the current system of 
income based rents towards the use of Rent Assistance as the preferred rent 
subsidy scheme across both private and public tenures.47 
14.27 The committee considers Commonwealth rent assistance in chapter 22.  
14.28 Clearly, the strong demand for the few available public housing dwellings and 
the benefits they offer—secure tenure and lower rents—have consequences for their 
tenants and for those seeking to fill a potential vacancy. 
Need to be needy 
14.29 The value that low-income earners place on living in public housing means, as 
noted above, that in some cases tenants may be reluctant to compromise their 
eligibility for such housing. For example, having drawn attention to the disparity in 
rents paid by public housing tenants and those in private rental, Mr Searle, 
Department of Housing, Western Australia, highlighted the challenge for public 
housing providers—'why would anyone want to move out of such accommodation 
once housed in it?'48 He elaborated: 
So we are seeing a lot of behaviour amongst tenants to limit their incomes, 
consciously, because the cost of earning that extra $10 or $15 per week may 
well be greater than the income they get if they have to move out of our 
[public] houses.49 
14.30 Ms Nihal Iscel, Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre, cited cases involving 
some of her clients affected by losing their eligibility for public housing. She knew of 
one person who could have taken on extra work but did not, despite the capacity to do 
so, because of the fear of being evicted.50  
14.31 Along the same lines, Ms Helen Dalley-Fisher, Equality Rights Alliance, 
referred to older women in public housing, who reported being afraid of getting a job 
47  A New System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 71, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). The final report made a similar recommendation—
'Reduce disincentives to workforce participation by moving from income based rents in public 
housing and extending Commonwealth Rent Assistance to public housing tenants.' A New 
System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Report of the Reference Group on 
Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Final Report, February 2015, p. 20, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/02_2015/dss001_14_final_report_access_
2.pdf (accessed 2 April 2015). 
48  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 6.  
49  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 6.  
50  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 35.  
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with a higher salary or of working overtime in case they lost their entitlement to 
public housing and had to enter the insecure and unaffordable private market.51 In this 
context, Anglicare noted that 'considering that many public housing tenants are 
pressured to leave their dwelling once they have secured steady employment, it 
appears safer for many to remain jobless but housed'.52 Mr David Cant, Brisbane 
Housing Company Ltd, also spoke of the reduced incentives for public housing 
tenants to work.53 
14.32 In this regard, the National Affordable Housing Consortium informed the 
committee that the social housing system encouraged people to 'be more vulnerable, 
more in need' than the next person on the waiting list and for them 'to continue to 
demonstrate that need and vulnerability'. It suggested that while many 'face ongoing 
vulnerability, the system does not acknowledge, speak to, nor build on the "strengths, 
resilience and aspirations" of its customers'.54 
14.33 Mr Myers, CEO of the Consortium, reasoned that because access to public 
housing was, in effect, a competition for scarce resources, applicants must highlight 
their predicament at the expense of the next person in the queue. He explained further: 
They must demonstrate that they are more disadvantaged and more needy 
than the next person. There is no focus on resilience, strength, plans for that 
person and where they want to be. There is a focus on them continuing to 
demonstrate incapacity.55  
14.34 According to Mr Myers, if the focus is on a system that encourages such 
dependency and where people must show they are more disadvantaged than the next 
person, then people will behave accordingly because of the rationing of 'a scarce and 
valuable commodity'. The current system was sending the clear message that a group 
of individuals must be 'a disadvantaged community in order to qualify for what we are 
going to give them'. In his words, 'we have got a philosophical as well as an 
economical imperative to readjust that system—and there are ways to do it'.56 
14.35 As part of the policy goal, Mr Myers was of the view that it was important to 
find a way to reconnect the social housing system with the market system to achieve 
movement across and between them.57  
14.36 Apart from discouraging households from improving their financial situation, 
public housing also has other shortcomings. 
51  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 19. 
52  AnglicareWA, Submission 161, p. 7. 
53  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 61. 
54  Submission 101, p. [6]. 
55  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
56  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
57  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
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Clusters of disadvantage 
14.37 Other witnesses, including Mr Langford, Junction and Women's Housing, 
noted that the configuration and location of much of the existing public housing stock 
presented a problem in that it tended to create clusters of disadvantage, which also had 
an adverse effect on the value of those assets. As an example, he cited South 
Australia, where there were significant pockets of highly concentrated public housing. 
In his view, the challenge was 'to devise a longer term strategy to reconfigure both the 
physical asset—the bricks and mortar—and the social mix to break up some of those 
concentrations'. According to Mr Langford, some of these estates had been sold down 
over a period of time, but a considerable number still existed where high rates of 
social housing were interspersed with some private.58  
14.38 Mr Leitch noted that putting people, particularly those with high needs, out 
into areas that were more affordable missed the opportunity to connect them with 
health services, mental health services and things they needed to make a success of 
their tenancies. Indeed, he argued that, in many cases, it probably contributed to 
worsening rather than improving their circumstances.59 
Social housing—current state of repair 
14.39 Not only is the supply of public housing stock shrinking, but much of the 
remaining stock is old and in need of repair or restoration and is increasingly 
expensive to maintain.60 Stellar Living suggested that 'many of the social/affordable 
housing properties throughout Australia leased and rented to the public are in high 
need of repair'.61 Indeed, consistent with this assessment, the AIHW noted: 
Some of the public rental housing stock is now at the end of its economic 
life and/or it does not meet current needs. Poor maintenance of dwelling 
stock often creates stigma and negative stereotyping of social housing 
tenants.62 
14.40 The AIHW cited Victoria as an example of where around 42 per cent of 
public housing stock was more than 30 years old. It noted further that some of this 
housing required 'significant modification for those with disability' and a large 
proportion of the stock needed to be renovated or refurbished before it could be re-let. 
58  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2012, p. 34. 
59  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 44.  
60  See for example, Mr David Cant, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 60–61.  
61  Submission 3, p. 1. 
62  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p.27, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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In its assessment, these maintenance and upgrade issues posed considerable 
challenges for the owners of public housing.63  
Sustainability of public housing 
14.41 Mr Keith Jacobs, University of Tasmania, observed that the rents charged by 
state housing authorities were not sufficient to cover the costs of maintaining and 
renewing public housing stock.64 Likewise, the Council to Homeless Persons 
remarked that governments faced significant operating deficits due to a combination 
of tightly targeting the allocations of social housing to extremely disadvantaged 
households and an ageing housing stock portfolio. It suggested that, as a consequence, 
state housing authorities were 'cannibalizing existing housing stock, resulting in low 
growth in the number of social housing properties available'.65 Mr Cant also referred 
to the state housing authorities as landlords receiving limited income, which made 'the 
whole portfolio unsustainable'.66 
14.42 Importantly, the income from rent at 25 per cent of a household's income 
meant that the returns to the state were not high, particularly given the need to 
maintain run-down or ageing properties. According to Mr Pisarski, the brutal reality 
from the states' perspective was that public housing was 'unviable in its current 
model'. He explained: 
We have been charging people on very, very low incomes 25 per cent of 
their incomes for a very long time and we have only been targeting that 
housing to those people on very low incomes. Where public housing was 
once a much broader system with a range of income groups—with workers 
and whatnot—in it and had internal cross-subsidy involved, it no longer has 
that cross-subsidy, so it is no longer a viable system in its own right. Until 
we start to address that, we will not fix it. This is one of the reasons I am 
saying we need to get our heads out of the welfare-only approach to 
affordable housing.67 
14.43 Mr Leitch, Queensland, agreed with the view that the trend for public housing 
to cater for the most vulnerable who were invariably on social security payments 
meant that the public housing economic model was unsustainable. He explained that 
the Department of Housing and Public Works had undertaken its own modelling 
indicating that the Queensland Government carried an annual subsidy of about $7,500 
to $8,000 per public housing dwelling in the state. Furthermore, that figure was 
increasing each year as the gap between the subsidy that came into public housing 
63  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p.33, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
64  Submission 33, p. 2. 
65  Submission 179, p. 4. 
66  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 61. 
67  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 37.  
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widened from the Commonwealth rent assistance possibilities and the private sector. 
He explained that public housing had become a 'more deeply rationed product' where 
most of the people coming into that housing sector had concerns other than 
affordability—emergency issues needing attention, which further eroded the rent 
revenues.68 
14.44 Drawing a similar conclusion, the Real Estate Institute of Australia described 
the public housing sector as currently financially unsustainable. In its assessment, the 
provision of social housing was characterised by demand exceeding supply and with a 
large proportion of stock in disrepair yet on valuable land. It stated further: 
…the system does not offer the type of housing that many tenants need; the 
public sector is generally less efficient in managing rental property than the 
private sector; except in Western Australia, there is no assistance to social 
housing tenants with a good tenancy record and stable incomes to make the 
transition to the private rental market.69 
14.45 Mr Myers, National Affordable Housing Consortium, noted that Australia had 
a housing supply problem, an affordability problem and a public housing system that 
was in terminal decline. In his view, the system was not viable with Australia selling 
more stock than it builds, and with 115,000 people homeless.70 
14.46 While Master Builders Australia ACT understood the challenge in providing 
public housing, it argued that taxpayers were entitled to see their taxes spent 
effectively and efficiently. It was not convinced that taxpayers were receiving value 
for money from the investment in public housing, describing the sector's performance 
at best, as mixed. It listed shortcomings in public housing, already identified in this 
report—the financial burden of maintaining an ageing stock of public housing and 
poor rent returns—but provided the following additional details: 
• the average cost of providing public housing dwellings increased by around 
25 per cent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms over the past decade, with the 
cost of land component growing by around 30 per cent;  
• turnaround times for vacant public housing had risen from an average of 
25 days in 2008 to 29 days in 2012; and 
• some 21 per cent of the public housing stock was being used inefficiently 
(either under-utilised or over-crowded) in 2012, well up (just over 60 per 
cent) on the rates experienced in 2008 and 2009.71 
68  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 50. 
69  Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission 88, pp. 14–15.  
70  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 51. 
71  Submission 48, p. 18. 
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Protect stock of public houses 
14.47 Despite the dwindling and deteriorating state of public housing and the 
tendency for it to be located in clusters, the stock of public dwellings remains a 
valuable state asset. For example, the National Affordable Housing Consortium 
referred to the considerable asset base of public housing now held by the states, of 
which the Commonwealth was the major investor.72  
14.48 Mr Cant, Brisbane Housing Company Limited, argued that a top priority 
should be to protect the current stock of public and community housing. He indicated 
that there were nearly 400,000 dwellings, which were old and getting older and were 
often the wrong size. In his assessment, two-thirds of this stock in Australia needed to 
be 'redeveloped comprehensively'. Mr Cant valued the stock at between $80 and $100 
billion based on 'the vacant possession highest and best used'. He noted, however, that 
this was not its true value which was as a community asset that generated very low 
rents and had quite high costs.73 He also referred to the fact that in many instances 
around the country the stock was producing a loss. In his words, the public housing 
sector was a portfolio that was overvalued, not generating enough money but was 
terribly important to the Australian community.74 
14.49 But, as already noted, governments have been withdrawing from public 
housing even at a time of increasing demand for such housing evident in the long 
waiting lists for public housing. Arguing that states were no longer in a position to do 
the sorts of programs required to maintain public housing, Mr Pisarski highlighted the 
need to find ways to make those systems viable again. He was of the view that the not-
for-profit sector was probably the solution because it was able to do things now that 
state housing authorities could not do and to start to build the supply. He noted, 
however, the need for more investment in the affordable end.75 
14.50 Similarly, Dr Ian Winter, AHURI, could not foresee state governments having 
a significant role in public housing provision over the next 25 years. According to 
Dr Winter, a vibrant housing association sector, which had 'a much bigger rent mix—a 
variety of income streams', would take the place of the public sector. In addition, the 
community housing sector had Commonwealth rent assistance subsidies coming into 
it as well as GST discounts and discounts on local government rates. In his view: 
That is a much more viable, affordable housing program sector than trying 
to hang on to the state government sector. We just do not have the right 
institutional and organisational mix for a sustainable housing system in the 
21st century. We need to get fit-for-purpose organisations up and running, 
and this is the not-for-profit sector. They are very good at it, they are 
72  Submission 101, p. 6 and Mr Myers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54. 
73  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 60–61.  
74  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 61.  
75  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 37.  
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growing quickly, they have got the capability, they are delivering the 
outcomes, their tenants are happy; why wouldn't you back the growth of 
that not-for-profit sector?76 
14.51 Along similar lines, Professor Shane Murray, Monash University, saw the 
need for community housing to take on a greater role in the supply of affordable 
housing. To his mind, governments needed to find effective strategies, 'probably 
joining up with the community housing sector, to ensure that the current disaggregated 
public housing stock was redeveloped in an effective manner and not sold off 
opportunistically based on land value'.77 Likewise, Mr Adam Mills, City of 
Melbourne, agreed with the intention of supporting housing associations, because, in 
his view, they were going to be 'the crucial stakeholder' to help manage and own the 
affordable housing that is needed. He suggested that should be the top priority.78 
Conclusion 
14.52 The public sector used to provide much needed housing for low-income 
earners or disadvantaged people. But, due to inadequate funding over a period of time, 
the public sector is no longer meeting the growing and urgent need for such housing.  
14.53 Public housing is, however, the safety net for society's most disadvantaged 
who require direct assistance to access affordable and secure housing.79 Indeed, the 
Kingsford Law Centre referred to public housing as becoming the 'housing of last 
resort'. In this regard, the committee is of the view that it is unacceptable that the 
chronic shortage of public housing has created a situation whereby people feel they 
cannot improve their circumstances for fear of becoming ineligible for such housing. 
While understandable, this attitude is counterproductive to building a resilient and 
productive workforce and a strong economy. Moreover, some people in desperate 
need of housing assistance cannot access public housing including those with chronic 
health conditions.   
14.54 In summary, the supply of public housing is short and waiting lists are long—
properties are old and in need of repair and/or renewal and the income derived from 
rents is insufficient to keep the sector viable. Also, there are inefficiencies associated 
with the under-utilisation of properties. Even so, the public housing sector remains a 
valuable asset not only in dollars terms but also socially.  
Recommendation 22 
14.55 The committee recognises that public housing has now become the 
housing of last resort for many Australians with supply unable to meet the 
76  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 24. 
77  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 14. 
78  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 33.  
79  See for example, Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, p. 8.   
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demand and waiting lists far too long. With this situation in mind, the committee 
recommends that the Australian Government, together with the states and 
territories, commit to retaining an adequate supply of public housing with the 
goal of increasing the overall proportion of public housing as a percentage of 
housing stock. Targets should be established for both the proportion of social 
housing and the reduction in existing waiting lists as part of the national housing 
plan, working through COAG and the re-established National Housing Supply 
Council. The initial goal would be for the Australian Government together with 
the states and territories to fund public housing in order to lift the percentage of 
public housing from its current low base and to reach agreement on a plan to 
achieve this objective. 
14.56 The committee recommends further that an underlying principle shaping 
the development or redevelopment of public housing must be to prevent the 
concentration of people with complex problems in the same locality and in 
locations removed from important services—transport, education, health, 
welfare and employment. 
14.57 In this context of a dwindling stock of public housing, much of which is in 
need of repair or refurbishment, governments have recognised the benefits of growing 
the community housing sector. In the following chapter, the committee explores the 
opportunities that the community housing sector offers to provide affordable housing 
for low-income earners unable or struggling to meet their housing needs in the private 
rental market.  
 

  
Chapter 15 
Community housing 
15.1 Community housing, along with the public housing estate, is part of the social 
housing sector. The community housing sector in each state and territory has 
developed under its own unique conditions, over different timeframes and with its 
own particular policy and funding arrangements. Thus, the community housing sector 
in each state and territory varies in size and structure.1 
15.2 In this chapter, the committee considers the community housing sector, the 
particular attributes of the sector, the transfer of public housing to community housing 
providers, the contribution that community housing makes to affordable housing and 
the potential for it to increase the supply of affordable houses.  
Role of community housing sector 
15.3 The primary role of community housing is to deliver housing to people on 
low- to moderate-incomes with a housing need. Community housing may cover short, 
medium and long-term tenancies. Providers of community houses are not-for-profit 
organisations that manage the provision of housing assistance and include: 
• housing cooperatives;  
• housing associations; and  
• other community service organisations. 
15.4 Community housing providers seek to encourage local communities to be 
more active in managing and providing affordable housing. The Community Housing 
Federation of Australia described in greater detail its role as a provider of community 
houses: 
We provide affordable and appropriate housing for low- and moderate-
income people and for those people whose housing needs are not 
adequately met in other forms of housing, particularly, for example, people 
with disability. Our models, organisational structures, funding, financing 
arrangements and the degree to which we either manage and/or own our 
dwellings vary in scale.2 
1  National Regulatory System for Community Housing Directorate, Charter, p. 10, 
http://www.nrsch.gov.au/__data/assets/file/0011/288218/D_Charter.pdf (accessed 12 January 
2015). 
2  Ms Croce, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 9. 
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15.5 It gave the example of a project run by Common Equity in Melbourne which 
has a mix of both private and social housing, including some housing for people with 
a disability. It was built on an old boot factory.3 
Growth of community housing sector 
15.6 The community housing sector has grown rapidly over the past 15 years or so. 
This expansion was due to increased capital funding, the transfer of public housing 
dwellings from the state and territory housing authorities and by provider leverage. 
More specifically, from 2000 to 2010 mainstream community housing had more than 
doubled but has done so from a relatively low base of 6.7 per cent to 13.7 per cent of 
social housing stock.4 In 2013, the proportion of social housing dwellings managed by 
community housing providers had increased further and stood at 16 per cent of total 
social housing or 65,000 dwellings.5 This figure does not include NRAS properties or 
other properties owned by community housing providers. According to the 
Community Housing Federation of Australia, the number of dwellings for this broader 
sector was estimated in 2008 to be closer to 77,000 which would likely be 
significantly higher now.6 
15.7 According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), the 
increasing numbers of community houses reflected 'a gradual but steady shift of focus 
from the public to the community-managed sector'. It stated: 
A decrease in the number of public rental dwellings was offset by an 
increase in mainstream community housing. The increasing contribution of 
the community sector reflects housing policy at both the Australian 
Government and state and territory government levels.7 
15.8 The community housing sector, however, emphasised in hearings that while a 
significant amount of housing has been transferred, the process has not been 'steady', 
and has come in 'fits and starts', and varies widely across jurisdictions.8 
3  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 9. 
4  See National Regulatory System for Community Housing Providers, a Joint Initiative of 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments, Decision Regulation Impact Statement, p. 5, 
http://ris.dpmc.gov.au/files/2013/05/NRS-Community-Housing-DRIS.pdf (accessed 19 January 
2015). 
5  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, pp 27–28, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
6  Community Housing Federation of Australia, Submission 171, p. 7. 
7  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 28, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
8  See paragraphs 15.65–15.66. 
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15.9 The NSW Federation of Housing Associations noted that community housing 
providers draw income from a range of sources—grant funding, transfer of public 
housing property management and/or ownership, concessions on taxes and levies, 
eligibility of tenants for rent assistance, and other forms of subsidy.9 In this regard, the 
Productivity Commission noted that community housing organisations generally 
received some form of government assistance, including direct funding or the 
provision of land and property. A number of community housing organisations, 
however, are entirely self–funded. According to the 2015 Productivity Commission 
report on government services, community housing organisations were increasingly 
seeking funding through alternative, non–government means, such as leveraging and 
partnership arrangements.10  
15.10 Based on unpublished information from Australian, state and territory 
governments, the Productivity Commission listed some of the community housing 
models: 
• housing cooperatives, providing tenancy management and maintenance of 
housing that is owned by government, a central finance company or an 
individual cooperative; 
• local government housing associations, providing low cost housing within a 
particular municipality, closely involved in policy, planning, funding and/or 
monitoring roles and able to manage directly the housing stock; 
• regional or local housing associations, providing property and tenancy 
management services, and support services to tenants; 
• specialist providers—organisations with a specific purpose or function, such 
as tenancy management, housing development, or for specific target groups; 
• broad service delivery—organisations providing housing and other welfare 
services, such as aged care and disability services; 
• vertically integrated providers of affordable housing—involved in all stages 
of providing affordable housing, from construction to property and tenancy 
management; 
• community ownership and/or management, where housing is owned and/or 
managed by not-for-profit or community housing associations; 
• joint ventures and housing partnerships, where church and welfare entities, 
local government, private sector and other organisations provide resources in 
cooperation with state and territory governments; or where groups of 
9  Submission 80, p. 2. 
10  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2015, Volume G: Housing and 
homelessness p. 17.8, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-
services/2015/housing-and-homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-
and-homelessness.pdf (accessed 27 February 2015).  
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community housing providers form partnerships to maximise growth 
opportunities, share resources and/or manage risk; and 
• equity share rental housing, where housing cooperatives wholly own the 
housing stock and lease it to tenants (who are shareholders in the 
cooperative).11 
15.11 In its submission, AHURI referred to data collected by the Productivity 
Commission (2014), which appeared to show that in 2013 only 0.5 per cent of public 
housing residents paid more than 30 per cent of their gross income in rent (as 
discussed earlier, a typical benchmark of housing affordability). However, about 
10 per cent of people in community housing (and up to 60 per cent in jurisdictions 
such as Western Australia) were paying more than 30 per cent of their gross income in 
rent.12 
Transfer of public housing to community housing sector 
15.12 The committee has referred to the considerable asset base of public housing in 
the states and territories. In May 2009, Australian Housing Ministers agreed that 
jurisdictions and the Commonwealth should develop a large scale community housing 
sector comprising up to 35 per cent of social housing by 2014.13 This objective would 
be achieved by transferring management (and some ownership) of public housing 
dwellings to not-for-profit (NFP) housing associations.14 Indeed, over time, there has 
been a gradual transfer of affordable housing properties from the public to the 
community-managed sector. 
15.13 As noted earlier, while there has been a fall in the number of public rental 
dwellings, an increase in community housing has, to a degree, offset this decrease.15 
Professor Beer used South Australia as an example, where: 
We have seen some replacement of public housing with social housing, 
with growth of social housing providers; but they too raise some significant 
challenges, which we need to acknowledge. The growth is unlikely to 
11  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2015, Volume G: Housing and 
homelessness p. 17.10, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-
services/2015/housing-and-homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-
and-homelessness.pdf (accessed 27 February 2015). 
12  Submission 93, p. 12. 
13  Implementing the National Housing Reforms, A Progress Report to the Council of Australian 
Governments from Commonwealth, State and Territory Housing Ministers, November 2009, 
p. 26, https://www.coag.gov.au/node/91 (accessed 5 March 2015) and AHURI, Submission 93, 
p. 30. 
14  AHURI, Submission 93, p. 30.  
15  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 28, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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completely replace the public housing that has been lost since the period of, 
say, 1993.16 
15.14 Many witnesses advocated accelerating the transfer of public housing to the 
community housing sector. For example, Mr Pisarski, National Shelter, recognised 
that Australia had not been building sufficient public housing for a very long time and 
argued that increasingly this stock should be transferred across to the not-for-profit 
sector.17 Mr Langford, Junction and Women's Housing, argued that the existing 
supply of social housing had 'to be reconfigured, through social and economic 
renewal'. In his view, this change needed to involve a shift away from 'a dominant 
monopoly model of public housing authorities being the primary holder and manager 
of that stock'. He acknowledged the trend towards transfers to the community housing 
sector, which he saw as a key mechanism that would enable the reinvestment in 
partnership with the private sector. He noted further: 
There are numerous examples emerging now, around the country, where 
transfers of public housing stock to community housing providers are 
fostering opportunities for private sector investment in a way that can never 
happen whilst that stock is owned, controlled and managed by state housing 
authorities.18 
15.15 AHURI spelt out the various advantages of transferring public housing to 
community housing providers for governments. They included a reduced need for 
governments to borrow money in order to buy or maintain dwellings, and a greater 
borrowing capacity for not-for-profit housing associations from improved rent flows 
and more property titles.19  
15.16 Importantly, community providers would be able to increase stock through 
redevelopment of old properties, thereby contributing to the supply side of the 
affordable housing equation. In this context, the National Affordable Housing 
Consortium was of the view that not only could new stock of public housing replace 
the old but more community houses could be added 'at no cost to the state'.20 As an 
example, while referring to the 'fantastic' pool of public housing assets, Mr Cant noted 
that some public housing properties had too few dwellings on them and houses that 
were too old. He spoke of the scope for expanding the stock of community houses: 
In a lot of public housing purchased at a realistic valuation there is latent 
equity that can be realised by someone with development capacity, because 
you are then creating more housing assets and selling some and there is a 
bit of cross-subsidisation.21 
16  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 10.  
17  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 37. 
18  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 31. 
19  AHURI, Submission 93, p. 30. 
20  Mr Myers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54. 
21  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 64.  
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15.17 Making a similar observation, Dr Lucy Burgmann, NSW Federation of 
Housing Associations, explained that in New South Wales, if not elsewhere, there 
were many public housing properties dating back to the 1970s that were on blocks that 
had potential to sustain more properties. She noted that while there was nothing 
stopping the state departments of housing from redeveloping the land, they often 
lacked the capacity to do so. According to Dr Burgmann, on a project by project basis, 
one option would be: 
…as part of transferring properties from public to community housing, that 
there was an expectation or a commitment received that the properties 
would be redeveloped and a capacity in some places to turn four or five 
houses into a medium-density dwelling that may be more like 20 properties, 
and not all of them would necessarily have to be retained for social 
housing.22  
15.18 Dr Burgmann noted that some of the dwellings might be affordable housing 
while others might be sold, which presented an opportunity to generate more 
community houses.23 She explained that members of the NSW Federation of Housing 
Associations managed tenancies especially for, but not limited to, very-low-income to 
low-income people, vulnerable people or people who require a higher proportion of 
support.24 According to Dr Burgmann: 
Increasingly, we are also managing tenancies for key workers and for 
people on moderate incomes. I think the new threshold will be about 
finding affordable housing for young people so that they are not 
accidentally locked out of the employment market because of where they 
have to live in order to be able to afford that. Community housing providers 
are already doing work there and there is more that can be done.25 
15.19 The Women's Housing Company maintained that community housing was a 
'proven model and growth industry' that had already made an 'enormous contribution 
to addressing the housing affordability crisis for the disadvantaged, including 
vulnerable women'.26 
Attributes of the community housing sector 
15.20 The community housing sector has the potential not only to add to the stock of 
safe, secure and affordable housing but also provide a range of support services to 
enable people to access suitable housing and to remain housed.  
22  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 17. 
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 17. 
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 12. The NSW Federation of Housing 
Associations is the industry peak body for community housing providers in NSW. 
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 12.  
26  Submission 52, p. 4.  
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Support services  
15.21 Evidence before the committee reinforced the widely held contention that 
providing support services to people in social housing was a valuable way to create a 
favourable environment in which tenants could become productive members of the 
community and help prevent them getting into crisis.27 In this regard, 
Mr Damien Walker, Department of Housing and Public Works, Queensland, referred 
to the particular benefits that community housing providers offer. He mentioned that 
Queensland and the other jurisdictions saw great value in having community housing 
providers closely involved in property and tenancy management because of their 
agility, local knowledge and ability to deliver 'a greater level of wraparound service 
and support'.28  
15.22 According to Dr Burgmann, community housing providers bring flexibility to 
the delivery of social and affordable housing: 
Community housing providers are well able to match the subsidy, the 
property and the wrap-around services that tenants need to meet their needs 
now, and possibly their changing needs into the future.29 
15.23 Ms Marie Skinner, National Seniors Australia, also recognised the way in 
which community housing providers integrate support services with secure housing to 
help people remain where they are and to maintain their health and wellbeing more 
effectively. In her words:  
It brings not just the housing but all the support services that the person 
might need; and, when you pull them all together, you get a comprehensive 
response to that person's situation and to their needs.30 
15.24 In its submission, the Community Housing Council of South Australia stated 
that community housing providers understood the communities in which they 
operated, had strong social missions and well developed business skills.31 Likewise, 
the Community Housing Federation of Australia stated that solid community 
engagement and the ability to provide very secure tenure for people were among the 
notable advantages of community housing.32 It also contended that the provision of 
community housing was as much a productivity measure as a social benefit.33 
27  See, for example, Mr Astbury, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 36.  
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 45–46. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 12.  
30  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 15. 
31  Submission 99, p. 1. 
32  Ms Croce, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 9. 
33  Submission 171, p. 9. 
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15.25 It should be noted that, although community housing providers expressed 
confidence in their ability to deliver tenancy services, a recent AHURI study observed 
that 'direct quantitative evidence on this point' was not to be found. Even so, the study 
stated that 'while falling short of unanimity, tenant research participant views 
generally supported the managerial assertion that community housing offers a more 
personalised, responsive style of provision'. The study concluded that a more intensive 
follow up study would be required. This examination would be able to determine 
whether the initial findings reflected 'service standards more ambitious than those of 
SHAs [state housing authorities], better compliance with similar service standards, or 
a generally more consumerist organisational culture'.34 
Diversification 
15.26 The Community Housing Federation of Australia suggested that the diversity 
of community housing models was one of the sector's principal strengths, as it allowed 
the sector to respond to local requirements and the needs of specific groups of 
tenants.35 The NSW Federation of Housing Associations also noted the growth and 
diversification of the community housing industry, with the number of properties 
under community housing management in NSW doubling between 2006 and 2013.36  
15.27 Mr Walker informed the committee that in line with Housing 2020, the 
Queensland Government was taking an approach that sought 'to breakdown 
concentrations where we have existing stock and reinvesting in stock in other 
locations.' This policy was directed at achieving 'a pepper-potted' distribution of social 
housing. He explained that when the department makes decisions around where to 
invest, matters at the front of its mind are on proximity to existing services—hospital 
and/or employment networks, and whether they are serviced by good public transport. 
Basically, the department considered all of the things that go to providing suitable and 
appropriate housing with the necessary support infrastructure. He made clear that the 
department attempted 'to avoid providing social housing simply at the periphery of the 
urban boundary'.37 
15.28 Evidence pointed to other advantages attached to mixed housing 
developments, including sound financial benefits for community providers by 
including moderate-income earners in their blend of affordable housing. Ms Croce, 
Community Housing Federation of Australia, noted that community housing providers 
need to stay financially sustainable. She pointed to public housing authorities 
34  Hal Pawson, Vivienne Milligan, Ilan Wiesel and Kath Hulse, Public housing transfers: past, 
present and prospective, AHURI Final Report No. 215, Australian Housing and Urban 
Research Institute, University of New South Wales and Swinburne University of Technology, 
October 2013, p. 5, http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/projects/p71008 
(accessed 5 March 2015). 
35  Submission 171, p. 6. 
36  Submission 80, p. 2. 
37  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 47. 
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currently not being able to meet the costs of running a system. In her view, to avoid 
this situation and to make their business financially viable, the Community Housing 
Federation provided houses for people in the very lowest incomes as well as people 
able to pay more as they start to earn. She stated: 
It would mean being able to have different types of rent setting policies that 
allowed the people who are able to pay more to quite simply help to cross-
subsidise for those people who cannot.38 
15.29 Likewise, the Hobsons Bay City Council recognised the recent partnering 
between government and the community sector to provide social housing. In its view, 
this joint effort had 'broadened the delivery model and resident profile to include a 
mix of tenants' such as those on Centrelink allowances, pensioners, and people on 
moderate incomes. It regarded this development as 'a positive shift from one that has 
prioritised high needs and disadvantage as criteria for obtaining state owned 
housing'.39 
15.30 This range of incomes and the graduated rise in rent would, up to a point, also 
encourage people to seek employment and/or take on extra work without fear of being 
forced into the more expensive and less secure private rental market. There are, 
however, limits to this incentive. 
High levels of satisfaction and reluctance to leave social housing 
15.31 According to the Community Housing Federation of Australia, community 
housing tenants express high levels of satisfaction with their housing.40 While there 
are very important social and welfare benefits that derive from providing longer term 
and secure tenure in community housing, such a situation could provide a disincentive 
for people to take up other options.  
15.32 In this context, the committee has referred to the public housing sector, which 
can discourage tenants from endeavouring to improve their personal circumstances for 
fear of losing eligibility for public housing and the benefits that derive from such 
housing. The same situation can apply to community housing tenants. Mr Langford, 
Junction and Women's Housing, explained that there was a view that social housing, 
in both the public and the community housing sector, had become 'a destination rather 
than a point along the continuum for many people'.41 From Mr Langford's perspective, 
people who are in long-term, secure tenure, be it in community housing or public 
housing, were very reluctant to leave because of the risk of losing their security.42  
38  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 17.  
39  Submission 39, p. 8.  
40  Submission 171, p. 6. 
41  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 42. 
42  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 37. 
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15.33 The challenge facing community housing providers is to afford their tenants 
the opportunities and incentive to move from community housing to the private rental 
market or even home ownership. For example, Junction and Women's Housing not 
only endeavours to provide secure tenure but is also cognisant of the importance of 
helping people move out of social housing. Mr Langford noted that the vast majority 
of its properties were longer term tenures. He explained that while its philosophical 
approach was very much about supporting successful and long-term tenure, Junction 
and Women's Housing was increasingly trying to develop a range of programs to help 
people who had stabilised to look at other housing options. According to 
Mr Langford: 
We start with the premise that we will offer, for our long-term housing 
programs, housing for as long as people need it. As I say, that is where we 
are focusing some of our attention at the moment, on trying to find and 
develop programs that will assist people to move out of our housing into the 
market, because we are in a position where we are rationing access at the 
point of allocation, because we simply do not have enough supply to meet 
the demand.43 
15.34 This mobility would allow those on the waiting list to take up much wanted 
allocations. Junction and Women's Housing was looking to its programs to 'unclog the 
biggest bottlenecks'.44 
15.35 Dr Petersen, University of Queensland, noted that reforms across states were 
directed at social housing becoming transitional rather than permanent. She noted, for 
instance, that in Queensland the Housing 2020 strategy aimed to ensure 'people have 
access to the help and support they need to give them the skills and resilience to find 
and sustain tenancies in the private rental market instead of becoming reliant on social 
housing'.45 
Title transfer 
15.36 While community housing providers may receive government assistance, they 
were also looking to the private sector as partners to build up the stock of community 
houses. Some witnesses argued that to encourage private investment, the title over 
public housing properties as well as the rent roll needed to be transferred to 
community housing providers. 
15.37 In some instances, however, the handover of public housing to the community 
housing sector involved the transfer of the rent roll only and not ownership. Ms Croce 
43  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 42.  
44  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 37.  
45  Queensland Government, Media Release, 10 July 2013, 
http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2013/7/25/housing-2020-strategy-to-renew-social-
housing, quoted in Submission 163, p. 2. 
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contended that the programs were 'mostly transferring the property just for 
management, without the title', which would limit the ability to increase the stock.46 
15.38 In this regard, the Queensland Council of Social Service stated that the 
impetus behind the transfer of public housing stock to the community housing sector 
had been the expectation that transfer of stock would give community housing 
providers a means of leveraging private finance for developing new stock.47 
It suggested, however, that this leverage would only occur if stock were transferred 
with title. The Council indicated that, unfortunately, state and territory treasuries were 
reluctant to transfer the titles because of the effect on balance sheets.48  
15.39 Along similar lines, a project that examined the effect of the South Australian 
Government's program of public housing stock transfers to the community sector 
observed that: 
Some commentators have argued that the community housing stock is held 
back by the reluctance of State Governments to transfer title deeds of stock, 
as well as a lack of specialist skills amongst operators.49 
15.40 The Community Housing Council of South Australia was one organisation 
calling for a transfer model with some degree of title transfer in order to maximise the 
growth potential of the housing portfolio.50  
Importance of title transfer 
15.41 As noted earlier, community housing providers need to be financially viable if 
they are to provide affordable housing and support services to low-income earners and 
add to the stock of community housing. With this financial imperative in mind, many 
witnesses spoke of the financial benefits that would attend the transfer of title. 
Dr Ian Winter, AHURI, noted: 
One of the key drivers here is the expectation that the housing associations 
will actually leverage, will borrow against the value of those assets to invest 
in new supply. If they do not have control of the assets they will not be able 
to borrow.51 
46  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
47  Submission 175, p. 21. 
48  Submission 175, p. 21. 
49  Andrew Beer et al, Public Housing stock transfer—impacts and implications for local 
government, CHURP, p. 19, http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2013.37%20-
%20Public%20housing%20stock%20transfer%20Final%20Report%2024%20June.pdf 
(accessed 5 January 2015). 
50  Submission 99, p. 2. 
51  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 24.  
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15.42 Ms Croce, Community Housing Federation of Australia, informed the 
committee of the need for the government to commit to a transfer program 
nationwide. She also spoke of the ability of community housing providers who held 
the title to take advantage of this ownership to leverage: 
Stock transfer is a major source of growth as it allows community-housing 
programs to leverage properties for private financing and to build more 
housing stock.52 
15.43 Research undertaken in South Australia, which looked at the first tranche of 
public housing transfers, supported Ms Croce's contention. According to Ms Croce, 
the study, which included about 600 properties, found: 
…if you keep the status quo you will get no growth. If you transfer it 
[public housing stock] over but you are only doing it with management and 
just working off the income stream, you will get maybe two to three new 
houses per year. But if you give them the asset and the title and they can 
leverage off that, you are looking at 75 new houses per year. That is just a 
small example.53  
15.44 According to Ms Croce, this example provided some idea of what can be 
achieved with the stock transfer—that is 'still 700 properties off 600'.54 
15.45 Mr Schrapel, Uniting Communities, stated bluntly that without transferring 
the ownership—the title—you cannot leverage the asset, so therefore it has a limited 
value in that regard.55 
15.46 The Queensland Government was one of the states actively engaged in the 
transfer of public housing to the community housing sector. It has made no firm 
commitment, however, to transfer the title to its public houses to the housing 
associations. Mr Walker noted that Housing 2020 had a number of recommendations 
of which stock transfer was certainly a key. He then went on to explain that, at a high 
level, the policy itself was reasonably straightforward in what it recognised, and was 
consistent with the COAG agreement reached a few years ago. As noted earlier, the 
states agreed that, primarily, 35 per cent of public stock would be transferred by 
December 2014. Queensland was a party to that agreement, as were all other 
jurisdictions.56 Mr Walker referred to the Queensland Government's goal of 90 per 
cent quantum by 2020, identified as part of its Housing 2020 plan.57 He explained 
further, the approach to title transfer:   
52  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
53  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 16. 
54  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 16. 
55  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 34.  
56  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 45–46. 
57  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 45–46. 
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The government's policy at this point in time, as per Housing 2020, is to 
pursue property and tenancy management transfers, and each of those 
transactions…it is a procurement exercise—will be bespoke. That will be 
something that the government makes a decision on at that particular point 
in time. I am not aware of any policy that precludes a transfer of the title 
itself, but certainly my understanding is that it is generally on a case-by-
case basis, transaction by transaction.58 
15.47 Mr Walker reiterated the Queensland Government's intention for transfer 
transactions to be tailored: that no one transaction would necessarily be the same. He 
explained that each one would need 'to be responsive to the environment in which we 
currently have our housing'. According to Mr Walker, there certainly would be 
opportunities where a transfer of title was considered and times when the government 
deemed the transfer appropriate. He maintained: 
There will be other occasions where it is simply a transfer in the rent roll, or 
a mix of the two…the policy on the transfer of title is not explicit.59 
15.48 In addition, his colleague, Mr Leitch, noted:  
…given the scale of what we are proposing, the government has taken a 
risk management approach because, even when we talk about the Logan 
transfer, the proponent that takes that on board will become the biggest 
provider in Australia. The government, I think, would see that there is a fair 
amount of risk involved in transferring title straight up so early. It is a 
matter, I think, of building capacity in the sector to be able to take that up as 
well.60 
15.49 In South Australia, the transfer of public housing also involves some transfer 
of title. Ms Palumbo, Community Housing Council of South Australia, explained that 
the sector understood that 35 per cent of public housing needed to be transferred to 
community housing providers. For South Australia, this amounted to 
12,000 properties. According to Ms Palumbo, these transfers included a portion of 
58  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 48. 
59  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 46. 
60  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 48. The Productivity Commission noted that: 
'The Logan Renewal Initiative was the first major step in the reform to achieve the large scale 
transfer of the management of public housing and redevelopment of housing stock in the Logan 
area. The intention was to enhance service delivery outcomes through local decision making, 
increase supply of social and affordable housing, reduce social housing concentration and better 
align the portfolio with housing need'. Productivity Commission, Report on Government 
Services 2015, Volume G: Housing and homelessness p. 17.55, 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-services/2015/housing-and-
homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-and-homelessness.pdf 
(accessed 27 February 2015). 
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ownership or titles—not all, but some.61 She referred to the Sphere report, which 
demonstrated that some level of title was essential for growth. Ms Palumbo 
elaborated: 
We know that most states prefer the management model. We are saying that 
the report demonstrates that title can be as low as nine per cent, to a 
maximum of around 20 per cent, to get the optimum amount of growth you 
can achieve with the income sources you have. Then that growth can be 
further increased if you have subsidies like opportunities to partner, shared 
equity, mixed models, discounted or gifted land and of course NRAS-type 
subsidies.62 
15.50 In her view, South Australia needed to accelerate its current commitment of 
title transfers, which currently stood at 5,000. She suggested that the 5,000 would 
bring $14 million per annum into the housing system, which, on its own, would 
increase the stock by another 220 houses.63 Ms Palumbo highlighted the reasons for 
transferring public housing to the community housing sector: 
…we want to see a more balanced system, we want to see a more 
sustainable system, we want to simply bring more revenue to the social 
housing system, and this does that. We see that the community housing 
business model as a more efficient model and therefore there are more 
resources that will come in just by doing that to meet the goals we need to 
meet, which are simply more supply and renewed communities.64 
15.51 Also referring to the South Australian transfer of public housing to the 
community housing sector, Dr Clark noted that the transfer was still in its infancy, 
where the management of only about 1,000 houses had been transferred to the 
community housing sector. She explained that there were plans for more, but not for 
the title to be transferred. In her view, however, it was the transfer of title that would 
enable community housing providers to grow and regenerate their stock. She stated 
further that the eastern states, particularly the larger ones, had shown more interest in 
the stock transfer idea allowing for thousands of properties to be transferred. 
According to Dr Clark, state governments would be interested in doing so because it 
attracts more Commonwealth rent assistance—more federal money—into the states 
and territories.65 
61  Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 38. The report cited in this quote is The Sphere 
Company, Maximising growth potential of housing providers through title transfer, 2013, 
http://www.chcsa.org.au/sites/default/files/Maximising%20growth%20through%20title%20tran
sfer%20(Final)%20November%202013.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015).  
62  Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 38. The report cited in this quote is The Sphere 
Company, Maximising growth potential of housing providers through title transfer, 2013, 
http://www.chcsa.org.au/sites/default/files/Maximising%20growth%20through%20title%20tran
sfer%20(Final)%20November%202013.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015).  
63  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 38. 
64  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 38. 
65  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 33.  
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15.52 In WA, the stock transfer had resulted in the community housing sector more 
than doubling over the last three and a half years with about 1,700 dwellings 
transferred, including the title. Mr Searle, Department of Housing WA, indicated that 
WA was head-leasing as well. He noted that it seemed the sector had two major issues 
for their credit worthiness to banks—one was asset backing, which the title transfer 
delivered; the other was income stream. He explained that head-leasing actually 
provided access to an income stream. Further, he noted the two components needed to 
get financing from the banks and that the Western Australian Government was trying 
to accommodate both of those.66 
Committee view 
15.53 Clearly there is much merit in transferring public housing stock to the 
community housing sector. The committee believes, however, that the states are right 
to be cautious in how they go about the transfer of title. The committee is of the view 
that a thorough and comprehensive examination of the implications of transferring 
title needs to be undertaken before any large scale transfer of title takes place. Such a 
study, however, should in no way slow down the process of transferring the public 
housing stock to the community housing sector already in train. Indeed, the transfer of 
stock that has taken place and is currently underway would provide the basis for 
examination and review to determine the advantages and disadvantages of title 
transfer and more broadly identify ways to gain the maximum benefit from the 
transfer of public housing to the community housing sector.  
Recommendation 23 
15.54 The committee recommends that the Australian Government request the 
Productivity Commission undertake an inquiry into the merits of transferring 
public housing to the community housing sector with particular emphasis on the 
advantages and disadvantages of transferring property title.  
Need for public housing 
15.55 In its submission, the Queensland Council of Social Service stated that, while 
the move to transfer stock was seen as a panacea for the decline in social housing 
stock, faith in this approach should be tempered. It suggested further that stock 
transfer should coincide with ongoing and adequate investment in the construction of 
new public housing dwellings by state and federal governments.67 
15.56 The committee agrees with this view. The transfer of current public housing 
stock should not be interpreted as sanctioning the withdrawal of governments from 
funding public housing which should remain at the core of social housing to ensure 
that the most disadvantaged are adequately housed. Community housing would then 
be able to provide housing for low income earners and for some a stepping stone into 
66  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 11. 
67  Submission 175, p. 21. 
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the private rental market and even home ownership. In other words, community 
housing should not be regarded as a substitute for public housing but complementary 
by offering greater diversity in affordable housing, incentives for tenants to improve 
their circumstances without losing all the benefits of community housing and a more 
sustainable form of social housing.  
Recommendation 24 
15.57 Consistent with the recommendation for the Australian Government to 
increase the overall proportion of public housing as a percentage of housing 
stock, the committee recommends that the Australian Government together with 
the states and territories commit to achieving a higher proportion of overall 
social housing as a percentage of Australia's housing stock. This recommendation 
recognises that currently social housing in Australia forms only a small 
proportion of Australia's housing stock and is falling far short of meeting 
demand. 
15.58 Aside from the transfer of title, a number of submitters raised other concerns 
about the transfer arrangements from public to community housing including 
protecting the rights of public housing tenants, the structure of the community housing 
sector and policy uncertainty.  
Community housing—level of protection 
15.59 The project that examined the effect of the South Australian Government's 
program of transferring public housing stock to the community sector on local 
governments referred to a 'deep-seated concern' amongst some community members 
that transfers represented 'the privatisation of the public housing stock'.68 An AHURI 
study also noted that if mandated transfer were to become the norm: 
…there is a need for good practice guidance on tenant consultation and 
involvement in shaping the process, and in subsequent social housing 
governance.69 
15.60 In its submission, the Queensland Council of Social Service made the point 
that tenants transferred to the community housing sector should have the same level of 
68  Andrew Beer et al, Public Housing stock transfer—impacts and implications for local 
government, CHURP, p. 19, http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2013.37%20-
%20Public%20housing%20stock%20transfer%20Final%20Report%2024%20June.pdf 
(accessed 5 January 2015). 
69  Hal Pawson, Vivienne Milligan, Ilan Wiesel and Kath Hulse, Public housing transfers: past, 
present and prospective, AHURI Final Report No. 215, Australian Housing and Urban 
Research Institute, University of New South Wales and Swinburne University of Technology, 
October 2013, p. 6, http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/projects/p71008 
(accessed 5 March 2015). 
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protection from eviction as afforded under the public housing system, including a 
right of appeal.70 
15.61 National Shelter also highlighted the importance of managing carefully, in 
partnership with tenants and their representatives, the effects of transferring public 
housing stock to the community housing sector. It made a significant number of 
recommendations in this regard. One such recommendation involved the regulatory 
framework for such transfers including provisions for public accountability and 
independent review and appeal processes for all social housing tenants.71 
Organisation and structure of the not-for-profit housing provider sector 
15.62 A number of submitters drew attention to particular aspects of community 
housing that may be limiting the sector's opportunities to contribute more to the 
supply of affordable housing.   
15.63 The committee has noted that small-scale providers make up the large 
proportion of community housing providers.72 For example, the Tamworth Regional 
Council suggested that most of the not-for-profit housing organisations were small 
and lacked 'expertise, structure and the processes to handle large volumes of 
affordable housing'.73 Making a similar point, Stellar Living was of the view that the 
not-for-profit sector was in desperate need of consolidation. It stated: 
The cost of capital, administration duplication and missed funding 
opportunities is high as far too many organisations manage far too few 
tenancies and properties.74 
15.64 The project that examined the effect of the South Australian Government's 
program of public housing stock transfers to the community sector also commented on 
the prevalence of small-scale providers. It observed: 
Some larger providers have been the beneficiaries of title transfers and been 
able to finance the development of additional affordable dwellings and 
upgrade other facilities, but the sector remains dominated by smaller 
70  Submission 175, p. 21. 
71  Submission 78, p. 24. 
72  Andrew Beer et al, Public Housing stock transfer—impacts and implications for local 
government, CHURP, p. 19, http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2013.37%20-
%20Public%20housing%20stock%20transfer%20Final%20Report%2024%20June.pdf 
(accessed 5 January 2015). 
73  Tamworth Regional Council, Submission 12, p. 3.  
74  Submission 3, p. 1. 
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providers—which is argued to be the single largest constraint on growth in 
the sector.75   
Continuity and certainty 
15.65 While the overall policy framework within which community housing 
providers work and forge partnerships is important for their growth and further 
development, some commentators were critical of the decision-making that forms the 
basis of this framework. For example, the Community Housing Federation of 
Australia complained of a 'stop and go' approach to housing policy, and the 
uncertainty this created for community housing providers.76 It argued that it was really 
difficult to maintain a growth trajectory in an environment where community housing 
providers have limited capital funding from government and a 'stop-and-go or wait-
and-see nature of government programs and policies'.77 It stated emphatically: 
…we need a long-term strategy that is going to provide policy certainty for 
the sector, clear and consistent funding commitments, a provision for 
investment assurances and some new growth funding mechanisms.78 
15.66 The NSW Federation of Housing Associations also underlined the importance 
of policy certainty for the community housing industry in order for it to continue to 
'facilitate stronger partnerships with the private sector and other agencies'.79 Likewise, 
the project that examined the effect of the South Australian Government's program of 
transferring public housing stock to the community sector referred to the negative 
effect of the lack of coherent government policy and the stop-start nature of stock 
transfers.80  
15.67 This call for continuity and consistency in policy governing the community 
housing sector is consistent with, and reinforces, similar appeals for overall certainty 
in Australia's housing policy.81   
75  Andrew Beer et al, Public Housing stock transfer—impacts and implications for local 
government, CHURP, p. 19, http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2013.37%20-
%20Public%20housing%20stock%20transfer%20Final%20Report%2024%20June.pdf 
(accessed 5 January 2015). 
76  Submission 171, p. 12. 
77  Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 9. 
78  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 9. 
79  Submission 80, p. 3.  
80  Andrew Beer et al, Public Housing stock transfer—impacts and implications for local 
government, CHURP, p. 19, http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2013.37%20-
%20Public%20housing%20stock%20transfer%20Final%20Report%2024%20June.pdf 
(accessed 5 January 2015). 
81  There are numerous references throughout this report on the importance of having policy 
certainty around housing and homelessness. See, for example, paragraphs 15.64, 17.30–17.31, 
18.63–18.65, 22.40. 
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Conclusion 
15.68 Over recent years there has been a slow transfer of public housing to the 
community housing sector spurred by the agreement between Australian Housing 
Ministers to boost the overall proportion of community housing as a proportion of all 
social housing. This trend received strong support from submitters and witnesses who 
saw many advantages to having a larger community housing sector. Indeed, a number 
urged the states to accelerate this transition. While in favour of the transfer, a number 
of submitters raised concerns relating to ensuring that the interests and rights of 
tenants in public housing were preserved.  
Recommendation 25 
15.69 The committee recommends that the Australian Government in 
collaboration with the states and territories monitor carefully the transfer of 
public housing stock to the community sector to ensure that this transfer does not 
adversely affect tenants of public housing or cause them unnecessary anxiety if 
required to vacate their dwelling. The recommendation is intended to ensure that 
tenants are consulted about the changes and that their rights as tenants, 
including security of tenure, of rent levels, and of access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms is preserved. 
15.70 The committee has noted the difficulties that the states have in maintaining an 
ageing stock of public housing and the low returns from rent due to public housing 
now serving the most disadvantaged in the community. The community housing 
sector also faces challenges in finding the finances to maintain and develop properties 
while being able to provide not only appropriate housing but wrap around services 
needed by many of its tenants. In this context, the transfer of title becomes a major 
concern. The committee believes that the transfer of title needs a thorough and 
comprehensive examination and has accordingly recommended that the Productivity 
Commission should undertake such a review.  
 

  
Chapter 16 
Particular housing needs 
16.1 The committee has quoted statistics regarding households and housing 
affordability and, in general terms, highlighted the shortage of affordable and suitable 
dwellings in the private rental market and the social housing sector. Overall, the 
committee found that low income earners in the rental market in Australia face 
significant obstacles in finding affordable and appropriate houses. These difficulties 
are compounded for disadvantaged low-income renters who have particular housing 
needs.  
16.2 In this chapter, the committee looks at particular groups of people who do not 
own their own home and have specific needs as renters—older Australians dependent 
on income support, women and children experiencing or under threat of domestic 
violence, people with a long-term health condition or disability, young unemployed 
Australians and migrants or refugees.1 In subsequent chapters, the committee looks at 
Indigenous housing and homelessness, especially as it affects both young and older 
Australians.  
People with particular needs and the rental market  
16.3 With a growing population and continuing shortage of affordable housing, 
many Australians encounter difficulties finding and retaining suitable housing. Indeed, 
in this tight rental market where competition for affordable housing is strong, some 
people are clearly at a disadvantage securing appropriate accommodation. Renters 
with specific housing needs often find the challenge accessing suitable housing is even 
greater because of their particular circumstances.2 For example, it is important for a 
person with disability to have an affordable, secure long-term tenancy, with easier 
access and entry, that is in a safe environment and close to public transport and the 
services they need.  
16.4 The subgroups of those in the rental market with particular housing needs may 
be characterised by their age, household composition, race, geographic location, or 
physical or mental disability. While the committee considers the particular difficulties 
1  A recent Productivity Commission paper found that people at the highest risk of experiencing 
deeper or multiple forms of disadvantage include those who are dependent on income support, 
unemployed people, Indigenous Australians, people with a long-term health condition or 
disability, lone parents and people with low educational attainment. Rosalie McLachlan Geoff 
Gilfillan Jenny Gordon, Deep and Persistent Disadvantage in Australia, Productivity 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Productivity Commission, July 2013, p. 11 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/deep-persistent-disadvantage/deep-persistent-
disadvantage.pdf (accessed 5 January 2015).  
2  See, for example, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 38. 
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that of a number of these sub groups face in accessing appropriate housing, its main 
focus is on older Australians. It has taken this approach because older Australians in 
the rental market experience disadvantage that tends to capture those of the other sub 
groups. Indeed, Australians with disability or single women may find that their 
concerns with securing affordable and appropriate housing are heightened as they 
grow older and face added hardship.  
Older Australians in private rental 
16.5 The AIHW highlighted the dramatic shift projected to occur in Australia as 
the population ages, especially over the next 50 years, with noteworthy changes to the 
age structure of the population. It noted the significance of this structural change: 
• the cohort of people aged 65 and over in Australia was 14 per cent in 2012 
and projected to increase to 22 per cent in 2061; and 
• the cohort of people aged 85 and older was 2 per cent in 2012 
(420,300 people) and projected to grow rapidly throughout the projection 
period to 5 per cent by 2061.3 
16.6 Ms Skinner, National Seniors Australia, outlined the types of housing older 
Australians occupied: 
Among people aged 50 and older, 74 per cent own their own home, five per 
cent still have a mortgage, 10 per cent rent privately, eight per cent are 
social housing tenants and four per cent are other tenure types.4 
16.7 Using different figures but consistent with other research findings, 
Dr Debbie Faulkner, University of Adelaide, stated that currently about 81 per cent of 
people over 65 own their own home. She informed the committee that this proportion 
was projected to decline to around 55 per cent by the middle of the century.5 
Rental market—a brutal place 
16.8 Mrs Kylie Ullman, National Seniors Australia, noted that people who have 
not had the opportunity to purchase their own home and who will not be able to do so 
by the time they reach 65 face a lifetime in the private rental market or in community 
and public housing. She noted: 
By 2026, the number of lower income people aged 65 and over who are 
living in rental households, as home ownership falls, are projected to far 
exceed the supply capacity of the social housing system. Census data from 
2006 to 2011 shows a steady increase in the number of renters aged 55 and 
3  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 12, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
4  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 9. 
5  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 11–12. 
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over in the private market. Housing affordability is particularly challenging 
for those in private rental, as rent increases well above CPI. Older renters 
experience significant anxiety linked to their security of rental tenure and 
many experience housing stress, which ABS data indicates is also felt by 
people in other forms of housing.6 
16.9 The growth in this older age group combined with the gradual decline in 
home ownership especially among older Australians and the continuing shortage of 
affordable rental properties has serious implications for older Australians who do not 
own their own home.  
16.10 Indeed, many submitters contended that older people who rent were one of the 
most disadvantaged groups in Australian society and that their numbers were 
increasing.7 In its submission, COTA noted that the private rental market was often 
the only option for older Australians as there was 'a critical shortage of public and 
social housing in Australia'. Referring specifically to people over 65, it stated that 
around 12 per cent of people of this age were renters, with a third of them in public 
housing and two thirds in private rental accommodation.8  
16.11 Moreover, Aged and Community Services Australia suggested that a crisis 
was emerging with regard to housing and older people.9 Professor Beer also agreed 
there was increasing evidence of 'an affordability crisis for older Australians'.10 
Capacity to pay increasing rents 
16.12 Many retired Australians have limited choices when it comes to housing 
because they are on a fixed income, with a significant number reliant on the pension. 
In this regard, the 2013 Productivity Commission's report Deep and persistent 
disadvantage in Australia, found: 
People aged 65 years and over (especially singles) are far more likely to 
experience persistent poverty than other households—particularly where 
estimates have not been adjusted to account for housing costs. Around 
17 per cent of elderly couples, 30 per cent of elderly single males and 
6  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 9. 
7  See for example, Dr Petersen, University of Queensland, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 11. 
8  Submission 191, p. 3. 
9  Aged and Community Services Australia had 'the housing crisis for older people' as a heading 
in its submission, Submission 111, p. 3. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 10.  
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36 per cent of elderly single females experienced relative income poverty 
for between six and ten years between 2001 and 2010.11 
16.13 Mr Adrian Pisarski, National Shelter, drew attention to 'a long-term 
intergenerational headache that is really starting to grow'. As noted earlier, he 
explained: 
Australia's pension system is predicated on the basis that people retire 
owning a property; therefore, the pension is adequate to live if you have 
achieved home ownership. If you have not achieved home ownership, and 
this is increasingly the experience of many low-income households, then 
the private rental market is a brutal place if you are on a fixed income or 
even a pension, and a pension is probably the best of those income support 
payments that you can be on.12 
16.14 Likewise, Dr Petersen referred to the assumption of home ownership that 
underpins Australia's age pension system. Thus, according to Dr Petersen, the pension 
does not take account of the rents that pensioners have to pay, particularly in large 
cities. She stressed, however, that rural areas should not be excluded because her 
research found that there were significant difficulties in some rural areas as well—
particularly in areas where rents are very high because of significant mining and 
tourism.13 Associate Professor Yates, City Futures Research Centre, also highlighted 
the fact that the age pension was based on the understanding that retired people would 
own their home.14  
Rental stress  
16.15 The 2009 pension review report found that pensioners who rent privately had 
poorer outcomes, including higher financial stress than pensioners who owned their 
homes outright or who were living in public housing.15 It acknowledged that some 
pensioners faced financial pressures because of the high rent they were outlaying in 
the private rental market.16 The welfare system review similarly suggested that 
11  Rosalie McLachlan, Geoff Gilfillan and Jenny Gordon, Deep and Persistent Disadvantage in 
Australia, Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper, July 2013, p. 65, 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/deep-persistent-disadvantage/deep-persistent-
disadvantage.pdf (accessed 9 February 2014). See also Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 November 2014, p. 19. 
12  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 33. 
13  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 11. 
14  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 37.  
15  Dr Jeff Harmer, Pension Review Report, Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, 27 February 2009, p. 53. 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/pensionreviewreport.pdf 
(accessed 14 January 2015). 
16  Dr Jeff Harmer, Pension Review Report, Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, 27 February 2009, p. 52. 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/pensionreviewreport.pdf  
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pensioners experienced difficulties because of 'high rental costs and the declining 
effectiveness of rent assistance to help with these costs, as well as other disadvantages 
such as the security of their housing arrangements'.17 
16.16 Dr Baker, CHURP, stated that while a smaller proportion of older people live 
in private rental housing, 50 per cent of them were paying more than 30 per cent of 
their income on housing costs and they were already on low incomes.18 Mrs Ullman 
noted that about one in four recipients of the Commonwealth Rent Assistance 
payment aged over 65 was still in rental stress after receiving the payment.19 She 
informed the committee that members regularly made contact with National Seniors 
Australia because they were worried about how they could afford to continue paying 
rent without a regular full-time wage, particularly if they had to pay for services 
associated with health care for a chronic health condition.20 In particular, she noted 
that single women with low superannuation balances and those facing relationship 
breakdowns in their later years were 'very vulnerable to housing stress'.21  
Unstable tenure  
16.17 A number of witnesses informed the committee that older people living in 
private rental properties report that they experience high levels of anxiety due to 
'unstable tenure, high and frequent rent rises and the need to move relatively 
frequently'.22 Research undertaken by National Seniors Australia indicated that two-
thirds of older Australians wish to stay in their current home or, if they had to move, 
at least remain in their local area.23 On this matter of insecure tenure, the National 
Foundation for Australian Women noted that: 
While Commonwealth aged care policy has more recently emphasised 
ageing in place, this is not an adequate response or solution when so many 
older people do not have any secure and/or suitable housing in which they 
can age. This focus has arguably led to a neglect of the range of alternative 
options such as forms of congregate housing, boarding houses, and 
retirement villages.24  
17  A new System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 68, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
18  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 13–14. 
19  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
20  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
21  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
22  See for example, National Seniors, Submission 165, p. 1. 
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 9. 
24  Submission 38, p. [5]. 
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Modifications to homes for older Australians 
16.18 Furthermore, the changing housing needs of older people may require 
modifications to their dwellings to improve access, to make the surroundings safe and 
secure, to ensure that certain appliances (heaters, taps, showers) are maintained and 
simpler to use, and to cater for limited mobility and other health conditions. In other 
words, the dwellings of older people need to be made free from hazards and obstacles, 
comfortable and, taking account of reduced mobility, liveable. For example, in its 
submission, National Shelter noted that adaptability was a key aspect of housing 
design in the context of an ageing population as people were more likely to acquire 
disabilities as they age. Thus adjustments and alteration to their houses were necessary 
to make it easier for them to 'age in place' and could include grab rails in bathrooms 
and kitchens, a ramp instead of steps and improved house insulation.25  
16.19 National Shelter observed, however, that despite the modest extra cost 
associated with these features, developers were often unwilling to bear this cost, and 
hesitant to take on new designs or processes untested in the market.26 The same lack 
of incentive applied to making a rental property more energy-efficient. Dr Faulkner, 
CHURP, noted that if a person is in private rental, he or she cannot make 
modifications without the permission of the landlord. Further, if the owners' main 
purpose was capital gains then they are:  
…really not interested in accommodating the needs of their tenant. They 
can quite easily, in this market, find a new tenant for that housing without 
having to make those changes to their property.27 
16.20 Mrs Ullman noted that appropriate housing options were extremely limited for 
renters, with assistance for home modifications restricted if the work was considered 
to be the responsibility of the landlord.28 According to Mrs Ullman, adaptable housing 
with features of universal design could be more affordable in the long run because a 
dwelling of this type would be appropriate for people of all ages.29 In its submission, 
COTA noted that there would need to be some incentives for landlords to modify 
existing accommodation to make it more appropriate for their tenants. It suggested 
extending the home modification program or offering enticements through the 
taxation system as a means to encourage landlords to make their properties more 
suitable.30 
25  See, for example, Submission 78, p. 25. Ms Mary Wood, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 November 2014, p. 46.  
26  Submission 78, p. 25. See also paragraphs 13.37–13.39.  
27  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 18.  
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
30  Submission 191, p. 7.  
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16.21 The committee has already considered the considerable drain on a household's 
finances by having to relocate. Dr Faulkner explained that one of the reasons older 
people often move from their private rental is that they cannot get minor modifications 
done when the house is not their own. She noted: 
For them, having to move every 12 months when they are on a fixed 
income—the searching fees, the moving fees, the disconnection and 
connection of phone, electricity and all those things—can become an 
unbearable cost for older people. They find it very difficult to save any 
money, let alone cover those costs, which can amount to thousands of 
dollars. Then to find accommodation that can suit their needs out in the 
rental market is extremely difficult.31 
16.22 Dr Petersen referred to the lack of protections or safety nets available for 
older Australians in Australia's private rental market. She noted that the no-fault 
eviction 'really does disadvantage older people' and contrasted that practice with the 
stronger tenancy laws and stronger social housing in some European countries. 
According to Dr Petersen, under the tenancy laws in places such as Germany and 
Europe, someone who is over 70 cannot be evicted, because 'it puts them in hardship'. 
Also, as noted earlier, private renting in some European countries is part of a very 
different culture that accepts long-term tenures. As a consequence, renters in those 
countries feel secure in their housing. In Dr Petersen's view, if people were being 
pushed, in a policy way, to the private rental market, some safeguards should be there 
for older people, or people generally, in terms of the security of their tenure.32 
Access to services 
16.23 The committee has noted that people's economic and social wellbeing and 
their health are connected to good housing.33 Thus, affordable and secure housing 
brings health and wellbeing advantages for renters especially as they grow older. In 
her study, Dr  Baker, CHURP, found that people who have health vulnerabilities tend 
to be concentrated in unaffordable housing, but significantly people in unaffordable 
housing were likely to have health vulnerabilities. So, in her assessment there was 
interplay between health and unaffordable housing that worked in two directions. 
According to Dr Baker, the study showed that being in unaffordable housing had 'a 
measurable health effect within the population and especially within certain 
subgroups'. Further, the mental health effect was 'very different for renters and 
owners', suggesting that housing affordability was 'a different beast' for renters than it 
was for home owners.34 
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 18.  
32  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 15.  
33  Mr Yates, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 22. 
34  Dr Baker, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 14 and 17. 
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16.24 In this regard, the lives of a significant minority of older Australians are 
affected not only by limited access to affordable housing but also to the support 
services that would help them to remain housed in suitable accommodation. 
Ms Skinner noted that the provision of affordable housing must address a wide range 
of housing options and associated policy areas, including employment, health and 
aged care supports.35 Any consideration of affordable housing for Australia's older 
population must provide for these other aspects of social wellbeing. 
16.25 Mrs Ullman underscored the importance of having policies that would ensure 
integrated support and health services for older Australians. In her view, such a 
joined-up, holistic approach would assist housing security and ageing in place. It 
would help to improve access to affordable rental accommodation; prevent older 
Australians from experiencing homelessness for the first time; and take account of the 
diverse and complex nature of exclusion as experienced by older Australians.36 The 
National Foundation for Australian Women also referred to the Commonwealth's aged 
care policy with its emphasis on ageing in place. In its view, the Commonwealth's 
solution is inadequate 'when so many older people do not have any secure and/or 
suitable housing in which they can age'.37 Unaffordable and inappropriate housing 
means that older Australians are at increased risk of prematurely entering residential 
aged care, forgoing many of their freedoms and independence. 
Recommendation 26 
16.26 In light of the anticipated rise in the number of older Australians in the 
private rental market, and the insecure tenancy confronting many older renters, 
the committee recommends that the Australian Government look closely at its 
aged care policy so that it takes account of the particular difficulties confronting 
older Australians in the rental market. The aim would be to determine how 
policies designed to assist older Australians remain in their home could take 
better account of, and accommodate, the added difficulties for older people 
accessing safe and secure housing and in conducting modifications to rental 
dwellings, and more broadly in renting in the private rental market. 
Older Australians and social housing 
16.27 The 2009 pension review found that social housing, through the community 
sector and state housing authorities, provided security of tenure for those with an 
ongoing need as well as with rent setting policies that ensured affordability.38 
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 9. 
36  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
37  Submission 38, p. [5]. 
38  Dr Jeff Harmer, Pension Review Report, 27 February 2009, p. 52. 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/pensionreviewreport.pdf 
(accessed 14 January 2015).  
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16.28 More recently, the NHSC observed that a notable response to chronic 
insecurity in the rental market among the current generation of older Australians was a 
greater shift to social housing. In 2004, 48.3 per cent of renters over 64 years of age 
were in the social housing sector. The proportion of renters in social housing increased 
with age to 57.8 per cent of those over 84 years.39  
Advantages of social housing for older Australians 
16.29 In its submission, COTA noted that the supply of social housing was an 
essential part of the housing stock, which provided low income people and homeless 
people or people at risk of homelessness with a pathway to secure long term 
accommodation. COTA noted further that long-term tenure as well as the low rent 
made it 'particularly valuable to older people so they would not have to move around, 
could maintain links to a community and feel confident about accessing services if 
they need them'.40 
16.30 Dr Petersen informed the committee that social housing offered the solution to 
affordable housing for older Australians. She stated: 
In Australia, there are great examples of affordable, accessible housing that 
is very attractive, that offers security to older people, and older people tell 
us that they feel very secure there and they are very happy there.41 
16.31 Along similar lines, Dr Faulkner spelt out the advantages of public housing, 
which had proven 'a really valuable option for older people'. She told the committee 
that the stability and cost of public housing had been a wonderful option in South 
Australia for older people. Dr Faulkner also noted that, while making minor 
modifications designed to assist older people at home was a major issue in the private 
rental market, the operators of public housing would provide those modifications.42  
She added, however, that public housing was no longer guaranteed: that being old or 
over 65 was no longer a criterion for entering into public housing. In her words: 
So they are forced to essentially seek low-cost accommodation from some 
of the other aged care and housing providers in this state. We have had 
some comments from some of those providers that every day they are 
fielding inquiries from older people looking for low-cost rental, stable 
housing. At the moment they cannot fulfil those requests.43 
39  The National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, 
p. 58, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 6 March 2015).  
40  Submission 191, p. 4. 
41  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 14.  
42  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 18.  
43  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 12. 
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16.32 While Mr Yates, COTA, acknowledged that public housing in Australia had 
been a significant source of housing for lower income people in retirement, he noted 
that this had not been the case for some time. He maintained that although a lot of 
older people—pensioners—were still in public housing, the front door on this type of 
housing shut quite a while ago.44 
16.33 Indeed, the NHSC found that the lack of growth in the sector and the 
competing claims of other population groups meant that the social housing system 
alone was unlikely to be able to respond adequately to these demands from older 
renters. It concluded: 
Older people will continue to be a high proportion of tenants in the social 
housing system, but it is likely that a steadily increasing proportion of low-
income older households will be renting in the market sector.45  
16.34 According to the NHSC, the social housing sector was likely to face three 
major challenges with retirement of the baby boomers: 
• Overall volume—the larger population coupled with prevailing proportions of 
households outside home ownership means that, even as a residual housing 
option, social housing demand will climb. 
• Suitability of the social housing stock—even though more of the existing 
social housing stock is tenanted by older Australians, it is potentially not well 
suited to complex needs and limited independence of older Australians. More 
of the growth in specialised housing will need to come from the not-for-profit 
sector, including non-profit retirement homes or 'independent living units'.46  
• Cost of providing such housing—even as the onus shifts away from 
government housing provision, the need for high levels of subsidy will strain 
government finances and policy. The low incomes of older social housing 
44  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 22. 
45  The National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, 
p. 58, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
46  The National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, 
pp. 58–59. 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
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tenants, along with their complex needs, will mean that specialised, and 
therefore expensive, housing will be needed.47 
16.35 Importantly, NHSC thought it was worth noting that renters, and social 
housing renters, were 'more likely to end up in nursing homes'.48 This finding 
underscores the importance of having a national 'ageing in place' policy designed to 
assist older Australian's remain in their home, which would take better account of, and 
accommodate, the particular difficulties for older people renting in the private rental 
market. 
Alternate accommodation  
Transportable homes and caravan parks 
16.36 As the demand for public housing continues to outstrip supply, Mrs Ullman 
observed that increasingly people of all ages and backgrounds were looking to 
manufactured homes in caravan parks as an affordable, permanent, interim or crisis 
housing option. She was concerned, however, that these housing options faced 'major 
challenges as their ageing stock no longer met the expectations of many older 
people'.49 Members of National Seniors Australia also expressed disquiet about the 
lack of secure tenure, short-term rolling contracts and the focus of park operators on 
selling residential parks and villages to large-scale developers. According to 
Mrs Ullman, displaced residents have few other housing options available to them and 
owners can lose their home if they are unable to relocate to another park.50 
16.37 Mr Yates referred to the significant growth in transportable homes, albeit off a 
relatively low base. According to Mr Yates, the homes were generally cheaper and an 
improvement on the ones available. COTA did not have an issue with such houses 
except that the legislative environment for them was much patchier than retirement 
village legislation. Mr Yates suggested that the regulatory environment needed to be 
examined carefully to make sure there were good consumer protections in place. It 
47  The National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, 
pp. 58–59. 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
48  The National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, 
pp. 58–59. 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
49  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
50  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
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was also important, according to Mr Yates, to look at 'some of the risk management if 
things should go wrong with the company that is operating them'.51 
Older single women 
16.38 There is also a subgroup within the broader grouping of older Australia that 
confront a particular challenge in gaining access to affordable, safe and appropriate 
housing—single women, who often have inadequate incomes.52 Ms Dalley-Fisher, 
Equality Rights Alliance, argued that many factors combined to make older single 
women 'particularly vulnerable to housing insecurity, including years of unpaid 
caring, low superannuation, relationship breakdown and wage inequity'.53 
16.39 Ms Coleman, the National Foundation for Australian Women, drew attention 
to the fact that many older women were without any other capital asset and had 'a 
very, very high propensity to be entirely dependent on the age pension'.54 
Furthermore, the Foundation suggested that research also showed that the number of 
single, older women soon reaching retirement age without either economic or housing 
security was set to increase.55 
16.40 The committee has referred to the prevailing high rents in Australia and 
recognised that many people on low fixed incomes were under rental stress and 
further, as noted earlier, the pension assumed home ownership.  
Women on low incomes and affordable housing  
16.41 In certain circumstances, women on low incomes may find themselves having 
great difficulty finding affordable and appropriate housing. Ms Dalley-Fisher noted 
that women were over represented in key poverty indicators and tended to be at 'a 
significant financial disadvantage compared to men' and hence found it harder in the 
tight housing market.56 She produced the following statistics: 
Women make up 53 per cent of adults in low-income households, and there 
are more women than men in that category experiencing rental stress. 
Women make up 59 per cent of those accessing homelessness services. 
Contrary to common stereotypes, the face of housing stress and 
homelessness in Australia is female.57 
51  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 25. 
52  See for example, Mr Schrapel, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 33. 
53  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 19. 
54  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 55.  
55  Submission 38, p. [2].  
56  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 19. 
57  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 19.  
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16.42 Ms Findlater Smith, National Council of Women of Australia, observed that 
in cases of divorce or family breakdown, women were generally the ones who 
suffered most: 
Even if they get the house—which is probably mortgaged—they cannot 
afford the mortgage payments. If they get half the house after it has been 
sold, that usually goes to pay their rent.58  
16.43 The Council also drew attention to the lack of available and accessible 
housing for older single women. For example, it stated that 'accessing the private 
rental market was difficult in Canberra not only because of cost, but transport, home 
modifications and the willingness to see elderly women as legitimate tenants59 
According to the Council, however, the 'marketing' of elderly single people as tenants 
of choice was working with some real estate agents.60 It cited two particular concerns 
related to housing and older women: 
• 'the hidden and increasing problem of families pushing older females out of 
their circle (and their assets)'; and 
• the over-representation of women among the homeless or those living in 
marginal housing.61  
16.44 Sudden illness, the need to undergo lengthy treatment or a period of 
unemployment can also place a single low-income woman at risk of serious rental 
stress or even homelessness. But domestic violence is one of the main causes of 
homelessness for both men and women, but mainly for women and particularly for 
women with children.62 
Domestic violence 
16.45 Ms Lulu Milne, Women's Legal Service Queensland, informed the committee 
that domestic violence had been estimated to cost the Australian economy $13.6 
billion annually.63 Indeed, the Women's Legal Services NSW told the committee that 
domestic and family violence was the biggest single cause of homelessness among 
women and children.64  
58  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 53. 
59  Submission 98, p. 7. 
60  Submission 98, p. 7. 
61  See, for example, Older Women and Homelessness Seminar, prepared by DMA for National 
Council of Women of Australia ACT, p. 8, Submission 98, National Council of Women of 
Australia Ltd and The National Foundation for Australian Women, Submission 38, p. [1]. 
62  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 53.  
63  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
64  Submission 65, p. 2.  
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16.46 Women experiencing domestic violence were often reluctant to leave an 
abusive partner because of the lack of affordable housing, which was a major 
barrier.65 Delay in moving to a safer place puts women and children at risk of further 
violence.66 The Central Highlands Local Area Service Network also observed that: 
…the fear of not having somewhere suitable to live is one of the most 
common factors which lead women to make the decision to stay in an 
abusive relationship rather than report the abuse and seek safety for 
themselves and their children.67  
16.47 Similarly, Equality Rights Alliance noted that the lack of safe, affordable 
housing was a major barrier for women seeking refuge, which underlined the fact that 
women may remain in violent relationships because they have no alternative 
accommodation.68 
Social housing 
16.48 According to Ms Milne, the eligibility criteria for social housing was 
restrictive and many women were deemed ineligible for such housing, despite 
experiencing high-risk domestic violence and being unable to afford private rental 
accommodation. For example, having an income is an eligibility criterion for social 
housing with the Department in Queensland.69 The Women's Legal Service 
Queensland also noted that women on temporary visas and some New Zealand 
citizens experiencing domestic violence do not qualify for social housing as they are 
not permanent residents or Australian citizens.70 It suggested that social housing and 
affordable housing providers could relax their eligibility criteria for women and 
children escaping domestic violence, which may include women applying for 
permanent residency under the Migration Regulations and women who were legal 
homeowners. 
16.49 Ms Milne observed that even when women meet the eligibility criteria for 
emergency housing, waiting times were unacceptable due to the lack of available 
housing stock.71 Indeed, in its submission, the Equality Rights Alliance referred to 
anecdotal reports it had received that women were giving up on public housing as an 
option because of the long waiting lists.72 
65  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
66  See, for example, Women's Legal Services NSW, Submission 65, p. 3.  
67  Submission 55, p. 3. 
68  Ms Dalley-Fisher, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 19. 
69  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 20. 
70  Submission 59, p. 2.  
71  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
72  Submission 95, p. 10. 
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Emergency accommodation 
16.50 The Women's Legal Service Queensland referred to the 'chronic underfunding 
for refuges and an ever increasing demand for medium to long term housing'. It stated 
that women and children were in refuges for extended periods while waiting for social 
housing.73 Thus, access to emergency accommodation or a refuge tended to be 'crisis 
driven and restricted to women presenting in high-risk situations'.74 Ms Milne 
explained: 
Once in refuge, women face long wait times to access more permanent 
housing, as exit options are limited. This creates a bottleneck, as women are 
waiting longer in refuge.75 
16.51 Furthermore, Ms Milne also observed that women were required to pay rent 
and board but, when a woman does not have an income, that can be a barrier to her 
accessing a refuge.76  
Motel accommodation 
16.52 Ms Milne told the committee that DVConnect, which is Queensland's state-
wide crisis service, was 'routinely having to place women and children in motel 
accommodation because of a lack of available or appropriate refuge places'. 
According to Ms Milne, last year, DVConnect placed 2,300 women and 3,700 
children in motels.77 Ms Rachel Neil, also from the Women's Legal Service 
Queensland, stated:  
Putting women in motels is really inadequate. It takes them away from their 
support structures and their communities. It takes children from their 
schools. Often women are staying because they do not want to go into a 
motel. It is scary. There are all sorts of decisions that a woman goes through 
when she decides to leave, but that in our experience is a really big one. 
Where do I go?78 
16.53 Women stay in motel accommodation until they are able to take up the next 
space in a refuge, which could result in a couple of moves for the woman. This heavy 
demand on refuges means that the queue of women waiting for a safe place to live is 
long and a women seeking emergency relief might not get the next vacancy in a 
refuge because the woman in the motel takes that place.79 
73  Submission 59, p. 2. 
74  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
75  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
76  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 20. 
77  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
78  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 19.  
79  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 22–23. 
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16.54 Essentially, the Women's Legal Services NSW attributed the inadequacy of 
housing options for victims/survivors of domestic and/or family violence to 'systemic 
failures across emergency, temporary and long-term housing options across public, 
social and private housing systems'.80 
Solutions 
16.55 The Women's Legal Service Queensland called on governments to increase 
funding for the supply of a range of affordable housing options, including social 
housing and subsidised rental schemes. It also saw significant potential in investing in 
effective programs to prevent homelessness caused by domestic violence.81 It referred 
to the Private Rental Assistance Program (PRAP) operating in areas of Victoria, 
which, in its view, offered a successful model. It stated: 
This has been demonstrated to be effective in assisting eligible women to 
access sustainable long term private rental, which has the broader benefit of 
reducing the pressure on refuges and the demand for social housing.82 
16.56 Ms Milne suggested that other states also provided rental subsidy programs 
offering medium-term financial assistance to remain in or to acquire private rental. 
This allowed women to plan for sustainable housing and bypass the crisis housing 
services.83 For example, the Women's Legal Service Queensland also referred to the 
Start Safely Program in New South Wales, which provided medium-term rental 
subsidy for women in the private market.84  
16.57 According to Women's Legal Services NSW, the Start Safely Program has 
allowed some of its clients to access the private rental market while they are re-
establishing themselves. But it acknowledged that the Start Safely rental subsidy may 
not be an appropriate solution for all women escaping domestic violence. Under the 
program, women are only supported for a period of up to 24 months. Thus, while 
supporting the program, Women's Legal Services NSW noted that it was common for 
its clients to experience long-term psychological, social and economic difficulties 
because of domestic and/or family violence, which could significantly limit their 
capacity to work. Importantly, it suggested that in some cases public housing 
accommodation was 'a much more appropriate housing solution'.85 The Women's 
Legal Service Queensland also advocated the introduction in Queensland of a scheme 
similar to the New South Wales' 'Staying Home Leaving Violence' program, which 
80  Submission 65, p. 5.  
81  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
82  Submission 59, p. 3. 
83  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17. 
84  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 18.  
85  Submission 65, p. 6.  
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allowed women to remain safely in their home and to avoid the disruption of 
homelessness.86 
16.58 The committee fully supports state-based programs designed to assist women 
seeking affordable and safe accommodation removed from the risk of domestic 
violence. The current shortage of emergency shelter and longer term affordable 
housing, however, should be of concern to the Australian Government. The pressing 
need for such accommodation reinforces the committee's recommendation for the 
Australian Government together with the states and territories to commit to an 
increase in public housing and an overall increase in social housing.  
Disability 
16.59 People with disability often face the same difficulties as older Australians in 
finding affordable and suitable accommodation—paying high rents from a low fixed 
income, difficulty finding a suitable property, having a house modified to meet their 
particular requirements and securing stable tenancy. For example, Side by Side 
Advocacy noted that people with disability who are dependent on their disability 
pension and other Centrelink benefits have difficulty coping with periodic increases in 
rent. It also indicated that rental properties were often physically inappropriate and: 
…most landlords will not agree to modification even at no cost to them and 
would most likely just choose an applicant who is able and willing to move 
into the property without the need for modification.87 
16.60 Likewise, the Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre referred to the difficulty 
people have in finding accessible rental properties in the private market as most 
landlords were reluctant to spend money to make their properties accessible. Indeed, 
discrimination was one area where people with disability may experience a particular 
obstacle to gaining access to the private rental market. Ms Iscel, Ethnic Disability 
Advocacy Centre, stated that it was very difficult for a person with a disability in the 
private rental market because once an estate agent or landlord see the person has a 
disability they think 'lack of income, do they work'.88 A person with a disability may 
also experience difficulty inspecting rental properties and moving from one advertised 
vacancy to another in time for inspection.89  
16.61 Giving evidence in Western Australia, the Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre 
noted further that tenancy agreements of people with disability living in Department 
of Health (DOH) accommodations were often terminated if the person started to earn 
about $500 per week. It gave the example of one of their clients, who currently lived 
86  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 17.  
87  Submission 57, p. 4.  
88  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 36. 
89  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, pp. 36 and 37. 
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in wheelchair accessible accommodation provided by the DOH. The Centre explained 
further: 
He currently works two days a week. Although he is experiencing financial 
difficulty and is able to work more than two days a week, he can't because 
he will lose his accessible house when he earns more than the DOH 
threshold.90 
16.62 It suggested that people with disability should be allowed to continue to live 
in their DOH-provided home with the rent based on their income.91  
Role of social housing  
16.63 Many people with disability also require support services to assist them. In its 
submission, the WA Association for Mental Health suggested improving the 
flexibility and personalisation of landlord services by transferring a higher proportion 
of low income housing to the administration of community providers and expanding 
the opportunity for community-managed low-cost housing initiatives. It cited as 
examples, the Victorian Common Equity Rental Cooperatives (CERCs) and Rental 
Housing Cooperatives (RHCs) programs.92 In this regard, AHURI recognised that 
housing assistance: 
…provides stability for those who may otherwise have no sense of control 
over their lives; improves resilience and independence especially in relation 
to health, family relationships and monetary concerns; reduces exposure to 
very-high housing costs and the risk of eviction; and makes it more likely 
they will gain and retain paid employment.93 
16.64 AHURI suggested that governments could improve social inclusion for 
persons with a disability by providing more social housing that accommodates the 
needs of this vulnerable group and avoiding having concentrations of such groups in 
particular clusters.94 Side by Side Advocacy also contended that social housing was 
the only viable and sustainable option for people with disability who were dependent 
on their disability pension and other Centrelink benefits.95  
National Disability Strategy 
16.65 The National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, which sets out six priority areas 
for action, includes housing under the objectives of inclusive and accessible 
communities and under Economic security. It was endorsed by COAG on 
90  Submission 102, p. [2]. 
91  Submission 102, p. [3]. 
92  Submission 143, p. [4]. 
93  Submission 93, p. 32. 
94  Submission 93, p. 32. 
95  Submission 57, p. 6. 
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13 February 2011.96 The Strategy also recognises the importance of having anti-
discrimination measures, complaints mechanisms and advocacy, which would have an 
important role in ensuring that people with disability are treated fairly in the rental 
market.  
16.66 The committee recognises the challenges facing people with disability in 
accessing affordable and appropriate housing and strongly supports the National 
Disability Strategy 2010–2020 which recognises the central importance of housing for 
persons with disability. 
Refugees and migrants 
16.67 In its submission, Shelter SA expressed concerns about the need for culturally 
appropriate housing for new arrivals to Australia and recognised the unique 
requirements of a range of culturally and linguistically diverse communities.97 
Professor Dodson noted that many cultural groups have different forms of family 
structures. For example, new migrants 'often have larger families than perhaps more 
established groups within the Australian community'. In his assessment: 
That creates a potential mismatch in social housing stock, and we see a 
number of problems in our social housing supply of two- or three-bedroom 
houses or apartments which cannot accommodate, say, a five-, six- or 
seven-person household. In our new rental supply or housing supply in 
general we do not see larger dwellings with multiple bedrooms in many 
parts of the spatial housing market being supplied. It is very hard to, for 
example, buy a four-bedroom house or apartment within the inner city or 
even in some of the middle suburbs of Melbourne.98 
16.68 Moreover, the problems confronting migrants and refugees when seeking 
access to affordable and appropriate housing are compounded where disability is 
involved. In its submission, the Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre observed that due 
to low income, people from migrant and refugee backgrounds with disability were 
'usually being housed in the fringes of the metropolitan areas' where there was 'very 
little access to public transport, employment, health services, and disability support 
services'.99 
16.69 According to the Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre, people with migrant or 
refugee backgrounds with disability on low incomes in the private rental market, 'are 
forced to live in sub-standard inaccessible houses'. Also, when looking for a property 
to rent, they may face 'racial and disability discrimination from real estate agencies 
96  Department of Social Services, 'Disability and Carers: National Disability Strategy', 
https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/disability-and-carers/program-
services/government-international/national-disability-strategy (accessed 19 March 2015).  
97  Submission 117, p. 2. 
98  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 18.  
99  Submission 102, p. [1]. 
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and landlords'.100 Indeed, the Equal Opportunity Commission of Western Australia 
found that there was 'substantial evidence of racial discrimination in the private 
housing rental market' against Aboriginal and culturally and linguistically diverse 
people.101 
16.70 As with all the groups requiring particular housing needs considered by the 
committee, secure housing has a central role in ensuring that people have 
opportunities to obtain and maintain stable employment, to pursue education and to 
enjoy better health. Professor Fiona Haslam McKenzie concluded: 
Where you have inadequate housing or inappropriate housing you often 
have escalated domestic violence, overcrowding, and inappropriate living 
arrangements for young people and old people, or sometimes Aboriginal 
people where they deem it is culturally inappropriate.102 
16.71 The complex requirements of disadvantaged people or people with disability 
underscores the need to look at affordable housing more broadly and to take account 
of the support services required to help people find a house, maintain their tenancy 
and prevent them from falling into homelessness.  
Essential service workers and long term residents of regions undergoing 
rapid development 
16.72 Although not in the same category as pensioners who are renting, women and 
children experiencing domestic violence or people with disability, there are other 
groups that have significant difficulties accessing affordable rental properties due to 
very high rents. For example, according to the National Union of Students, there is a 
crisis in student housing affordability, with students entering a housing market 
characterised by high rental costs and thus forced to live in acute housing stress.103 
Professor Earl drew particular attention to the housing problems facing students who 
move interstate to attend university.104 
16.73 Also, sometimes external developments can place individuals at particular risk 
of rental stress. For example, the 2009 Henry Review noted: 
In a limited number of areas—such as in mining towns facing supply 
constraints in the provision of rental housing—market rents may reach a 
level where even the enhanced Rent Assistance program envisaged by the 
100  Submission 102, p. [1]. 
101  Equal Opportunity Commission, Report of outcomes of the Recommendations of 
Accommodating everyone, March 2011, p. 8, http://www.eoc.wa.gov.au/publications/reviews-
and-reports (accessed 6 March 2015). 
102  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 39. 
103  Submission 82, p. 3. 
104  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 57. 
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Review will not provide assistance that makes social housing affordable by 
low income households.105 
16.74 In this same context, Mr Pisarski cited circumstances that arose in mining 
communities throughout Queensland and Western Australia during the mining booms. 
In many cases, miners and construction workers earning very high wages could afford 
to live in those communities causing rents to skyrocket. Essential workers such as 
butchers, childcare workers and librarians and 'all the people who make up the real 
fabric of the community could not afford to live in those communities anymore, let 
alone a pensioner'.106 Mr Pisarski referred to the detrimental effect that mining booms 
can have on a local community where long-time residents find themselves priced out 
of the market. He noted: 
Take a pensioner, for example, who may have grown up in Moranbah and 
might not have ever thought they needed to buy a house because in their 
lifetime housing had never been that expensive and the rental market was 
quite affordable.107  
16.75 According to Mr Pisarski, Moranbah's housing prices went up something like 
1,500 per cent over a number of years and suddenly older renters had to leave the 
town they had lived in all their lives. He observed: 
You destroy the fabric of the community and you destroy the very things 
that make that town productive and worthwhile to live in…108  
16.76 Mr Pisarski noted further that you cannot find a butcher, do not have child 
care, cannot get a book out of the library or get your car fixed when it breaks down 
because people with such occupations were 'just priced out of those markets'.109 
16.77 Shelter WA, Anglicare WA, and Community Employers WA referred to a 
number of employer members in the community services sector that have 'expressed 
their long held concern about the high cost and shortage of housing for their 
employees, particularly in regional areas of Western Australia'. They noted that 
government workers were often provided with significant housing subsidies in 
regional areas of WA, which further reduced the availability of rental properties. In 
105  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2, p. 615, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
106  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 34. See also, Western Australian Local 
Government Association, Submission 37, p. 14.  
107  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2015, p. 34. 
108  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2015, p. 34. 
109  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 34.  
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some cases, many essential services workers were forced to live in backpackers' 
shelters or caravan parks.110 
16.78 Mr John Bouffler, Community Employers WA, noted that finding 
accommodation for staff was particularly challenging for his organisation, notably in 
regional areas. He explained: 
In the Pilbara and in the Goldfields, it is very hard to attract and retain staff. 
Government provides funding for government staff. It is very hard to pay 
the costs involved in renting accommodation and in retaining staff, as I 
said, in those areas. I think the government has a role to play in helping us 
to do that, because, if you do not have NGOs in those areas, then you are 
not going to be able to provide the support in those areas. It is not so bad in 
the Great Southern and it is not so bad in Esperance, but it is particularly 
[bad] in the Pilbara, the Kimberley and the Goldfields regions.111 
16.79 As an example, he cited the case where one of its members employed 46 staff 
in the Goldfields region, but only three had been able to purchase their own homes in 
the last five years. He wanted to emphasise the difficulty attracting staff because: 
…if we do not have people to provide the services out there then you are 
really going to struggle to support the people who are ultimately in need.112   
16.80 The Pilbara also raised similar difficulties. Mr Bouffler informed the 
committee that one service provider had to invest over $4 million for construction of 
some housing in the Pilbara. To his mind, that was money 'they could otherwise have 
used to actually employ people to provide services on the ground'—they were 
'spending the money on capital investment rather than in the actual provision of 
services'.113 
16.81 This problem is not confined to towns and regions experiencing a mining 
boom. The high rents commanded in particular regions or locations in Australia mean 
that essential workers struggle to find affordable and suitable accommodation. For 
example, Mr Pritchard, Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast, informed the 
committee that the shortage of affordable and suitable housing close to the medical 
and education precincts on the Gold Coast would create difficulties in attracting and 
retaining young professionals—nurses, teachers and doctors. Further, while there was 
more affordable housing quite a way out from the CBD, there was a high dependency 
on car ownership. He noted: 
Quite often there is insufficient or non-existent public transport servicing 
those areas in newly built housing estates, so that requires a heavy 
110  Submission 46, p. [2]. See also Submission 174 and Submission 161. 
111  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 13.  
112  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 13.  
113  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 13.  
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dependency on two cars to get around just for simple visits to schools, 
doctors and shops.114 
16.82 In its submission, Shelter WA maintained that local governments can support 
affordable housing through the provision of land for potential affordable housing 
(re)developments. The Penny Lane Key Worker housing in inner city Perth, which has 
been developed in collaboration between the City of Perth and the community housing 
sector provides an example of a project that is meeting the need for essential 
workers.115 Indeed, other submitters cited the Penny Lane Key Worker housing as a 
good model. For example, both the City of Perth and Western Australian Local 
Government Association commended the project.116  
Conclusion 
16.83 While pensioners and people dependent on welfare or disability payments are 
priced out of the private rental market, they also face fierce competition for social 
housing. Indeed, to avoid severe levels of rental stress and, in some cases, 
homelessness, social housing provides a much needed safety net. An adequate supply 
of social housing would mean that older Australians were better able to age in place 
and not have to forgo daily essentials simply to pay their rent and people with 
disability not left to fend for themselves in substandard dwellings that make no 
allowance for their particular needs. Also, an adequate supply of social housing would 
mean women escaping domestic violence would not be forced to stay in motels or, 
worse still, remain in abusive relationships.  
16.84 While social housing is better able to meet the needs of disadvantaged groups 
as it offers lower rents, more secure and stable tenure and appropriately modified 
housing, supply is limited and waiting lists far too long.  
16.85 The committee heard that the heavy demand for social housing means that 
people have to demonstrate that they are in greater need than others on the waiting list, 
while those already housed in community housing have to demonstrate their 
continuing disadvantage to remain eligible. Rather than encourage people to improve 
their circumstances, for example through gaining employment or working extra hours, 
the shortage of affordable housing and the need to demonstrate disadvantage has the 
opposite effect.  
16.86 Finally, community housing providers do not stop at providing an affordable 
home, often they have established and strong links with providers across a range of 
social services, if not providing such services themselves. Quite often, those making 
hard budget decisions do not take account of the savings to their budgets by ensuring 
that vulnerable people have access to secure, appropriate and affordable homes, 
114  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 25.  
115  Submission 174, p. 8. 
116  Submission 43, pp. 2–3 and Submission 37, p. 14. 
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thereby becoming more productive members of the community and easing the demand 
on health, police and other social services.  
16.87 The committee has highlighted the inadequate supply of social housing, which 
affects people with specific needs most keenly. In this regard, the committee has 
already recommended that the Australian Government continue to fund public housing 
and to lift the number of public houses as a percentage of Australia's housing stock. 
The committee has also recommended that the Australian Government commit to 
achieving a higher proportion of overall social housing as a percentage of Australia's 
housing stock. This additional investment in social housing should go some way to 
ensuring that people with special needs are housed in affordable and appropriate 
houses. The committee, however, notes in particular the shortage of emergency 
housing, particularly for women and children escaping domestic violence, who may 
be housed in motels. This situation is intolerable. 
Recommendation 27 
16.88 The committee recommends that the Australian Government together 
with the states and territories commit to ensuring that adequate funding be made 
available so that women and children escaping domestic violence are housed in 
secure and appropriate housing with the necessary support network that would 
allow them to remain in a safe environment. This approach would mean that 
women and their children would experience as little social and educational 
disruption as possible and that the pathway to more permanent housing would 
be easier. A priority would be to consider the introduction of programs 
throughout Australia such as New South Wales' Staying Home Leaving Violence 
initiative, which is designed to protect women who want to live separately from a 
violent husband or partner, but remain in their home. 
16.89 The committee also recommends the Australian Government reverse the 
cuts to the capital program in NPAH and apply needs-based supply and services 
program as part of the national affordable housing platform in recommendation 
30 (the cuts are discussed in chapter 18). 
16.90 The committee has recommended that the Australian Government take a 
leadership role through COAG to encourage and support the states and territories to 
establish best practice tenancy requirements that would include minimum standards of 
safety and habitability, reasonable rent increases and fair and just eviction laws. In 
addition to this recommendation, the committee makes the following 
recommendation. 
Recommendation 28 
16.91 The committee recommends that, in its consideration of current tenancy 
law, the proposed ministerial council also place a high priority on the obligations 
and responsibility of landlords when it comes to house modifications for those 
with particular housing needs. The committee recommends that the council look 
at measures, such as tax incentives, to encourage landlords to improve the energy 
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efficiency of their properties and to make required modifications for tenants with 
disability.  
16.92 There are other groups that warrant mention as being particularly 
disadvantaged in gaining access to affordable and suitable accommodation—
Indigenous Australians and young Australians not living at home. The following 
chapter considers Indigenous housing and the chapter on homelessness includes a 
section on young Australians living in marginal housing. 
 

  
Chapter 17 
Indigenous Australians 
17.1 Compared to other Australians, Indigenous people have relatively low 
incomes, higher rates of unemployment and lower levels of financial literacy and, as a 
consequence, the housing options available to them are more limited than for many 
other Australians.1  In this chapter, the committee considers the housing choices that 
Indigenous Australians who cannot afford home ownership must make. 
Indigenous households 
17.2 The 2015 Prime Minister's report, Closing the Gap, found that 'the 
disadvantage suffered by Indigenous Australians was unacceptable'.2 As an example 
of the areas of demonstrated disadvantage, the report noted: 
• the gap in life expectancy between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians was 10.6 years for males and 9.5 years for females;3 
• Indigenous students were estimated to be behind non-Indigenous students by 
the equivalent of about two-and-half-years of schooling in the tested area of 
literacy—'without adequate literacy and numeracy skills, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander children and young people will find it harder to take 
advantage of opportunities that present themselves later in life';4 
• the proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples aged 15–64 
years who were employed fell from 53.8 per cent in 2008 to 47.5 per cent in 
2012–13;5 and 
1  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance for Indigenous Australians, 
2014, p. 1, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548051 
(5 January 2015). 
2  Closing the Gap, Prime Minister’s Report 2015, Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p. 20,  
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Closing_the_Gap_2015_Report_0.pdf 
(accessed 2 Mach 2015). 
3  Closing the Gap, Prime Minister’s Report 2015, Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p. 7,  
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Closing_the_Gap_2015_Report_0.pdf 
(accessed 2 Mach 2015). 
4  Closing the Gap, Prime Minister’s Report 2015, Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p. 22,  
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Closing_the_Gap_2015_Report_0.pdf 
(accessed 2 Mach 2015). 
5  Closing the Gap, Prime Minister’s Report 2015, Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p. 18,  
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Closing_the_Gap_2015_Report_0.pdf 
(accessed 2 Mach 2015). 
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• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were more likely to experience 
violence, child abuse and neglect—evidence showed that key drivers of 
violence were 'alcohol and drugs, inadequate education and unemployment'.6  
17.3 The 2009 Henry Review noted that, in the context of Australia's housing 
supply difficulties, social housing provided a valuable stock of houses and, in some 
areas such as remote Indigenous communities, was the only viable source of housing.7 
Indeed, statistics produced by the AIHW show that in 2013, Indigenous households 
were six times as likely as other Australian households to live in social housing (rates 
of 31 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively).8 At 30 June 2013, almost 63,000 
Indigenous households were assisted through the provision of social housing.9 Of 
indigenous Australians in social housing: 
• public housing was the largest provider of social housing to Indigenous 
households, with about 30,800 Indigenous households living in such housing 
at 30 June 2013—a rate of 14 per cent of Indigenous households; and 
• Indigenous community housing was the second largest provider—8 per cent 
of Indigenous households lived in such housing at 30 June 2013.10 
17.4 In June 2013, 9,820 households lived in state owned and managed Indigenous 
housing (SOMIH), which is administered by state and territory governments. SOMIH 
is targeted specifically at low- to moderate-income households with at least one 
Indigenous member and includes dwellings managed by government Indigenous 
housing agencies for allocation to Indigenous tenants. Indigenous households in 
SOMIH are not considered special needs households, as SOMIH is an Indigenous-
targeted program. For SOMIH, special needs households are those that have either a 
6  Closing the Gap, Prime Minister’s Report 2015, Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p. 27,  
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Closing_the_Gap_2015_Report_0.pdf 
(accessed 2 Mach 2015). 
7  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2 p. 604, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
8  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance for Indigenous Australians, 
2014, p. vi, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548051 
(5 January 2015). 
9  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 36, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
10  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance for Indigenous Australians, 
2014, p. vi, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548051 
(5 January 2015). 
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household member with disability or a principal tenant aged 24 or under, or 50 or 
over.11 In 2012–13, states and territories spent $113.3 million on SOMIH.12 
Trends of indigenous Australians in social housing 
17.5 As noted in previous chapters, the provision of housing assistance has shifted 
over time to be targeted to highly vulnerable groups, which, according to the AIHW, 
include households where there was an Indigenous member.13 
17.6 The number of Indigenous households living in public housing increased by 
23 per cent between 2009 and 2013 (from 25,115 to 30,774 households respectively). 
This rise was in contrast to a fall of 4 per cent in the number of other households 
living in public housing over the same period. The AIHW noted that 'some of the 
observed increase for Indigenous households may be due to an improvement in 
Indigenous identification in the public housing data collection (with missing data 
about Indigenous status dropping from 17 per cent in 2009 to 14 per cent in 2013)'.14 
17.7 This increase in tenancy was also evident in community housing where the 
number of Indigenous households living in housing provided by the mainstream 
community sector rose between 2009 and 2013, from 2,680 to 4,640 households—
a 73 per cent increase. For other households, the rise was also 73 per cent.15 The 
AIHW indicated that: 
The growth over time in the contribution of the mainstream community 
housing sector reflects changes in government policy that have encouraged 
this sector to play a larger role in the provision of social housing.16 
11  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 52, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
12  Reform of Federation White Paper, Roles and Responsibilities in Housing and Homelessness, 
Issues Paper, 2 December 2014, p. 15, https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/issues-
paper/Housing_and_Homelessness_Issues_Paper.pdf (accessed 6 March 2015).  
13  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 51, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
14  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance for Indigenous Australians, 
2014, p. 10, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548051 
(5 January 2015). 
15  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance for Indigenous Australians, 
2014, p. 10, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548051 
(5 January 2015). 
16  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance for Indigenous Australians, 
2014, p. 10, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548051 
(5 January 2015). 
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17.8 In contrast, the number of Indigenous households living in SOMIH fell by 
15 per cent between 2009 and 2013, from 11,582 to 9,820 households. The AIHW 
stated that: 
At least part of the reason for this change was a transfer of dwellings 
between programs. In the past, all Australian states (but not territories) had 
a SOMIH program but Victoria and Western Australia have not had such a 
program since around 2010 when SOMIH dwellings were transferred to 
other social housing programs.17 
17.9 Allowing for incomplete data on Indigenous housing, there can be no doubt 
that the number of Indigenous households relying on social housing is very high. 
Indigenous housing in remote regions 
17.10 Aboriginal people living in remote regions of Australia experience additional 
expenses not encountered in urban areas. The Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly drew 
attention not only to the limited housing options but the high prices of groceries and 
proximity to shops as adding to living costs in remote areas. It stated: 
If the nearest affordable grocery shop is 200–300 kms away the cost of fuel 
to get there and back (also higher than in urban areas) means the money left 
over is much more limited.18 
17.11 The Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly also noted the escalating cost of energy 
in remote communities, which was increasing to a level that was 'almost unaffordable 
for people'. It stated: 
Solar panels or alternative energy needs to be considered as a matter of 
urgency as it is also an employment generating possibility.19 
17.12 The Henry Review noted that housing assistance should reflect the difficulty 
Indigenous Australians may face in accessing mainstream housing markets. In 
addition, the particular housing needs of Indigenous Australians in remote areas 
should be addressed through specific measures, such as the provision of capital for 
house building.20 According to the review, there was a particular need for the 
provision of capital funding in some circumstances, such as Indigenous Australians in 
remote areas. The review formed the view that to ensure that housing assistance was 
17  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance for Indigenous Australians, 
2014, p. 10, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548051 
(5 January 2015). 
18  Submission 127, p. [1].  
19  Submission 127, p. [1] 
20  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2 p. 596, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
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effective, the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government in its 
provision should be made clear.21  
17.13 The review recognised that public housing was a significant mechanism for 
providing housing to disadvantaged groups. In other words, public housing had 
become the primary source of housing for people who could not access appropriate or 
adequate housing in the private market such as people with a mental illness and 
Indigenous Australians who too often faced discrimination in the housing market.22 
According to the review, rent assistance reforms and the high-need housing payment 
would not replace the need for governments to provide capital funding for social 
housing. In the review's assessment, the need for capital funding was particularly 
strong for Indigenous housing in remote areas, where the Australian Government had 
already assumed responsibility for the provision of such funding. The review argued 
that as 'the social housing sector will need to continue to provide a significant part of 
the stock of housing in Australia, capital funding can also enable a more immediate 
increase in supply when the housing market is constrained'.23 
National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing 
17.14 One of the principal aims of the National Affordable Housing Agreement 
(NAHA) is to ensure that Indigenous Australians have the same housing opportunities 
as all Australians. The National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous 
Housing (NPARIH) is a subsidiary agreement to NAHA designed to help address 
significant overcrowding, homelessness, poor housing and severe housing shortages 
for Indigenous communities.24  
17.15 Commencing in 2008, the $5.5 billion investment over 10 years included 
property and tenancy management arrangements to bring remote housing in line with 
mainstream public housing standards, including reformed rents and tenancy support 
programs. Secure land tenure was a pre-condition of investment to secure government 
21  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2 p. 597, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
22  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2 p. 604, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
23  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2, p. 616, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
24  Submission 198, p. 33. 
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and commercial investment, and to promote economic development opportunities and 
home ownership possibilities.25  
17.16 According to the Department of Social Services, since 2008, the program had 
delivered affordable accommodation in over 300 remote Indigenous communities in 
the Northern Territory, Western Australia, Queensland, South Australia, New South 
Wales, Tasmania and Victoria.26 As at 31 January 2014, 2,316 new houses had been 
delivered against the 2018 target of 4,200, and the refurbishment target of 4,876 by 
2014 was exceeded early with 6,339 refurbishments and rebuilds delivered.27 
17.17 The department also noted the Employment Related Accommodation (ERA) 
programme, which was designed to break the cycle of welfare dependency that often 
occurred in remote Indigenous communities. The program was geared to do so by 
providing affordable accommodation in regional and urban areas to support people 
from remote communities to access training, education, and employment. As at 
31 January 2014, ERA has delivered a total of 112 facilities across Australia.28  
17.18 Notwithstanding the efforts to improve the standard of housing for Indigenous 
Australians, significant problems remain. Ms Findlater Smith, National Council of 
Women of Australia, indicated that there was a shortage of appropriate and affordable 
housing for Indigenous Australians. She suggested that one only had 'to look at the 
money supposedly spent in the Northern Territory on Aboriginal housing, which we 
know has fallen far short of any target'. She maintained that very few houses had been 
built despite great aspirations about fixing the problem of 10 years ago. She argued 
that: 'They were going to build 750 houses in the Northern Territory. I doubt they 
have built more than 75. Where has the money gone?' 29 
17.19 It should be noted that while much work remains to be done to improve access 
to affordable and appropriate housing for Indigenous Australians, some progress has 
been made. For example, in May 2013, the then Minister for Families, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs drew attention to the fact that the Australian 
Government had funded the rebuilding or refurbishment of more than 5,300 homes in 
remote Indigenous communities, nearly two years ahead of schedule. Furthermore, 
that the government was on track to meet its target of delivering 4,200 new homes by 
2018 with more than 1,600 houses already constructed.30 Indeed, as noted above, at 
25  Submission 198, p. 33. 
26  Submission 198, p. 33. 
27  Submission 198, p. 32. 
28  Submission 198, p. 33. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57. 
30  Statement by the Honourable Jenny Macklin MP, Minister for Families, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs, 'Continued Investment to Close the Gap', Indigenous Budget Statement 
2013–14, 14 May 2013, p. 2, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2013/indigenous_budget_statement_2
013-14_0.pdf (accessed 20 April 2015). 
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the end of January 2014, 2,316 new houses had been built and the refurbishment target 
exceeded.  
17.20 Even so, the issues paper on housing and homelessness produced as part of 
the Federation White Paper process found: 
Despite significant government investment over the past 40 years in both 
mainstream and Indigenous-specific housing and homelessness 
programmes, many Indigenous Australians continue to experience difficulty 
securing appropriate and affordable housing.31 
17.21 As noted earlier, the high proportion of Indigenous Australians living in social 
housing highlights the importance of governments at all levels ensuring that firstly 
their investment in housing for Indigenous people is adequate and secondly that it is 
effective in increasing the supply of housing appropriate for Indigenous households. 
Overcrowding 
17.22 The department informed the committee that despite the overall investment 
under the NPARIH, overcrowding remained a significant issue in many Indigenous 
communities throughout Australia. Data from the 2011 Census showed some 
reduction in the proportion of Indigenous households experiencing both overcrowding 
and severe overcrowding (a component of homelessness) in remote Australia. 
Jurisdictions also reported a reduction in severe overcrowding in communities where 
there had been capital works investment under the NPARIH.32 The Census indicated 
that the Northern Territory had the highest incidence of overcrowding (37.5 per cent 
in 2011), with these rates as high as 60.4 per cent in very remote parts of the Northern 
Territory.33  
17.23 Between 2011–12 and 2012–13, the proportion of Indigenous people living in 
overcrowded households declined in remote areas in public rental housing 
(from 14 per cent to 13 per cent) and very remote areas (16 per cent to 13 per cent) but 
overcrowding increased in major cities (from 10 per cent to 11 per cent) and inner 
regional areas (from 8 per cent to 9 per cent). Over the same period, the proportion of 
Indigenous people living in overcrowded households increased in all areas in 
SOMIH.34 
31  Reform of Federation White Paper, Roles and Responsibilities in Housing and Homelessness, 
Issues Paper, 2 December 2014, p. 26, https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/issues-
paper/Housing_and_Homelessness_Issues_Paper.pdf (accessed 6 March 2015). 
32  Submission 198, pp. 31–32. 
33  Submission 198, pp. 32–33. 
34  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 45, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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17.24 Clearly, the persistence and obstinate problem of overcrowding requires a 
concerted effort by all levels of government to reduce the high rates. Statistics 
produced by AIHW indicate that Indigenous households were more likely to 
experience overcrowding, with 11 per cent of SOMIH households classified as 
overcrowded, as were 11 per cent of Indigenous households in public rental housing, 
and 4 per cent of Indigenous households in mainstream community housing.35 Among 
those living in social housing, Indigenous households were twice as likely to be 
overcrowded compared with all households (11 per cent and 5 per cent respectively).36 
The Institute highlighted the extent of overcrowding in remote and very remote areas: 
In 2012–13, overcrowded households in public rental housing were more 
likely to be in Remote and Very remote areas. Among public rental housing 
tenants, about 1 in 8 Indigenous households (both 13%) living in such 
housing in Remote and Very remote areas were living in overcrowded 
households, as were 11% in both Major cities and Outer regional areas and 
9% in Inner regional areas. In comparison, SOMIH households in more 
remote areas were more likely to be overcrowded than those in regional 
areas, with the proportion ranging from 9% in Major cities to 17% in Very 
remote areas.37 
17.25 The Productivity Commission's 2015 report on government services similarly 
observed that overcrowding remained a significant issue for many Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people.38 Likewise, the issues paper on housing and 
homelessness drew attention to overcrowding as 'the largest contributor to high rates 
of homelessness among indigenous Australians'. It noted that Indigenous people living 
in severely overcrowded accommodation in very remote areas of the Northern 
Territory represent 11.2 per cent of all homeless Australians.39 
35  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 44, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
36  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 75, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
37  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 45, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
38  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services, 2015, Produced by Productivity 
Commission for the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 
p. G.13, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-services/2015/housing-
and-homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-and-homelessness.pdf 
(accessed 2 February 2015). 
39  Reform of Federation White Paper, Roles and Responsibilities in Housing and Homelessness, 
Issues Paper, 2 December 2014, p. 19, https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/issues-
paper/Housing_and_Homelessness_Issues_Paper.pdf (accessed 6 March 2015). 
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Culturally appropriate housing 
17.26 In its submission, Shelter SA wrote about the significance of addressing the 
cultural needs of Aboriginal people. It stated further that, when increasing the supply 
of housing, matters such as habitability, affordability and security needed to be 
recognised as the 'basis upon which Aboriginal families can achieve safety, teach 
respect to their children, have control over their environment and share language and 
culture'.40 Shelter SA listed a number of other matters that need to be considered, 
including culturally appropriate housing designed and built to accommodate extended 
families, with quality materials and durable living spaces.41 
Standard of dwellings 
17.27 Indigenous households across all social housing programs were less likely 
than non-Indigenous households to rate their dwelling as being of an acceptable 
standard—62 per cent of Indigenous respondents rated their dwelling as of acceptable 
standard compared to 78 per cent of non-Indigenous respondents.42  
17.28 Figures reproduced by the Productivity Commission show that in 2014, the 
National Social Housing Survey (NSHS) found that nationally: 
• for public housing, 65.9 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
households were living in dwellings of an acceptable standard; 
• for SOMIH, 70.1 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander households 
were living in dwellings of an acceptable standard; and 
• for community housing, 83.0 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
households were living in dwellings of an acceptable standard.43 
17.29 The Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly informed the committee that the 
standard of work associated with repairs and maintenance carried out in the Murdi 
Paaki region was sub-standard with work 'already crumbling or failing'.44 In its view, 
improved standards and an increased numbers of dwellings would decrease long-term 
maintenance costs. It also noted houses being built close together without taking 
40  Submission 117, p. [2]. 
41  Submission 117, p. [2]. 
42  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 75, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
43  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services , 2015, Produced by Productivity 
Commission for the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 
p. G.15, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-services/2015/housing-
and-homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-and-homelessness.pdf 
(accessed 2 February 2015). 
44  Submission 127, p. [3]. 
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account of the need for privacy, which appeared to be considered acceptable for 
remote communities but could create tensions within the community.45  
17.30 Also, according to the Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly, changes to housing 
plans occur every political cycle, which means that with this stop-start pattern there 
was no opportunity to make the most of any gains. It highlighted the need for 
consistency and continuity in housing policy and its implementation for Indigenous 
Australians and urged governments to develop a bi-partisan national approach that 
would provide certainty and stability.46  
17.31 This call for certainty and continuity in housing policy was not confined to 
Indigenous housing but applied overall to Australia's affordable housing and 
homelessness policies and their implementation.  
Conclusion 
17.32 The committee has drawn attention to the central role that safe and secure 
housing has in improving the health, education and employment opportunities of its 
occupants and of fostering an environment promoting the household's overall 
wellbeing. If Australia is to narrow the gap on Indigenous disadvantage, clearly access 
to affordable, secure and suitable housing must be a high and immediate priority. 
Otherwise, efforts to lift the health and education standards of Indigenous Australians 
and to improve their employment prospects will be undermined.  
17.33 The committee underlines the observations of the Henry Review that housing 
assistance should reflect the difficulty Indigenous Australians may face in accessing 
mainstream housing markets. In addition, the particular housing needs of Indigenous 
Australians in remote areas should be addressed through specific measures, such as 
the provision of capital for house building.47 This observation remains starkly 
relevant.  
17.34 The statistics presented in this chapter show that Indigenous households were 
six times more likely than other Australian households to live in social housing. 
Moreover, a significant number of those in social housing experience overcrowding. 
For example, 13 per cent of Indigenous tenants in public housing in remote and very 
remote regions were living in overcrowded dwellings and 11 per cent in major cities. 
17.35 Considering the interconnection between housing and health, education and 
employment—which are major concerns with the government's efforts to close the 
45  Submission 127, p. [4].  
46  Submission 127, p. [5]. 
47  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2, p. 596, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
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gap on Indigenous disadvantage—the committee believes that housing should be very 
much a part of the Prime Minister's closing the gap report. 
Recommendation 29 
17.36 The committee recommends that housing should be included in the Prime 
Minister's Closing the Gap report: that access to affordable and appropriate 
housing must be regarded in the same context as Indigenous education, health 
and employment. 
 

  
Chapter 18 
Homelessness 
18.1 Homelessness is one of the most extreme manifestations of people living in 
housing stress. Between 2001 and 2011, the number of people recorded as homeless 
and the number living in other marginal housing increased. The causes that underpin 
homelessness are many, varied and complex. Thus, while the lack of available suitable 
low-cost housing contributes to people living in these circumstances, a multitude of 
social, health and economic issues also contribute to homelessness and to people 
living in substandard accommodation.1 
18.2 In this chapter, the committee looks at homelessness: what is meant by being 
homeless; the nature and magnitude of the problem; and what is being done to help 
people out of homelessness and to remain housed.  
Definition of homelessness 
18.3 The Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS) definition of homelessness is 
informed by the notion of 'home'lessness as distinct from rooflessness. Homelessness 
may include a lack of a sense of security, stability, privacy, safety, and the ability to 
control living space.2 Noting the ABS distinction between 'home'lessness and 
rooflessness, the types of homeless accommodation may take the form of improvised 
dwellings, tents or sleeping out, supported accommodation for the homeless, staying 
temporarily with other households, boarding houses or other temporary lodgings and 
severely overcrowded dwellings. The ABS defines a person as homeless if they do not 
have suitable accommodation alternatives and their current living arrangement: 
• is in a dwelling that is inadequate; or 
• has no tenure, or if their initial tenure is short and not extendable; or 
• does not allow them to have control of, and access to, space for social 
relations.3 
1  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability Issues 2012–13, p. xi, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/201
3/NHSC/Downloads/PDF/housing_supply_affordability_report_2012-13.ashx 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
2  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Information paper—a statistical definition of homelessness, 
no. 4922.0, 2012, p. 7,   
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/B4B1A5BC17CEDBC9CA257A6E00
186823/$File/49220_2012.pdf (accessed 20 January 2015). 
3  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Information paper—a statistical definition of homelessness, 
no. 4922.0, 2012, p. 7,   
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/B4B1A5BC17CEDBC9CA257A6E00
186823/$File/49220_2012.pdf (accessed 20 January 2015). 
 
                                              
308  
18.4 The National Housing Supply Council (NHSC) defined a person as homeless 
if he or she did not have access to adequate housing that was safe and secure. People 
who are homeless fall into three broad groups; that is, those who are: 
• sleeping rough (living on the streets); 
• living in temporary accommodation, such as crisis accommodation or with 
friends or relatives; or 
• staying in boarding houses or caravan parks with no secure lease and no 
private facilities.4 
Statistics on homelessness 
18.5 A number of witnesses referred to the increase in homelessness. The 
Department of Social Services informed the committee that although the overall rate 
of homelessness in Australia (as a proportion of the overall population) was relatively 
low, there were still approximately 105,000 Australians who met the ABS definition 
of homeless.5 The key homelessness estimates from the 2011 Census show that:  
• there were 105,237 people who were classified as being homeless on Census 
night (up from 89,728 in 2006); 
• the homeless rate was 49 persons for every 10,000 persons, up 8 per cent from 
the 45 persons in 2006 but down on the 51 persons in 2001; 
• the homelessness rate rose by 20 per cent or more in New South Wales, 
Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT, with the largest fall in the Northern 
Territory down 8 per cent; 
• most of the increase in homelessness between 2006 and 2011 was reflected in 
people living in severely crowded dwellings, up from 31,531 in 2006 to 
41,390 in 2011; 
• the number of people spending Census night in supported accommodation for 
the homeless in 2011 was 21,258, up from 17,329 in 2006; 
• there were 17,721 homeless people in boarding houses on Census night in 
2011, up from 15,460 in 2006; 
• the number of homeless people in improvised dwellings, tents or sleeping out 
in 2011 was 6,813, down from 7,247 in 2006; 
• about three quarters of the increase in the homelessness estimate was 
accounted for by people who were born overseas; 
• there was little change in the total number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Australians who were homeless (up 3 per cent to 26,744 in 2011); 
4  National Housing Supply Council, Housing Supply and Affordability—Key indicators, 2012, 
p. 61, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2012/NHSC 
(accessed 4 March 2015). 
5  Submission 198, p. 33. 
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• 60 per cent of homeless people in 2011 were aged under 35 years, and 
22 per cent of the increase in homelessness was in the 25 to 34 years age 
group (up 22 per cent to 19,311 homeless people in 2011); and 
• the male homelessness rate fell slightly to 56 males per 10,000 males, while 
the rate rose slightly for females to 42 per 10,000 females.6 
18.6 The census also produced statistics on people who were not classified as being 
homeless on Census night but were living in some form of marginal housing and may 
have been at risk of homelessness. It showed that the number of people living in 
improvised dwellings fell sharply, down 42 per cent to 4,504 people in 2011; the 
number of people marginally housed in caravan parks was little changed 
(at 12,963 people in 2011); while the number of people living in crowded dwellings 
requiring three extra bedrooms jumped 41 per cent to 60,875 in 2011.7 
18.7 The statistics show a changing composition of the homeless population with 
fewer rough sleepers (declined from 8 per cent to 6 per cent of all homeless people 
from 2006 to 2011) but more people in supported accommodation or boarding houses. 
It should be noted, however that much of the increase in the numbers of homeless 
people recorded was related to the inclusion of a new category of people who were 
residing in overcrowded dwellings.8 
18.8 The committee notes that the South West Australia Homeless People queried 
the ABS' definitions of homelessness. It stated that 'if those living in motor vehicles 
come under the category of 'sleeping rough', as it appeared they did not fit into other 
categories, then this suggested that there were only 959 homeless people 'sleeping 
rough' in WA. The South West Australia Homeless People suggested that, 'given what 
we know of motor vehicles used to house the homeless, this figure is grossly 
underestimated'. Consequently, it argued that there needed to be a better way of 
categorising 'sleeping rough' or expand its parameters to capture all concerned.9  
18.9 Also, Dr Petersen referred to a general recognition in published work of 
women's homelessness being hidden or invisible because women were more likely to 
stay with family or friends on a couch or in a garage or something similar. So, in her 
6  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Summary of Findings, Introduction, 2049.0—Census of 
Population and Housing: Estimating homelessness, 2011 
http://abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/2049.0Main%20Features22011 
(accessed 23 December 2014).  
7  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Summary of Findings, Introduction, 2049.0—Census of 
Population and Housing: Estimating homelessness, 2011 
http://abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/2049.0Main%20Features22011 
(accessed 23 December 2014). 
8  See also, Mr Patrick Flynn, Mission Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, 
p. 27.  
9  Submission 214, p. 18. 
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view, it was very difficult to appreciate fully women's homelessness from current 
statistics.10 
Social housing—supply side 
18.10 The 2009 Henry Review was of the view that the focus on people with 
particular needs and the broader role of social housing in the current Australian 
housing market meant that: 
…some supply side measures are also a critical element of a comprehensive 
social housing system. Projected population growth will require that supply 
of social housing keeps pace to ensure that homelessness is prevented.11 
18.11 People experiencing homelessness receive priority allocation into social 
housing and are identified as one of the groups in 'greatest need'. In 2012–13, social 
housing provided a pathway out of homelessness for 17,581 households and 
represented 57 per cent of all newly allocated public rental housing. In 2011–12, 
54 per cent of priority households that were newly allocated to public rental housing 
and state owned and managed Indigenous housing (SOMIH) were previously 
homeless and a further 36 per cent were at risk of homelessness. While social housing 
may provide the opportunity for homeless people to access a house, the high number 
who accessed newly allocated public rental dwellings underlines the heavy demand 
for such housing and its role in providing housing for the most disadvantaged groups.  
18.12 Mr Patrick Flynn, Mission Australia, informed the committee of the 
evaluations of the Specialist Homelessness Services (previously Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program), which had shown repeatedly that: 
…the lack of social and affordable housing is a problem both because it 
creates a risk of more people being homeless and because it prevents an exit 
from homelessness. Yet today the percentage of social housing is at a 
historic low—less than five per cent of stock—and falling.12 
18.13 Dr Clark, Shelter SA, noted that during 2012–13 there were approximately 
20,000 people who used specialist homelessness services in South Australia, 
indicating that the close similarity in numbers with the reduction in public housing 
was no coincidence.13 In her view, the only way to reduce or eliminate homelessness 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 13.  
11  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2 p. 596, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
12  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 26. 
13  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 29.  
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as much as possible in any country was to provide social and affordable housing. Dr 
Clark pointed to the simple fact that supply could not meet the demand.14  
Rooming and boarding houses   
18.14 The committee has referred to higher income people crowding out lower 
income earners from the private market. This process has a cascading effect which 
affects the homeless. Mr Wilson, Salvation Army, spoke of the difficulties he had in 
finding emergency accommodation for people in crisis. Even places such as caravan 
parks no longer offer temporary relief. Mr Wilson told the committee: 
In the process of attempting to find temporary accommodation for people in 
our area [around Rockingham, WA], I have called many of the caravan 
parks. The common answer is, 'We have no places available.' I think it is 
mostly because they have become long-term solutions for people. The 
caravan parks in our area are now places where people live. The places that 
do have vacancies can be between $600 and $1,000 a week, which is 
unsustainable. It is just incredible to compare what you can rent with what 
you can get at a caravan park. It just shows there is a lack of housing 
around.15 
18.15 In its submission, Shelter WA referred to park residents and the precarious 
and insecure housing that they experience.16 The National Foundation for Australian 
Women noted that many older people receiving rental assistance live in private 
boarding houses.17 
18.16 The Maribyrnong City Council drew attention to the fact that rooming houses 
had become the de facto form of affordable housing in its area and were often 
accessed by people on low income such as women experiencing domestic violence, 
students, refugees and people with disability.18 It referred to the existence of 
unregistered or illegal rooming houses which were not compliant with the Victorian 
health and building regulations. The Council argued that the provision of genuine 
affordable housing that was safe and secure was required to stop the proliferation of 
rooming houses throughout the municipality.19 
18.17 Shelter SA noted that the State Parliament had recently amended the 
Residential Tenancies Act 1995 to address a range of issues faced by tenants 
accommodated in rooming or boarding houses, who were some of the most vulnerable 
people in the community. In its opinion, this legislative change provided a range of 
14  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 34.  
15  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 28.  
16  Submission 174, p. 13.  
17  Submission 38, p. 6. 
18  Submission 50, p. 8.  
19  Submission 50, p. 8. 
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protections, including access to a tribunal on issues such as: challenging unreasonable 
house rules; right of entry and notice provisions; notice provisions for renovations or 
sale; abandonment of room and protection of any goods or personal effects left 
behind.20 
Lived experiences of homeless people 
18.18 A number of witnesses were concerned about the rise in homelessness and, in 
this regard, the committee has quoted a range of figures to show that homelessness is a 
reality for some Australians, young and old.21 These statistics, however, fail to convey 
the lived experiences of homeless people, whose voices are often ignored or simply 
not heard. 
18.19 The committee was privileged to have a number of people from a group of 
homeless people who live in their motor vehicles around the area of approximately 
45 km bounded by Rockingham Beach and Kwinana Beach, southwest of the Perth 
CBD. Mr Jonathan Shapiera, the author of the submission on behalf of the South West 
Australia Homeless People, had recently experienced an extended period of 
homelessness.22 He spoke of the enormous difficulties facing those living in cars, 
stating bluntly that being homeless was a 'dangerous way to live': 
Being on the street becomes like [a] shell; you protect yourself as best as 
possible.23 
18.20 A fellow homeless person, Mervan, explained further: 
All we want is a place where we can go at night time. Somewhere with 
showers and where we can cook a meal and have a laugh and a joke. But we 
do not have that. You have to have eyes in the back of your head you never 
know who is going to sneak up and rob you or do damage to your car. You 
are living on the edge the whole time. It is very hard.24  
18.21 Another member of the group, Mr Farmer, told the committee that homeless 
people were not all drug addicts, drunkards or losers—'a lot of them are genuine 
people who have just come on very tough times and they have nowhere to go'.25 As 
Bevan said, they were 'just down on their luck'. They cannot afford housing and the 
waiting list for accommodation was 'a mile long'. Mr Shapiera explained that the 
hardest thing when you become homeless was the total lack of services, whether you 
are sleeping in a car or sleeping anywhere. He referred to being on the bottom rung of 
20  Submission 117, p. [1]. 
21  See for example, Ms Kerrie Young, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 25. 
22  Submission 214. 
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 30.  
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 23. 
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 22.  
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a ladder and the 'huge gap' needed to be bridged just to enable people to climb up 'that 
ladder to even being recognised as being part of the community': 
It is such a despair to be at the bottom of the rung and having that gap to get 
anywhere up the ladder to be respected. It is so hard.26 
18.22 Having no fixed address can pose a significant problem for homeless people 
seeking government assistance as Mr Shapiera described: 
I bit the bullet, filled out the application form and I submitted it at Kwinana 
at the Department of Housing there. No address, and the lady at the counter 
said, can you put your address down? I said, no I cannot because I am 
homeless. 'Oh, I am sorry, we cannot accept your application.' I said, 
'Excuse me, I'm homeless. I don't have an address.' 'No we can't accept it 
because you need an address.' She said, 'Could you put down a friend's 
address? Can you put down any address?' I said, 'No, I'm homeless. I don't 
have an address. I can put down the registration of my car, but I don't have 
an address.'27 
18.23 Fortunately for Mr Shapiera an acceptable resolution was found due to the 
intervention of a supervisor. Even so, his experience demonstrated how the simplest of 
tasks can pose a significant challenge for a homeless person. Another homeless person 
living in her car contacted the committee to alert members to the difficulty in 
obtaining or renewing a driver's licence when an applicant has no fixed address.  
18.24 Mr Wilson, Salvation Army, reminded the committee that people who are 
homeless or caught in poverty live in a very different world—they think minute to 
minute. He provided some insight into the sense of security they draw from their 
surroundings, which others cannot comprehend: 
Sometimes we logically say, 'Why don't you do this; why don't you do 
that?' But that is from our world. When you deal with people whose world 
is the car park at Rockingham, to venture outside of that is actually 
unstable. When you have a small amount of stability, you want to keep it. It 
is very complex. It is a very complex issue.28 
18.25 Centrelink is often the first point of call for a person looking for help and 
advice. According to Mr Shapiera, it is from this initial contact that people are 
redirected internally or to other government services not necessarily located close by. 
He suggested that setting up one team in the major Centrelink premises that was 
trained in dealing with housing issues would present a front face and satisfy a one stop 
shop protocol.29  
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 28. 
27  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 29. 
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 32. 
29  Submission 214, p. 10. 
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18.26 The committee notes that apart from the services that Centrelink provides 
from its premises, it also has Community Engagement Officers, who assist homeless 
people or those at risk of becoming homeless and are having difficulty visiting a 
service centre or calling Centrelink. These officers and Homeless Outreach Program 
social workers deliver services in a range of locations such as drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation centres, mental health units, drop-in centres, hostels, boarding houses, 
refuges and informal meeting places such as local parks.30  
18.27 The challenge for such outreach services is making those in need of such 
services aware of the assistance that is available to them and to ensure that, because of 
their complex needs, the process of receiving assistance from various agencies is 
coordinated. For example, Mr Nathan Quinnell had been homeless for nearly eight 
years before he found out about Street to Home, a national program delivered by 
St Vincent de Paul providing frontline services to the homeless and funded through 
NPAH. He told the committee that he had been sleeping in a tent out in the bush for a 
few years and if he had not met up with Street to Home, he 'would probably still be 
there'.31 According to Mr Quinnell, he found out about Street to Home through 
another person who was homeless. Although connected with Centrelink during the 
time that he was living in his tent, Centrelink did not mention this service to him. He 
did note, however, that he did not tell too many people about his circumstances 
because he was a bit embarrassed at the time.32 
Homelessness among Australians—the young and the old 
18.28 Youth Affairs Council of Western Australia noted that young people 
disproportionately make up around 50 per cent of those seeking assistance from 
homelessness services each night.33 Mr Craig Comrie, CEO of the Council, drew 
attention, however, to the critical shortage of transitional accommodation for homeless 
youth. He then explained: 
…the services that we support and which are our members say that, at any 
given time, they can be turning away nine out of 10 people who seek 
support from their service. Most of the homelessness services in the crisis 
area only have up to eight beds, and there is only a finite number of services 
in Western Australia. So we definitely do not have anywhere near the beds 
that we need in the crisis area, and then, looking at moving on to 
transitional accommodation, there is a huge, huge gap there that we need to 
try to fill to get young people into transitional accommodation.34 
30  Centrelink website, 'Community Engagement Officers', 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/community-engagement-
officers (accessed 10 March 2015). 
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2014, p. 2. 
32  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, pp. 1–2. 
33  Submission 166, p. [7]. 
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 49. See also Submission 166. 
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18.29 Based on its experience supporting young people, Youth Action NSW 
observed that the fall in the number of affordable houses has had a 'substantive impact 
on young people's ability to lead fulfilling lives and access education and services'. It 
noted that the increasing squeeze on an already over-stressed rental market was 
'locking young people with particular vulnerabilities out of access to even the most 
basic housing'.35 
18.30 Ms Kerrie Young, Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast, noted that 
her area had very serious issues with the lack of youth shelters. She informed the 
committee, 'If you want to talk about the cross-overs, there are young teenage mothers 
who are also in a great deal of difficulty at the moment'.36 
18.31 To date the committee's focus has been on securing affordable housing for 
Australian households. Once housed, some may have difficulty remaining in their 
home. Youth Affairs Council of Western Australia highlighted in its submission the 
importance of ensuring that once housed, a young person has adequate follow-up 
support to ensure that they do not return to their past living situation.37 A successful 
social and public housing system requires long-term support that understands the 
specific needs of its client. 
18.32 There are numerous programs that are producing notable successes by 
providing both housing and other support services designed to keep people housed and 
to encourage them to become independent and self-sufficient. For example, the Youth 
Affairs Council of Western Australia referred to Anglicare's work with the state 
government, Foundation Housing Ltd and the Central Institute of Technology to 
address the lack of accommodation and housing for young people with its Foyer 
Oxford project. It described this project as a creative solution that provided: 
…a strong collaborative effort to provide at-risk young people with 
supported accommodation and case management to break their cycle of 
homelessness, and transition to sustainable independent living'. 38  
18.33 From its perspective, Foyer Oxford was a 'fantastic' example of innovation in 
the youth sector. Mr Comrie stated further: 
It is the first purpose-built Foyer in the country. It has 98 beds for young 
people, with specific beds for young parents, and specific beds for young 
people exiting the justice system and young people leaving the care of the 
department. That service has been open since February but has been 
operating in an interim model for quite some time and is seeing some really 
positive outcomes.39 
35  Submission 51, p. [1]. 
36  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 24.  
37  Submission 166, p. [6]. 
38  See Submission 166, p. [7]. 
39  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, pp. 48–49. 
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18.34 According to Mr Comrie, the success of the project could be attributed to the 
requirement for young people to enter into a social contract of engagement with 
education and employment, which was a critical determinant in staying in sustainable 
housing.40 Foyer Oxford underlined the significance of having strong support 
networks to help young people stay out of homelessness. For example, Mr Comrie 
underscored: 
…the importance of youth workers and the way that they practise and the 
way that they support young people is that they are not just capable of 
dealing with housing as the primary issue and forgetting everything else; it 
is making that a priority but also trying to deal with and supporting young 
people around other issues. A lot of that has to do with ensuring that young 
people have the information they need themselves to make the decisions 
that they need to change their lives.41 
Access to services 
18.35 Youth Affairs Council of Western Australia noted the tendency for policy 
makers to promote land areas on the urban fringe but argued that that this should be 
avoided.42 It stated that education institutions, employment opportunities, public 
transport, community activity and health services were limited and also difficult to 
access in these areas. According to the Council, research indicated that a young 
person's physical and mental health could deteriorate if these services were not within 
a reasonable distance from where the young person lived.43 
Older Australians and homelessness 
18.36 Based on its survey, the most recent Journeys Home Research noted that, 
although the young tend to be more at risk of becoming homeless, older vulnerable 
people were not only 'more likely to experience homelessness, but importantly to be 
homeless more often'. It contrasted the experiences of homelessness by the young 
which tended to be transitory with that of older Australians.44 
18.37 The committee has already touched on the vulnerability of older Australians 
to homelessness, notably those in receipt of the age or disability pension in the private 
rental market. Mrs Ullman informed the committee that between 2006 and 2011, 
40  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 49. 
41  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 50. 
42  Submission 166, p. [7]. 
43  Submission 166, p. [7]. 
44  Abraham Chigavazira, Guy Johnson, Julie Moschion, Rosanna Scutella, Yi-Ping Tseng and 
Mark Wooden, The Journey Home Research, No. 5, September 2014, Findings from Waves 
1 to 5: Special Topics, University of Melbourne, p. 2,  
http://melbourneinstitute.com/journeys_home/assets/pubs/2014/Scutella%20et%20al%20Journ
eys%20Home%20Research%20Report%20W5.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015). 
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people over 55 made up 14.1 per cent of all homeless people in Australia.45 She stated 
that older people face a housing crisis when they were unable to maintain or to remain 
safe in their rental home or to continue living with family, noting further: 
A lack of adequate programs, services and supports for older people at risk 
will lead them further down a pathway to homelessness. This is especially 
so when a person is nearing retirement, has low and/or fixed income and 
requires ongoing support for mental health conditions, substance misuse or 
dementia.46 
18.38 COTA raised concerns about the increase in homelessness amongst older 
people, particularly older women, and the increase in older people suffering from 
housing stress. It noted that there was 'an increase of 14 per cent between 2011–12 
and 2012–13 in the number of people over 55 seeking support from specialist 
services'. COTA stated that this underestimates the number of people who are 
homeless or at risk of homelessness amongst older people as many were reluctant to 
use specialist services, particularly when they were homeless for the first time.47 
18.39 Dr Faulkner indicated that older people were becoming even more vulnerable 
to homelessness. She cited findings of the NHSC, which suggested that around one in 
10 older people was vulnerable to falling out of home ownership. The number 
included women involved in divorce, separated from their partner or widowed, who 
have very little financial capability to hold onto the family home or to re-enter the 
housing market in any way.48  
18.40 To highlight the emerging problem for older Australians trying to find 
affordable housing, Mr Yates, COTA, referred to the AIHW and stated:49 
…we are seeing increasing amounts—still small compared to other 
groups—of homelessness, particularly amongst older women, and that is a 
function of housing stress amongst older women without significant 
superannuation and income. If they lose a job or something like that, then 
they are not able to either keep up the mortgage payments or the rent.50 
18.41 Dr Petersen also produced statistics showing the number of homeless people 
over 55 was 14,851 out of a total of 105,237 and of those aged over 55, 9,521 were 
men and 5,330 were women.51 Dr Petersen explained further: 
45  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 12.  
46  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
47  Submission 191, p. 4. 
48  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 11–12. 
49  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 12. 
50  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 22.  
51  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 13.  
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…it tends to be the single, older person who is paying rent who is subject to 
more disadvantage—because they are receiving a single's pension payment 
they cannot afford the rent—so we are more likely to see those people at 
risk of homelessness and housing crisis.52 
18.42 According to Dr Petersen, older renters who, on the whole, had worked, raised 
their families and lived very conventional lives, find themselves at risk of 
homelessness for the first time at the age of 60 or over.53 She noted that a recent 
national study found that 69 per cent of the 561 older people presenting with a 
housing crisis over a three month period had conventional housing histories—that is, 
they were people who had rented in the private market while working and raising a 
family. In retirement, they then experience homelessness 'due to gentrification, due to 
a lack of affordable housing'.54 She stressed that the issue was one of affordable 
housing.55  
Keeping people housed 
18.43 The South West Australia Homeless People noted that one important question 
that the committee did not include in its Terms of Reference was: 
Once you have a person/persons/family housed within an affordable 
structure, what is required to keep them there and remove the risk of them 
becoming homeless?56 
18.44 In this regard, Ms Young, Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast, 
recognised the importance of maintaining people in their accommodation:  
We need to ensure that the product and the rental cost meet the demand, and 
adequate funding is available for supporting agencies to assist people in 
maintaining their tenancies is also important. We can build stock. The 
development industry knows how to do that, but once we built that roof 
over their head, the resourcing agencies like MICAH and the others need to 
also have funding otherwise we cannot support those people to stay in their 
tenancies.57  
18.45 Similarly, the Inner South Rooming House Network informed the committee 
that clients expressed frustration that many services were not resourced to continue 
assisting people once they were housed.58  
52  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 12. 
53  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
54  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 11. 
55  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
56  Submission 214, p. 6. 
57  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 25. MICAH is a member of the community 
services sector in Brisbane.  
58  Submission 58, p. 3.  
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18.46 It is in this context that support services assume such a critical role as do other 
forms of assistance designed to keep people housed. National Shelter noted that it was 
important that Commonwealth, state and territory policies on homelessness continue 
to focus on prevention and early intervention and develop a range of appropriate 
support models to best meet the needs of people experiencing homelessness.59  
18.47 Indeed, a number of witnesses spoke of the considerable benefits that flow 
from providing people with safe, secure and appropriate housing and the required 
support services designed to keep them housed. The committee has already mentioned 
the link between secure housing and better health, education and employment 
opportunities and, though their problems may be complex, the same positive results 
can be achieved for the homeless. In its submission, National Seniors recommended 
that housing assistance provided to the over 50s and others who were long-term 
unemployed should continue for a period after stable employment was gained and 
financial circumstances have improved.60 The Journeys Home research found 
evidence showing consistently that: 
…poor health is more often a consequence of homelessness than a cause, 
and that individuals whose homeless experiences is characterised by a lack 
of any form of shelter (e.g the primary homeless) experience the poorest 
health.61 
18.48 Consistent with this finding, Mr Flynn referred to research showing that 
keeping people housed not only benefits the individual but also more broadly benefits 
government budgets with 'big reductions in health and justice costs—police costs'. In 
his view, there were 'good economic underpinnings to running homeless services and 
cited Michael's Intensive Supported Housing Accord (MISHA),62 which had 
demonstrated government savings by helping people out of homelessness. He argued 
that justice and health costs were reduced substantially more than the actual cost of 
delivering the program.63 MISHA provides secure long-term housing as the very first 
step for a homeless person. Once a person has the foundation of a home, they then 
receive intensive support to address their issues and maintain their tenancy.  
59  Submission 78, p. 18. 
60  Submission 165, p. 3. 
61  Abraham Chigavazira, Guy Johnson, Julie Moschion, Rosanna Scutella, Yi-Ping Tseng and 
Mark Wooden,  The Journey Home Research, No. 5, September 2014, Findings from Waves 
1 to 5: Special Topics, University of Melbourne, p. 50, 
http://melbourneinstitute.com/journeys_home/assets/pubs/2014/Scutella%20et%20al%20Journ
eys%20Home%20Research%20Report%20W5.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).   
62  Based in Parramatta, MISHA follows on from The Michael Project—a three-year initiative that 
aimed to improve the social inclusion of homeless men through intensive case management and 
wrap-around support services. See Mission Australia, 'Michael's Intensive Supported Housing 
Accord (MISHA)', https://www.missionaustralia.com.au/what-we-do-to-help-
new/homelessness/improving-services/misha (accessed 18 February 2015). 
63  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 26. 
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18.49 Similarly, Ms Christine Allison understood the importance of keeping people 
housed: 
People leave rehabilitation, prison and long term hospital stays without any 
real prospect of secure housing; this undoes the benefits of treatment. This 
is a huge cost in dollar and human terms.64 
18.50 Clearly programs such as Foyer Oxford and MISHA demonstrate the 
importance of providing support networks that will assist a homeless person once 
housed to remain housed. Such programs are central to breaking the cycle of 
homelessness.  
National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness (NPAH) 
18.51 In 2008, the Australian Government, with the agreement of the states and 
territories, set two headline goals to tackle homelessness: 
• halve overall homelessness by 2020; and 
• offer supported accommodation to all rough sleepers who need it by 2020.65 
Funding arrangements 
18.52 The Commonwealth provides funding through the National Partnership 
Agreement on Homelessness (NPAH), which commenced in January 2009. NPAH's 
primary aim is to reduce, prevent and break the cycle of homelessness and increase 
the social inclusion of people experiencing homelessness.66 It contributes to the 
NAHA outcome that 'people who are homeless or at a risk of homelessness achieve 
sustainable housing and social inclusion'. The agreement focuses on three key 
strategies to reduce homelessness—prevention and early intervention to stop people 
becoming homeless; breaking the cycle of homelessness; and improving and 
expanding the service response to homelessness.67 
64  Submission 35, p. 2.  
65  Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, The Road 
Home: A National Approach to Reducing Homelessness, 2008, p. viii, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/housing-support/programmes-
services/homelessness/the-road-home-the-australian-government-white-paper-on-homelessness 
(accessed 10 March 2015). 
66  Australian National Audit Office, Implementation of the National Partnership Agreement on 
Homelessness, Audit Report No. 312 2012–13, Performance Audit, 2013, p. 13, 
http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2012-2013/Implementation-of-the-
National-Partnership-Agreement-on-Homelessness (accessed 10 March 2015). 
67  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 78, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
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18.53 Jointly, the Commonwealth and states and territories provided over $320 
million in 2013–14 under NPAH.68 This funding supported over 180 homelessness 
initiatives and a range of capital projects across Australia. The Department of Social 
Services also drew the committee's attention to two small programs funded by the 
Commonwealth—the Reconnect program ($24 million each year) and the HOME 
Advice Program. The Reconnect program is designed to provide support services for 
young people at risk of becoming homeless. A community-based early intervention 
program for young people aged 12 to 18 years, this initiative provides counselling, 
group work, mediation and practical support to the whole family to help break the 
cycle of homelessness.69 The HOME Advice Program provides financial capability 
advice and assistance to people under financial stress and at risk of losing their 
homes.70 It is to be merged with a new activity, the Financial Wellbeing and 
Capability program.71  
18.54 In addition to these funds, the Commonwealth provides a significant amount 
of assistance to the states and territories to provide stable pathways to housing and 
further training and employment for homeless Australians through the NAHA. 
According to the Department of Social Services, approximately $250 million of the 
funding provided under the NAHA has its origins in former programs for homeless 
Australians.72  
18.55 On 30 March 2014, the then Minister for Social Services, 
the Hon Kevin Andrews MP, announced that in financial year 2014–15, the Federal 
Government would provide $115 million towards the continuation of homelessness 
services in Australia via NPAH. He stated: 
That means that if the State and Territory Governments add their equal 
share of $115 million it will be some $230 million for homelessness 
services in Australia for the next financial year.73 
18.56 On 15 July 2014, the Minister indicated that all Australian states and 
territories had signed the new agreement.74 According to the then Minister, this one-
68  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 33. 
69  Submission 198, p. 33. 
70  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 2.  
71  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 2.  
72  Submission 198, p. 33. 
73  The Hon Kevin Andrews, Minister for Social Services, Homeless Funding', 30 March 2014, 
http://www.formerministers.dss.gov.au/15296/homelessness-funding/ 
(accessed 12 January 2015) and Submission 198, p. 33. 
74  The Hon Kevin Andrews, Minister for Social Services, Media Release, 'National support for 
homelessness agreement', 15 July 2014, 
http://www.formerministers.dss.gov.au/15257/national-support-for-homelessness-agreement/ 
(accessed 10 March 2015). 
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year extension would 'enable the Government to re-assess Commonwealth housing 
and homelessness policy with the object of doing things more efficiently'.75 
Australian National Audit Office report  
18.57 In its 2013 report on the implementation of NPAH, the Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO) found: 
In agreeing the NPAH in 2008 the Australian, state and territory 
governments made a substantial financial commitment to preventing, 
reducing and breaking the cycle of homelessness. The governments have 
committed over $1.1 billion to new and expanded initiatives, but progress is 
not leading to the achievement of the expected 7 per cent reduction in 
homelessness by 1 July 2013. Between 2006 and 2011 the number of 
homeless people, rather than declining, increased by 17 per cent from 
89,728 to 105,237 people.76  
18.58 According to the ANAO report, while the NPAH target was to be reached by 
1 July 2013, the trend indicated that reaching the target would be 'extremely 
challenging' and was 'unlikely to be achieved'.77 
18.59 The ANAO report highlighted a number of areas where the implementation of 
the agreement could be improved. In particular, it observed: 
• Where significant reforms to service delivery arrangements are being sought, 
the performance measurement and reporting framework should be designed to 
measure the implementation of the reforms as well as the delivery of funded 
activities and their impact. 
• Payments made through the NPAH are not currently linked to the 
achievement of agreed milestones, as is the case in some other agreements. 
Creating a payment structure that is more closely related to performance 
would enhance public accountability in respect of progress being made 
towards the outcomes sought by governments, and would be worthy of further 
consideration in any future agreement. 
75  The Hon Kevin Andrews MP, Media Release, 'National homelessness agreement on track', 
8 July 2014, http://kevinandrews.com.au/latest-news/2014/07/08/national-homelessness-
agreement-track/ (accessed 19 March 2015). 
76  Australian National Audit Office, Audit Report No.31 2012–13, Performance Audit 
Implementation of the National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness, Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, p. 16, 
http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2012%202013/Audit%20Report%20
31/Audit%20Report%20No%2031.PDF (accessed 10 March 2015). 
77  Australian National Audit Office, Audit Report No.31 2012–13, Performance Audit 
Implementation of the National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness, Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, p. 17, 
http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2012%202013/Audit%20Report%20
31/Audit%20Report%20No%2031.PDF (accessed 10 March 2015). 
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• The NPAH is based on a shared funding model, but the state and territory 
governments are not required to report financial information to FaHCSIA [the 
former Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs]. Where a co‐contribution approach forms part of any 
future funding arrangement for homelessness, it is not unreasonable to expect 
financial information to be reported to FaHCSIA by the state and territory 
governments, to enable the department to provide assurance to the Minister 
over the level of contributions made.78 
National Commission of Audit 
18.60 The Report of the National Commission of Audit referred to various reports 
from the COAG reform Councils, which suggested that there had been 'limited 
success in delivering affordable housing and reducing the incidence of homelessness'. 
It stated that 'National agreements have added complexity and increased the 
administrative burden to all levels of government'.79 
Future of NPAH 
18.61 As already noted, implementing preventive measures to keep people in their 
homes is critical to addressing homelessness. In its submission, Anglicare stated its 
belief that an increase in funds for brokerage through the NPAH was essential to 
prevent people and families from having to move to inappropriate housing. The funds 
would be used for one-off difficulties: for example to contribute to the clearance of 
existing debt and to provide material assistance which supports the maintenance of 
tenancies.80 Clearly, there are many programs that are assisting homeless people to 
find and then remain in appropriate housing. 
18.62 In this regard, Mr Comrie, Youth Affairs Council of Western Australia, noted 
that there had been some great successes in the area of NPAH services, which 
involved programs not necessarily about providing housing but which provided the 
peripheral support services that homeless young people need:  
So we know that young people who find themselves homeless may have a 
mental health issue; they may have an educational or employment 
disengagement issue; they may have a drug and alcohol issue. The NPAH 
services actually focus on providing specialist support to young people in 
those areas so that if they have housing they can retain it, and if they do not 
78  Australian National Audit Office, Audit Report No.31 2012–13, Performance Audit, 
Implementation of the National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness, Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, p, 19, 
http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2012%202013/Audit%20Report%20
31/Audit%20Report%20No%2031.PDF (accessed 10 March 2015). 
79  Towards Responsible Government, Appendix to the Report of the, National Commission of 
Audit, Volume 2, p. 72, http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/index.html (accessed 10 March 2015).  
80  AnglicareWA, Submission 161, p. 10. 
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then they can start to deal with some of the complex issues so that they can 
get access to housing.81 
18.63 While Mr Comrie acknowledged the successes achieved through the NPAH, 
he also indicated that the sector was becoming increasingly anxious about murmurs of 
the possible discontinuation of funding in the area of homelessness.82 
Mr John Bouffler, Community Employers WA, also noted that the sector and 
employers had been 'extremely frustrated by the lack of clarity and certainty' in 
funding.83  
18.64 It is worth noting that since 2013, NPAH had been extended for only one-year 
terms. The current NPAH is due to expire in June 2015. On 23 March 2015, the 
Minister for Social Services, the Hon. Scott Morrison announced the Federal Coalition 
Government would provide $230 million to extend the National Partnership 
Agreement on Homelessness (NPAH) for two years to 2017. Funding priority would 
be directed to 'frontline services focusing on women and children experiencing 
domestic and family violence, and homeless youth under 18'.84 
18.65 The decision to make funding available for a two-year period is an 
improvement on the previous one-year term. Nonetheless, the providers of services to 
the homeless remain apprehensive about the continuity and certainty of funding under 
NPAH.  
18.66 It is also important to note that at a time when demand for appropriate 
accommodation for homeless Australians or Australians at risk of homelessness is 
increasing, government funding for such housing is decreasing. In March 2013, the 
Australian Government announced that under NPAH it would make available $159 
million and that the states had committed to matching this amount taking the amount 
to $320 million.85 The following year, the government announced that it would 
provide $115 million, or 44 million dollars less, to ensure critical homelessness 
services continued to support some of Australia’s most vulnerable people.86 The 
81  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 48. 
82  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 48. 
83  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 13.  
84  The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Minister for Social Services, Media Release, 'Coalition reverses 
Labor’s funding cuts on homelessness with $230 million commitment prioritising victims of 
domestic violence', 23 March 2015, http://scottmorrison.dss.gov.au/media-releases/coalition-
reverses-labor-s-funding-cuts-on-homelessness-with-230-million-commitment-prioritising-
victims-of-domestic-violence (accessed 25 March 2015). 
85  The Hon Mark Butler, '$159 million for national homelessness agreement', Media Release, 
16 March 2013 and '$320 million deal of homelessness services, 28 March 2013.   
86  Media Release by Hon Kevin Andrews MP, 'Coalition Government to renew homelessness 
funding', 30 March 2014, http://www.formerministers.dss.gov.au/15200/coalition-government-
to-renew-homelessness-funding/ (accessed 10 April 2015). 
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Australian Government's funding remained unchanged for 2015–16 at $115 million 
for each financial year. 
Withdrawal of funding from Housing and Homelessness Program  
18.67 In December 2014, the Australian Government decided to terminate its 
Housing and Homelessness Program effective from 30 June 2015. This program was 
designed to provide support for housing and homelessness through research, peak 
bodies and innovative projects.87 The savings achieved over the four years' forward 
estimates would amount to $21.1 million. Ms Hand, Department of Social Services, 
explained that the housing and homelessness program came under the department's 
review of its major grants program. The review's aim was to identify ways for the 
department to streamline and make its grants funding more effective and to provide 
better services with less duplication.88 Her departmental colleague, Mr Palmer, added: 
…in terms of program 4.1, housing and homelessness, we had $21 million 
in the portfolio budget statement for that program. The expenditure that we 
have incurred so far this year is obviously spent, so that expenditure will 
continue. The government agreed that in the next two years AHURI would 
continue to be funded and then in the 2017–18 year my understanding is 
that there will be no money in that year and going forward from then.89 
18.68 A number of peak bodies affected by the withdrawal of funding appeared 
before the committee to highlight the way in which this decision had caused 
'significant turmoil and uncertainty in the sector'.90 The peak bodies support the 
organisations that assist the homeless and were notified of the government's decision 
to remove their funding just days before Christmas.91  
18.69 Mr Piarski, National Shelter, noted that together with many others in the 
sector, the peak bodies had been at the forefront of developing a reform agenda in the 
area of affordable housing and homelessness, which was now at risk.92 It seemed to 
him that the decision to axe not just the peak bodies but the whole Housing and 
Homeless Program pre-empted the findings of the Federation White Paper process.93 
87  Department of Social Services Budget Statements 2014–2015, p. 132, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2014/2014-2015_dss_pbs.pdf 
(accessed 10 March 2015). 
88  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 16.  
89  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 16.  
90  Ms Glenda Stevens, Homelessness Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, 
p. 1.  
91  Mr Pisarski, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, pp. 5–6. See also Mr Palmer, 
Department of Social Services, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 16. 
92  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 11.  
93  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 3.  
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18.70 Along similar lines, Ms Glenda Stevens, Homelessness Australia, stated that 
the decision to withdraw the funding made prior to the Federation White Paper 
process may well undermine 'the strategic approach of the federation process'.94 
Moreover, the removal of this funding would, according to Ms Stevens, have a long-
term effect on the ability of services to support homeless people and to make their 
experiences of homelessness as short as possible. She stated: 
So, if we take it right back to basics, it affects the front line; it affects re-
housing families, people from domestic violence, single men and older 
people. Everybody who is affected by homelessness will be affected by this 
decision, short and long term.95 
18.71 Importantly, she referred to the sector's significant loss of trust in the 
government and the unease within the sector. She explained: 
At least every day we have a member ringing up saying, 'Do we renew our 
membership fees? Are you going to be here?' So, whilst most of our money 
is government funding, we do get some from our membership, but already 
that is being put in jeopardy.96 
18.72 Indeed, even before this withdrawal of funding, Ms Phillips, Australian 
Council of Social Service, pointed to a general disquiet about overall funding for 
homelessness, referring to: 
…an annual cycle of growing anxiety and uncertainty about the future of 
the national partnership agreement on homelessness as it is rolled over for 
12 months and is then looking for another 12-month or longer extension 
until there are bigger decisions made about the future of these national 
partnership agreements.97 
18.73 This withdrawal of funding and misgivings about the continuation of funding 
through the NPAH adds to the uncertainty that has grown up around the 
Commonwealth's commitment and contribution to improving affordable housing for 
Australians. 
Committee view 
18.74 The evidence presented in this chapter sent strong and resounding messages 
that: 
• the Australian government cannot vacate the affordable housing space or step 
back from its responsibilities to ensure that every Australian has access to 
affordable, safe and sustainable housing; 
94  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, pp. 1–2. 
95  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 11.  
96  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 8.  
97  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 25. 
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• in the long run, investment in affordable housing returns dividends not only to 
the individual struggling to access safe, secure and affordable housing but to 
the budgets of the Australian, state and territory governments and ultimately 
the Australian taxpayer by having a more productive community with reduced 
costs for social, health and unemployment services and for justice and 
policing; and 
• the lack of certainty around funding arrangements for homelessness is eroding 
confidence and undermining the efforts of those engaged in providing 
assistance to the homeless and those at risk of becoming homeless. 
Recommendation 30 
18.75 The committee recommends that the Australian Government: 
• take a definite and high profile role in placing affordable housing at the 
forefront of government policy across Australia;  
• make a strong and certain recommitment to NPAH (including 
considering reintroducing an ongoing capital component) and its 
continuation for at least ten years; 
• task Homelessness Australia with investigating and quantifying the 
service delivery gap to people experiencing homelessness, and commit to 
funding NPAH to meet that gap;   
• recommit to the target to at least halve homelessness by 2025 (originally 
set at 2020 in the 2008 White Paper) with set milestones at two yearly 
intervals to track and report on progress and to offer supported 
accommodation to all rough sleepers who want it;  
• work to achieve multi-party support for this long-term goal and, noting 
that this problem cannot be solved at any one level of government, 
encourage states and territories to commit to this target and to 
coordinate their response;  
• take a longer-term approach when funding programs or agreements that 
would provide certainty of funding so that organisations and people 
engaged in delivering programs can, with confidence, plan ahead and 
seek to achieve continuity in the services they provide to homeless people; 
and 
• introduce an urgent capital program with the Australian Government 
and the states sharing responsibility for funding through NPAH to 
provide fast build, sustainable and appropriate emergency housing and 
affordable rental housing to meet the needs of Australians rough sleeping 
and seeking appropriate housing, with the target of housing by 2020 all 
rough sleepers who seek to be housed. 
18.76 The committee notes the criticism levelled against NPAH but is strongly of 
the view that the partnership should be strengthen not jettisoned. NPAH is a necessary 
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mechanism that has the potential to make a real difference to housing homeless 
people. 
Recommendation 31 
18.77 Noting that much of the evidence presented before this committee was 
consistent with the ANAO's findings on the implementation of NPAH, the 
committee recommends that COAG establish a working group to review the 
ANAO's findings and reassess the implementation of NPAH to ensure that 
NPAH has: 
• clear performance measures that can be tracked and verified; 
• a requirement for states and territories to report to government on their 
expenditure on housing under NPAH complemented by a reporting 
framework that measures the implementation of reforms against set 
benchmarks and the extent to which they are being delivered on the 
ground;  
• Commonwealth funding linked to the achievement of agreed milestones; 
and 
• investigate Centrelink as a one stop shop to assist people experiencing or 
at risk of homelessness with referral and in-house expertise to link clients 
with services and housing. 
Recommendation 32 
18.78 The committee recommends that the Australian and state and territory 
governments recognise the important work of advocacy and peak organisations 
in housing and homelessness and provide adequate support to enable them to 
continue to deliver their much needed services. 
18.79 The committee recommends further that the Australian Government 
reinstate funding for the peak bodies that represent and provide advice on 
homelessness, community housing and housing and tenancy policy. 
Williams decision—implications for funding housing and homelessness 
18.80 The constitutional validity of Commonwealth funding agreements on 
affordable housing was another source of uncertainty raised during the course of the 
inquiry. This concern was based on the High Court's decision in 
Williams v Commonwealth of Australia, which found that the Commonwealth had 
acted beyond its executive power in entering into a funding arrangement with a 
private company to provide chaplaincy services in a Queensland government school. 
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In other words, the High Court found that the payments made under this agreement 
were not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth.98  
18.81 Although, this decision would not jeopardise all Commonwealth funding 
programs, it did raise doubt about the validity of some Commonwealth funding 
programs including the Department of Social Services' grant funding offers. On 
24 December 2014, the Minister for Social Services explained: 
As a result of developments in the background law and the High Court's 
Pape and Williams decisions; some programmes will require redesign to 
ensure conformity with the law. Some grant agreements will be of two 
years duration as that redesign process takes place. This will also help to 
ensure service providers have the scope and flexibility to be responsive, 
innovative and creative in meeting the needs of the community.99 
18.82 The minister made a similar statement on 30 January 2015: 
The Government has also sought to focus on areas of primary Federal 
responsibility, especially in light of the recent Williams Case that has 
reframed the funding framework for many services delivered in our 
communities, and removed the Federal Government from being able to 
provide direct funding, where previously it may have done so.100  
18.83 According to the Department of Social Services, the Williams decision may 
well have applied to the Commonwealth grants under its Housing and Homeless 
program. Referring to the government's decision to discontinue the grants round, 
Ms Hand noted (as explained earlier) that the department's review of its major grants 
program was to make the grants funding 'more streamlined and effective, to give 
better services with less duplication'. She explained further, however, that: 
…the review of housing and homelessness programs was done in that 
context, also taking into account the potential outcomes of the Williams 
case and legal developments.101 
18.84 According to Ms Hand, the Williams decision did 'not exactly' have 
implications for the federal government funding organisations such as Homelessness 
98  High Court of Australia, Ronald Williams v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors, [2012] 
HCA 23, 20 June 2012, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/judgment-
summaries/2012/hca23-2012-06-20.pdf (accessed 2 April 2015). 
99  The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Minister for Social Services, 'Department of Social Services 
Grant Funding Offers', 24 December 2014 http://scottmorrison.dss.gov.au/media-releases/1 
(accessed 24 March 2015). 
100  The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Minister for Social Services, 'Morrison to fill critical front line 
service gaps in Social Service grants', 30 January 2015, http://scottmorrison.dss.gov.au/media-
releases/morrison-to-fill-critical-front-line-service-gaps-in-social-service-grants 
(accessed 24 March 2015). 
101  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 16. 
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Australia, Community Housing Federation of Australia and National Shelter. Even so, 
she went on to state: 
In making decisions in this area, housing and homelessness, the legal 
implications are a consideration; they are not the only consideration. We are 
taking advice from AGS and AGD on this—Attorney-General's. They 
advise what heads of power exist for the Commonwealth and which do not, 
and the area of housing and homelessness, as you are probably aware, is 
very complex in this regard. So it is a consideration, but it is not the only 
consideration. 
… 
In some cases we are advised by Attorney-General's that there is no head of 
power for the Commonwealth to deliver housing and homelessness 
programs.102 
18.85 Another departmental officer, Mr Palmer, offered the following explanation: 
I think it is better to think about Williams as a prioritisation factor when 
looking at programs in a budget-constrained environment and determining 
which programs should be contributing more or less to budget savings. It 
was in that context that Williams was an informing factor, not a 
determinative factor, if that makes sense.103 
18.86 The committee found the department's explanation of the Williams decision 
and its flow-on effects for the Commonwealth grants to housing and homelessness 
less than satisfactory.  
Recommendation 33 
18.87 The committee notes that the advice provided to the committee on the 
Williams decision and the consequences for Commonwealth funding for housing 
and homelessness simply adds to the uncertainty around the future of 
Commonwealth funding in this area. The committee recommends that the 
Australian Government clarify what the consequences are for Commonwealth 
funding grants for housing and homelessness that flow from the Williams 
decision and how it intends to respond to them. 
 
102  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 17. 
103  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 20. 
 
                                              
  
Chapter 19 
National Affordable Housing Agreement  
19.1 In this chapter, the committee considers Commonwealth initiatives or 
programs that could contribute to, or are making, a material difference to improving 
people's access to affordable housing. The main focus, however, is on the National 
Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA). 
Background 
19.2 NAHA is a broad-ranging, ongoing housing agreement which commits a 
significant amount of Commonwealth funding to the states and territories through a 
national specific purpose payment.1 Commencing on 1 January 2009, NAHA replaced 
the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement and the Supported Accommodation 
Assistance Program.2 Its aspirational objective is for: 
…all Australians [to] have access to affordable, safe and sustainable 
housing that contributes to social and economic participation.3 
19.3 This agreement provides the overarching framework within which the 
Commonwealth and states and territories work together to 'improve housing 
affordability and homelessness outcomes for Australians'.4 In relation to the provision 
of social housing, NAHA aims to promote affordable, secure housing via allocations 
policies and support to those with multiple forms of disadvantage.5 According to the 
Department of Social Services, the agreement 'identifies individual and shared roles 
for the Commonwealth and the states, as well as performance benchmarks and reform 
directions'.6  
1  Submission 198, p. 27. 
2  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2015: Housing and homelessness, 
Volume G, produced by the Productivity Commission for the Steering Committee for the 
Review of Government Service Provision, p. G.2, 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-services/2015/housing-and-
homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-and-homelessness.pdf 
3  Council of Australian Governments, National Affordable Housing Agreement, p. 3, 
http://www.federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/content/national_agreements.aspx 
(accessed 18 March 2015). 
4  Ms Hand, Department of Social Services, Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 2.  
5  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 78, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
6  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 2.  
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19.4 National Partnership agreements (NPA) define the mutually agreed 
objectives, outcomes, outputs and performance benchmarks or milestones related to 
the delivery of specific projects, improvements in service delivery or reform. Of the 
NPAs that were established to support NAHA, two remain active: 
• the National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness; and 
• the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing. 
19.5 The agreements ensure that all levels of government are committed to the 
same framework of outcomes, measures of progress, and policy directions. In 2013–
14, the Australian Government provided $2.0 billion to state and territory 
governments for housing and homelessness services through NPAs in support of the 
NAHA.7 These agreements were considered in chapters on Indigenous Australians 
(chapter 17) and homelessness (chapter 18). 
Criticism of NAHA 
19.6 The Commonwealth contributes approximately $1.3 billion each year to the 
states and territories through NAHA8 and, as noted in the previous chapter, $115 
million through the NPAH.9 Despite this substantial contribution to affordable 
housing, many submitters criticised several aspects of the agreement and identified 
areas where the implementation of the agreement could be improved. 
Greater accountability and transparency 
19.7 A number of submitters cited the need to improve the agreement's 
accountability and transparency. For example, Ms Phillips, Australian Council of 
Social Service, noted the paucity of data on the number of new dwellings that have 
been constructed as a result of the agreements.10 JELD-WEN, a leading supplier of 
windows and doors, stated: 
There has been a gaping lack of information on program outcomes. The 
paucity of readily available information on the effectiveness of 
Commonwealth-funded State housing programs and initiatives has reduced 
transparency and diminished accountability and contributed to uncertainty 
about the value received from the commitment of scarce Commonwealth 
7  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2015: Housing and homelessness, 
Volume G, produced by the Productivity Commission for the Steering Committee for the 
Review of Government Service Provision, pp. G.5–6, 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-services/2015/housing-and-
homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-and-homelessness.pdf 
8  Portfolio Budget Statements 2014–15, Budget Related Paper No. 1.5A, Social Services 
Portfolio, p. 129, https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2014/2014-
2015_dss_pbs.pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). 
9  Submission 198, p. 33 and Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 2. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 28.  
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taxpayer funds to joint housing programs delivered by State 
Governments.11 
19.8 The National Shelter added that accountability mechanisms around housing 
needed to include accurate and publicly available data on a number of matters. They 
involved the 'overall supply of social and affordable housing, including an accounting 
for new developments, acquisitions, disposals and transfers between parts of the social 
housing system'.12  
19.9 Mr Flynn, Mission Australia, agreed that greater transparency would improve 
the system.13 The Council to Homeless Persons noted that NAHA moved to a single 
agreement that measured progress based on outcomes. In its view, not only have the 
outcomes defined in the agreement proved difficult to measure over the relevant 
funding periods, but this has led to reductions in many states' own revenue 
contributions to housing and homelessness assistance.14 Mr Myers, National 
Affordable Housing Consortium, compared the $1.3 billion put into NAHA with the 
result of 'a declining stock base and a lack of transparency'.15 He explained: 
The policy goals set out in NAHA are broad—but there are no mechanisms 
in there to see what investment is happening and what it is doing to the 
overall stock. Part of that investment could be competitive—across states, 
not-for-profits and partnerships with the private sector.16 
19.10 The Western Australian Local Government Association referred to a 'strong 
need to evaluate the effectiveness of the policies as part of the renegotiation of the 
NAHA', including taking account of local government concerns.17  
Tackling supply side 
19.11 Most witnesses agreed with the view that there was 'definitely a supply 
problem' with affordable housing.18 Master Builders Australia (MBA) was of the view 
that NAHA was flawed in its design in that it focused on the symptoms of the problem 
and not the causes. In its view, NAHA should be designed to clear the roadblocks to 
improved housing affordability rather than provide government subsidies and other 
forms of assistance.19 Mr Leitch, Department of Housing and Public Works, 
11  Submission 54, p. 4.  
12  Submission 78, p. 20. 
13  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 26. 
14  Submission 179, p. 3. 
15  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
16  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53.  
17  Submission 37, p. 4.  
18  Ms Hand and Mr Palmer, Department of Social Services, Proof Committee Hansard, 
11 February 2015, p. 15. 
19  Submission 48, p. 19. 
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Queensland, informed the committee that one of the things his department struggled 
with was that, while the last national affordable housing agreement spoke to broader 
affordable housing measures, there was 'nothing in there that actually puts the rubber 
on the road, so to speak'.20 
19.12 Mr Myers indicated that the National Affordable Housing Consortium would 
like to see the Commonwealth's activity focused on new supply and not necessarily on 
operational subsidies and to see a competitive arrangement for new supply.21 Dr 
Winter, AHURI, also explained that while the funds through NAHA were distributed 
on a per capita basis across the states, there was no incentive for spending those funds 
to generate new supply. He observed: 
Effectively state governments are using those funds to maintain a falling 
percentage of public housing dwellings across the country. We need a 
National Affordable Housing Agreement that links that expenditure to the 
creation of net new supply of affordable dwellings in Australia.22 
19.13 From Dr Winter's perspective, the current federal financial agreements do not 
link funds with supply. He suggested that NAHA needed to reintroduce and retie 
matching of funds with the creation of new affordable houses and have some of the 
'discipline of the old Commonwealth–State Housing Agreement'.23 
19.14 Mr Cant, Brisbane Housing Company Ltd, spoke of the latent equity in the 
current pool of public housing and the potential to use it to boost and renew the supply 
of affordable housing. He advocated strongly for maintaining and building on the 
current stock of social housing.24 With this objective in mind, Mr Cant suggested that 
funding through NAHA be made conditional to ensure that the stock of social housing 
was protected and that there was reinvestment in this stock. He added: 
If we have this model where 400,000 dwellings are going to be made fit for 
purpose over a 20-year period—they are going to be aligned to be the right 
size for the demographic, they are going to be new, they are going to be 
purpose-built and they are going to be in the right locations—that is where 
the money should be conditioned. Someone in Canberra would say, 'You 
can have the money provided you demonstrate to us that it is serving this 
purpose'.25 
19.15 Consistent with the overall thrust of evidence, Ms Croce, Community 
Housing Federation of Australia, argued that as part of a growth strategy, NAHA 
20  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 45. 
21  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 53. 
22  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 20.  
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 20. 
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 64.  
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 64. 
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should be reformed substantially in order to refocus the agreement 'on growing the 
supply of affordable housing'.26 
Adequacy of funds 
19.16 Dr Milligan, City Futures Research Centre, referred to the forerunner to 
NAHA, the Commonwealth–State Housing Agreement. She noted that the money put 
into that agreement as capital was 'insufficient to retain continuing growth in that 
system'. In her view, instead of developing additional public housing, the money was 
used to underwrite the operating losses of the state housing authorities.27 Dr Milligan 
explained that NAHA was an attempt to reset the agenda for the supply of affordable 
housing and to maintain and modernise existing public housing.28 According to 
Dr Milligan, however, the funding base essentially remained the same, except with a 
small indexation factor, which did not address the fundamental deficit problem. Also, 
the requirements on the states to match funding and to provide certain levels of 
investment into new supply were dropped.29 She argued: 
…whoever delivers the housing has to be able to deliver it in a way where 
the revenue and the subsidy meet their costs, and a national government has 
an interest in ensuring that there is an adequate level of public housing or 
social housing or community housing commensurate with measured 
needs.30 
19.17 Mr Leitch, Queensland Department of Housing and Public Works, also noted 
that the agreement was an aspirational goal. Further, the funding stream that sat within 
NAHA was 'similar to that that came through the Commonwealth–State Housing 
Agreement before it'.31 
19.18 Despite this criticism about the lack of accountability and transparency; the 
need to focus on boosting the supply of affordable housing; and the inadequacy of 
funding, no one suggested that NAHA should be abandoned. For example, the Youth 
Affairs Council of Western Australia noted that schemes such as NAHA must be 
continued and developed to ensure that young people do not experience high levels of 
housing stress, which may have detrimental effects on their future.32 While critical, 
many witnesses offered advice on ways to improve NAHA. 
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
27  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 38. 
28  Dr Milligan was involved in policy negotiations for many years around the Commonwealth 
State Housing Agreement, which preceded the National Affordable Housing Agreement. 
Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, pp 37–38. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 38. 
30  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 38. 
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 45.  
32  Submission 166, p. [2]. 
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Areas for improvement 
19.19 In particular, some witnesses saw the need for the government not only to 
articulate the purpose of NAHA clearly and definitely—to increase the supply of 
affordable housing—but to ensure that funding was tied to this objective. Further, the 
reporting mechanism around the funding should be more robust and transparent, 
producing accurate and reliable data on how money was being spent and the results—
number of new dwellings, acquisitions, dispatches, developments and transfers.  
19.20 The committee has discussed the value that would flow to community housing 
providers with the transfer of public housing stock including title to that sector. In its 
submission, Shelter WA suggested that through NAHA, the Commonwealth and 
states and territories reaffirm their commitment to transfer a substantial proportion of 
social housing stock to community housing organisations to facilitate growth. This 
undertaking would include title transfer to ensure properties could be used to leverage 
investment in new housing, within the context of a clear overall growth strategy for 
the social housing sector.33 Dr Clark referred to NAHA and the national partnership 
agreements that sit beneath it. She accepted that there was a lack of accountability: no 
real template or outcomes that required performance reporting. In her view, however:  
…the new federal government are in an ideal position to insist on the 
outcomes and the type of reporting they would like to see and to show this 
leadership, not just withdrawing millions of dollars of funding to the states 
but to insist that the money does not just go to admin fees for large 
departments and contract managers and that it is seen as an investment in 
this area to save money later.34 
19.21 Ms Palumbo suggested that NAHA provided the Australian Government with 
the best lever for reform. She explained: 
When the Commonwealth drives reform, things happen; when it is left to 
the states, our experience has been that things meander. So a really driven 
reform that is actually attached to that agreement is probably the most 
effective way we can look at genuine change, where that agreement says 
that we actually want to have a mixed model, we want a multi-provider 
system, we want to see different business models operating in this state, not 
an old and tried monolithic model that means that nobody can really do 
anything other than on the fringes.35 
19.22 National Shelter recommended that COAG embed NAHA as a permanent part 
of its decision-making and expand it to include all forms of housing assistance. Its 
coverage would include 'funding for social housing, funding for affordable rental 
33  Submission 174, p. 18. 
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40.  
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40. 
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housing, rent assistance, programs to support home ownership and homelessness 
programs'.36 
19.23 The Community Housing Federation of Australia advocated the establishment 
of an affordable housing growth fund that would ensure the states and territories 
receive money on a per capita basis but would have to meet specific targets.37 The 
Council to Homeless Persons stated its belief that the NAHA needed to be split into 
three funding streams—an operating stream (funded on a per dwelling basis), a capital 
stream and a homelessness support stream (both funded on a per capita basis).38 
Certainty of funding 
19.24 As noted earlier, many submitters referred to the uncertainty surrounding 
funding arrangements for affordable housing and homelessness. Some spoke of a 'stop 
and go' approach to housing policy. According to Mr Leitch, it was an imperative to 
get clarity about how the funding for the next year was going to be treated in terms of 
how the Queensland Department of Housing and Public Works would respond.39 
Mr Comrie noted that the community housing sector was becoming increasingly 
apprehensive about talk of the possible withdrawal of funding for NAHA and 
NPAH.40 
Government's response 
19.25 The Commonwealth Government has expressed interest in examining ways to 
improve the operation of NAHA to ensure greater transparency and accountability as 
well as having incentives that would increase the supply of dwellings.41 In 
February 2015, Ms Hand told the committee that for some time the government had 
been grappling with NAHA and the lack of real metrics or performance measures to 
assess whether supply was 'actually increasing in terms of the funding that is going to 
the states to deliver houses'. She explained: 
The former minister, Minister Andrews, was very keen to see some reform 
to that agreement to make it much more transparent and accountable, and to 
have performance metrics to try to influence and see some progress in the 
area of supply. As I said, there is $6.5 billion from the Commonwealth and 
that does not count what the states and territories put in that goes to the 
issue of solving housing supply and affordability. Yet, as you just said, it is 
still a big issue. The department has definitely looked at this with the 
36  Submission 78, p. 27. 
37  Ms Croce, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
38  Submission 197, p. 5. 
39  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 49. 
40  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 48. Also refer to paragraphs 15.64–15.66, 
17.30–17.31, 18.61–18.71 and 22.40 of this report. 
41  Submission 198, p. 33.  
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current government as to how we increase the accountability mechanisms to 
actually deliver these houses.42 
19.26 The Department of Social Services informed the committee that the 
Commonwealth was committed to working with all state and territory governments to 
achieve better results.43 
Conclusion 
19.27 The criticism levelled at NAHA during the inquiry was designed to be 
constructive and to offer suggestions on how this agreement could be more effective 
especially in adding to the supply of affordable housing. There was concern about the 
lack of sound data, the difficulty in measuring outcomes and poor reporting and 
evaluation processes.  
19.28 Clearly there is a need to restore and build people's confidence in NAHA and 
provide assurance that the money being spent on affordable housing is making a 
difference as intended. In addition, accountability should be strengthened so that 
outcomes can be linked back directly to the funding dedicated to that purpose and can 
be measured and evaluated. With this in mind, the committee makes the following 
recommendation. 
Recommendation 34 
19.29 The committee recommends that through COAG, NAHA be 
reinvigorated with particular emphasis on improving accountability and 
transparency. The committee recommends that the following particular reforms 
of NAHA should be considered and acted upon: 
• expand the agreement to include all forms of housing assistance—funding 
for social housing, affordable rental housing, rent assistance and the 
various programs to support people to remain housed;   
• develop measurable benchmarks and ensure these benchmarks are used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of government expenditure on affordable 
housing; 
• improve the collection and publication of data, especially on the number 
of new homes added to the pool of social housing; and 
• ensure that funding is tied directly to concrete outcomes, for example, by 
tightening conditions on Commonwealth funding to the states that would 
realise growth in the stock of social housing. 
42  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 15.  
43  Submission 198, p. 31. 
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19.30 Furthermore, the committee understands the area of housing and 
homelessness is to be considered as part of the broader Federation White Paper 
process and consequently makes the following recommendation. 
Recommendation 35 
19.31 The committee recommends that the Federation White Paper process 
consider carefully NAHA in this critical area of transparency and accountability. 
Importantly, that the committee's findings feed into the White Paper process 
with the aim to improve NAHA so that a robust evaluation and reporting 
framework is established ensuring that the funds allocated to improving 
affordable housing can be tracked and the intended outcomes measured and 
evaluated. 
 

  
Chapter 20 
National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) 
20.1 The National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) is a partnership between 
the Australian Government and the states and territories to invest in affordable rental 
housing. It is a $6.0 billion initiative intended to stimulate the supply of affordable 
rental homes across Australia.1 In this chapter, the committee examines NRAS and its 
implementation. 
NRAS objectives 
20.2 NRAS aims to: 
• increase the supply of new affordable rental housing; 
• reduce rental costs for low and moderate income households; and 
• encourage large-scale investment and innovative delivery of affordable 
housing.2 
20.3 From its commencement in 2008, the scheme sought to address the shortage 
of affordable rental housing. It was designed to bring forward additional housing 
supply by offering annual financial incentives to private investors and community 
organisations to build and rent homes to low and moderate income households at a 
rate that was at least 20 per cent below market rates.3 
20.4 It should be noted that some community housing providers rent out their 
properties at an even more generous rate. For example, Ms Croce noted that members 
of the Community Housing Federation of Australia did not go above 74.9 per cent of 
market rates—which was linked to tax concessions and to maintaining charitable 
status.4 According to the Community Housing Council of South Australia, this 
reduced rent meant that tenants were less likely to experience housing stress. 
Professor Beer noted that NRAS in some ways tried to emulate the German financing 
model by giving tax breaks and tax subsidies to support and underpin long-term 
tenancies.5 
1  Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 31. 
2  Portfolio Budget Statements 2014–15, Budget Related Paper No. 1.5A, Social Services 
Portfolio, p. 133, https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2014/2014-
2015_dss_pbs.pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). 
3  Submission 198, p. 31 and Mr Somerville, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, 
p. 57.  
4  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 15. 
5  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 17. 
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Incentives 
20.5 The annual incentives available to NRAS providers last for ten years, are 
indexed annually for the rental component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 
comprise two parts. The incentive values for 2014–2015 were: 
• a Commonwealth Government incentive of $7,996 per dwelling per year as a 
refundable tax offset or payment; and 
• a state or territory contribution of $2,665.6 
The total amount came to $10,661.  
20.6 When announced, the original proposal was for an initial round of 50,000 
incentives. If the scheme proved successful and investors came on board, another 
50,000 incentives were to be considered.7 Mr Pisarski, National Shelter, argued that in 
order to get institutional investment on board, that scale of program was needed to 
create the momentum to attract institutions.8 
20.7 Mr Pisarski, who was involved in the design of NRAS when it was first under 
consideration, proposed NRAS as a national rental affordability incentive rather than 
as a scheme. He observed that: 
…as soon as you call something a scheme, people expect it to do far more 
than it was perhaps ever designed to do. We called it an incentive 
deliberately because it was supposed to be used in conjunction with other 
things in our minds. It was not a stand-alone thing that was going to fix this 
problem.9  
20.8 According to Mr Pisarski, NRAS was implemented differently from the initial 
recommendations. He explained that the summit group's implementation proposal 
intended the scheme to be applied 'more at scale in a portfolio approach so that it 
worked with other things'.10 He stated: 
We always thought that it would take at least six years to generate 
institutional investment and that, in the first place, it would still follow a 
pattern of mum and dad investors being the ones to invest, until we could 
create the vehicles and sorts of banking processes that might agglomerate 
6  Department of Social Services, National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS), NRAS 
Incentive (indexation) 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/04_2014/nras_incentive_indexation_facts
heet_-_dss_template_-_indexation_update_april_2014_2.pdf (accessed 23 February 2015) and 
Realestate, 'What is NRAS: the National Rental Affordability Scheme', 
http://www.realestate.com.au/blog/what-is-the-national-rental-affordability-scheme/ 
(accessed 23 February 2015).  
7  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39. 
8  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39.  
9  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
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some of that smaller investment into larger investments to really drive it 
more as an institutional investment vehicle.11 
20.9 The summit group involved in the early discussion on the design of NRAS 
was of the view that the government's targets should have been more modest: that they 
were too ambitious. Even so, Mr Pisarski explained that NRAS had exceeded the 
estimates that the summit group thought it would reach.12 
Support for NRAS 
20.10 A diverse range of organisations and individuals supported NRAS including 
community housing providers, researchers, academics, think tanks, state 
representatives and organisations advocating for groups with particular housing needs 
such as older Australians, those with disability and women experiencing domestic 
violence.13  
20.11 When explaining their reasons for endorsing the scheme, many witnesses 
highlighted the scheme's achievements and the many examples of where it had 
worked well.14 The Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA) was among the 
numerous organisations that recognised NRAS' achievements in boosting the supply 
of affordable housing. From the UDIA's perspective, NRAS had been successful in 
providing tens of thousands of homes affordable to those on low incomes.15 Likewise, 
COTA noted that NRAS had made 'a very useful contribution to increasing the supply 
of affordable housing, particularly in locations close to services'.16 In its submission, 
Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast supported NRAS' continued rollout.17 
20.12 Mr Schrapel, Uniting Communities, thought that by and large NRAS had 
produced a very good result. He understood that, even though some cases indicated 
that the scheme may not have been targeted as well as originally intended, it had 
brought a lot of new properties into the market that would not otherwise have been 
there for lower income households.18 Ms Croce, Community Housing Federation of 
Australia, described the scheme as: 
11  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
12  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
13  There are too many submitters that supported the continuation of NRAS to list here but see for 
example, City of Perth, Submission 43, pp. 1–2; National Shelter, Submission 78, pp. 12–13; 
Tenants Union of Victoria, Submission 119, pp. 9–10; Shelter WA, Submission 174, p. 2.  
14  Mr Flynn, Mission Australia, Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 26. 
15  Submission 190, p. 14. See also Grace Mutual Limited, Submission 1; Neumann and Turnour 
Lawyers, Submission 20, p. 3.  
16  Submission 191, p. 4. 
17  Submission 74, p. 45. 
18  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 36.  
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…a significant driver in the supply of affordable housing to people who do 
not qualify for public housing or who are not going to get in because they 
are too low on the waiting list but who are struggling to pay high rents in 
the private rental market.19  
20.13 Likewise, the City Futures Research Centre acknowledged NRAS as: 
…the most significant local policy innovation so far, generating as it has 
considerable investor demand and a momentum for a new public private co-
financed model of affordable rental supply.20 
20.14 The Tenants Union of Victoria held the view that NRAS was one of the 
important supply side interventions that made a positive difference. In other words, 
NRAS addressed the allocation problem and dealt with affordability.21 Ms Young 
stated that NRAS had been very successful as a tool in a number of areas: 
For a start it did deliver a housing construction industry where there was 
none. It did stimulate the economy. It did save a number of developers. It 
did increase housing supply in a period in which there was a huge downturn 
at that time. It was very successful just for that alone—it gave people jobs 
in construction. It did increase the supply of housing. What are we up to—
35,000 or something approvals right now? That is housing that probably 
would never have been delivered without that program. And there are 
people who are very grateful for the opportunity to be able to rent a home, 
have a home, at 75 per cent of market rent, where they would not have been 
able to afford one otherwise. Hopefully those people are also saving to buy 
their own homes, because that is the outcome that we also wanted out of 
that. I think it was very successful.22 
20.15 Ms Palumbo argued that NRAS was a desperately-needed subsidy to provide 
social housing. It provided innovative ways for the community housing sector to form 
partnerships and to achieve genuine results that added value to the government's 
investment.23 As chair of the Community Housing Council of South Australia, 
Ms Palumbo gave the example of a building that was close to completion: 
That building cost $15 million, with 52 apartments. The government's 
contribution was 60 per cent, and Common Ground's contribution has been 
40 per cent. So, of the 52 apartments, 20 of those have come from private 
funding. Fifteen of those are because of NRAS—with NRAS, we have been 
able to finance 15 of those units—and five of them have come from the 
corporate sector. So there are an extra 20 units going to homeless people 
that have come purely from NRAS and corporate support, which then adds 
value to the government's additional investment of 60 per cent of that 
19  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
20  Submission 152, p. 9. 
21  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 43.  
22  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 31. 
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 39.  
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building. That is a simple example of bringing together as many incentives 
as you can, to be innovative about products to meet demand.24 
20.16 She noted, however, that NRAS should not replace government investment in 
affordable housing, which would always be needed.25  
20.17 Mr Myers, National Affordable Housing Consortium, told the committee that 
NRAS had delivered 2,800 dwellings in Queensland in the last five years, all with 
private investment and well above the average of delivery on a per capita basis. He 
explained: 
We borrow other people's capital and make the affordable housing equation 
work…I can tell you right now that, because we operate under that system, 
26 per cent of people in NRAS housing in our portfolio are on a disability 
support pension…A third of those people were also on the public housing 
waiting list. So we can demonstrate that this is the gap in the market that we 
keep saying needs much more sophisticated filling so that people can move 
into products that are more suited to their income and household needs.26 
20.18 The committee has referred to the Penny Lane Key Worker housing 
apartments. The City of Perth noted that the viability of its investment in this 
development 'was underpinned by the receipt of NRAS funding'.27 
Delivering diversity of housing 
20.19 NRAS has been able to support the building of affordable housing for a range 
of Australians from essential service workers on low to moderate incomes to people 
on a pension. Dr Burgmann, NSW Federation of Housing Associations, stated that 
New South Wales had a lot of the NRAS projects approved for community housing 
and included a small amount of capital funding from the state government as well: 
So it was part of a package that [was] allowed to deliver social housing as 
well as affordable housing, and perhaps some for sale. Curiously, though, 
the NRAS part is what allows there to be some housing developed for the 
very low income. The projects that are entirely around key workers or 
perhaps a mix of properties for sale and some retained for affordable 
housing are the ones that might still be able to attract direct private 
investment with some of the larger community housing providers in the 
absence of NRAS.28  
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 39. 
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 39.  
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54.  
27  Submission 43, pp. 1–2. 
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 14. 
 
                                              
346  
20.20 Dr Burgmann argued that NRAS allowed the housing industry to meet that 
broader suite of needs.29 Along similar lines, the Community Housing Council of 
South Australia noted that community housing providers had 'used the NRAS to 
develop mixed models of housing that promote social inclusion and community 
benefit'.30 
Facility for tenants to improve 
20.21 The committee has discussed how people occupying social housing are 
discouraged from gaining employment or working extra hours in case they lose their 
eligibility for such housing and are forced into the more expensive and less secure 
private rental market. Ms Croce explained that if a tenant in one of their community 
houses remained above the income threshold for a period of time then they were 
required to vacate. She explained that community housing providers try to find such 
tenants another property within their portfolio, so they are not totally being moved out 
of the community-housing organisation. Thus, because of the diversity of housing 
provided through NRAS, this scheme offered the potential to encourage mobility from 
social housing to affordable private rental properties, even home ownership. Ms Croce 
elaborated:  
The idea at the beginning of NRAS was that we would have a big enough 
portfolio so that when somebody became income ineligible you could move 
the incentive to another location for somebody who was eligible, so the 
person would not have to leave their property.31  
20.22 Ms Croce acknowledged that this broad objective had not eventuated because 
the industry had not had the time to accumulate that kind of stock or have the 
flexibility, in the way it was administered, to do that.32 In this regard, it should be 
noted, as Ms Coleman observed, that it was: 
…pretty rough to critique something which went out into the market on the 
assumption of attracting private investment right at the time that the private 
investment market pretty much collapsed with the global financial crisis.33 
20.23 Mr Somerville, NRAS Providers Ltd, also drew attention to the fact that the 
scheme was introduced in the middle of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) at a time 
when the banks were very hesitant and valuers were very negative. In his view: 
It took some time to overcome that inertia. Certainly, there has been 
criticism of the design and the management of the scheme, but the actual 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 14. 
30  Submission 99, p. 1. 
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 15. 
32  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 15. 
33  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57. See also Ms Milne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 21. 
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delivery of over 20,000—at the last published records, and we are guessing 
in the high 20,000s now—we believe is successful.34  
20.24 He concluded that 'the tenancy demographics from that are very, very strong, 
straight out of the textbook'.35 
Building partnerships and attracting private investment 
20.25 The Community Housing Federation of Australia suggested that one of the 
benefits of NRAS had been the partnerships it had facilitated across the not-for-profit, 
for-profit, development, and financial sectors.36 Ms Croce from the Federation noted 
that many NRAS projects were joint ventures with different developers and mixed 
tenure. She stated that they were able to build sustainable communities with some 
private sales, some NRAS and some social housing.37 According to Ms Croce, NRAS 
brought direct private investment into the affordable housing arena and significantly 
increased the community housing providers' engagement with financial institutions—
it brought them into the arena. In her words, financial institutions saw 'our capacity to 
be able to manage and build affordable housing'.38  
20.26 Mr Somerville, who represented NRAS providers, indicated that they were all 
very much aware of the highly publicised failings of the NRAS scheme. As an 
association they were very strong supporters of the scheme, convinced that, as a 
supply stimulus, NRAS had been 'incredibly effective': 
It has created a mechanism which has enabled a combination of private 
equity, the private sector, community-housing providers and the 
government to work in collaboration. We believe that the delivery of NRAS 
under that [model] was successful, given that it had a substantial amount of 
inertia to overcome in its initial stages.39 
20.27 At a regional level, Ms Kerrie Young, a non-executive director of Horizon 
Housing, also spoke of the effective partnerships that developed between community 
housing providers and developers. She cited the comments contained in a report based 
on stakeholder consultation and feedback indicating that two-thirds of the respondents 
felt that the supply of affordable housing on the Gold Coast was improving due to the 
work of the not-for-profit groups and NRAS. Giving evidence in Brisbane, she 
explained: 
The increase in supply of affordable housing on the Gold Coast was 
actually promoted by the non-for-profit groups, particularly Horizon 
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 52. 
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 52.  
36  Submission 171, pp. 2, 5–7 and 14. 
37  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 14.  
38  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
39  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 52. 
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Housing, which is located on the Gold Coast. They made sure that they 
partnered with private developers while that stock was being delivered, and 
they got approvals on behalf of developers. So the awareness down there 
I think was probably quite good, given that the partnerships that were 
created by the not-for-profit community housing organisations. Also the 
Gold Coast City Council is a shareholder of Horizon Housing, so they were 
partners also.40 
20.28 Ms Young observed that Horizon Housing was a very early adopter of NRAS 
in Queensland, with over 200 approvals during the early rounds which increased to 
1,400 approvals being managed by the organisation. She noted that 'a lot of people 
who were on unemployment benefits and disability pensions were occupying the 
NRAS housing'.41  
NRAS and the states 
20.29 Ms Young noted that while NRAS was a federal government overarching 
structure, each state was responsible for administering the scheme in its jurisdiction 
and as a consequence, each state had a different experience.42 As an example, 
Queensland supported and adopted the scheme 'very strongly at the outset'.43 
Queensland 
20.30 According to representatives from the Queensland Department of Housing 
and Public Works, NRAS had been 'particularly successful and well targeted' in that 
state.44 Mr Somerville, NRAS Providers Ltd, agreed with this assessment. In his view, 
the Queensland Government had a much higher level of control, with far more rigid 
requirements through the application and management processes. Mr Somerville noted 
that the state government also embraced the scheme and contrasted Queensland's keen 
acceptance of it with the more tentative approach taken by some other states.45 
He explained that a number of the other states said, 'Let's just see how it goes and then 
test it out.'46 According to Mr Somerville: 
South Australia, for example, said, 'We're limited with the amount of 
money we've got so we'll only take seven per cent.' I think Western 
Australia said, 'We're 10 per cent of the population so we'll take 10 per 
cent.' Victoria said, 'We're not sure.' They held back in some of the earlier 
40  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 31.  
41  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 28–29. 
42  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 29. 
43  Mr David Somerville, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54. 
44  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 42. 
45  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54. 
46  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54.  
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rounds. They did not participate in the shovel-ready at all. Queensland said, 
'We'll take all the surplus.'47 
20.31 In summary, Mr Somerville noted: 
When the floods [in Queensland] occurred they [Queensland Government] 
said, 'We'll have another 5,000 NRAS.' So they had the additional numbers, 
the additional resources, and it was much more tightly managed.48 
20.32 Mr Walker, Department of Housing and Public Works, Queensland, was of 
the view that NRAS in Queensland had been particularly successful and well targeted. 
He informed the committee that: 
As at the end of August 2014, Queensland had 10,503 approved NRAS 
incentives and had delivered 8,483 NRAS dwellings. Some 
10,180 households have benefited from NRAS tenancy since commencing 
in 2008 and of these over 76 per cent were on incomes of less than 
$50,000 per annum and 37 per cent earnt less than $30,000 per annum. 
Twenty-eight per cent of those NRAS clients had been listed on the housing 
register here in Queensland for social housing, with over 50 per cent with 
high or very high housing need.49 
20.33 According to Mr Walker, as well as income limits set by the Australian 
Government, Queensland established additional eligibility criteria for NRAS tenants 
to ensure the new supply of affordable housing was well targeted. In Queensland, 
NRAS tenants must meet residency requirements, not own residential property and be 
under liquid asset limits. Queensland has a single register of applicants for NRAS 
properties and fair and accessible processes for eligible households to register as 
prospective NRAS tenants. Furthermore, Mr Walker explained that most applications 
were submitted through efficient online forms; and its NRAS tenancy management 
had the flexibility to determine which applicant was offered an NRAS property.50 
20.34 Mr Walker stated that, as a result of these additional measures, Queensland 
avoided situations that were occurring in some other jurisdictions where taxpayer 
subsidised NRAS properties were being occupied by international students.51 
South Australia  
20.35 The Community Housing Council of South Australia stated that in South 
Australia, the NRAS program had meant 'significant growth in both affordable and 
47  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 55. 
48  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54. 
49  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 42. 
50  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 42. 
51  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 42. 
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high needs dwellings, which would not have been possible without the NRAS 
subsidy'.52 
20.36 Despite the strong support for NRAS, a number of witnesses drew attention to 
weaknesses that have undermined its performance.  
Efficiency in delivery 
20.37 According to NRAS Providers Ltd, both the government and providers 
acknowledged there was room to improve efficiency in delivering NRAS dwellings. It 
referred to the need for better alignment of government assessment and market 
delivery.53 JELD-WEN indicated that some NRAS incentives had been allocated to 
tenderers that did not have sites for the commencement of rental housing. In its view, 
it was implausible that NRAS incentives could be approved without tenderers 
submitting proposed developments on actual sites.54  
20.38 The Central Highlands Local Area Service Network maintained that the 
challenge for NRAS was to ensure that proper controls were instigated and monitored 
according to the scheme's intended purpose. Reflecting on the implementation of the 
scheme, the Network suggested that strict eligibility should have been implemented 
when assessing the proposed tenants for NRAS housing.55 It suggested that had 
NRAS kept to its intended purpose the scheme could have delivered much needed 
affordable housing.56 
Accountability 
20.39 Ms Findlater Smith, National Council of Women of Australia, referred to the 
apparent lack of accountability, where in some cases little was known about what the 
NRAS money was actually being spent on. She questioned the accountability of 
schemes where: 
…the Commonwealth hands over the money and does not say, as with any 
good governance, 'What have you done with it? Show us where you spent it 
and we'll see if it is worthwhile giving you the next lot.'57 
20.40 JELD-WEN also criticised NRAS for poor accountability. It referred to 'a 
glaring need for a report card on the cost-effectiveness of and outcomes achieved from 
Commonwealth housing and related expenditure', including NRAS and NAHA.58 
52  Submission 99, p. 1. 
53  Submission 31, p. 7. 
54  Submission 54, pp. 4–5.  
55  Submission 55, p. 1.  
56  Submission 55, p. 1.  
57  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57. 
58  Submission 54, p. 4. 
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Ms Young agreed that more accountability was required—having someone with 
development experience actually monitoring what is going on with the development 
projects.59 In Mr Cant's view, grants, such as NRAS, must be made conditional on 
new supply.60 
Bureaucracy 
20.41 The Property Council of Australia made a number of observations about 
NRAS including that some participants had been concerned about repetitious and 
costly tendering processes in rounds 1–3. It noted further that applications for new 
developments were often delayed by unnecessary bureaucracy, undermining 
Australia's competitiveness and impeding housing affordability. Other issues 
identified by the Property Council were concerned with there being no formalised 
timeframes for tendering rounds and no set approval timeframes.61  
20.42 Ms Young, who personally put some NRAS proposals together on behalf of 
developers and community organisations, also referred to the red tape involved. 
Indeed, she found 'masses of paperwork' to complete.62 Grace Mutual Limited referred 
to delays in processing applications and unclear, complex and poorly drafted 
regulations and law that 'hurt the program'.63  
20.43 From the Queensland government's perspective, Mr Walker pointed to the 
need for 'greater role clarity of funding and administrative simplicity between state 
and Commonwealth governments, particularly around housing assistance'. He also 
argued for better targeting, equity and subsidies received by low- to-middle-income 
earners to improve access to affordable housing.64 
20.44 Anglicare WA indicated that NRAS remained overly complex and program 
requirements created barriers to access for vulnerable people.65 
Effective targeting   
20.45 In its submission, the Property Council stated that the fundamental problem 
with a single national NRAS incentive was that it applied a 'one-size-fits-all' approach 
across national property markets and building types. It argued that policy goals such 
59  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 30.  
60  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 61.  
61  Submission 212, pp. 5, 8. 
62  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 30. 
63  Submission 1, p. 1.  
64  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 43. 
65  Submission 161, p. 9. 
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as increasing affordable housing in specific locales or supplying more apartments 
were made more difficult because of this model.66 
20.46 The Women's Housing Company suggested that the government could 
maximise the benefits of NRAS for disadvantaged Australians with better targeting of 
the program. It stated: 
Greater consideration should be given to the geographic location of the 
NRAS incentives granted to ensure those regions with the poorest housing 
affordability and suitability for disadvantaged groups receive more 
incentives. For example, in Western Sydney it is very difficult to rent 
appropriate housing for single women as the housing stock is 
predominantly 3‐bedroom.67 
20.47 Mr O'Brien, Tenants Union of Victoria, also wanted to emphasise the 
importance of the allocation process of housing supply. He argued there was a spatial 
dimension to the problem with NRAS in that there was a need to find ways to inject 
affordable supply into less affordable markets. He explained that one of NRAS' 
shortcomings stemmed from it being geared around market rents—80 per cent of the 
market rent. In his view, this approach was less useful in high-value suburbs: 
If you want to deliver affordable rents in high-value suburbs, you need a 
deeper subsidy, so you probably need a different kind of supply model to 
have affordable rents in those better amenity suburbs.68 
20.48 Mrs Julie Morris, National Council of Women of Australia, suggested that if 
the Commonwealth were going to tie NRAS to dollars and outcomes, the scheme 
needed to be targeted geographically to where constituents who need affordable 
housing are located, particularly in cities. This specific targeting would mean, for 
example, that older members of the community living close to the city would not have 
to disrupt their lives to move out to suburbs on the fringes.69 In her view, the 
Commonwealth should be setting such targets.70 
Rural areas  
20.49 Professor Fiona Haslam McKenzie, Curtin University, noted that NRAS did 
not have 'a substantial profile in rural, regional and remote areas of Western Australia' 
and more generally had only a marginal effect on affordable housing in those 
communities.71 Noting that the scheme was 'premised on a level of demand and 
therefore scale derived from economic efficiency', she indicated that some small, 
66  Submission 212, p. 5.  
67  Submission 52, p. 3.  
68  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 44. 
69  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57. 
70  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57. 
71  Submission 41, p. 6. 
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remote communities could never achieve the required degree of scale to ensure 
viability at the local level.72  
20.50 In Professor Haslam McKenzie's view, if programs such as NAHA and NRAS 
were to have any bearing in rural, regional and remote communities, the structure of 
programs would have to change significantly. She suggested that local agencies do not 
have the capacity to coordinate or manage the processes for these schemes.73 
Attracting investment 
20.51 In their submission, Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry recognised 
that while NRAS was a very important new tool for attracting investment, it was yet to 
generate 'suitable levels of interest from long-term institutional investors in the wake 
of the GFC and ongoing uncertainty of policy support'.74 
20.52 Mr Kerry Doss noted the Brisbane City Council's struggle to get take-up of 
NRAS schemes. He explained that generally developers or other potential partners 
were more interested in the ability to achieve better profit margins, which outstripped 
the incentive the Council was able to offer. According to Mr Doss, there were other 
disincentives: 
We were putting in place a rental guarantee system, and I know that, to get 
finance for those projects, there were limits on the periods for which those 
rental guarantees could operate, and they had to be kept under 10 years; 
otherwise, the banks did not really want to provide finance to those sites. 
The other thing was that to go and monitor that those units had been let at 
the required rate below market value was difficult—and the ongoing 
monitoring of that.75 
20.53 Ms Young referred to the development industry not understanding what was 
involved with NRAS, so, in her view, better education was needed. She noted that the 
federal government's tax incentive and the cash payment from the state were 
acceptable to the private investors who bought those homes and put them into the 
scheme.76  
Specific concerns—international students and trading incentives 
20.54 Aside from the criticism relating to accountability, red tape, better targeting 
and flexibility with a one-size-fits-all approach, some witnesses were concerned about 
two specific matters—NRAS funding accommodation for students from overseas and 
72  Submission 41, pp. 6–7. 
73  Submission 41, pp. 6–7. 
74  Submission 24, p. 9. 
75  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 6.  
76  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 29.  
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the trading of incentives. Indeed, the Department of Social Services cited these as two 
particular areas where the implementation of NRAS had given rise for concern.77 
University students—international students 
20.55 The Tenants Union of Victoria noted that NRAS had played an important role 
in bringing private finance to increase the amount of affordable housing in Australia. 
But it also referred to recent negative media coverage reporting allegations that NRAS 
had been 'rorted to provide accommodation for wealthy international students, and 
that foreign investors, brokers and small time investors' were exploiting NRAS tax 
breaks.78 
20.56 In this regard, Ms Hand, Department of Social Services, informed the 
committee that on average in the past year, 58 per cent of student accommodation 
allocated under NRAS went to foreign students.79 She stated that the department was 
trying to ensure that, where relevant, preference would be given to 'Australian 
students in need, particularly those from low- to moderate-income families'.80 
Her colleague, Mr Bryan Palmer, understood that international students occupied a 
high percentage of Monash University's NRAS accommodation.81  
20.57 According to Ms Hand, at the time of the scheme's design there was no 
specific discussion or wording in the legislation around foreign students.82 Clarifying 
this statement further, she explained that the current legislation and regulations did not 
preclude students from overseas. She suggested that a review of NRAS would be 
looking at ways to tighten up this area of the scheme as part of its aim to enhance 
NRAS.83 
20.58 Mr Somerville stated quite clearly that he and all the members of NRAS 
Providers were 'pretty devastated when the universities got entitlements because it just 
seemed to be counter to the intention of the scheme'.84 Mr Liam Foley, Urban 
Development Institute of Australia, conceded that the allocation of NRAS to housing 
overseas students was an example of where the scheme had not operated to its best but 
was not 'representative of the scheme in its entirety'.85 
77  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 3.  
78  Submission 119, p. 10. 
79  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 4.  
80  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 4.  
81  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, pp. 5, 6–7. See also Mr Liam Foley, Urban 
Development Institute of Australia (National), Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 69. 
82  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 5.  
83  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 6.  
84  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 55. 
85  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 69. 
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20.59 Mr Yates, COTA, observed that universities using NRAS to expand student 
accommodation was probably not part of the scheme's original intention. 
He suggested that COTA was keen for NRAS to be tightened up in terms of its focus 
'to support community, church and charitable organisations and so on'. The Council 
would have had 'no difficulty with a tightening of the eligibility criteria for NRAS 
tenants'.86 
20.60 Not all witnesses opposed the use of NRAS to house international students. 
Mr Pisarski thought the situation 'a little bizarre' that Australia wants to encourage 
foreign students to come to the country, take up opportunities in Australian 
universities and contribute to the economy but then exclude them from affordable 
housing. In his view, this was particularly relevant given that most Australian cities 
have a major overcrowding problem in foreign student housing. It seemed to him that 
there ought to be 'the possibility of doing a proportion of student housing and foreign 
student housing within those propositions'.87 
20.61 Professor Earl was concerned about the level of understanding around the 
issue of NRAS being used to provide accommodation for students from overseas. He 
stated: 
To put a blanket over this and say all investment into university housing is 
for international students is to draw a long bow. It obviously did happen, 
but I think there could be some safeguards for those kinds of students who 
are travelling from regional Australia to the cities for educational 
purposes.88 
20.62 Indeed, the University of Sydney drew attention to the 'acute shortage of 
affordable housing within 3km of the University's main campus, resulting in high 
levels of rental stress…'89 The National Union of Students raised the need for more 
stringent means testing to ensure that on-campus housing subsidised under NRAS 
went to students in need.90 
Trading incentives 
20.63 In early 2013, the media reported on concerns about the transfer of NRAS 
incentives whereby the holders of unused incentives were trading them for between 
$10,000 and $30,000.91 In March 2014, the then Minister for Social Services 
86  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 27. 
87  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
88  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 57.  
89  Submission 62, executive summary.  
90  Submission 82, p. 7. 
91  See, for example, Australian Financial Review 'Affordable rents review', 9 March 2013.  
 
                                              
356  
announced that the government would 'crackdown' on this practice of trading in 
NRAS entitlements.92  
20.64 In July 2014, Mr Palmer, Department of Social Services, informed the 
committee that the problem with the trading of incentives involved excessive fees in 
such a trade. He noted, however, that, at that time, the department had no visibility on 
such transactions or any direct evidence. Nonetheless, according to Mr Palmer, the 
department did have 'an awful lot of anecdotal evidence of the practice of excessive 
fees being charged during the transfer of an incentive'. Mr Palmer explained that in 
some cases the person entitled to hold the incentive transferred it to another person for 
a fee. That person would then bring their property into the scheme as a replacement 
for the original incentive. In endeavouring to explain the practice of trading 
incentives, Mr Palmer understood that the process sounded complicated.93  
20.65 Apart from this concern with the integrity of the scheme, he also noted that 
the overall goal of increasing the housing supply could be undermined: 
If you think about how houses are brought into the NRA scheme, there is a 
tremendous benefit if we manage to bring houses into the NRA scheme in a 
way that adds to the overall supply of housing in the entire market. If as a 
result of the scheme a house is built that would not otherwise have been 
built there is a tremendous benefit. We expand the housing market and we 
bring a low-income house to the market. If a house that is brought into the 
scheme does not do that, if it is something we spot purchase from a supply 
already occurring or if it would have been built anyway then it does not add 
to the overall supply of the market. So in a sense we are not helping overall 
market affordability while we are bringing into the scheme a house that 
provides an additional 20 per cent reduction on market rents and a house 
that is available for someone who is low-income.94  
20.66 In other words, according to Mr Palmer, the intention to build houses that 
would otherwise have not be built had not 'always worked out'.95 
20.67 A number of submitters outlined their understanding of the trading of 
incentives. For example, Ms Young, Regional Development Australia, Gold Coast, 
explained that projects that did not eventuate—that did not obtain bank funding to be 
constructed—still had approvals attached to them. So people who had obtained an 
approval for a particular project then put their hand up to say they could not fund the 
92  See, for example, The Australian, 'Unlike Labor, one state closed rental loophole', 
13 March 2014 and Transcript, The Hon. Kevin Andrews MP, Minister for Social Services, 
Bush Telegraph, ABC National, 20 May 2014, 
http://www.formerministers.dss.gov.au/15285/bush-telegraph-abc-radio-national-20-may-2014/ 
(accessed 5 January 2015).  
93  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 8.  
94  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 9.  
95  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 11.  
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build—it was not going to eventuate—and then sold the approval to another 
developer. She agreed with the proposition that, in effect, the entitlement to an NRAS 
incentive was being treated as a commodity, which was never the intention.96 
Ms Young suggested that, from the delivery side of things, more control was needed 
over the people who were participating and selling NRAS approved homes.97 She 
indicated that greater central control could be the answer rather than management by 
the states as well as having performance indicators earlier in the process rather than 
letting developments run.98 
20.68 Other submitters closely involved in the operation of NRAS and based on 
their knowledge of the industry, also informed the committee of the practice of trading 
incentives. In Mr Somerville's view, there was a need to understand why this trading 
had happened, that is what had initiated the practice. He explained: 
That occurred because in round 4 of NRAS there was a massive delay in the 
allocation of entitlements after the applications closed; it was nine months. 
That was not the fault of bureaucrats; that was a hung parliament, a change 
of government, changes of ministers and a protracted announcement. So 
through that nine month period of time—assuming you made an application 
in the earlier months when it was first opened—the allocation was 
12 months down the track. Within that period of time, developers sold their 
stock, and a huge proportion of those that were applied for under that model 
were simply not able to be delivered. 
The department said, 'We will allow substitutions to be made,' which was 
fair and reasonable at that point in time. But that unwittingly created a 
massive amount of change requests. Again, it took an extraordinary amount 
of time for the bureaucrats to assess the change requests that came in for all 
of that round 4 stock. That then went for another four months. So you could 
have easily had an application for a property which was undeliverable, and 
then, by the time the assessment was made again, it was undeliverable 
again. Those delays created a negative opportunity for people to profit from 
that.99 
20.69 Mr Somerville was aware of some examples where such fee-making activity 
had taken place, citing Melbourne in particular where, at that time, there were a 
number of large-scale developments. He explained that these developments: 
…were being engaged in the city, for which the market was pretty dead, so 
those developers found it opportune to be able to transfer an NRAS 
entitlement onto those and make them NRAS dwellings.100  
96  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 30. 
97  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 29. 
98  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 29. 
99  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 55. 
100  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 55.  
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20.70 At that point, Mr Somerville did not know how many incentives had changed 
hands, because, in his words: 
…fundamentally that market did not work for NRAS. Putting an NRAS 
entitlement onto a one-bedroom Docklands apartment which is going to 
rent for $600 a week does not work for NRAS. So they were never going to 
actually make it work. I think there is a lot more noise around it than 
substance.101 
20.71 From Mr Myers' perspective, the trading that had been reported in the media 
was not an accurate reflection. He explained: 
We have sat down with the department and gone through this line by line, 
because it is small-scale but it is damaging, so we want it out of the way. 
We have made proposals on it. If we are an approved participant, we cannot 
just give the incentive to somebody else. However, if [for example] we 
have gone in for a deal with Mirvac on this development, and, by the time 
the approval comes through, that development or stage is sold out and there 
is not another stage, and if we go to another developer in a neighbouring 
area, AVJennings, then what is a reasonable administrative fee for doing all 
the work on that and having to do redo it all over on this—the same 
approved participant?102 
20.72 Mr Myers agreed that certain requirements could be included in regulations, 
including fee disclosure and the obligation to notify the department of any change. 
Indeed, as Mr Somerville noted, change requests under NRAS now required a 
statement of the fee model to be submitted with any change request.103  
20.73 Mr Pisarski told the committee that trading of incentives was not supposed to 
happen, though in his opinion, the fact that it did demonstrated that NRAS incentives 
were a valued commodity. He attributed the problem to 'the small portfolio or the 
small allocation processes that had happened and a range of other issues'.104 He did 
not see the emergence of this practice of trading incentives as a reason to end the 
scheme. Indeed, he did not necessarily see it as a problem, if it meant that the 
affordable housing gets put on the ground in a more timely fashion.105 In his view, the 
problem could be addressed easily and even disallowed if NRAS were to continue.106 
Most importantly, according to Ms Croce, the problems with the trade in incentives 
were 'administrative and seemingly fixable'.107 
101  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 55.  
102  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 56.  
103  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 56. 
104  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
105  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39.  
106  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
107  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 15. 
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Conclusion 
20.74 Evidence indicated clearly that a range of individuals and organisations 
strongly supported NRAS. When mounting a case for its continuation, they could 
identify its achievements, citing in particular NRAS' positive contribution as a supply-
side intervention and its success in increasing the stock of affordable housing. NRAS 
also promoted constructive partnerships between not-for-profit and private sector 
investors and developers, and added value to the government's investment. It delivered 
social housing as well as affordable housing in mixed developments overcoming 
problems created by having social housing in concentrated pockets. NRAS was 
looking to develop properties with the flexibility that allowed people to improve their 
circumstances without jeopardising their tenancy. 
20.75 Undoubtedly, NRAS has experienced some difficulties with its 
implementation, which are attributable to: 
• teething troubles, including administrative practices associated with too much 
paperwork, delays in processing applications and slow response to emerging 
signs of problems; 
• understaffing, inexperience and high turnover within the department 
administering the scheme; 
• design inadequacies including a one size-fits-all approach which failed to take 
account of, or appreciate, the housing circumstances of particular  areas with 
an identified need for affordable housing such as high value suburbs and 
regional, rural and remote areas; 
• lack of clarity around the targeting of incentives and eligibility, which allowed 
significant allocation of incentives to overseas students; 
• disclosure measures, which allowed the trading of incentives with excessive 
fees to persist and ultimately to damage the perceived integrity of the scheme; 
and 
• external factors, notably the global financial crisis which created challenges in 
attracting private investment. 
20.76 These design and administrative shortcomings have overshadowed NRAS' 
success but, while they point to the need for refinement, they in no way warrant its 
discontinuation.  
20.77 The Department acknowledged that there were design flaws in the scheme.108 
In the following chapter the committee examines the government's response to the 
reports of deficiencies in NRAS. 
108  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 23. 
 
                                              

  
Chapter 21 
NRAS, review of housing and homelessness and the 
Federation White Paper 
21.1 On 13 May 2014, the Hon Kevin Andrews MP, then Minister for Social 
Services, announced that NRAS had 'fallen well short of expectations'—it had 'simply 
failed to deliver for low and moderate income Australians'. He stated: 
The scheme has been plagued by the late delivery of dwellings, trading of 
incentives, multiple changes to agreed locations, leasing to international 
students and rorting.1 
21.2 The 2014 portfolio budget statement also announced that the Australian 
Government would not proceed with the final round (round 5) of NRAS. Incentives 
already allocated through the scheme, however, would continue to be paid for up to 
10 years 'as long as eligibility requirements were met and homes were built in agreed 
locations according to agreed timeframes'.2  
21.3 In this chapter, the committee considers developments with NRAS since the 
government indicated publicly it had a number of concerns with the scheme and had 
cancelled round 5. It looks at the proposed review of NRAS and housing more 
broadly; the inclusion of housing and homelessness in the Federation White Paper 
process; and industry's response to these developments. 
Government's view of NRAS  
21.4 According to the Department of Social Services, the scheme had not delivered 
on its targets. As at 29 July 2014 there were 23,211 incentives delivered.3 It should be 
noted, however, that the scheme was introduced during the GFC and the Brisbane 
floods caused a delay to the roll-out. Mr Palmer explained: 
There was a rephasing that occurred with the scheme at the time of the 
Brisbane floods…but at that point there was a delaying of the phasing of 
the scheme to harvest some funds to help with the repair work following the 
Brisbane floods. The original schedule was changed at that point…The 
1  The Hon Kevin Andrews, Minister for Social Services, Media Release, 'Round 5 of flawed 
National Rental Affordability Scheme not proceeding', 13 May 2014, 
http://www.formerministers.dss.gov.au/15215/round-5-of-flawed-national-rental-affordability-
scheme-not-proceeding/ (accessed 27 August 2014). 
2  Department of Social Services, Portfolio Budget Statement, p. 23, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2014/2014-2015_dss_pbs.pdf 
(accessed 18 March 2015). 
3  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 10. 
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schedule of the rollout was slowed down. It was delayed quite 
substantially.4 
21.5 Even so, Ms Hand referred to other developments that had frustrated progress 
including requests to delay delivery and to change location.5 
As a supply side measure  
21.6 In February 2015, Mr Damian Coburn, Department of Social Services, 
informed the committee that together with dwellings already delivered into the 
scheme and with further reserved allocations to be delivered, the total number of 
dwellings to be delivered by June 2016 amounted to 38,000. He explained that the 
termination of the scheme meant that there would be no further rounds but the existing 
arrangements would remain unaffected.6 With reference as to whether NRAS had 
succeeded in increasing the supply of affordable housing, Mr Coburn maintained that 
the scheme had certainly reduced the rent for the houses in the scheme. In his opinion, 
however, it was difficult to determine whether NRAS had succeeded as a supply-side 
measure. He explained that some projects may have been built that would not have 
gone ahead without the NRAS incentive but there were some that were already 'green 
lit and funded' that would have proceeded anyway and had NRAS incentives attached 
to them.7 Ms Hand supported her colleague's view that it was very difficult to measure 
whether overall housing had been increased under NRAS. She did note, however, that 
it was 'a very expensive scheme', costing about $8,000 per dwelling per annum, 
whereas the Commonwealth rent assistance and public housing was about $3,000.8 
International students 
21.7 With regard to NRAS incentives being used to provide affordable housing for 
overseas students, Ms Hand made clear that there was nothing in the legislation and 
regulations to stop NRAS dwellings being rented out to foreign students. Nonetheless, 
she explained that the department was looking at whether there might be a potential 
for changing regulations, to make it focus more on domestic Australian students. She 
added that the department had communicated with providers 'to reinforce the fact that 
there should be a focus on domestic Australian students'.9 
4  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 10. 
5  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 10. 
6  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 22.  
7  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 23. 
8  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 23.  
9  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 February 2015, p. 24. 
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Trading of incentives 
21.8 It should be noted that in October 2014, the Department issued a caution to 
NRAS investors stating that the department had: 
…become aware of unscrupulous persons/entities who purport to have 
NRAS incentives under the Scheme, and who are then selling those 
'incentives' to unwary investors, developers and charitable organisations. 
The persons involved may have been falsifying correspondence from the 
Department as 'proof' that they hold the incentives.10 
21.9 The statement warned of people discovering that they had paid a large sum of 
money for nothing.11  
21.10 The government also promulgated regulations, which came into effect during 
the latter part of 2014, designed to improve the integrity of the scheme. 
The committee has noted that to prevent the trading of incentives for excessive fees, 
change requests now require a statement of the fee model to be submitted with any 
such request.12 
Proposed review 
21.11 The 2014 portfolio budget statement indicated that a focus in 2014–15 would 
be on a review of housing and homelessness including NRAS.13 The Department of 
Social Services informed the committee that while the Commonwealth Government 
understood NRAS' role in providing more affordable rental housing, particularly for 
low income earners, it also acknowledged that there was 'significant scope' to improve 
the scheme's operation and administration.14 According to the department, the 
government had tasked it with examining options to improve the operation of NRAS 
and to ensure there were more stringent processes to test compliance.15  
10  Department of Social Services, 'Cautionary Note to Developers, Investors and Charitable 
Organisations', October 2014, https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/housing-
support/programmes-services/national-rental-affordability-scheme/cautionary-note-to-
developers-investors-and-charitable-organisations (accessed 12 January 2015). 
11  Department of Social Services, 'Cautionary Note to Developers, Investors and Charitable 
Organisations', October 2014, https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/housing-
support/programmes-services/national-rental-affordability-scheme/cautionary-note-to-
developers-investors-and-charitable-organisations (accessed 12 January 2015). 
12  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 56. 
13  Portfolio Budget Statements 2014–15, Budget Related Paper No. 1.5A, Social Services 
Portfolio, p. 129, https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2014/2014-
2015_dss_pbs.pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). 
14  Submission 198, p. 31. 
15  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 4.  
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21.12 In July 2014, the department informed the committee that the Minister was 
keen for this review to be quick, short and sharp.16 The main reasons for the review 
were to: 
• address short term things that could be done immediately in advance of the 
reviews of taxation and Federation, such as the future of the NPAH beyond 
the current financial year; and 
• have NRAS operate more fully.17 
White Paper on Federation 
21.13 In August 2014, the then Minister for Social Services announced, however, 
that in the year ahead the government would review housing and homelessness 
policies and programmes to examine ways to improve housing supply and 
affordability. Further, this review would feed into the government's white papers on 
reform of the Federation and on taxation.18 
21.14 At a public hearing in October 2014, Ms Hand informed the Senate 
Legislation Committee on Community Affairs that the review on housing and 
homelessness announced over a year before would now happen through this review of 
Federation. She explained that the white paper process on Federation, which had a 
particular focus, amongst other things, on housing, would serve as the government's 
primary vehicle for considering housing and homelessness. Noting the 
Commonwealth's involvement in terms of its funding role through NAHA and NPAH, 
she explained further: 
The reform of Federation review is considered the right process to really 
look deeply at housing and homelessness issues because…the service 
delivery for housing and homelessness is done almost exclusively by the 
states.19  
21.15 Ms Hand told the committee that the minister intended in the near future to 
host roundtable discussions with representatives, stakeholders and service providers 
on housing and homelessness matters. From these concurrent consultations and 
roundtables, relevant issues would then contribute to the Federation White Paper 
process to inform that deep review.20 Ms Hand also told the Community Affairs 
Committee that the department had initiated its own independent audit using 
16  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 3.  
17  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 3.  
18  Media Release by Hon Kevin Andrews MP, 'Coalition Committed to Reducing Homelessness', 
4 August 2014, http://www.formerministers.dss.gov.au/15242/coalition-committed-to-
reducing-homelessness/ (accessed 12 January 2015). 
19  Senate Legislation Committee on Community Affairs, Estimates Hansard, 23 October 2014, 
p. 163. 
20  Senate Legislation Committee on Community Affairs, Estimates Hansard, 23 October 2014, 
p. 163. 
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independent organisations to do a health check. In addition, she stated that the ANAO 
had indicated interest in doing an audit on the program.21 
21.16 Following on from this statement, it should be noted that the ANAO is 
currently undertaking an audit of the department's administration of NRAS, with a 
focus on the assessment of applications for incentives and management of allocations. 
It will also conduct a second audit, commencing in the second half of 2015, to 
examine the department's processing of claims for entitlements under the scheme and 
monitoring of approved applicants' compliance with NRAS.22  
21.17 As part of the reform of the Federation White Paper process, an issues paper 
on Roles and Responsibilities in Housing and Homelessness has been produced. The 
paper explained: 
To some extent, the White Paper will pick up the review of housing and 
homelessness policies and programmes the Commonwealth Minister for 
Social Services had planned, reflecting that service delivery in this area is 
managed almost exclusively by States and Territories.23 
21.18 The committee took evidence both before and after it became apparent that 
the review of housing and homelessness, as initially proposed, would become part of 
the Federation White Paper process.  
Response to government announcements 
21.19 In July 2014, Mr Richard Lindsay, Urban Development Institute of Australia 
(UDIA), acknowledged the government's intention to review NRAS as well as some 
other schemes around housing and homelessness. In his view, however, any review of 
NRAS should be done quickly. He stated that as an industry association, it was very 
keen to be involved and engaged in helping to sort through any issues. Even so, 
according to Mr Lindsay, two years was definitely too long to wait: there being 
downsides to delay.24 In his assessment, the scheme had reached a stage where it was 
'really starting to get some acceptance and momentum'.25 
21  Senate Legislation Committee on Community Affairs, Estimates Hansard, 23 October 2014, 
p. 159. 
22  ANAO, Audits in progress, 'Administration of the National Rental Affordability Scheme', 
http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audits-in-
Progress?portfolio=1104C9D81F57435393DBCC1681E1B62B (accessed 27 March 2015). 
23  Reform of the Federation, White Paper, Roles and Responsibilities in Housing and 
Homelessness, Issues Paper, 2 December 2014, p. 3, 
https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/issues-
paper/Housing_and_Homelessness_Issues_Paper.pdf (accessed 2 March 2015). 
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68. 
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68.  
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21.20 Importantly, he was not confident that the scheme could pick up from where it 
left off. From his perspective, the lapse of two years 'basically puts some doubt in 
people's minds about the scheme and what might be coming next'. He agreed that 
there were some elements that probably needed to be addressed and fixed, but he did 
not think that it would necessarily take two years to complete.26 He added that as an 
industry association, the UDIA was very keen to be involved and engaged in helping 
to iron out any problems with NRAS. 27  
21.21 COTA understood the importance of, and welcomed, the review into housing 
issues, but thought it was unfortunate to discontinue NRAS before the government 
had a good look at housing policy.28 Mr Bouffler, Community Employers WA, 
similarly referred to the lack of certainty as to what was going to happen. He stated: 
The issue that we have as employers is more the here and now. What do we 
do whilst all those discussions are going on? Our members employ 10,000 
people; what do those people do? What do the people they support do while 
all these discussions are happening? We need to keep the machinery of 
government and the support that is provided out there in the system going 
every day. When you have boards doing strategic plans and investments 
and thinking about where they allocate their increasingly scarce resources, 
we need some confidence that government has a plan and knows what it is 
doing.29  
21.22 While acknowledging that the government could be working on a longer-term 
plan, which, in Mr Bouffler's view, was great, he maintained that people needed to be 
confident that funding was available and would continue.30  
21.23 The Equality Rights Alliance also approved of the inclusion of housing in the 
Tax and Federation white paper processes. It was concerned, however, that there 
would be no separate review into federal housing and homelessness policy.31 
Importance of continuity 
21.24 Consistent with the views of many others, COTA thought that NRAS had a lot 
of potential and was disappointed that the scheme had been discontinued rather than 
refocused.32 Likewise, National Shelter argued that NRAS was successful, exceeded 
expectations and was: 
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68.  
27  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68.  
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 22. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 15. 
30  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 15. 
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 20. 
32  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 22. 
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…pretty much the only thing, along with the social housing initiative that 
was part of the nation-building package, that was growing housing supply 
in Australia, particularly at the affordable end of the market'.33  
21.25 Mr Pisarski pointed out that continuity was also 'really important'.34 
He explained that his sector 'always understood or expected that there would be a 
continuing pipeline of NRAS incentives' and, in his view, this was an expectation 
shared by investors and the investment community. Indeed, he informed the 
committee that when the proposal to create NRAS was being considered, investors, 
developers and the business community kept talking of the need for certainty over the 
long term. He indicated that they were saying: 
If we have certainty, whatever the rules are, we will learn to live with them 
and we can plan a business case around the rules. But, if the rules keep 
changing, that creates real problems.35 
21.26 Mr Pisarski referred to the discontinuation of round 5 of NRAS and the 
concern it was generating. From his perspective, the cancellation of this round was a 
missed opportunity and suggested that the government should be looking at how 
NRAS might be adjusted rather than ended.36 Nonetheless, according to Mr Pisarski: 
…even if NRAS were to be revamped or brought back in some other shape 
or form, we have now created an impression amongst the investment 
community that it is subject to the whim of government change all of the 
time and we do not have that long-term certainty. That is the greatest 
criticism that I have been hearing of the discontinuation of round 5—that 
we do not now have the certainty of a pipeline that existed.37 
21.27 Mr Walker indicated that Queensland had some concerns about the 
Australian Government not proceeding with the final round of NRAS. He noted that 
this decision would mean that at least 2,000 new affordable rental dwellings would not 
be delivered under this scheme for low- to moderate-income households. He argued 
that this development 'very much pushes responsibility back onto states to find 
alternative ways to deliver affordable housing'.38 
21.28 His colleague, Mr Leitch, also referred to NRAS having got a 'fairly good 
head of steam', with most recent rounds in Queensland achieving a very high 
subscription. Mr Leitch indicated, however, that the decision to suspend NRAS 
resulted in activity associated with NRAS 'going cold'. According to Mr Leitch, there 
33  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38.  
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 38–39.  
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39. 
36  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38.  
37  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 39. 
38  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 42.  
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was a lot of interest in the community which would have to be reactivated if 'we fired 
up'.39 Mr Walker stated: 
There is some loss of that momentum as a result of this current pause. The 
quicker we are able to resolve whether it is proceeding or not proceeding 
would be particularly useful.40 
21.29 Mr Somerville echoed the sentiments of many other witnesses when he 
highlighted the importance of having consistency and clarity. In his opinion, the 
changes in the policy of NRAS, through its evolution, created a fair amount of 
uncertainty and instability.41 He argued that continuity was essential to the success of 
NRAS, suggesting strongly that the scheme should be on an annual rolling basis with 
the capacity to vary the 'amount nationally for economic stimulus, between 5,000 and 
10,000 every year'.42 He explained that by setting a low level of 5,000 or a high level 
of 10,000 allocation every year, everybody would know that an annual allocation was 
going to be available. 
21.30 According to Mr Somerville, under round 5 of NRAS, Queensland 
specifically identified land available for the state's contribution to the scheme. The 
Western Australian and South Australian governments were also supportive of that 
model, which involved collaboration between the private equity and the community 
housing providers. Mr Somerville explained that the scheme was 'at the point of 
attracting institutional investment and certainly had high levels of interest'.43 
21.31 Ms Young informed the committee that as each round for NRAS came out, 
the rules changed, which made it difficult for people in the private sector to come in 
and out of the system and understand it. She also noted, however, that by rounds 3 and 
4, NRAS had built up 'a head of steam'. But now, according to Ms Young, this 
impetus had effectively dissipated. She stressed that NRAS had worked and 
underlined the importance of having something to replace it: 
That may be the state or federal government coming in with CRA funding 
for private investors to allow them to offer rentals at lower cost. Perhaps 
that means the government may offer a five-year or 10-year head lease on a 
private investment property, which allows somebody to come in and 
finance that with public bank funding—something that could secure it so 
that the supply continues.44 
21.32 Ms Croce, Community Housing Federation of Australia, explained that NRAS 
was based on a program in America called the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
39  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 47. 
40  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 47. 
41  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 55.  
42  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 56.  
43  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 52.  
44  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 29.  
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program. When NRAS became permanent as a part of legislation, it allowed 
community providers access for the first time or in an expanded way to financial 
institutions and they started to engage and partner in joint ventures.45 Ms Croce noted 
that NRAS was the only private investment vehicle that was available. She was 
concerned that if something did not replace NRAS and replace it quickly, the financial 
institutions, investors and developers' growing confidence in the scheme would 
expire.46 Mr Flynn, Mission Australia, reinforced this message: 
One of the most disappointing things about the removal of the last round of 
NRAS, aside from the drop in the number of dwellings that will be 
delivered, is that it undermines the confidence of the investor sector in that 
marketplace. Clearly one of the successes of the US system is that private 
investors have a very high level of confidence in that market, which in turn 
has been able to deliver something—over a long period of time.47 
21.33 Indeed, Dr Burgmann, NSW Federation of Housing Associations, stated that 
one of the reasons the housing association industry had been so concerned about the 
cancellation of NRAS was because investors had just started to dip 'their toes in the 
water of financing affordable housing'. She stated: 
We were arguing for that to become a permanent program because it does 
give that sense that this is a piece of the infrastructure of the Australian 
housing system that investors and lenders can come to with some degree of 
confidence. It does not matter whether it is NRAS or some other kind of 
program. What we would be looking for from both levels of government is 
to signal that investing in affordable housing is a legitimate thing to do, that 
the rules of the game are not going to change in a hurry, and that this is an 
asset class that it is worth super funds and the big banks wrapping their 
heads around and developing lending policies around because it is going to 
be here to stay.48 
21.34 Professor Yates added her voice to the many disappointed with the 
cancellation of NRAS. In her view, it was a 'terrible shame that NRAS does not seem 
to be on the books again'. She agreed that NRAS may not have been an ideal program, 
but the ideas behind it were important. According to Professor Yates, there was 'a 
need for some kind of subsidy, targeted to generate an affordable entry-level kind of 
housing'.49  
45  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 13. 
46  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
47  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 29. 
48  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 13. 
49  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, pp. 40–41. 
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Scope for improvement 
21.35 While some witnesses and submitters had reservations about certain aspects of 
the way NRAS was implemented, they did not advocate its abolition. Indeed, most 
agreed that the scheme should be further refined or replaced by one with the same 
objective of increasing the supply of affordable housing.50 For example, Catholic 
Health Australia recommended that: 
The Government reinstate it [NRAS] with some modifications, or establish 
a successor program that continues to offer incentives for Church or 
charitable non-government organisations to invest in provision of new, or 
undertake refurbishment of existing, housing stock for utilisation by 
vulnerable older Australians.51 
21.36 The Community Housing Council of South Australia gave unilateral support 
for the continuation of NRAS, particularly in the way in which community housing 
providers had adopted and used the scheme.52 It acknowledged that, as was the case 
with all programs, there were 'opportunities for refinement and change'.53 
Ms Coleman was of the view that while NRAS had the bones of a good scheme, she 
was sure that it could be improved. From her perspective, the principle of seeking 
private investment to match government investment was important because she could 
not envisage a time where social housing was going to be fully government funded. In 
her view, the market must be involved.54 Likewise, the Property Council of Australia 
suggested that NRAS was a 'vital affordable housing program', but that it should be 
recalibrated.55 
21.37 According to Mr Myers, National Affordable Housing Consortium, 
40 per cent of the current investor market was indicating that it would like 'to buy 
another NRAS product within that next five years'. He stated that this would account 
for $100 million worth of additional investment from just one agency alone.56 
21.38 From the UDIA's viewpoint, NRAS had been 'a really useful program', which 
had gained growing acceptance from the private sector in recent years.57 In its view, 
50  See, for example, Mr Flynn, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 26. See also 
Grace Mutual Limited, Submission 1; Neumann and Turnour Lawyers, Submission 20; 
National Affordable Housing Consortium, Submission 31, p. 6; and Women's Housing 
Company, Submission 52, p. 2.  
51  Submission 49, p. 3.  
52  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 38. 
53  Submission 99, p. 1. 
54  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 57. See also Ms Milne, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 September 2014, p. 21.  
55  Submission 212, pp. 3, 5. 
56  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 57.  
57  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 67.  
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NRAS was a way in which the Commonwealth could engage in addressing supply-
side issues. Although Mr Foley, UDIA, conceded that the scheme may not have been 
implemented as well as it could, he was of the view that basically the framework was 
a good one. In summary he stated: 
…the fundamental basis of NRAS, which is a cooperative scheme between 
the private sector and the federal government to provide affordable housing 
for low- to middle-income households, is solid.58  
21.39 Mr Foley explained that homes have and will be delivered directly because of 
that policy position. In his view, NRAS had made a useful contribution to the supply-
side and the experiences gained from the program could be built on to make NRAS 
better.59 Mr Foley believed that the reasons for NRAS not attracting institutional 
investors was around the current incentives being provided and the time taken for the 
private sector to become used to the scheme, to build trust in, and acceptance of, it.60 
21.40 His colleague, Mr Lindsay, also pointed to a timing issue whereby the 
introduction of the scheme 'basically landed slap-bang in the middle of the GFC'.61 In 
his opinion, it took a couple of years, in particular, for the scheme 'to get up and 
running and to get industry involved and engaged'. Mr Lindsay saw the potential for 
NRAS, if it kept going, to attract increasing numbers of institutional investors as they 
became more aware and more comfortable with the concept.62 Essentially, he thought 
the whole principle of the scheme was good and it was achieving some valuable 
outcomes.  
The basis of the scheme is sound, but we probably do need to look at 
addressing some of the ways in which it has been implemented.63 
21.41 Without doubt, NRAS encountered some troubles during its short life but, as 
many witnesses noted, the shortcomings, many of which were teething problems, 
could be fixed. The very fundamentals of the scheme were solid and NRAS was 
starting to make a very significant contribution to the supply side of affordable 
housing. The government discontinued the scheme just as it was beginning to gain 
traction with the private sector: just as partnerships were being developed between the 
public, not-for-profit and private sector. The committee supports the call for the 
review of NRAS to be completed expeditiously and for the government to begin to 
send reassuring signals to both the not-for-profit sector and private investors that it is 
committed to working with both sectors to ensure that the work started under NRAS 
would continue and furthermore be built on.  
58  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 69. 
59  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68.  
60  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68. 
61  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68.  
62  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 68.  
63  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 69. 
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21.42 While many submitters recognised that NRAS had shortcomings: they 
believed that the scheme had great merit; that it should not be jettisoned; and could be 
reformed for the better. They identified ways in which they thought NRAS could be 
improved.  
Suggested improvements  
21.43 Mr Pisarski suggested that there should be a broader portfolio approach where 
incentives were allocated at scale—at 1,000 a time—to single providers in order to 
achieve the scale take-up that was required. Also, he would remove the location-
specific requirement. Mr Pisarski favoured an approach whereby minimal 
requirements would be stipulated for NRAS around set percentages in middle-ring 
suburbs, in regional areas, in outer-ring suburbs, of various bedroom sizes and types 
and of affordability. In his view, community housing providers and developers would 
have the scope to use their own creativity to make a viable operation out of the 
scheme. According to Mr Pisarski, NRAS could still be adjusted over time to fit such 
a model. He stated further that even within those requirements, limits or conditions 
could be set, for example, on student housing to foreign students.64 
Queensland as a model  
21.44 In the previous chapter, the committee detailed Queensland's approach to 
NRAS with its greater level of control and the additional measures it introduced to 
help preserve the integrity of the scheme and improve its efficiency—tighter 
eligibility criteria and application and management processes. Also, with regard to 
NRAS, Queensland achieved well above the average level of delivery on a per capita 
basis than the other states and, according to Mr Leitch's understanding, trading in 
approvals 'did not happen in Queensland, pretty well at all'.65 He stated: 
Regarding the way we managed it in Queensland, I think we had a very 
diligent approach as to how that was managed and, because it was tied in 
with the rest of our housing products, we had a better focus on where things 
were going.66 
21.45 Having witnessed some of NRAS' successes in Queensland, Mr Walker was 
convinced that there was much benefit in such a program. Based on Queensland's 
positive and encouraging experience, he explained that if the Australian Government 
were to rework NRAS in any way, then Queensland would certainly be supportive. He 
stated further that the Queensland Government would be: 
64  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 38. 
65  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 49. 
66  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 49. 
 
                                              
 373 
…particularly keen to be involved in any conversations with the Australian 
government on what worked for us and on what might make for a better 
scheme moving forward.67 
21.46 Also, referring to Queensland, Mr Somerville recognised that the state had put 
more resources into NRAS and made the criteria far more specific—including the 
eligibility for tenants. He suggested that Queensland had a much higher level of 
control and far more rigid requirements through the application and management 
process as well as embracing the scheme.68 For example, as noted earlier, 
Mr Somerville explained that: 
When the floods occurred they said, 'We'll have another 5,000 NRAS.' So 
they had the additional numbers, the additional resources, and it was much 
more tightly managed.69 
21.47 Mr Myers noted the 2,800 dwellings delivered in Queensland in the last five 
years, all with private investment. NRAS providers borrowed other people's capital 
and made the affordable housing equation work. Mr Myers was certain in his mind 
that aspects of the Queensland model should be applied nationally. In particular, he 
cited accountability—the ability to demonstrate who is getting what—noting that 
Queensland had more relevant data than the other states. He maintained that, because 
members of the National Affordable Housing Consortium operated under that system, 
26 per cent of people in NRAS housing in its portfolio were on a disability support 
pension and a third of those were also on the public housing waiting list. He stated: 
So we can demonstrate that this is the gap in the market that we keep saying 
needs much more sophisticated filling so that people can move into 
products that are more suited to their income and household needs.70 
21.48 Mr Myers reminded the committee, however, that Queensland, at 3.2 per cent, 
had one of the lowest levels of social housing of any state.71 
Tailoring incentives 
21.49 It should be noted that there are two streams of investors in the rental market: 
mum and dad investors; and institutional investors.72 Mr Somerville suggested that 
there should be two specific application criteria—for institutional models and for the 
individual investor model. He explained the difference: 
The individual investor model is driven by the tax benefits, largely, and a 
10-year NRAS with the tax benefits is a very attractive proposition for an 
67  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 47.  
68  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54.  
69  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54.  
70  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 54.  
71  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 55.  
72  Mr Myers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 57.  
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individual investor. But for an institutional investor it is about longevity, so 
a lesser amount over a longer term would suffice, or different mechanisms 
than the rebatable tax offset, over a longer term.73 
21.50 Mr Myers elaborated further on the taxation incentives and the benefits they 
offer to different classes of investors: 
…if you work out the incentive's real economic value—to a 47-cents-in-
the-dollar taxpayer, to a 30-cents-in-the-dollar taxpayer and to a 15-cents-
in-the-dollar taxpayer, or a super fund who may not pay anything in the 
dollar on what they are doing—then what you are saying is, effectively, you 
are giving a super fund a not-for-profit cash payment. It is not enough yield. 
If you were to split it down the middle and say, 'well, actually we need a 
mechanism that gives them the same as, say, a 30-per-cent company 
taxpayer', you would actually get buy-in. And you can get buy-in over 
20 years.74 
21.51 Mr Myers noted that the National Affordable Housing Consortium had 
worked with institutions and that they would like to see a 20-year term. He stressed 
that institutional investment 'has got to be one of the core policy objectives to improve 
both supply and affordability'.75  
21.52 In its submission, the Queensland Council of Social Service suggested that the 
Commonwealth and states continue funding for the NRAS and undertake the 
following actions: 
• commit to a consistent amount of NRAS incentives every year for five 
years; 
• centralise the administration of the scheme to reduce delays and 
processing timeframes; 
• review eligibility criteria and allocation processes to ensure that housing 
is allocated to low and moderate income renters; 
• vary income eligibility by region to account for differences in regional 
housing markets; and 
• increase the financial incentives available for NRAS dwellings in high 
need areas, including rural and regional areas, to promote uptake of the 
scheme in these areas.76 
21.53 As noted earlier, the government has already taken some measures and 
promulgated regulations to improve the implementation of NRAS, especially to 
remove the opportunity for the trading of incentives. Clearly there is further scope to 
73  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 56.  
74  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 56.  
75  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 57.  
76  Submission 175, p. 3. 
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reform NRAS and it would appear that the Queensland model could provide a starting 
point. Furthermore, many in the industry have identified in both general and specific 
terms areas of NRAS that could be tightened or changed and have indicated their 
willingness to engage in this process of refinement. Finally, the ANAO audit on the 
administration of NRAS should provide clear guidance on ways to improve the 
scheme's administration.   
Committee view 
21.54 Observations made in this chapter about the value in tailoring incentives for 
classes of investors and of tightening eligibility criteria and application processes 
coupled with the shortcomings identified in the previous chapter, demonstrated that a 
review of NRAS was warranted. The cancellation of round 5, however, was a very 
different matter. This cessation has set back the scheme just as it was gaining the trust 
and support of the private sector and beginning to make a material contribution to the 
supply of affordable housing. Not only has it undermined investor confidence in this 
scheme, it has also fed into the general uncertainty that has engulfed the national 
policy on affordable housing. In this regard, the committee also notes the abolition of 
the home and homelessness program. 
21.55 The committee is firmly of the view that the government should start 
immediately to rekindle the confidence that institutional investors were starting to 
show in investing in affordable housing and to provide greater certainty in order to 
attract such investors. 
Recommendation 36 
21.56 The committee recommends that: 
• in the absence of any credible alternative scheme designed to increase the 
supply of new affordable housing and considering steps have already 
been taken to improve the administration and implementation of NRAS, 
that the Australian Government continue with NRAS round 5;  
• the Federation White Paper process look at the Queensland NRAS 
model, which appeared to have much tighter controls over eligibility, as a 
means of determining where further improvements or fine-tuning could 
make the system more robust and effective; 
• the Federation White Paper process look at how NRAS or a replacement 
scheme could be reframed to take account of the particular housing 
circumstances of regional Australia and ensure that NRAS housing was 
better targeted to areas in most need; and 
• as part of the Federation White Paper process, a thorough cost benefit 
analysis of NRAS be undertaken, and that any such analysis include 
comparison of forgone revenue from demand subsidies such as the first 
home owners grant, and negative gearing and capital gains tax.  
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Recommendation 37 
21.57 The committee recommends that when considering NRAS, the 
Federation White Paper process: 
• take note of the concerns raised by many submitters and witnesses about 
the need for continuity and certainty in order to attract and to gain the 
confidence of private investors; and 
• ensure that any proposed refinement or a replacement of the scheme:  
• places the highest priority on restoring and building on the initial 
success that NRAS had in attracting private investors; 
• provides investors with certainty regarding the scheme by 
committing to a consistent flow of incentives extending over a period 
of at least five years; and 
• takes note of lessons to be learnt from NRAS such as the need for 
clear and tight eligibility criteria and better targeting to areas of 
need (the ANAO audit should provide a sound starting point). 
21.58 In the context of NRAS, a few witnesses raised the matter of the charitable 
status of community housing providers as a matter of concern. 
Possible loss of charitable status 
21.59 In 2008, the Standing Committee on Community Affairs inquired into 
legislation providing for regulations to prescribe NRAS. Witnesses representing the 
community housing sector who appeared before the committee agreed that their 
biggest concern around their participation in NRAS was the possibility that such 
engagement would compromise their charitable or public benevolent institutions (PBI) 
status. At that time, a position taken by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
generated concern as summarised by Ms Croce: 
The ATO have indicated that any organisation with charitable status will 
seriously jeopardise that status if they participate in NRAS. They have 
further indicated that organisations such as consortiums that participate in 
NRAS will not be endorsed as charitable organisations. Furthermore—and 
this is one that sent chills down the spine of the sector—participation in 
NRAS may cause the ATO to heavily scrutinise all of the activities of a 
participating not-for-profit organisation, not just those that pertain to 
participating in NRAS. The ATO have indicated that some of the current 
activities that our community housing organisations are involved with may 
no longer satisfy this test for charitable purpose.77 
77  Standing Committee on Community Affairs, National Rental Affordability Scheme Bill 2008 
[Provisions]: National Rental Affordability Scheme (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2008 
[Provisions], November 2008.  
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21.60 The ATO reasoned that NRAS was intended to assist not only low income 
earners, but people on moderate incomes. In this way, the ATO argued that a 
charitable organisation's participation in NRAS might fall foul of the 'sole purpose 
test', which required organisations holding PBI status to have as their sole purpose the 
provision of charity.78 
21.61 The then government took measures to provide assurances that participating 
in NRAS would not jeopardise the status of not-for-profit organisations as charities. 
Even so, concerns persist that charitable organisations could risk their charitable status 
by participating in NRAS.  
21.62 According to the Community Housing Federation of Australia, a charitable 
tax status allows providers access to a range of tax concessions, including exemption 
from income tax and GST, access to the Fringe Benefits Tax and often local 
government concessions on rates and utility bills. It argued that the charitable tax 
status was an essential component of the community housing model because the 
concessions lowered their operating, construction and development costs. The 
Federation told the committee that these concessions, however, were contingent on a 
community housing provider satisfying the ATO that its organisation's purpose met 
the criteria for charitable status. Despite measures taken since 2008 to preserve the 
status of NFP community housing providers as charitable institutions, the Federation 
explained: 
Over the last several years the sector has operated under the threat and 
uncertainty that many of its activities, especially in the delivery of 
affordable housing, would not be considered to have met the criteria of the 
relief of poverty and could jeopardise the charitable status of community 
housing providers. The legislation that was purported to constrain housing 
activities through a narrow interpretation of permissible activities was 
withdrawn earlier this year. However, other legislation passed in June 2013 
contained some tax conditions that may have a similar impact on providers' 
charitable status, resulting in limiting their participation in the affordable 
housing market for fear of putting their charitable tax status at risk. 
Other legislation, such as the new definition of charity that went into effect 
1 January 2014 provided some clarity on the situation…[but it] has been 
mooted for repeal leaving the sector back in the position it was before with 
ambiguous interpretations of housing activities allowable as a charitable 
organisation.79 
21.63 The Community Housing Federation drew attention to 'the unsettling 
environment in the charities and tax arena' which would 'cause continuing uncertainty 
for the sector for forward planning in the affordable housing market'. It noted: 
78  Standing Committee on Community Affairs, National Rental Affordability Scheme Bill 2008 
[Provisions]: National Rental Affordability Scheme (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2008 
[Provisions], November 2008, pp. 6–7. 
79  Submission 171, pp. 17–18.  
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…providers are at risk of incurring a significant tax liability if the ATO 
judges their activities to be ineligible for concessions and at worst, they 
could lose their charitable status if the ATO deems their activities do not 
meet their charitable purpose.80 
21.64 In addition, Ms Croce expressed concern regarding the possibility of 
community housing providers, incurring significant tax liabilities or, at worst, losing 
their charitable status because they were inadvertently non-compliant with certain tax 
laws.81 According to Ms Croce, there needed 'to be some certainty that affordable-
housing activities are acceptable charitable activities'.82 In her view, the current 
uncertainty made it difficult for community housing providers to make decisions 
about their work plans and future strategy.83 The community housing industry was 
calling for policy consistency and appropriate tax policies, which would allow for 'a 
comprehensive definition of housing provision that encompasses a broad range of 
housing activities'.84 
21.65 The NSW Federation of Housing Associations similarly highlighted the worry 
that the charitable status of community housing providers remained relatively unclear 
because the future of the recent legislation defining 'charitable' was not certain. In its 
view, this matter needed to be resolved as a matter of urgency, 'as it has implications 
for the type of growth and business structures community housing providers can 
pursue and the capacity to hold back the expansion of the industry'.85 Neumann & 
Turnour Lawyers also argued that the charitable sector required certainty that their 
ongoing participation in NRAS, or any similar scheme, was in fact charitable. 
According to Neumann & Turnour Lawyers, the government could provide such 
certainty through legislative recognition.86  
Committee view 
21.66 The committee is firmly of the view that the Australian Government must take 
steps to provide certainty for community housing providers engaged in NRAS or 
similar schemes designed to provide affordable housing that their charitable status is 
not in jeopardy by participating in such schemes.  
21.67 The committee understands that community housing providers must be 
financial sustainable if they are to continue to assist people gain access to affordable 
housing and provide the support services needed to keep people housed. To do so, 
80  Submission 171, p. 18. 
81  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
82  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10.  
83  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 18. 
84  See the Community Housing Federation of Australia, Submission 171, p. 18. 
85  Submission 80, p. 3. Also see Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 18. 
86  Submission 20, p. 8. 
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means that they may well enter into commercial activities. It should be clear, however, 
that their charitable status should not be at risk provided they turn any surplus arising 
from those activities to their charitable purpose.  
Recommendation 38 
21.68 The committee recommends that the Australian Government, through 
legislative recognition of charitable status, resolve any uncertainty over the effect 
that participation in NRAS or any similar scheme would have on the tax status of 
entities operating as charities, or public benevolent institutions (PBIs).   
 

  
Chapter 22 
Commonwealth Rent Assistance 
22.1 Government rent assistance is intended to ensure that adults with limited 
means can afford to live in rental housing that meets adequate standards.1 It 
recognises that many renters in the private rental market struggle to pay high rents out 
of low to very low incomes. In this chapter, the committee looks at Commonwealth 
Rent Assistance (CRA) and its effectiveness in helping with housing costs and 
reducing rental stress.  
Eligibility for Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) 
22.2 Commonwealth rent assistance payments are provided to eligible income 
support recipients. It involves a base payment to certain households, to help them 
meet basic living standards.2 To receive CRA, a person must qualify for a social 
security income support payment or Family Tax Benefit A and must pay a minimum 
amount of rent, called the rent threshold. CRA is then paid at the rate of 75 cents for 
each dollar above the rent threshold up to a maximum rate.3 The CRA is indexed to 
CPI. Also, CRA is paid to eligible tenants in community housing but not tenants in 
public housing. 
22.3 CRA is the main form of housing assistance in Australia, with over 
40 per cent of households in the private rental market receiving these payments. 
In 2012–13, around 1,268,000 individuals and families received CRA at a cost of $3.6 
billion. According to the Department of Social Services, in 2014–15, the number of 
CRA recipients had risen to 1.3 million renters around Australia at a cost of 
approximately $4.4 billion.4  
1  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2 p. 411, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
2  See Ms Phillips, Council of Social Service, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, 
p. 30.  
3  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. 6, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
4  See, for example, Department of Social Services, Submission 198, p. 31 and Proof Committee 
Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 2. The Appendix to Volume 2 of the Report of the National 
Commission of Audit, Towards Responsible Government, February 2014, p. 71, stated that 
CRA is provided to over a million renters at a cost of about $3.6 billion per year. 
http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/index.html (accessed 27 March 2015).  
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Reliance on CRA 
22.4 The AIHW noted that CRA had a major effect on households' rental 
affordability, with a 27 percentage point reduction in the number of low-income 
recipients in housing stress after receiving CRA.5 The Productivity Commission's 
figures show that at 6 June 2014 of the 1,315,385 income units receiving CRA 
nationally: 
• the median CRA payment was $124 per fortnight; and 
• 76.3 per cent of all CRA recipients were paying enough rent to be eligible to 
receive the maximum rate of CRA.6 
22.5 In June 2014, 67.4 per cent of CRA recipients would have paid more than 
30 per cent of their gross income on rent if CRA were not provided. However, with 
CRA provided, 40.3 per cent of CRA recipients still spent more than 30 per cent of 
their income on rent.7 Giving some meaning to these figures, Australian Council of 
Social Service (ACOSS) explained: 
Those who are in private rental will always need some subsidy to help them 
meet that cost. Unless you are in fully subsidised housing, in the public and 
community housing system, in terms of making rent affordable for those 
households I think some kind of demand-side subsidy is necessary.8 
22.6 Similarly, Ms Sue King, Anglicare, indicated that people were becoming 
'incredibly reliant on CRA' in order just to survive in the private rental market.9 
The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Minister for Social Services, 'Answer to Question Without 
Notice—National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness', 24 March 2015 
http://scottmorrison.dss.gov.au/speeches/answer-to-question-without-notice-national-
partnership-agreement-on-homelessness (accessed 3 April 2015). 
5  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Housing assistance in Australia 2014, Canberra, 
2014, p. ix, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129549033 
(accessed 18 January 2015). 
6  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services, 2015, Produced by Productivity 
Commission for the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 
p. G.7, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-services/2015/housing-
and-homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-and-homelessness.pdf 
(accessed 2 February 2015). 
7  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services, 2015, Produced by Productivity 
Commission for the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 
p. G.7, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/recurring/report-on-government-services/2015/housing-
and-homelessness/download-the-volume/rogs-2015-volumeg-housing-and-homelessness.pdf 
(accessed 2 February 2015). 
8  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 30. 
9  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 30. 
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Previous reviews 
22.7 A number of reviews that have looked more broadly at housing and welfare 
issues have included CRA in their consideration.  
Pension review report 
22.8 The 2009 pension review report acknowledged the important role that CRA 
had in alleviating rental stress and recognised, in particular, the pressure faced by 
some pensioners paying high rents. It noted that price increases in the rental market 
had outstripped the rate of assistance. Further, the payment had become less 
effectively targeted because of the way CRA had been indexed. The review found that 
the magnitude of these effects was significant and: 
If Rent Assistance had been indexed by the changes in actual rents paid by 
Rent Assistance recipients between 2001 and 2008, rather than by the CPI, 
it would be some $8.00 a week higher than it currently is. Noting that the 
last major adjustments to Rent Assistance occurred in the context of the 
GST changes in 2000, this suggests that the gap over this longer period is 
more likely to be around $9.00 to $10.00 a week.10  
22.9 The pension review report concluded that there was scope to improve the 
targeting of this payment so it would better meet the needs of those who face the 
highest housing costs.11 It also suggested that an immediate response to improve the 
circumstances of pensioners who rent privately could be achieved through an increase 
in rent assistance.12 
Henry Review 
22.10 That same year, the Henry Review also mounted a case for increasing the 
amount of CRA. It found: 
As at 5 June 2009 there were 418,000 individuals and families paying more 
than 30 per cent of their income in rent even after receiving Rent 
Assistance; 129,000 of these were paying more than 50 per cent of their 
income. Many of these people, especially age pensioners and disability 
10  Dr Jeff Harmer, Report Pension Review Report, Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, 27 February 2009, p. 52, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/pensionreviewreport.pdf  
(accessed 14 January 2015). 
11  Dr Jeff Harmer Report Pension Review Report, Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, 27 February 2009, p. 93, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/pensionreviewreport.pdf  
(accessed 14 January 2015). 
12  Dr Jeff Harmer Report Pension Review Report, Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, 27 February 2009, p. 93, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/pensionreviewreport.pdf  
(accessed 14 January 2015). 
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support pensioners (who make up around one-quarter of Rent Assistance 
recipients) are likely to have limited capacity to increase their incomes. The 
number of Rent Assistance households paying more than 30 per cent of 
their income in rent is at its highest level since 2000.13 
22.11 The Henry Review proposed that rent assistance should be increased so that 
assistance would be sufficient to support access to an adequate level of housing and 
should be more appropriately indexed in line with market rents to reflect that growth. 
The review also suggested that CRA be extended to public housing tenants, with 
recipients paying rents that reflected market rates, subject to gradual transitional 
arrangements.14 The review went further, advocating: 
A new source of funding should be made available in respect of the tenants 
who have high housing needs, such as those with high costs due to 
disability or people likely to face discrimination in the private market. The 
payment would be based on the needs of recipients and, where practical, 
directed by them to providers of their choice.15 
National Commission of Audit 
22.12 The 2014 National Commission of Audit considered the Henry Review's 
suggestion about extending rent assistance to public housing tenants. It argued that 
under such an arrangement, the Commonwealth would need to increase aggregate rent 
assistance funding. The Commission suggested that this additional funding could be 
sourced from redirecting funds currently contributing to NAHA and NRAS, which 
amounted to $1.5 billion a year. It was of the view that there was much merit in 
considering this option further, arguing that two benefits would arise from this 
approach: 
First, the market would determine rents for public and private housing. 
Second, abolishing housing agreements with the States would remove 
duplication of effort, improve accountability and alleviate the reporting 
burden for State governments.16  
13  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2, p. 413, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
14  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2, p. 491, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
15  Australia’s future tax system, Report to the Treasurer, December 2009, Part Two, Detailed 
analysis, volume 2, p. 491, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_Final_Report_P
art_2_Vol_2_Consolidated.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 
16  Towards Responsible Government, Appendix to the Report of the National Commission of 
Audit, Volume 2, p. 73, http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/docs/appendix_volume%202.pdf 
(accessed 12 December 2014). 
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22.13 The Commission concluded that 'Commonwealth funding currently directed 
to the housing agreements should be redirected to fund the extension of rent assistance 
to public housing tenants'.17 
Welfare system review 
22.14 The Commonwealth Government recognised the importance of CRA 
achieving its policy outcomes. To ensure this occurred, CRA was included, like many 
other government payments, in the recent review of government welfare. Accordingly, 
the welfare reform review looked at rent assistance available to tenants in public 
housing and to tenants in community or private rental accommodation.18 
The committee has discussed the rental arrangements for public housing and noted 
that tenants in public housing are not entitled to CRA.  
22.15 The welfare reform interim report recognised, as did the earlier reviews, that 
rent assistance had gradually become 'less effective in reducing rental stress for people 
in the private market'.19 It indicated that while rent assistance had increased by 
40 per cent between 2001 and 2013, median rents had increased by between 
65 per cent and 100 per cent.  
22.16 As a consequence, according to the welfare reform interim report, income 
support and family recipients have had to cover more of the costs of rent from their 
income support and family assistance payments, which reduced the income available 
for other costs of living.20 In its view, there was a need 'to redesign Rent Assistance to 
assist people in private rental who have the highest needs'.21 The interim report 
suggested: 
17  Towards Responsible Government, Appendix to the Report of the National Commission of 
Audit, Volume 2, p. 73, http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/docs/appendix_volume%202.pdf 
(accessed 12 December 2014).   
18  A new System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, pp. 9, 
68–71, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
19  A new System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 31, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
20  A new System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 69, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
21  A new System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 69, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015) 
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Rent Assistance should be reviewed to determine appropriate levels of 
assistance and the best mechanism for adjusting assistance levels over time. 
Initial steps in this direction may be possible at little cost to the Budget.22  
22.17 The review noted further that rent assistance for parents should recognise their 
role in supporting young people beyond school to independence.23 
Effectiveness of CRA 
22.18 The role and effectiveness of CRA was also a major topic raised in evidence 
before the committee. 
Increase CRA 
22.19 Evidence received by the committee was generally consistent with the 
findings of the earlier reviews. It recognised the valuable assistance that CRA 
provided to low-income renters and the continuing and growing gap between the 
amount of assistance provided and rising rents. For example, Ms Findlater Smith, 
National Council of Women of Australia, argued that CRA was far too low. She 
stated: 
At $80 a fortnight it is a little bit of help but it goes nowhere near far 
enough. If you are getting $590 a fortnight plus $80 and your rent is $300 a 
week, what are you living on? That is taking away heating and all of the 
other running expenses you have. The trouble is that that gap is being 
picked up by emergency relief. So millions and millions of dollars are 
going to Anglicare, St Vinnies and the YWCA for emergency relief to pick 
up the mess for people who cannot afford to live. 24  
22.20 Mr Flynn, Mission Australia, supported the longstanding call for an increase 
to the CRA. He argued that lifting CRA would 'probably be the fastest thing that you 
could do' to bring immediate short-term relief for households in extreme financial 
stress.25 COTA was of the view that CRA often meant 'the difference between having 
and not having a home'. It observed, however, that the CRA had not kept up with the 
increases in private rents, particularly in metropolitan areas, and did not reflect the 
geographical difference in rents that people faced. It stated: 
22  A new System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 71, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
23  A new System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes, Interim Report of the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services, Full Report, June 2014, p. 71, 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/06_2014/dss001_14_full_report_27_june
_tagged.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 56. 
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2015, p. 29. 
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Whilst we see long term solutions for increasing the supply of affordable 
housing as critical, an increase in the CRA for the lowest income groups is 
an important measure as it would start to reduce the gap between the level 
of subsidy received by people in public housing and people in private rental 
who may have similar incomes and needs.26 
22.21 COTA was one of many organisations calling on the government to increase 
the CRA. It suggested an increase to the maximum rate of the CRA by 30 per cent.27 
Ms Phillips, Australian Council of Social Service, urged the government to increase 
financial support to low-income renters. She told the committee that CRA was 'not 
delivering enough support to ensure that low-income earners were not living in 
financial stress'.28 The Council also suggested a 30 per cent increase to CRA which 
equated to a $20-a-week rise at a cost of $880 million for 2014–15, going up to $920 
million for 2015–16.29  
22.22 Likewise, the Tenants Union of Victoria highlighted the need for an 
immediate increase in rent assistance. In addition, it suggested a longer term view be 
taken about what role rent assistance played in the market and how it could be 
reshaped and reformed to provide a better housing affordability outcome.30 It 
recommended increasing CRA by at least $25 per week and subjecting the payment to 
a 'fundamental review'.31 According to the National Union of Students, Australians for 
Affordable Housing had undertaken some modelling, which suggested that while 
a $25 increase in CRA was not the solution to the affordability problem, it was a 
realistic option considering budgetary concerns and the current financial climate 
around housing and housing affordability.32 Indeed, Australians for Affordable 
26  Submission 191, p. 3. 
27  Submission 191, p. 7. 
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 25. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 34. It should be noted that the former 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs in an answer to 
a question on notice stated that 'The annual cost of increasing the maximum rate of RA by $15 
per week is $596 million. The annual cost of increasing the maximum rate of RA by $25 per 
week is $932 million. These costings are indicative only, as they are based on the RA 
population at only one point in time'. Senate Community Affairs Committee, answers to 
Estimates questions on notice Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
Portfolio, 2011-12 Budget Estimates Hearings, Question No: 246.  
30  Mr O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 43.  
31  Submission 119, p. 4 and Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 42. 
32  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 39. For details on the call for increasing CRA 
by 30 per cent see Australians for Affordable Housing, Easing Housing Stress Budget 
Statement 2012–13, p. 6, http://housingstressed.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/AAH_12_Memo_Federal-Budget-Statement-final_SD_060212.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2015). 
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Housing indicated that a $25 per week increase in CRA would provide relief to nearly 
100,000 renters.33 
22.23 The National Union of Students (NUS) suggested increasing CRA by 
$25 per fortnight, which would 'see a substantial proportion of students lifted out of 
housing stress and go towards alleviating the burden that rent places on many student 
budgets'.34 NUS argued that a student's rental assistance should not be automatically 
cut when that student is in a shared accommodation arrangement.35 
Indexation of CRA 
22.24 Mrs Ullman, National Seniors Australia, suggested that the value of CRA 
should be linked to movements in national rents, rather than CPI, which had not kept 
up with increases in rent.36 In support of this view, Ms Phillips, ACOSS, argued that 
indexing CRA to CPI was an inappropriate and inadequate response and a review was 
required.37 Mission Australia, was similarly definite in its view that, to be responsive, 
CRA had to move at a rate different from other income support payments in order to 
reflect the realities in the rental market.38 Equality Rights Alliance urged an increase 
in the indexation of CRA.39 Similarly, Mr Schrapel, Uniting Communities, was of the 
view that CRA needed to be indexed properly to housing costs rather than just to CPI 
and better targeted to areas where rental costs were very high. In his opinion, a 
supplement to rent assistance for people in those circumstances would allow them 
some relief.40  
CRA's responsiveness to different circumstances 
22.25 Mr Schrapel thought there was potential to broaden the base for people on low 
incomes, not just for those relying on social security benefits.41 In the same context, 
Mr Walker, Department of Housing and Public Works, Queensland, noted that social 
housing tenants and residents of some retirement villages could not access CRA. In 
his view, CRA, as structured, was not sufficiently responsive to variations in 
household income and movements in market rents in particular, which meant that 
33  Australians for Affordable Housing, Easing Housing Stress Budget Statement 2012–13, p. 6, 
http://housingstressed.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/AAH_12_Memo_Federal-Budget-
Statement-final_SD_060212.pdf (accessed 10 April 2015). 
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 36. 
35  Submission 82, p. 5.  
36  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 10. 
37  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 31.  
38  Mr Patrick Flynn, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 30. 
39  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 20. 
40  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 30.  
41  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 30.  
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some households received assistance exceeding the need to make rent payments while 
others remained in rental stress even after receiving CRA payments.42 
Dr Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Frost and Mr Borrowman supported the proposal 
to extend the rental assistance programs to reduce the incidence of rental stress and the 
effect of moving house.43  
Proposal for public housing eligibility for CRA 
22.26 Mr Langford referred to the Commission of Audit's reasoning that, if the CRA 
were made available to those in public housing, there would be some preconditions on 
that. For example, the Commission of Audit foreshadowed the possible removal of 
some of NRAS funding.44 Professor Winter also referred to one of the policy ideas 
canvassed by the Commission of Audit and the welfare reform review regarding 
making CRA available to public tenants with the Commonwealth moving out of the 
capital subsidy space. The Commonwealth would then assume the role of simply 
providing CRA. Professor Winter argued, however, that if the government wanted to 
grow the housing association sector then that decision would be counter to that 
objective. He stated further: 
That financial discrepancy of public tenants not having access to 
Commonwealth rent assistance at this point in time is one of the reasons 
why state governments are looking to do stock transfers to the not-for-profit 
sector. If you do want to grow the housing association sector and you want 
to see stock transfer from the public housing sector to the housing 
association sector, I would keep the distinction between who gets CRA and 
who does not.45  
22.27 Professor Winter contended that if the housing associations were deemed to 
have a role in providing both affordable rental and shared equity home ownership then 
they needed support to grow. He observed: 
One of the things that underpins their growth at the moment is that public 
housing agencies are transferring their assets slowly across to the housing 
association sector. One of the reasons they do that is there is not enough 
money coming into the public housing agencies. There are not enough 
subsidy streams coming in.46  
22.28 According to Professor Winter, if CRA were available to the public sector, the 
subsidy streams coming into the public housing agencies would be increased, which 
would slow down the stock transfer process.47 
42  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 43. 
43  Submission 23, pp. 2–3.  
44  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 33. 
45  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 23. 
46  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 23–24.  
47  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 23–24.  
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Inflationary effects 
22.29 Mr David Cant, Brisbane Housing Company, recognised the value of the 
CRA as a safety net. He also underlined the need to have measures to promote supply, 
noting that rent assistance on its own created more money chasing limited housing 
supply, which could drive up rents. In addition, he argued that rent assistance did not 
provide an incentive to an irresponsible landlord to improve standards, so it could be 
'a subsidy to slum landlords'.48 
22.30 Ms Coleman suggested that simply putting some hundreds of millions of 
dollars into increasing rental assistance would just contribute to an upward pressure on 
prices, as had happened under the First Home Owners Scheme. According to 
Ms Coleman, when rent assistance is pushed up, state housing authorities 
automatically put the rent up by the amount of the increase so that they just absorb the 
net difference.49 In her view, CRA would not necessarily lead to an increase in supply. 
She argued that consideration should be given to innovative approaches to using the 
economic levers the Commonwealth has 'to enhance the supply of housing rather than 
putting money into measures that would see more money chasing the limited amount 
of stock that is there at the moment'.50 
22.31 Mrs Julie Anne Morris, National Council of Women of Australia, supported 
this contention that landlords absorb increased rent assistance, suggesting that they 
had no incentive to keep rents down while the Commonwealth would top it up and 
keep it rising.51 While Mr Yates acknowledged the suggestions that CRA drove up 
rents because it puts more money into the system, he noted that it was clear that the 
most vulnerable group of pensioners in housing were those in the private rental 
market, who benefited directly from CRA. He also submitted that in the community 
housing space, CRA helped to increase supply because it made community houses 
more viable. Nonetheless, he drew attention to the fact that CRA had 'not in a large 
quantum increased for quite some time…'52  
22.32 Mr Pisarski noted proposals to raise the CRA because of its inadequacy in 
meeting the needs of low income earners in the rental market. He also recognised the 
potential for CRA to drive up rents, noting that if CRA were increased without a 
corresponding supply-side strategy, then that would exert inflationary pressure 
overall.53 He explained further: 
48  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 61.  
49  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 59. 
50  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 56. 
51  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 59. 
52  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 27. 
53  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 35.  
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If we are only putting Commonwealth rent assistance on the table, without 
doing something on the supply side of that affordable housing equation, 
then we are arguably creating an inflationary impact. There is not a lot of 
documented evidence around that, but there is anecdotal stuff around it, and 
it makes a lot of sense. 54 
22.33 Ms Phillips argued, however, that CRA recipients do not comprise a 
significant proportion of the overall rental market that would exert a significant 
inflationary effect across the market.55 Even so, she agreed that there may be some 
sub markets with a higher concentration of CRA recipients where there may be some 
effect. Although she conceded that a rise in CRA was an 'imperfect proposal', she 
argued that in the absence of supply flowing into the system at the required rate, the 
proposal to increase CRA was the best measure to alleviate very difficult 
circumstances.56 Others also regarded CRA as an imperfect solution—a band aid—but 
in light of an intractable supply problem they accepted that it was vital in assisting 
people to meet the basic cost of living.57 According to Mr Schrapel the suggestion that 
CRA ratchets up prices and the extent to which it did so derived more from anecdotal 
evidence rather than any hard and fast data. He also considered the supply side of 
affordable housing and informed the committee that: 
Our gut feeling is that if you just increase CRA as the only lever that you 
are using to try to support low-income households that are in housing 
distress then in the short term that is likely to inflate some of the rents and 
allow some landlords to put prices up. So there would need to be some 
controls over that.58 
22.34 Consistent with many other witnesses, he indicated that there needed to be a 
corresponding focus on supply.59 In other words, if supply remained constant, while 
the amount that people could pay in rent increased, then rents would go up.  
22.35 Mr Schrapel did wonder, however, how much of that reduction of 20,000+ 
public housing properties could have been saved in South Australia if public housing 
tenants had qualified for rent assistance in the same way that private renters were 
eligible.60 He noted that effectively CRA goes into the pockets of those who rent in 
the private sector.61 In his view, there was a need to re-look at the Commonwealth 
rental assistance program and how it was targeted. He conceded there was a problem 
54  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 35.  
55  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 30. 
56  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 30. 
57  See for example, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 30. 
58  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 33.  
59  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 33.  
60  For Mr Schrapel's reference to the 20,000 public houses see paragraph 14.10. 
61  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 33.  
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in simply increasing CRA, in terms of it becoming a price stimulant and inflating 
rentals. Nonetheless, he acknowledged, that when people were paying such high rents 
and not having disposable income to meet their other needs something needed to be 
done to recalibrate CRA.62  
22.36 In respect of the proposal to make CRA available to the public housing sector, 
Mr Searle, Department of Housing, WA, reminded the committee that CRA was 
income support and that it did nothing for supply. He explained that the dollars 
Western Australia received from the Commonwealth were about capital supply—$150 
million through NAHA. He explained that, if CRA were to be applied to public 
housing tenancies, Western Australia would gain between $80 to $90 million but lose 
$150 million if the Commonwealth withdrew financial assistance to the state through 
the NAHA—a cut of $60 to $70 million. The loss would vary from state to state.63 
Other forms of rental assistance 
22.37 There are other forms of rental assistance. For example, the Western 
Australian Government offers no interest bond loans to help people access the private 
rental market.64 Dr Wendy Stone noted that government cash payments were a means 
of providing households with rent assistance. In her view, these payments, while 
necessary, were not sufficient to enable tenants to manage the structural conditions in 
which they were living and the problems they created. From Dr Stone's perspective, in 
addition to private rental assistance in the form of, for example, bond assistance, there 
was the need to acknowledge critical reforms in other areas. She argued: 
…if we only address household needs in the form of rent assistance and 
private rent assistance without structural reform in tax and other systems 
'we just keep slapping on bandaids to a problem and we are not addressing 
the root cause'.65 
Income stream for community housing providers 
22.38 Dr Burgmann explained that in the private rental market, the tenant retains the 
CRA but in community housing the full amount of CRA that a tenant is entitled to is 
transferred to the community housing provider. The provider could then use this 
money for additional housing or for services.66 Thus, the CRA not only assists low 
income-earning renters by easing the burden of paying high rents but is also an 
important source of revenue for community housing providers. Ms Croce informed the 
committee that CRA comprises about one-third of most providers' rental income and 
is often used for repairs and maintenance and for improving services for tenants. She 
62  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 30.  
63  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, pp. 9–10. 
64  Proof Committee Hansard, 11 November 2014, p. 6.  
65  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, pp. 11–12. 
66  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 16.  
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indicated that CRA assists larger providers to grow their portfolios by using it to 
leverage for private financing so they can build more dwellings.67 
22.39 Mr Flynn also explained that access to CRA was key to the rental viability of 
community housing providers and enabled them to contribute to the supply side 
response by ensuring a sustainable community housing sector. He indicated that an 
increase in CRA would have a positive effect on the ability of community housing 
providers to attract finance to build more properties: that CRA was an important part 
of the viability of community housing providers.68  
Certainty 
22.40 The committee has referred to the importance of policy certainty in the 
housing and homelessness sector, which also applies to rental assistance. Ms Croce 
spoke of the sector's need to be confident that CRA was going to continue to be 
available to community housing providers.69  
Conclusion 
22.41 Unequivocally, evidence confirmed the fact that low-income earners need 
rental assistance to access affordable and appropriate housing and that they were 
becoming increasingly reliant on this assistance. Moreover, a number of 
comprehensive reviews have recognised that for some period of time the rate of CRA 
has continued to slip behind the rate of rent increase. Indeed, as far back as 2009, the 
call for an increase in CRA was clear and definite. Evidence presented to this inquiry 
highlighted this growing gap. 
22.42 Evidence also supported the grounds for a change in the way the CRA is 
indexed and favoured tying increases in CRA to the CPI for rents. In addition, a 
number of witnesses drew attention to the fact that CRA could be better targeted to 
take account of the rental burden borne by people living in areas or regions 
experiencing very high rents or low-income earners in rental stress but ineligible for 
assistance. 
22.43 The committee was not convinced, however, of the merit of the proposal by 
the Commission of Audit to redirect funding from NAHA and NRAS to enable a 
broadening of the eligibility for CRA to public housing tenants. In this regard, the 
committee notes the concerns of the Western Australian government that a shift in 
funding to CRA and away from NAHA and NRAS could result in a loss of $60 to $70 
million in Commonwealth funding to that state. Clearly any shift of funding needs to 
ensure that the overall funds allocated to the states for affordable housing increases 
67  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10.  
68  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 31. 
69  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 10. 
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rather than decreases and that the effort is directed toward increasing the supply of 
affordable rental properties.  
22.44 The committee also notes the concern that a rise in CRA could have an 
inflationary effect on rents if the supply of affordable rental properties remained 
constant. This situation of an inadequate supply of affordable housing is an area that 
requires immediate and definite government intervention, otherwise assistance such as 
CRA will serve simply as a band aid, albeit much needed, to a much deeper and 
serious shortfall in the rental market.  
Recommendation 39 
22.45 The committee recommends that the Australian Government:  
• review the eligibility criteria for CRA to ensure that it is targeted at those 
most in need; 
• review the method of indexing CRA with a view to retaining its 
adequacy; and 
• review the adequacy of CRA. 
 
  
 Chapter 23  
Investment in affordable housing 
23.1 Evidence presented to this inquiry indicated strongly that renting must be 
recognised as a mainstream, and for some a permanent, form of tenure in Australia's 
housing system. As a consequence, affordable rental housing must be placed on 
Australia's national policy agenda as a key issue to address poverty.1 Indeed, the 
increasingly tight and expensive private rental sector is locking low- to moderate-
income earners out of affordable and appropriate housing. This situation indicates 
market failure and suggests that market solutions to low cost housing will simply not 
emerge naturally: that there is a clear need to find ways to attract private investment 
into low cost and social housing.2 But currently, without government incentives, 
affordable housing does not tend to appeal to private investors. 
23.2 In this regard, an AHURI investigative panel of experts on rental housing and 
institutional investment found that significant volumes of public and private finance 
would be required to meet the projected need for additional rental housing in 
Australia, which could not be met from existing suppliers alone.3 Evidence presented 
before the committee similarly highlighted the needed for greater investment in 
affordable housing. Clearly, left to its own devices, the rental market will not deliver 
affordable housing for low- or moderate-income earners.4 
23.3 In this chapter, the committee considers the role of government as an enabler 
and investor in providing affordable rental housing.  
Government sector 
23.4 The vast bulk of social housing in Australia is public housing, much of which 
was built between 1945 and 1980, provided by state and territory governments and 
1  See, for example, National Foundation for Australian Women ACT, Submission 38, p. 4. 
2  See for example, Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17, pp. 8 and 12. 
3  Vivienne Milligan, Judith Yates, Ilan Wiesel and Hal Pawson with Carrie Hamilton, Financing 
rental housing through institutional investment Volume 1: outcomes from an Investigative 
Panel, for the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute at University of New South 
Wales, March 2013, p. 2. 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/download.asp?ContentID=ahuri_71016_fr1&redirect=tru
e (accessed 12 January 2015). 
The Investigative Panel comprised 'hand-picked experts from the banking and financial 
investment sectors, affordable housing providers (for-profit and not-for-profit) and affordable 
housing industry specialists, together with nominated senior officials of interested 
Commonwealth and state government agencies' (p. 9). 
4  Mr Mills, City of Melbourne, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 30.  
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financed through 'long-term, low-cost loans via the Commonwealth Government'.5 
This report has drawn attention to the shrinking pool of public houses in Australia and 
the deteriorating state of many of the dwellings. Yet the demand for public housing 
continues to mount.  
Not-for-profit sector 
23.5 The trend over recent years has seen the public sector withdraw from direct 
funding of public housing and a heavier reliance placed on the not-for-profit sector to 
assume a greater role in providing social housing. The Queensland Department of 
Housing and Public Works noted that the non-government sector had an increasingly 
important role to play in developing and delivering affordable housing and housing 
assistance services.6 
23.6 The Hobsons Bay City Council was just one of the many submitters that 
recognised the contribution community housing makes to accommodate both low-
income and moderate-income earners as well as groups with particular housing needs. 
Even so, it was of the view that the partnering of the community sector with 
government to provide affordable housing would 'require a funding commitment from 
both federal and state governments'.7 Indeed, it underlined its belief that 'in terms of 
equity and fairness, government must take responsibility for ensuring that a supply of 
affordable housing was available for those most vulnerable.8 
23.7 In its submission, COTA noted the importance of renewed investment in 
social housing to increase the stock of housing for low income households.9 While it 
recognised the need to bring about social and economic renewal in the affordable 
housing market, it acknowledged that to do so required investment. Mr Schrapel 
thought that it would be difficult in the short term to redevelop neglected public 
housing and therefore some level of public investment was required.10 The committee 
has made a number of recommendations designed to ensure that the public sector 
continues to invest in affordable housing. But increasingly government and the not-
for-profit sectors are looking to the private sector to also contribute to improving 
access to affordable housing in Australia. 
5  See Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, Submission 24, p. 10; Professor Frank Stilwell, 
Submission 25, pp. 4–5.  
6  Queensland Government, Submission 215, p. 4. 
7  Submission 39, p. 8.  
8  Submission 39, p. 8. 
9  Submission 191, p. 4. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 36.  
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Private investment 
23.8 Mr Myers, National Affordable Housing Consortium, voiced the view of a 
number of submitters when he stated that the not-for-profit sector did not have the 
ability to attract the level of resources required to fix Australia's affordable housing 
problem. He thought that they were doing a great job of leveraging but noted that the 
leveraging was coming in at 'perhaps 15 per cent' with cost bases rising probably as 
fast'. He suggested that both the finance and resources coming in through institutional 
investment must be considered, as well as how government might support that 
mechanism.11 National Shelter also highlighted the need to attract large scale 
institutional investors into the affordable housing market.12 
23.9 While recognising that the community housing not-for-profit sector was a 
significant part of the affordable housing equation, Mr Pisarski likewise argued that 
long-term institutional investment was required in residential property per se, not just 
the affordable end of it. He referred to the lack of interest displayed by the 
institutional investors in the residential rental market: 
Generally, institutions in Australia invest in commercial rather than 
residential property…You do need to get that large scale to create the sorts 
of long-term tenancies that would be in everybody's interest. But we have 
this history of mum-and-dad investors, by and large propped up by negative 
gearing and tax treatments. Even Ken Henry's idea of a 40 per cent income 
savings deduction was a way of equalising treatment between investment 
types so that then you would have been able to agglomerate small 
investment. I do not need to buy a whole house but I might still want to 
invest in property. So I could put $5,000, $10,000 or $20,000 into a 
residential property investment portfolio and that can invest on my behalf.13 
23.10 Mr Langford, Junction and Women's Housing, supported the contention that 
private investment was needed to drive that renewal in social housing where 
government had left a funding void. He similarly pointed out that, by and large, 
individuals owned the majority of private rental in Australia and referred to the 
barriers holding back institutional and private sector investors from moving into the 
affordable housing space. He noted that they would be looking for more stable returns. 
In his view, partnerships were required to attract long-term investment.14 
23.11 Dr Lawson and Professor Berry also asserted that access to private finance 
was crucial to not-for-profit housing agencies aspiring to develop or acquire new 
stock. In this context, they argued, however, that Australian efforts orchestrated by 
11  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 53–54.  
12  Submission 78, p. 23.  
13  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 40. 
14  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, pp. 34, 44. 
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various governments 'to attract institutional investment into rental housing have been 
"piecemeal and fragmented" or have lacked essential policy support'.15 They stated: 
National leadership can be demonstrated by governments acting as both an 
enabler and investment partner. In housing this could entail tax incentives 
for additional affordable and sustainable housing (via the continuation of a 
refined NRAS) plus government guarantees backing investment to reduce 
perceived risk, and equity contributions in the form of subordinated public 
loans or government land.16  
23.12 In their assessment, such strategic actions would 'channel lower cost 
institutional investment to appropriately regulated landlords serving the housing needs 
of those households not met by current market processes'.17 
Interest in higher end of rental market  
23.13 The prospect of low returns stands out as one of the major disincentives to 
invest in affordable housing. The AUHRI investigative panel of experts highlighted 
the fact that institutional investors were deterred from investing in rental properties 
because they 'heavily discount capital gains and expect higher rental yields than those 
typically applying in the rental investment market'.18 In respect of low returns, rental 
yields have hovered around the 4 per cent mark for the last decade.19  
23.14 The Department of Social Services agreed with the view that institutional 
investors have little interest in affordable housing. Despite recognising the importance 
of private investment in affordable housing, the department noted that: 
To date, efforts to attract a significant level of institutional investment into 
affordable housing have been unsuccessful, primarily due to the return 
offered on these investments. Given the fiscal constraints on all levels of 
government, necessary changes will need to be considered to ensure that 
private and institutional investors are able to take on a greater role in the 
provision of affordable housing.20 
15  Submission 24, p. 9.  
16  Submission 24, p. 8. 
17  Submission 24, p. 8. 
18  Vivienne Milligan, Judith Yates, Ilan Wiesel and Hal Pawson with Carrie Hamilton, Financing 
rental housing through institutional investment Volume 1: outcomes from an Investigative 
Panel, for the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute at University of New South 
Wales, March 2013, p. 2, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/download.asp?ContentID=ahuri_71016_fr1&redirect=tru
e (accessed 12 January 2015). 
19  Christopher Kent, 'Recent Developments in the Australian Housing Market' Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Address to the Australian Institute of Building, 14 March 2013, 
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2013/sp-ag-140313.html (accessed 12 January 2015). 
20  Submission 198, p. 29.  
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23.15 Retirement villages illustrate this point. Mr Yates, COTA, referred to the 
changes in the retirement village industry over the past couple of decades, which have 
seen the industry move more upmarket because 'it could not necessarily see how to 
make a lot of money out of lower income people, although there are quite a lot of 
pensioners in current stock'.21 
23.16 More broadly, Mr Doss, Brisbane City Council, observed that the industry 
appeared to be providing housing more at the higher end of the market rather than at 
the affordable end, particularly in Brisbane. In his view, this preference to invest in 
the higher end market was to do with profit margins. He gave an example: 
…when we ran a housing affordability scheme a few years ago which 
included federal government money we had a lot of trouble attracting 
developers to undertake that scheme. That gave them substantial reductions 
in infrastructure charges—up to 50 per cent reduction in some cases. But 
that meant that the product had to be rented at a certain level. We found that 
we would go chasing to try to get people into that scheme. We ended up 
having to hand money back, because in the market there were better profit 
margins in the higher end of the market.22 
23.17 The Brisbane City Council found that players such as the Brisbane Housing 
Company and others have had 'to be the ones who go in there and provide an 
alternative to the market, but they have a specific mandate to be able to do that'.23 
Brisbane Housing Company Ltd 
23.18 The Queensland state government and the Brisbane City Council worked 
together to establish the Brisbane Housing Company because there was a particular 
concern about the loss of affordable housing in inner Brisbane. Mr David Cant, CEO 
of the Brisbane Housing Company, explained: 
Public housing did not have much stock in inner Brisbane; so, as the 
demographic of people in need was switching from families to single 
people, it was felt there was a particular need to be addressed.24 
23.19 The company was incorporated as an independent charity in 2002 and was 
originally planned to deliver 400 homes over four years. It has successfully delivered 
1,500 homes of which it retains 1,200. Over time, the company has varied the types of 
dwellings and has engaged in mixed-tenure developments, where, 'as the density of 
dwellings in inner Brisbane has risen, it has been less appropriate to make it all 
21  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 22. 
22  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 4.  
23  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 4.  
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 60.  
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affordable housing'.25 Therefore, as stated by the CEO, 'we have made a virtue of 
necessity and done some complexes where we have sold some apartments as well'.26  
23.20 Mr Doss noted that the Council provided some seed funding for the Brisbane 
Housing Company as well as access to sites within Brisbane. He noted that initially, 
the aim was to deliver housing to the social and affordable housing part of the market. 
According to Mr Doss, the company learnt some lessons from delivering entire 
buildings of social and affordable houses. He maintained that best practice dictated 
that 'instead of having entire complexes of one type, you salt and pepper different 
forms of housing through development areas', which fits with the 15 per cent target 
adopted in Western Australia and under consideration by Economic Development 
Queensland (EDQ). Mr Doss commented: 
So Brisbane Housing Company has now moved on to where it will provide 
a number of different housing choices within its developments, from the 
high end to middle of the road to affordable to social housing as well, and 
those products work quite well…It also provides appropriate support 
services within those developments.27 
23.21 Mr Cant referred to the need to persuade people who invest in property to 
divert their funds into affordable housing. With regard to the Brisbane Housing 
Company, he was pleased to be able to say that: 
…by getting well-designed buildings that are well located and with strong 
on-site management, we have actually persuaded them that it is a good 
place to invest their money. Some have been owner occupied, some have 
been investors buying a market for sale unit and some have been NRAS 
investors.28 
23.22 Mr Cant explained: 
Privatisation is normally the privatising of profit. We are a not-for-profit. 
The unstated premise of all my remarks is that these disposals are to 
charities or not-for-profits—be they not fully charities, but I think they 
would all be charities—that retain the portfolio for the community's benefit. 
We only house people from the public housing waiting list in our rental 
properties. The stuff we sell we might sell in the open market, but the things 
we rent out we rent only to people under the single register in 
Queensland.29 
23.23 Mr Walker stated that the Queensland Department of Housing and Public 
Works was of the view that the Brisbane Housing Company was a good model among 
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 60.  
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 60.  
27  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, pp. 5–6. 
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 60.  
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 62. 
 
                                              
 401 
many good models.30 Professor Beer told the committee that the Gold Coast Housing 
Company had also been very successful.31  
23.24 Clearly, programs are needed to create opportunities for institutional or 
corporate investment into private rental. The Brisbane Housing Company and the 
Penny Lane Key Worker apartments are both examples where partnerships between 
government, community housing providers and private investors have worked to 
provide affordable housing. But, as noted earlier, there must be incentives to attract 
private investment.  
Incentives for investors 
23.25 The AHURI panel of experts on rental housing and institutional investors 
found that: 
Financial incentives and credit support will be essential to achieve 
increased supply at the affordable end of the market, to overcome investor 
perceptions of risk and to meet their yield requirements. The impact of 
government support is demonstrated by the way that NRAS has catalysed 
increasing specific interest from the finance industry in investment in the 
supply of affordable rental housing.32 
23.26 There are numerous government backed schemes that could be used to attract 
investors into the affordable housing markets. Youth Affairs Council of Western 
Australia mentioned promoting private engagement in social housing through 
protected savings and loan circuits (France), guaranteed housing association loans 
(Netherlands), providing tax incentives to investors of special purpose bonds (Austria) 
and via low-income housing tax credits (US).33 Professor Beer thought it was worth 
noting that in the United States of America (US) a lot of affordable housing was 
provided privately because of tax breaks for developers if they provided affordable 
housing. In brief, he explained that developers there might produce 200 multifamily 
housing units but 20 would be developed as affordable housing in order to attract 
substantial tax breaks for the overall development. In his words, such a tax 
arrangement would 'be important for them in terms of their feasibility'.34 
30  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 50. 
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 17. 
32  Vivienne Milligan, Judith Yates, Ilan Wiesel and Hal Pawson with Carrie Hamilton, Financing 
rental housing through institutional investment Volume 1: outcomes from an Investigative 
Panel, for the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute at University of New South 
Wales, March 2013, p. 3, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/download.asp?ContentID=ahuri_71016_fr1&redirect=tru
e (accessed 12 January 2015). 
33  Submission 166, pp. [5–6]. 
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 17. 
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23.27 Mr Schrapel, Uniting Communities, agreed with the view that in the end 
engaging the private sector came to an investment issue and referred to incentives, 
including taxation that would allow these schemes to flourish.35 Dr Lawson and 
Professor Berry noted that the primary purpose of any financing instrument should be: 
…to attract larger volumes of appropriate investment, under improved 
terms and conditions to those that exist currently to ensure the supply of 
decent quality, secure and affordable rental housing. International research 
demonstrates that raising funds at this scale will require a dedicated 
financial mechanism and appropriate institutions that are fit for purpose to 
raise and distribute funding.36 
23.28 The committee has written at length on NRAS as an effective incentive 
encouraging the private sector to invest in affordable housing but, as a number of 
submitters argued, this scheme on its own was insufficient to meet the growing 
demand. Dr Lawson and Professor Berry referred to the housing supply bonds (HSB) 
proposal, which has been developed with funding from AHURI working with industry 
specialists both in Australia and Europe.37 
Housing supply bonds 
23.29 In 2011, the Senate Economics References Committee considered the merit of 
introducing social bonds as a means of attracting private investment into Australia's 
social economy. It recognised that the development of a social bond market in 
Australia 'could bring significant finance to the social economy and thereby relieve 
the government of some social infrastructure costs.' It recognised, however, that the 
lower rate of return on a social bond coupon presented challenges when competing in 
the commercial market. The committee formed the view that government support was 
required to 'catalyse this market' and recommended that further exploration of ways to 
create incentives to invest in a social bond market be undertaken.38 
23.30 In its response to the committee's recommendation, the Australian 
Government noted that the uptake of social bonds in Australia had 'typically been 
limited to investors with a direct or personal connection with a specific social venture'. 
It suggested that before considering tax concessions, more needed to be done to 
understand the use of social bonds and the circumstances in which they could be a 
viable option for encouraging social investment. It noted further: 
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 35.  
36  Submission 24, p. 19. 
37  Submission 24, p. 19. 
38  Senate Economics Committee, Investing for good: the development of a capital market for the 
not-for-profit sector in Australia, November 2011, p. 156, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed%20
inquiries/2010-13/capitalmarket2011/index (accessed 1 April 2015). 
 
                                              
 403 
Given social impact bonds are complex instruments; further consideration 
is being given to some of the potential challenges associated with their 
implementation. The Government also recognises that social impact bonds 
are only one type of social investment tool amongst a range of new and 
emerging products.39  
23.31 In May 2012, after extensive research and consultation, AHURI published a 
report on HSBs. AHURI informed the committee that recent policy interest had 
focused on the housing bonds model, pioneered in Austria, which could be effective at 
leveraging finance for affordable housing. It explained that the Austrian Housing 
Construction Convertible Bonds scheme had 'been found to be popular among risk 
averse investors; an efficient scheme for capturing long-term savings; and, given the 
modest tax incentive, very cost effective'.40 
23.32 A 2012 AHURI study recommended a suite of HSBs with each bond type 
having risk and return characteristics and enhancements designed to attract different 
potential investors. According to the study: 
The HSBs proposed are intended to provide a standardized instrument for 
retail and institutional investors, to encourage investment in affordable 
rental housing and to keep at arm's length the respective roles of investor in, 
and provider of, affordable housing. The bonds are issued by an 
intermediary, not by individual providers, in order to achieve this 
standardisation. The funds raised are then on-lent to providers.41 
23.33 The creation of a specialist financial intermediary (or intermediaries) to 
channel raised funds towards affordable housing delivered by registered providers 
would be central to the financial architecture proposed to deliver the HSBs. The role 
of this specialist intermediary would be 'to link suppliers of capital with appropriate 
investment opportunities and to create aggregation benefits and efficiencies through 
lower transaction and search costs'. The financial intermediary would also assist in 
making providers 'investment ready'.42 
23.34 The proposed three HSBs matched to each investor segment are outlined in 
the following table: 
39  Government Response, Senate Economics References Committee Report—Investing for good: 
the development of a capital market for the not-for-profit sector in Australia, June 2012, p. 9, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed%20
inquiries/2010-13/capitalmarket2011/index (accessed 24 February 2015).  
40  Submission 93, p. 29. 
41  Julie Lawson, Vivienne Milligan and Judith Yates, Housing Supply Bonds—a suitable 
instrument to channel investment towards affordable housing in Australia?, AHURI Final 
Report No. 188, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, RMIT Research Centre 
UNSW-UWS Research Centre, May 2012, p. 63, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/download/ahuri_30652_fr (accessed 12 January 2015). 
42  Julie Lawson, Vivienne Milligan and Judith Yates, Housing Supply Bonds—a suitable 
instrument to channel investment towards affordable housing in Australia?, p. 64.  
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Table 23.1—Housing Supply Bonds43 
Bond type Characteristics and enhancements Investor segment 
AAA Housing Supply Bond A fixed interest, long-term (up to 10 
years) AAA-rated bond—implying 
need for a government guarantee. 
Super fund managers 
(15% tax rate) 
 
Tax Smart Housing Supply 
Bond 
A fixed term, fixed interest (or 
indexed) lower yield long-term bond 
with a tax incentive to generate a 
competitive after-tax yield. 
Retail investors 
(various tax rates) 
NAHA Growth Bond A zero interest bond that converts a 
direct grant into a long-term 
revolving loan. 
Governments 
23.35 The AHURI report also recommended a number of specific regulatory 
measures to reduce risks, including: 
• ensuring that standards of financial auditing comply with eligibility for 
funding; and 
• a sustainable business model and designated tax privileges.44  
23.36 According to the report, performance based reporting 'must be sufficiently 
robust to ensure adherence to intended goals and appropriate sanctions must be in 
place to reinforce good performance'.45 
23.37 In concluding, the AHURI report suggested that the HSBs proposal was 'now 
ready for more detailed refinement and development'. To do so, the report 
recommended that as part of the implementation strategy, a task force be established. 
This would be: 
…a collaborative government–industry–third sector task force to steer and 
coordinate five expert groups with the overall goal of developing and 
refining the HSB concept, based on the broad proposal contained in the 
43  Julie Lawson, Vivienne Milligan and Judith Yates, Housing Supply Bonds—a suitable 
instrument to channel investment towards affordable housing in Australia?, p. 5. 
44  Julie Lawson, Vivienne Milligan and Judith Yates, Housing Supply Bonds—a suitable 
instrument to channel investment towards affordable housing in Australia?, AHURI Final 
Report No. 188, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, RMIT Research Centre 
UNSW-UWS Research Centre, May 2012, p. 5, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/download/ahuri_30652_fr (accessed 12 January 2015) 
45  Julie Lawson, Vivienne Milligan and Judith Yates, Housing Supply Bonds—a suitable 
instrument to channel investment towards affordable housing in Australia?, AHURI Final 
Report No. 188, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, RMIT Research Centre 
UNSW-UWS Research Centre, May 2012, p. 5. 
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report… [Its] core focus 'should be to develop a tradable housing bond and 
contribute directly to the plan for the enhanced NAHA with advice on 
consequential policy settings, public funding, legislative requirements and 
governance'.46 
23.38 It is worth noting that AHURI researchers continue to build on their work 
developing a model that would attract and channel private investment towards 
affordable housing. For example, in their submission, Dr Lawson and Professor Berry 
proposed the Affordable Housing Finance Corporation Model, which, they described 
as 'simpler than the HSB approach'. This proposal was 'grounded in extensive national 
research of industry stakeholders and successful international experience'.47 
23.39 A number of witnesses supported the introduction of affordable housing 
bonds as a special purpose financial instrument to attract investment in affordable 
rental housing. For example, the Queensland Council of Social Service suggested that 
developing affordable housing bonds was an option to promote greater private sector 
investment in affordable housing. According to the council, the concept of social 
bonds was well-grounded and had been used internationally to encourage investment 
in affordable housing.48 In its view: 
Affordable Housing Bonds would complement and extend existing public 
subsidies, such as NRAS, to increase the supply of affordable housing over 
the long-term.49 
23.40 Mr Brett Petersson described the AHURI proposal for tradeable bonds as 'a 
sound proposal', which had 'received significant support from industry and 
financiers'.50 The City of Boroondara also cited AHURI's research on HSBs and the 
affordable housing finance corporation model for Australia. In its opinion, AHURI's 
model for HSBs proposed: 
…a safe, effective and innovative way to increase social housing stock 
managed by registered Community Housing Providers (CHP) and funded 
through a strong and low-risk investment framework.51  
23.41 According to the City of Boroondara, all of the schemes reviewed by AHURI 
in its international study of housing guarantee schemes showed a zero default rate and 
no call had yet been made on the government guarantees. The City of Boroondara 
46  Julie Lawson, Vivienne Milligan and Judith Yates, Housing Supply Bonds—a suitable 
instrument to channel investment towards affordable housing in Australia?, AHURI Final 
Report No. 188, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, RMIT Research Centre 
UNSW-UWS Research Centre, May 2012, p. 7. 
47  Submission 24, p. 27.  
48  Submission 175, p. 20. 
49  Submission 175, p. 20. 
50  Submission 56, p. 14.  
51  Submission 69, p. 15.  
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stated further that this default rate was due largely to the 'supportive role of 
Government in bolstering the equity position of housing providers and their revenue 
stream and the financial management and monitoring regimes guiding housing sector 
organisations'. In the City of Boroondara's view, this arrangement provided a 
'sustainable and sound business model' which was 'first and foremost the strongest line 
of defence protecting any Government guarantee, growing supply capacity amongst 
providers and easing access to lower cost larger volumes of investment'.52 
23.42 The Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology noted 
the failing private rental sector, in terms of security, supply and affordability, and the 
'great need' to rebuild Australia's social housing sector. In its view, much of the 
growth could be funded by savings in other areas (negative gearing, FHOS) but also 
by some form of affordable housing supply bonds as proposed by Dr Lawson and 
Professor Berry.53 
23.43 National Shelter referred to round tables held in 2012 and 2013 involving 
approximately 150 participants, who broadly supported the introduction of an 
affordable housing supply bond to attract the significant investment potential of 
superannuation and equity funds.54  
Committee view 
23.44 Clearly, the comprehensive work undertaken by AHURI on housing supply 
bonds provides a solid, well researched body of work that now warrants the Australian 
Government giving far more serious consideration to the introduction of HSBs or 
similar vehicles designed to attract investment affordable housing in Australia.  
Recommendation 40 
23.45 The committee recommends that the Federation White Paper process 
give due consideration to the proposal for the introduction of housing supply 
bonds using AHURI's research as a starting point for its consideration. 
23.46 The committee also recommends that the Australian Government 
establish a cross-sectoral high level industry and government Housing Supply 
Financing Task Force, as proposed in the AHURI report. It would provide 
advice to governments on the potential for a housing supply bond in Australia 
and investigate other mechanisms for private investment. 
Options  
23.47 Clearly the HSB is only one means of attracting private investment into the 
affordable housing market. It should be noted that the AHURI expert panel expressed 
52  Submission 69, p. 16.  
53  Submission 86, pp. [8–9]. 
54  Submission 78, p. 22. 
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considerable interest in the housing supply bonds proposal which was 'consistent with 
housing being seen as an infrastructure–type investment'. Even so, the expert panel 
saw housing supply bonds 'as a medium rather than short-term solution because of the 
inevitable delays in designing them and in establishing the institutional environment 
needed to support their delivery'. According to the expert panel: 
There was a sense of urgency for more immediate action, specifically 
around the unallocated NRAS incentives, and a commitment to a minimum 
supply target for new rental housing as an indicator of the scale of 
opportunity that government was seeking to generate.55 
23.48 At the National Shelter 2012 and 2013 round tables, a number of options were 
discussed including the 'housing supply bond', as well as an 'infrastructure bond' and 
an expanded and revised NRAS. National Shelter observed that common to all these 
options was an acceptance of the need to attract substantial investment into affordable 
housing to alleviate the current lack of supply. National Shelter identified a number of 
matters that would need to be addressed to secure greater institutional investment in 
affordable housing: 
• certainty from government, particularly the need for bi-partisan or 
multi party support; 
• scale of investment including government backed opportunities to 
enable institutions to invest $500m per annum using a portfolio 
approach; 
• reduction of financial risk for institutions; this may require the 
Commonwealth to underwrite a component of debt, if not all; 
• ability for liquidity of investment; 
• government equity and government credit enhancement to assist with 
consistent and predictable yields as a yield gap does exist; 
• revising NRAS to improve its workability including for scale 
investors, fix aspects of its tax treatment and provide ongoing funding 
certainty to ensure a pipeline of supply; 
• development of an investment scheme that does not require investors 
to fund property development; and 
• recognition that the requirements of institutional investors differ from 
banks. For example, banks prefer strata development but institutions 
prefer lower risk management arrangements such as multi-unit 
residential that are all rental.56 
55  Vivienne Milligan, Judith Yates, Ilan Wiesel and Hal Pawson, Financing rental housing 
through institutional investment, Volume 1: outcomes from an Investigative Panel, AHURI 
Final Report No. 202, March 2013, p. 41, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/download.asp?ContentID=ahuri_71016_fr1&redirect=tru
e (accessed 12 January 2015). 
56  Submission 78, pp. 22–23. 
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23.49 As noted throughout part II of the report, there was also general acceptance 
that public funding would be needed to continue to assist in the provision of 
affordable housing. For example, National Shelter acknowledged that while there was 
support for attracting private investment into affordable housing, it should not replace 
government funding. It accepted that while private investment should be used to 
accelerate affordable housing outcomes, government funding, through a subsidy, 
would still be required for social housing. National Shelter also suggested that the 
introduction of private investment mechanisms, such as supply bonds, would also 
supplement and provide alternatives to existing private rental investment measures, 
such as negative gearing or capital gains tax.57 Together with Shelter WA, it 
recommended the creation of vehicles such as unit investment trusts (in which 
investors can invest in the overall fund instead of individual properties) and 
Affordable Housing Bonds for attracting and managing institutional investment in 
rental housing.58 
23.50 It is important to note that the 2012 AHURI study on HSBs also suggested 
that HSBs were not intended to replace existing forms of housing assistance for 
affordable rental housing, such as that provided by NRAS and CRA, and under 
NAHA. It stated: 
Instead, they aim to complement and extend the value of such public 
subsidies in order to increase the long-term supply of affordable housing. 
HSBs of themselves will not deliver affordability outcomes for tenants 
regardless of their circumstances. Assistance currently provided through 
NRAS and CRA is still needed to ensure affordability outcomes for tenants 
of affordable rental housing and to assist with repayment of the bonds over 
their (presumed 10-year) life span.59 
23.51 As noted earlier, a number of witnesses referred to other mechanisms 
designed to attract private investment into the affordable housing sector including tax 
incentives to boost the supply of affordable housing. Some have already been 
introduced in Australia including NRAS, but other suggestions are drawn from 
overseas, including protected savings and guaranteed housing loans and, as considered 
at length by the committee, housing supply bonds.60  
57  Submission 78, p. 23. 
58  Submission 78, p. 11. 
59  Julie Lawson, Vivienne Milligan and Judith Yates, Housing Supply Bonds—a suitable 
instrument to channel investment towards affordable housing in Australia?, AHURI Final 
Report No. 188, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, RMIT Research Centre 
UNSW-UWS Research Centre, May 2012, p. 6, 
http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/download/ahuri_30652_fr (accessed 12 January 2015). 
60  See paragraphs 23.28–23.29. 
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Conclusion 
23.52 Without doubt significant amounts of public and private finance will be 
required to fill the growing shortfall of affordable rental properties in Australia. 
Investment is not meeting current demand, let alone projected needs. The Australian 
Government has available to it any number of levers to attract much needed private 
investment in the supply of affordable rental properties. The committee has considered 
and made recommendations in respect of taxation incentives, schemes such as NRAS 
and HSBs. It has looked at the role of community housing providers and the 
partnerships they can form with private enterprise to develop affordable housing. 
These various schemes and incentives are not intended to work in isolation but to 
come together as a concerted effort to boost the supply of affordable housing.  
23.53 In this regard, the overriding message coming out of this inquiry is the need 
for the Australian Government to give coherence to the numerous local, state and 
national incentives and schemes intended to contribute to the provision of affordable 
housing. It can only do so by providing much needed leadership through a renewed 
COAG process and by having a Minister for Housing and Homelessness driving this 
process. The committee has made recommendations accordingly. 
 

  
Chapter 24 
Conclusion  
24.1 In chapter 4, the committee recommended that the Australian Government 
appoint a Minister for Housing and Homelessness, with the portfolio to be located in a 
central agency. The evidence taken in this second part of the report, drawn in 
particular from people involved in social housing, gives even greater force to this 
recommendation.   
24.2 In this chapter, the committee draws together the principal themes developed 
in part II of the report and links them to the two headline recommendations—
appointing a Commonwealth Minister for Housing and Homelessness and establishing 
a COAG ministerial council on housing. Although the arguments in favour of having 
a more integrated approach to affordable housing under national leadership are similar 
to those presented in chapter 4 and 5, the perspective, in this chapter, comes from 
people interested or involved in the provision of affordable social and rental housing. 
The committee then draws together its main conclusions.  
National importance 
24.3 Evidence before the committee overwhelmingly supported the contention that 
access to affordable housing was a matter of national importance.1 But a number of 
submitters referred to what they perceive as the fragmentation of housing policy and 
effort, which has led to a good deal of confusion and discord in attempts to address 
housing issues. Generally speaking, these submissions suggested that different levels 
of government, and indeed different areas of the same government, often have 
dissimilar objectives that pull in different directions. For example, Mr Wolfe, Housing 
Industry Association, informed the committee that: 
Our frustration goes more to the fact that at various points along the 
continuum councils point to state governments, state governments point to 
the federal government and the federal government points to state 
government and local councils. The three levels of government do not seem 
to be working in concert.2 
24.4 The Junction and Women's Housing believed that to deal with any one 
element of affordable housing in isolation was to ignore the interrelated nature of 
Australia's housing system and 'the impact of other policies, particularly at a federal 
level'.3 Mr Langford explained further that an integrated policy response would cut 
across the tiers of government and all parts of the housing system and that such an 
1  See for example, Mr Langford, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40.  
2  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 47.  
3  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 31. 
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approach would be led nationally, as a national conversation allowing for state and 
local policy context.4 Noting that housing affordability presented many and various 
challenges that should not be underestimated, Professor Beer told the committee that 
multiple solutions operating in all dimensions of the housing supply and demand 
equation were needed: 
Solutions that focus only on demand will be inadequate and solutions that 
focus only on supply will be inadequate.5 
24.5 According to Mr Langford, there should be an integrated approach to the 
social and economic issues that relate to housing. He suggested that bricks-and-mortar 
housing solutions without appropriate and funded support would: 
…not address the issue of homelessness for many people and will just 
create and foster a cycle where people continue to fall into homelessness 
and are picked up through other systems, be it the health or justice systems, 
imposing a cost on the rest of the community. Support services need 
appropriate and secure funding to allow that to happen, and that funding 
needs a longer term vision than the current format, which often is short-
term funding contracts, which creates uncertainty for support partners and 
also creates uncertainty for tenants who are being supported to sustain 
successful tenancies.6 
24.6 National Seniors Australia argued that NRAS, which provided incentives to 
developers to supply affordable rental housing within the private sector, and the Social 
Housing Initiative and CRA programs were very successful when well integrated. 
Ms Skinner explained that integration was important because of situations where there 
was 'not necessarily a complete support system'. She noted: 
You might have housing assistance happening for one group of people. You 
might have access to aged-care services for another. Other people are 
getting the health supports they need. It is not until you bring it all together 
for the individual—so it is person-centred—that you are going to get the 
best success and the longest tenure or security. It is not just people living in 
rentals who experience problems. It is also people who are in the homes 
that might be quite run down and do not have the amenities they need.7 
24.7 Ms Palumbo, Community Housing Council of South Australia, acknowledged 
that CRA was a very important element of affordable housing but that NRAS was 
critical. She also referred to the NAHA grants. According to Ms Palumbo, they can 
make a difference if they pull together in a way that targets a specific reform agenda 
around social and affordable housing. She stated: 
4  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 31. 
5  Professor Andrew Beer, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Adelaide, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 10.  
6  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 31.  
7  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 15. 
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You can definitely do things with those three components together. The 
NAHA is used by state authorities, in the main, to plug their administration 
cost gaps. In this state [South Australia], there is none of that that goes to 
any capital or any renewal and that kind of thing, so it is kind of a lost 
revenue source.8 
24.8 As this report shows, the Australian Government uses a number of measures 
to improve Australian's access to affordable housing. To implement an effective 
strategy, the government needs to have a clear appreciation of how the various 
measures interact and form a coherent approach—NAHA, CRA and NRAS, the 
various taxation incentives as well as the contributions of the states and territories. For 
example, government decision-makers should understand whether CRA inflates rents, 
if at all; how housing associations benefit from CRA; the extent to which they use it to 
build their stock of affordable houses; and how NRAS and CRA work together. Also 
the committee has referred to the two groups of investors in affordable housing—the 
individual and institutional—and how, because of their different tax arrangements, 
derive different benefits from the NRAS incentives. The committee has also referred 
to the proposal for housing supply bonds. 
24.9 Indeed, the criticism levelled at NAHA and NPAH all point to the need for an 
integrated and coherent framework with consistent policy governing a national 
approach to affordable housing. An institutional mechanism is required to deliver such 
an overarching strategic approach. 
National leadership 
24.10 In this context, many submitters underlined the need for national leadership 
on access to affordable housing.9 For example, Mr Langford contended there was a 
huge opportunity for leadership, and Australians would expect that some of that would 
come from the federal level.10 Dr Burgmann spoke of the 'really important leadership 
role' that the Australian Government had to have—not 'a sole role to play, but a shared 
role with the states, with local government, with our industry and with other players'.11 
24.11 Mr Schrapel concurred with this view of the need for national leadership. 
While noting the complexity in providing affordable housing, he stated: 
All tiers of government plus the not-for-profit sector, the business 
community and the private investors play a part, but the levers the 
Commonwealth has are probably the most significant ones.12 
8  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40. 
9  See for example, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 31. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40.  
11  Dr Lucy Burgmann, Chief Executive Officer, NSW Federation of Housing Associations, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 November 2014, p. 11.  
12  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40. 
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24.12 Dr Clark, Shelter SA, added her voice to the call for national leadership.13 As 
did Ms Palumbo, who wholeheartedly endorsed the push for a national approach. She 
was of the view that 'handballing this to the states to sort out on their own is a step 
backwards'.14  
24.13 As noted earlier, Ms Palumbo regarded NAHA as the best lever the Australian 
Government had for reform. She highlighted the influence the Commonwealth could 
exercise through this lever: 
When the Commonwealth drives reform, things happen; when it is left to 
the states, our experience has been that things meander. So a really driven 
reform that is actually attached to that agreement is probably the most 
effective way we can look at genuine change, where that agreement says 
that we actually want to have a mixed model, we want a multi-provider 
system, we want to see different business models operating in this state not 
an old and tried monolithic model that means that nobody can really do 
anything other than on the fringes.15 
24.14 Mr Wolfe, HIA, argued strongly that the Australian Government needs to take 
a role. He noted: 
Look at NAHA payments, CRA payments and the investment made by the 
then government into the Social Housing Initiative—$5.4 billion. If you 
also look at the amount of money that is spent on residential aged-care 
facilities of which the residence itself is a significant amount of money—
that is, about $8.9 billion—there is an enormous amount of money that is 
contributed from the federal government down to the states and into 
housing. They have a role, a function, and it needs to be more than simply 
writing cheques. They need to take a role in assisting with state and local 
governments in the provisioning of the necessary infrastructure to support 
housing developments.16 
24.15 Professor Dalton drew attention to what he believed was the political parties' 
waning interest in housing policy, with some exceptions from time to time. In his 
view, the challenge was 'to bring housing policy into the political process more 
forcefully than it has been now for many decades'. He referred back to the post-war 
period when housing policy was 'quite central to the way we thought about Australian 
society'.17 Professor Dalton then noted that, apart from a few examples, the minister 
responsible for housing has not held a senior ministerial position in the government: 
that it has tended to be a junior ministry.18 
13  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40.  
14  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40. 
15  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 40. 
16  Proof Committee Hansard, 30 July 2014, p. 45.  
17  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 12.  
18  Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2014, p. 12. 
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24.16 Both Shelter WA and National Shelter suggested that 'to achieve effective 
coordination, a single minister, at both State and Federal levels, with a responsibility 
for Housing, Homelessness and Urban Development is required. Similarly, the 
Queensland Council of Social Service recommended that a Minister for Housing, 
Homelessness and Urban Development be appointed at the federal government level 
with responsibility to coordinate housing-related policy decisions across agencies and 
jurisdictions.19 In its view, there would be value in re-examining the roles and 
responsibilities undertaken by the state and Commonwealth governments to facilitate 
access to affordable housing to ensure these roles and responsibilities are clear, 
mutually exclusive and well-targeted. Dr Clark argued that a dedicated federal 
housing minister and a national plan for the housing system were required to effect 
real change. She noted that the government had a range of levers available to it to alter 
in order to achieve change.20 Anglicare Australia and the City Futures Research 
Centre also argued the case for a national Housing and Homelessness Minister, 
preferably one that would sit in Cabinet. 
24.17 As the committee noted in the previous chapter, the overriding message 
coming out of this inquiry was the need for the Australian Government to give 
coherence to the numerous local, state and national incentives and schemes intended 
to contribute to the provision of affordable housing. It can only do so by providing 
much needed leadership through a renewed COAG process and by having a Minister 
for Housing and Homelessness driving this process. Indeed, a dedicated minister for 
housing and homelessness could spearhead this process, supported by an institutional 
infrastructure that would provide the continuity, expertise, experience and established 
networks with all levels of government. 
Committee view 
24.18 In this report, the committee has underscored the importance of affordable, 
secure, and suitable housing as a vital determinant of wellbeing. For example, Dr Julie 
Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, RMIT University, stated simply that few material 
concerns were more important to Australians than the homes they live in: 
Secure, affordable housing contributes to our sense of security, individual 
wellbeing, health and supports family stability.21 
24.19 Indeed, Mr Scott Langford, Junction and Women's Housing, described, secure 
tenancy as 'the bedrock of building capacity for social and economic participation'.22 
24.20 But the committee took evidence that highlighted the fact that a significant 
number of Australians were not enjoying the security and comfort of affordable and 
19  Submission 175, p. 5. 
20  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 29.  
21  Submission 24, p. 5. 
22  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 30.  
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appropriate housing: that currently Australia's housing market was not meeting the 
needs of all Australians. This situation was most evident in the private rental market 
where low- to medium-income earners were encountering significant problems 
accessing affordable and appropriate housing.  
24.21 Drawing on the research on secure occupancy in rental housing, Dr Lawson 
and Professor Berry suggested that the rental market had 'the potential to provide a 
refuge, oasis and stepping stone for an increasing number of households'. But, in their 
assessment, Australia's rental housing was: 
…the least secure and most neglected pillar of our housing system.23  
24.22 Indeed, Mr Adrian Pisarski, National Shelter, stated bluntly that the rental 
market was 'a brutal place if on a fixed income or even a pension.'24 In this context, a 
number of witnesses referred to an emerging housing affordability crisis for older 
Australians.25 
24.23 Many in the private rental market seek relief by accessing social housing but 
here the waiting lists are long and such accommodation has become a 'housing of last 
resort'. Undoubtedly, Australia has a housing affordability problem—the challenges 
are complex, diverse and interact differently in different parts of Australia. Consistent 
with this overall assessment, and as noted earlier, Professor Beer noted that housing 
affordability presents multiple challenges and consequently 'needs multiple solutions 
operating in all directions of the housing supply and demand equation'.26 
24.24 Considering the vital importance of housing to a person's overall wellbeing 
and the current problems encountered gaining access to affordable and appropriate 
housing, the committee was firmly of the view that affordable housing should be a 
national economic issue that needs to be a central and cross-cutting theme of 
government. Furthermore, renting must be recognised as a mainstream and, for some, 
a permanent form of tenure in Australia's housing system. As a consequence, 
affordable rental housing must be placed on Australia's national policy agenda as a 
key issue to address poverty.27 
24.25 As the committee noted in the previous chapter, the increasing tight and 
expensive private rental sector is locking low- to moderate-income earners out of 
affordable and appropriate housing. This situation indicates market failure and 
suggests that market solutions to low cost housing will simply not emerge naturally: 
that there is a clear need to find ways to attract private investment into low cost and 
23  Submission 24, p. 6. 
24  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 September 2014, p. 33. 
25  Aged and Community Services Australia had 'the housing crisis for older people' as a heading 
in its submission, Submission 111, p. 3 and Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 10. 
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 28 July 2014, p. 10. 
27  See, for example, National Foundation for Australian Women ACT, Submission 38, p. 4. 
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social housing.28 But efforts to attract institutional investors into affordable housing 
have so far been disappointing. Nonetheless, this challenge provides the Australian 
Government with the opportunity to find and implement solutions.  
Continuity and consistency 
24.26 The committee identified the need for a long term housing strategy that 
would: provide certainty and coherence for the affordable housing sector; clear and 
consistent funding commitments; and policy certainty that would enable housing 
providers to forge stronger partnerships with the private sector. This call for certainty 
in policy and funding for affordable housing came from numerous quarters—
community housing providers, academics working in this area, the Indigenous 
community and investors. 
24.27 In this report, the committee has recommended that the Australian 
Government direct its attention and efforts to a number of areas, and has made 
recommendations accordingly, including developing a long-term national affordable 
housing plan that: 
• recognises affordable housing, including affordable rental housing, as a 
mainstream and national policy objective and places affordable housing at the 
forefront of government policy across Australia; 
• is spearheaded by a dedicated minister for housing and homelessness and 
supported by an institutional infrastructure that would provide the continuity, 
expertise, experience and established networks with all levels of government;  
• fosters intergovernmental cooperation in solving housing issues within a 
'whole-of-system housing policy framework';  
• places a high priority on improving the supply-side efficiency of the 
Australian housing market;  
• reinvigorates NAHA placing particular emphasis on improving transparency 
and accountability, and introducing a robust evaluation and reporting 
framework; 
• contains clear, consistent and longer-term funding commitments adequate to 
meet the growing demand for social housing; 
• recommits to halving homelessness by 2025; 
• takes account of the findings outlined in this report including facts such as the 
age pension assumes home ownership and the projected decline in home 
ownership especially among older Australian;   
• builds trust and confidence in both affordable housing providers and investors 
that Australian governments at all levels, led by the Commonwealth, are 
committed to increasing the supply of affordable housing; 
28  See, for example, Mr Cameron Murray, Submission 17. 
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• provides certainty and coherence for the affordable housing sector and policy 
certainty that would enable housing providers to forge stronger partnerships 
with the private sector; 
• recognises that significant volumes of public and private finance would be 
required to meet the projected need for additional rental housing and the 
importance of attracting institutional investors into the affordable housing 
market; 
• understands that efforts to attract a significant level of institutional investment 
into affordable housing have to date been unsuccessful; and  
• makes institutional investment a core policy objective in affordable housing. 
24.28 Overall, and as highlighted in the strong and resounding messages drawn from 
the chapter on homelessness, the committee is firmly of the view that: 
• the Australian government cannot vacate the affordable housing space or step 
back from its responsibilities to ensure that every Australian has access to 
affordable, safe and sustainable housing; and 
• in the long run, investment in affordable housing returns dividends not only to 
the individual struggling to access safe, secure and affordable housing but to 
the budgets of the Australian, state and territory governments and ultimately 
the Australian taxpayer (by having a more productive community with 
reduced costs for social, health, unemployment services and for justice and 
policing). 
 
 
 
Senator Sam Dastyari 
Chair 
 
  
Dissenting Report by Government Senators 
1.1 The majority report of the committee contains extensive and informative 
discussion of Australia's housing affordability problems and the resulting issues and 
policy challenges faced by governments at all levels, including the Australian 
Government. The comprehensiveness of the evidence the report brings together 
reflects the efforts of participants in providing to the committee both high quality 
submissions and evidence at inquiry hearings. However, in the view of Coalition 
Senators, many of the report's recommendations do not constitute the best responses to 
the housing affordability challenges Australia faces, and if implemented, would be 
unlikely to address many of the underlying problems identified in the report. 
1.2 Housing is a significant part of the Australian economy as it influences 
building activity and employment and provides a store of wealth for owner-occupiers 
and investors.  Access to affordable secure housing is a vital factor for individual and 
family health and happiness.  It also provides a platform for social connection through 
communities and families.   
1.3 Clarification of roles and responsibilities between levels of government is 
needed to improve the operation of direct government housing assistance and 
homelessness services. The development of the Roles and Responsibilities in Housing 
and Homelessness Issues Paper through the Federation White Paper process is 
designed to progress this goal. Specific reform proposals across a range of 
government activities, including housing and homelessness, will be identified in the 
Green paper which will be released in the second half of 2015.   
1.4 The key report finding (page 5) that the Australian government cannot vacate 
the affordable housing space or step back from its responsibilities in this area is 
supported. The Abbott Government is not vacating the affordable housing space or 
stepping back from its responsibilities. It is addressing the matter directly by 
supporting the Senate Inquiry and developing an Issues paper directly addressing the 
issues of affordable housing and homelessness in Australia. 
1.5 The Federation White Paper process seeks to complement (and not duplicate) 
the analysis provided in a number of other reviews that more fully address broader 
housing affordability pressures. This Senate Inquiry into Affordable Housing in 
Australia has reviewed the role of all levels of government in facilitating affordable 
home owner and private rental accommodation, the impact of social housing on 
housing affordability and the role of all government levels.  The outcomes from the 
Senate Inquiry will be considered as part of this process. However the Government 
has a clear approach to regulation: to reduce the regulatory burden for individuals, 
businesses and community organisations.  Cutting existing red tape and limiting the 
flow of new regulation is a high priority and this has been considered whilst analysing 
the recommendations. 
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Comments on recommendations: 
Response to recommendation 1   
1.6 The appointment of a Minister for Housing and Homelessness with the 
portfolio to be located in a central agency is not supported.  The determination and 
allocation of its Cabinet and Ministerial responsibilities to ensure maximum 
effectiveness is appropriately a matter for the Government. 
Response to recommendation 2 
1.7 The introduction of a Ministerial Council on housing and homelessness is not 
supported. The majority report has not made the case that such a mechanism would be 
effective in progressing reforms in a timely manner, or that the additional resource 
costs and bureaucratic overlay are justified, and is inconsistent with the Government's 
red tape reduction agenda. 
Response to recommendation 3 
1.8 The establishment of a new statutory body is inconsistent with the 
Government's red tape reduction agenda, in addition the area measuring housing needs 
is a matter for the state and territory governments.  The recommendation is not 
supported. 
Response to recommendation 4 
1.9 This recommendation is calling for the Commonwealth and states and 
territories to collaborate in the development of a long term plan.  This 
recommendation is not supported as it is being addressed through the Government's 
Federation White Paper process.  
Response to recommendation 5 
1.10 Conveyancing stamp duty is a state and territory issue and therefore this 
recommendation is not supported.   
Response to recommendation 6 
1.11 The development of an additional Ministerial Council is not consistent with 
the Government's red tape reduction agenda and therefore not supported. 
Response to recommendation 7 
1.12 The recommendation calling for state and local governments to investigate the 
possibility of using Tax Increment Financing to fund infrastructure for new housing 
developments is supported. 
Response to recommendation 8 
1.13 As previously indicated the development of a Ministerial Council is not 
supported as it is inconsistent with the Government's red tape reduction agenda.  The 
invitation to improve the consistency and timeliness of government information is 
being addressed through the Federation White Paper process and therefore this 
recommendation is not supported. 
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Response to recommendation 9 
1.14 The recommendation is not supported as the reinstatement of the National 
Urban Policy and Major Cities Unit is inconsistent with the Government's red rape 
reduction agenda.  
Response to recommendation 10 
1.15 The recommendation to consider developing a long term strategy for 
regenerating Australia's urban centres and transport corridors is supported. 
Response to recommendation 11 
1.16 The recommendation that government owned land represents a potential 
source of land supply for affordable housing is supported. 
Response to recommendation 12 
1.17 The matter of using prefabricated housing and its potential role in improving 
housing affordability is a matter for government and a new inquiry is not needed and 
therefore the recommendation is not supported. 
Response to recommendation 13 
1.18 The recommendation is not supported as the issue will be addressed by the 
White Paper on Reform of Australia's Tax System.   
Response to recommendation 14 
1.19 This recommendation is not supported as consideration of introducing means 
testing to ensure that the grants are appropriate targeted is a matter for state and 
territory governments. 
Response to recommendation 15 
1.20 This recommendation is not supported as it is inconsistent with the 
Government's red tape reduction agenda.  
Response to recommendation 16 
1.21 As per recommendation 2, the recommendation to establish the Ministerial 
Council is not supported as it is inconsistent with the Government's red reduction tape 
agenda.   
Response to recommendation 17  
1.22 The investigation of new policy settings that will address barriers to 
downsizing by retirees, including schemes along the lines of Housing Help for Seniors 
pilot is supported. 
Response to recommendation 18 
1.23 As per recommendation 2, this recommendation is not supported as it is 
inconsistent with the Government's red tape reduction agenda. 
Response to recommendation 19 
1.24 This recommendation is not supported as the review of tenancies laws is a 
state and territory issue. 
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Response to recommendation 20 
1.25 The investigation by states and territories of national minimum standards 
including security of tenure, stability and fairness of rent prices is a state and territory 
issue and therefore this recommendation is not supported.  
Response to recommendation 21 
1.26 Addressing the reluctance of tenants to exercise their right under the existing 
residential tenancies legislation is a state and territory and individual responsibility 
and therefore the recommendation is not supported. 
Response to recommendation 22 
1.27 Addressing the supply of affordable housing is a matter for government in 
conjunction with the states and territories, and therefore this recommendation is not 
supported.   
Response to recommendation 23 
1.28 The recommendation to request the Productivity Commission to undertake an 
inquiry into the merits of transferring public housing to the community housing sector 
is not supported as it will be addressed through the Federation White Paper process. 
Response to recommendation 24 
1.29 The recommendation to commit to increase the overall proportion of public 
housing as a percentage of housing stock is not supported.  This will be addressed 
through the Federation White Paper.   
Response to recommendation 25 
1.30 The issue of transfer of public housing stock to the community sector will be 
addressed through the Federation White Paper and therefore the recommendation is 
not supported. 
Response to recommendation 26 
1.31 Coalition Senators support the recommendation to look closely at its aged 
care policy so that it takes account of the particular difficulties confronting older 
Australians in the rental market. 
Response to recommendation 27 
1.32 Coalition Senators support the recommendation to commit to ensuring that 
adequate funding be made available so that women and children escaping domestic 
violence are housed in secure and appropriate housing with the necessary support 
network that would allow them to remain in a safe environment. 
Response to recommendation 28 
1.33 Modifying housing to improve energy efficiency is an individual obligation 
and responsibility and therefore the recommendation is not supported. 
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Response to recommendation 29 
1.34 Access to affordable housing is an Australia wide challenge. As the Closing 
the Gap report is working well with its current remit this recommendation is not 
supported. 
Response to recommendation 30 
1.35 This recommendation seeks to commit the Government to a number of long 
run spending and policy positions. Affordable Housing policy is a matter for the 
government and therefore the recommendation is not supported. 
Response to recommendation 31 
1.36 The recommendation is not supported as this is inconsistent with the 
Government's red tape reduction agenda.   
Response to recommendation 32 
1.37 The recommendation is not supported, however the Government is happy to 
recognise the important work of advocacy and peak organisations providing support, 
but recognition does not equal funding.  Due to the significant Budget repair task, in 
the recent grant funding round, funding was not provided for advocacy groups in this 
area.  Funding was directed to organisations delivering critical frontline services.  
Additionally, the Abbott Government has reversed Labor's funding cuts for 
homelessness and will provide $230 million to extend the National Partnership 
Agreement on Homelessness for two years to 2017, with funding priority given to 
frontline services focusing on women and children experiencing domestic and family 
violence, and homeless youth under 18. 
Response to recommendation 33 
1.38 This recommendation is not supported and will be addressed through the 
Federation White Paper. 
Response to recommendation 34 
1.39 The recommendation to improve accountability and transparency is supported 
in part, however final decisions will depend on the outcome of the pending Federation 
White Paper process.   
Response to recommendation 35 
1.40 The recommendation that the Federation White Paper process consider 
carefully NAHA is supported. 
Response to recommendation 36 
1.41 The supply of new affordable housing is a matter for Government and 
therefore this recommendation is not supported. 
Response to recommendation 37 
1.42 Any proposed refinement or placement of a scheme will be a matter for 
Government and therefore this recommendation is not supported. 
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Response to recommendation 38 
1.43 The resolution of any uncertainly over the effect of NRAS is a matter for the 
Government and therefore this recommendation is not supported. 
Response to recommendation 39 
1.44 The recommendation to review the eligibility criteria for CRA is not 
supported. 
Response to recommendation 40 
1.45 The recommendation that the White Paper on Federation give due 
consideration to the proposal for the introduction of HSB's using AHURI's research as 
a starting point is supported. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Sean Edwards 
Deputy Chair 
 
 
 
 
 
Senator Matthew Canavan 
Nationals Senator for Queensland 
 
  
Additional comments by Senator Nick Xenophon  
1.1 Even by the high standards of Senate committee reports, this report on 
housing affordability is a landmark examination of the crisis facing millions of 
Australians. My colleagues and the committee secretariat deserve to be commended 
for their incredibly hard work on this inquiry and the overall thrust of the report.  
1.2 Sadly for many Australians, home ownership is a dream that is becoming 
increasingly out of reach. Soaring property prices in our capitals have seen many low 
and middle income earners excluded from the property ownership market despite 
increasing average wages. As one witness told the committee: 
Home ownership provides security of tenure and helps a family to build 
roots and connections within their community. Research shows that home 
ownership contributes to wellbeing, feelings of financial security, 
community pride and better educational and health outcomes for families.1  
1.3 The statistics are sobering. While the number of home owner-occupiers in 
Australia has remained steady at approximately 70 percent over the past four 
decades,2 the number of families experiencing housing stress has been on the rise. A 
2014 report by National Shelter states that: 
Between 2002 and 2012, the average nominal rent increased by 75.8% for 
houses and 91.8% for other dwellings (mostly flats/apartments), while 
average earnings rose by 57% and house prices rose by 69%.3  
1.4 The report continued: 
In 2009–10, 60% of lower-income rental households in Australia were in 
rental stress.4  
1.5 I am encouraged by the committee's majority report that the issue of housing 
affordability is being taken seriously. The committee has made a number of sensible 
recommendations that will go towards improving home ownership rates across  
the country.   
1  Mr John Oliver, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 
July 2014, p. 2 
2  The Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1301.1 Year Book Australia 2012, Housing - Home 
Owners and Renters, available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1301.0Main+Features1292012, accessed 7 
May 2015. 
3  National Shelter, Housing Australia Fact Sheet, p. 1, available at 
http://www.shelternsw.org.au/publications-new/factsheets-new/226-housing-australia-
factsheet/file, accessed 7 May 2015. 
4  National Shelter, Housing Australia Fact Sheet, p. 1, available at 
http://www.shelternsw.org.au/publications-new/factsheets-new/226-housing-australia-
factsheet/file, accessed 7 May 2015. 
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1.6 However, I query in terms of policy priorities whether there should be a 
greater emphasis on home ownership rather than surrendering to the view that an 
increasing number of Australians will have to rely on long term rental 
accommodation.  
1.7 I think it is important that there be clear national goals set as to the level of 
home ownership that should be aimed for and desirable, and that must involve  
a holistic view of a range of measures. These must include: local and state government 
planning laws, the costs of outer and extra urban developments (in terms of 
infrastructure and social costs) and the role of the Commonwealth to provide 'carrot 
and stick' incentives to encourage home ownership and housing affordability.  
In addition there ought to be transparent and accountable goals on increasing levels of 
home ownership, reducing rental and mortgage stress as well as levels of 
homelessness.  
1.8 It also needs to be acknowledged that the current commercial lending market 
ought to be subject to targeted government intervention to encourage home ownership. 
The HomeStart scheme in South Australia is a stunning success story which for over  
a generation has allowed 65,000 home loans to be approved that the commercial 
market would have shunned. Other states could learn from the South Australian 
example.  
1.9 It was HomeStart, with its strong record of social inclusiveness and enabling 
home ownership for those that the banks would otherwise shun, that raised the issue of 
adopting a measure such as Canada's Home Buyers Plan that allows first home buyers 
to use their superannuation to buy a home. I believe this is worth investigating, but 
after considerable feedback following my raising of this proposal I believe it needs to 
be proceeded with cautiously. It needs to be part of a suite of measures, including 
changes to negative gearing (with an emphasis on increasing the stock of affordable 
rental accommodation), planning law changes and other policy levers to prevent such 
a measure having an inflationary impact on the housing market. 
1.10 Issues of urban planning and its impact on social indicators must also be more 
seriously considered. I find it extraordinary that in my home state of South Australia 
the square mile of the City of Adelaide (bounded by north, south, east and west 
terraces) has a residential population of 23,000 residents compared to 46,000 residents 
100 years ago. Any affordable housing policies must take into account the social and 
economic benefits of driving population growth to reinvigorate inner urban areas in a 
way that would make these areas attractive for young people and families. The 
consequential benefits in terms of reducing the cost of ever expanding infrastructure 
needs of extra-urban developments must be taken into account.  
1.11 Finally, in terms of over-heated housing markets, particularly in Sydney, 
which can distort the entire housing market and with it housing affordability, there 
must be a better way. There ought to be a requirement for the Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority to further stress test housing loans, particularly in the Sydney 
market. Interest rates by themselves are too blunt an instrument to do this. This should 
also prompt an examination of the importance of decentralisation and affordable 
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housing in regional communities. The Commonwealth could play a key role in 
providing incentives to encourage this. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Nick Xenophon 
Independent Senator for South Australia 
  
 

  
Additional Comments from the Australian Greens 
1.1 This report and its recommendations are the first serious attempt to address 
the chronic housing affordability crisis during the term of the Abbott government. Its 
refusal to sign on or engage meaningfully with the recommendations or intent of this 
report is disappointing in the extreme. It is also perplexing. The Treasurer on one hand 
has recently acknowledged the housing affordability crisis in Australia and announced 
a Housing Affordability Taskforce, yet on the other delivered a Budget that abolished 
over $590 million of homelessness and housing affordability programs, and then axed 
the three peak expert bodies on homelessness and housing three days before 
Christmas. 
1.2 The Australian Greens appreciate the collaborative and professional way the 
Inquiry was conducted over the last year, and thank the many expert witnesses who 
participated. 
1.3 We particularly wish to thank the witnesses who were experiencing 
homelessness at the time they participated in the inquiry. Their experiences and advice 
described to the committee were powerful and moving, and we note have translated to 
concrete recommendations. We strongly urge Federal, State and Local governments to 
talk to, rather than about, the homeless, and act with the urgency and compassion 
desperately needed in this country. 
1.4 We note the recommendation proposed by people experiencing homelessness 
to investigate Centrelink as a one stop shop to assist people experiencing or at risk of 
homelessness, with referral and in-house expertise to link clients with services and 
housing. This one single action could change the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
Australians who are currently experiencing or at risk of homelessness. 
1.5 We also wish to thank and acknowledge those witnesses and tireless 
advocates who gave evidence on the basis of expertise - even as they were being 
defunded by the government. 
1.6 Since the last Senate Inquiry into Housing Affordability in 2008, not only has 
the housing affordability crisis deepened, but countless initiatives introduced after the 
report was delivered have been abolished by the current government. It is hard to 
overestimate the impact of axing the Ministerial Housing Portfolio, the National 
Housing Supply Council, Major Cities Unit, National Urban Policy, Ministerial 
Council on Homelessness, National Partnership Agreement capital program for new 
homelessness shelters, COAG Reform Council on Housing, Housing Help for Seniors 
Program, National Rental Affordability Scheme, First Home Savers Scheme, Housing 
Affordability and Innovation grants program, and national expert peak bodies 
Homelessness Australia, National Shelter and the Community Housing Federation of 
Australia. 
1.7 The Australian Greens support the findings and recommendations of the 
committee but wish to make some additional comments.  
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1.8 The report includes what we believe to be a missed opportunity to engage 
meaningfully with Commonwealth tax reform. This is an area in which the Greens 
will continue to be strong advocates. 
1.9 The issue of Inclusionary Zoning – or setting mandatory targets for affordable 
housing in developments over a certain size usually at the state government level - 
was also ignored despite its local and international success in delivering diverse types 
of affordable housing. The Australian government and opposition has much to learn 
from local examples in South Australia as well as numerous European cities, where 
targets of 15-33% affordable housing (including private rentals) are being routinely 
delivered as part of development models that deliberately include private and non for 
profit housing companies as part of the development consortium, and where 
government plays a direct partnership role.  
1.10 The Australian Greens believe the committee report paints a partial picture, 
and represents an incomplete roadmap to Housing Affordability.  
1.11 To this end the Australian Greens recommend: 
1.12 That the Commonwealth include inclusionary zoning targets in any 
national affordable housing plan using evidence-based models to assess the 
impact of inclusionary zoning on housing supply and affordability. 
1.13 In addition to the recommendations, the Greens commend our 9 point 
National Housing Roadmap – a comprehensive and costed plan to address 
Australia’s Housing Crisis – as a contribution to the debate, and look forward to these 
issues being dealt with the urgency they deserve. 
1.14 To this end the Australian Greens recommend: 
1. Doubling the funding currently available for specialist homeless services 
and build 7,000 new homes for people currently sleeping rough as a matter 
of urgency.  At a cost of $900 million – 1 billion a year to 2020 this would end 
the most urgent need in homelessness and mean over 400 people in crisis each 
day were not being turned away from services. 
2. Halving the social waiting list within the decade by providing funding to 
build 122,000 new social housing homes - enough to halve the waiting list in 
ten years and provide a home for more than 250,000 Australians languishing on 
the waiting lists. This would cost $700 million per year, plus $25 million per 
year for a new affordable housing supply bonds instrument. 
3. Introducing an Affordable Housing Supply Bond instrument to provide a 
safe and tested mechanism that would generate $2 billion of finance from a $25 
million per year government investment, and would allow large institutional 
investors and smaller mum and dad investors to invest in affordable social 
housing and rentals. 
4. Introducing a Better Deal for Renters package that would include 
establishing a new national body to introduce national minimum standards for 
rentals, boost renters' rights, make rental properties safer, more sustainable, 
energy and water efficient, and more affordable. Under the Greens plan, 
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landlords will be offered a package worth $500 per property to help them make 
upgrades and meet the new national standard. It would also provide an extra 
$3 million for Tenants’ Advocacy services. This package would cost $103 
million per year. 
5. Adopting the Henry Tax Review recommendation to reduce Capital Gains 
Tax concessions on investments (including property) by 10% as a minimum, 
as a costed revenue initiative. This would save $3.4 billion over the forward 
estimates and would provide much needed revenue to be used to build 
affordable housing. 
6. Building 85,000 new affordable rentals over the next decade, including 
funding for 20,000 student rentals through a new University NRAS scheme.  
7. Introducing a 'Convert to Rent' scheme to provide financial assistance to 
property owners to help convert vacant or unused space into rental units to 
provide affordable housing to low income households. Just $345 million over 
ten years would fund 15,000 conversions.  
8. 'Repowering' our entire social housing stock by installing solar panels and 
insulation on every single Australian social housing dwelling to help tenants 
save energy and money. $78.3 million per year over ten years would see 
520,000 social housing homes retrofitted and repowered, saving tenants about 
$500 per year and contributing significantly to reducing carbon emissions; and 
9. Kick-start an Australian-made prefabricated housing industry to quickly, 
sustainably and cheaply build affordable homes – and boost local jobs and 
innovation at the same time. The Greens plan would introduce a $50 million 
sustainable prefabricated modular housing industry package over 5 years to 
provide support for Research and Development, Innovation, Excellence in 
Design, skills and training, assistance establishing new production and 
manufacturing facilities, and demonstration projects. The package would also 
establish direct opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
to obtain training, trade qualifications, and employment across the 
prefabricated housing industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
Senator Scott Ludlam 
Australian Greens Senator for Western Australia 
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Submissions received 
 
Submission 
Number 
 
Submitter 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Grace Mutual Limited 
Mr Saul Eslake 
Mr Steve Walker 
Name Withheld  
Home Loan Experts 
Mr Bob Day  
Ms Catherine Cashmore  
Mr James Murchison 
The Taxpayers Party  
Mr Don Owers  
Hon Colin Barnett MLA, Premier of Western Australia  
Tamworth Regional Council 
Mr Chris Moore  
Reserve Bank of Australia  
Ms Ashley Holmes  
BIS Shrapnel  
Mr Cameron Murray  
Mr Luke Buckley  
Hon John Thwaites, Australian Building Codes Board  
Neumann and Turnour Lawyers 
Ms Carol O'Donnell  
Mr George Samuel  
Dr Gennadi Kazakevitch, Associate Professor Lionel Frost and Mr Luc Borrowman  
Dr Julie Lawson and Professor Mike Berry, Centre for Urban Research, RMIT University  
Professor Frank Stilwell 
Mr Chris Baulman  
Mr David Chandler OAM 
Mr Heath Preston  
Name Withheld  
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30 
31 
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36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
 
 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
 
Ms Leonie Ben-Simon  
NRAS Providers Ltd 
• Attachment 1  
Name Withheld  
Mr Keith Jacobs  
Public Interest Advocacy Centre  
Ms Christine Allison  
Prosper Australia  
Western Australian Local Government Association  
National Foundation for Australian Women  
Hobsons Bay City Council  
The Victorian Public Tenants Association 
Professor Fiona Haslam McKenzie, Curtin University 
Mortgage and Finance Association of Australia  
City of Perth  
The Western Community Legal Centres (Wyndham Legal Service, Footscray Community 
Legal Centre, Brimbank Melton Community Legal Centre and Western Suburbs Legal 
Service)  
Mr Michael Dromgool 
Community Employers WA  
Mr Robert Braby  
Master Builders Australia 
Catholic Health Australia  
Maribyrnong City Council  
Youth Action NSW  
Women's Housing Company  
Honorary Associate Professor Judith Yates, University of Sydney  
JELD-WEN Australia  
Central Highlands Local Area Service Network  
Mr Brett Petersson  
Side By Side Advocacy  
Inner South Rooming House Network  
Women's Legal Service Queensland  
Mr Paul Prendergast 
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61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
 
Mr Sean Reynolds  
The University of Sydney  
Mr Jason Marks  
Rismark International  
Women's Legal Services NSW  
Family Advocacy  
Mr Alan Pears AM  
Kingsford Law Centre  
City of Boroondara  
HomeGround Services  
• Attachment 1  
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare  
HomeStart Finance  
Housing Alliance  
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National Disability Services  
Carers Victoria 
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Australian Bureau of Statistics  
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The Salvation Army  
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Shelter SA  
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Fairfield City Council 
Chinese Australian Services Society Limited  
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The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia  
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Genworth  
Community Housing Federation of Victoria  
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Mount Alexander Shire Council 
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City of Darebin  
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Mr Tilesh Fonseka  
• Supplementary submission 
Department of Education  
WA Association for Mental Health  
Mr Norman Carter  
St George Sutherland Housing Interagency  
Customer Owned Banking Association  
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National Welfare Rights Network 
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City Futures Research Centre, UNSW  
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Shelter WA  
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Link Housing Ltd   
Wintringham 
Residential Development Council, Property Council of Australia  
Mr Paul Robertson  
South West Australia Homeless People 
Queensland Government  
People with Disability Australia Incorporated  
Housing Tasmania 
City of Melbourne  
• Attachment 1  
• Attachment 2  
• Attachment 3  
Submission Withdrawn  
Confidential 
RI Australia and Australian Network for Universal Housing Design 
 
Page 440  
 
222 
223 
224 
225 
226 
227 
228 
229 
230 
231 
 
Wyndham City Council  
Confidential 
Dr Andrea Sharam, Dr Tom Alves and Ms Lyndall Bryant 
Confidential 
Ms Lyndall Bryant  
Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre, Curtin University 
Mr Stephen Koci  
Homelessness Australia  
Confidential 
CoreLogic RP Data 
 
 
  
Appendix 2 
Tabled documents 
 
1. Document tabled by HomeStart Finance at a public hearing held in Adelaide on 28 July 
2014.  
 
2. Document tabled by the Community Housing Council at a public hearing held in 
Adelaide on 28 July 2014.  
 
3. Document tabled by the Department of Social Services at a public hearing held in 
Canberra on 30 July 2014.  
 
4. Document tabled by Senator Sean Edwards at a public hearing held in Canberra on 30 
July 2014.  
 
5. Document tabled by Prosper Australia at a public hearing held in Melbourne on 9 
September 2014.  
 
6. Document tabled by Dr Ian Winter, Executive Director of the Australian Housing and 
Urban Research Institute, at a public hearing held in Melbourne on 9 September 2014.  
 
7. Document tabled by Dr Sharon Parkinson, RMIT University, at a public hearing held in 
Melbourne on 9 September 2014.  
 
8. Document tabled by Professor Carolyn Whitzman, Melbourne University, at a public 
hearing held in Melbourne on 9 September 2014.  
 
9. Document tabled by Professor Carolyn Whitzman, Melbourne University, at a public 
hearing held in Melbourne on 9 September 2014.  
 
10. Document tabled by the City of Melbourne at a public hearing held in Melbourne on 9 
September 2014.  
 
11. Document tabled by the Wyndham Legal Service at a public hearing held in Melbourne 
on 9 September 2014.  
 
12. Document tabled by the Wyndham Legal Service at a public hearing held in Melbourne 
on 9 September 2014.  
 
13. Opening statement tabled by the Wyndham City Council at a public hearing held in 
Melbourne on 9 September 2014.  
 
14. Document tabled by the Wyndham City Council at a public hearing held in Melbourne 
on 9 September 2014 (exhibit A).  
 
15. Document tabled by the Wyndham City Council at a public hearing held in Melbourne 
on 9 September 2014 (exhibit B).  
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16. Document tabled by the Wyndham City Council at a public hearing held in Melbourne 
on 9 September 2014 (exhibit C).  
 
17. Document tabled by the Wyndham City Council at a public hearing held in Melbourne 
on 9 September 2014 (exhibit D).  
 
18. Report 'Where Will I Live as I Age?', tabled by National Seniors Australia at a public 
hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
19. Report '2nd Seniors Sentiment Index', tabled by National Seniors Australia at a public 
hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
20. Report 'Downsizing decisions of senior Australians: What are the motivating and 
discouraging factors?', tabled by National Seniors Australia at a public hearing held in 
Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
21. Report 'Relocation to a Retirement Village: Who Considers Relocation and What are 
People Looking for?', tabled by National Seniors Australia at a public hearing held in 
Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
22. Housing Affordability Study, tabled by Regional Development Australia – Gold Coast at 
a public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
23. Document tabled by the National Affordable Housing Consortium at a public hearing 
held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
24. 'The National Rental Affordability Scheme' factsheet tabled by NRAS Providers Ltd at a 
public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
25. ‘National Rental Affordability Scheme—Economics and Taxation Impact Study’, tabled 
by NRAS Providers Ltd at a public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
26. 'BHC - creating liveable communities', tabled by the Brisbane Housing Company at a 
public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
27. '5 top priorities for affordable housing', tabled by the Brisbane Housing Company at a 
public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 2014.  
 
28. Document tabled by the Brisbane Housing Company at a public hearing held in Brisbane 
on 10 September 2014.  
 
29. Document tabled by Professor Judith Yates at a public hearing held in Sydney on 10 
November 2014.  
 
30. Document tabled by the Australian Building Codes Board at a public hearing held in 
Sydney on 10 November 2014.  
 
31. 'The Next Instalment in Building Regulatory Reform', tabled by the Australian Building 
Codes Board at a public hearing held in Sydney on 10 November 2014. 
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32. Annual Business Plan 2014-15, tabled by the Australian Building Codes Board at a 
public hearing held in Sydney on 10 November 2014.  
 
33. Research report 'From Homelessness to Sustained Housing 2010-2013', tabled by 
Mission Australia at a public hearing held in Sydney on 10 November 2014. 
 
Additional information received 
 
1. Additional information received from the Women’s Legal Service on 12 September 
2014, following a public hearing held on 10 September 2014 in Brisbane.  
 
2. Research paper 'Allocation, eligibility and rent setting in the Australian community 
housing sector', provided by the Community Housing Federation of Australia on 7 
November 2014.  
 
3. Research paper 'The Vital Subsidy: CRA and community housing', provided by the 
Community Housing Federation of Australia on 7 November 2014.  
 
4. A paper on Independent Living Units in Queensland, provided by the Aged and 
Community Services Australia on 18 November 2014, following a public hearing held 
on 10 November 2014 in Sydney.  
 
5. Additional information received from the Tenants' Union of NSW on 26 November 
2014, following a public hearing held on 10 November 2014 in Sydney.  
 
6. Additional information received from the Department of Housing, Government of 
Western Australia, on 11 November 2014.  
 
7. Additional information received from the Department of Housing, Government of 
Western Australia, following a public hearing on 11 November 2014 in Perth. 
 
Answers to questions on notice 
 
1. Answer to a question on notice from a public hearing held in Canberra on 30 July 2014, 
received from Master Builders Australia on 25 August 2014.  
 
2. Answer to a question on notice from a public hearing held in Canberra on 30 July 2014, 
received from the Housing Industry Association on 25 August 2014.  
 
3. Answers to questions on notice from a public hearing held in Canberra on 30 July 2014, 
received from the Department of Social Services on 29 August 2014.  
 
4. Answers to questions on notice from a public hearing held in Canberra on 30 July 2014, 
received from the Australian Bureau of Statistics on 12 September 2014.  
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5. Answers to questions on notice from a public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 
2014, received from the Brisbane City Council on 19 September 2014.  
 
6. Answers to questions on notice from a public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 
2014, received from the Queensland Department of Housing and Public Works on 16 
October 2014. 
 
7. Answer to a question on notice from a public hearing held in Brisbane on 10 September 
2014, received from National Seniors Australia on 13 October 2014.  
 
8. Answer to a question on notice from a public hearing held in Perth on 11 November 
2014, received from the Government of Western Australia on 10 December 2014.  
 
9. Answers to questions on notice from a public hearing held in Canberra on 11 February 
2015, received from the Department of Social Services on 23 February 2015.  
 
10. Answer to a question on notice from a public hearing held in Canberra on 11 February 
2015 and additional information, received from Homelessness Australia on 13 February 
2015. 
 
 
  
Appendix 3 
Public hearings and witnesses 
 
ADELAIDE, 28 JULY 2014 
BAKER, Dr Emma, Deputy Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional 
Planning, University of Adelaide 
BEER, Professor Andrew, Director, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional 
Planning, University of Adelaide 
CLARK, Dr Alice, Executive Director, Shelter SA 
FAULKNER, Dr Debbie, Research Fellow, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional 
Planning, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Adelaide 
LANGFORD, Mr Scott, General Manager, Junction and Women's Housing 
MILLS, Mr Andrew, Acting General Manager, Strategy, People and Operations, 
HomeStart Finance 
OLIVER, Mr John, Chief Executive Officer, HomeStart Finance 
PALUMBO, Ms Maria, Chair, Community Housing Council of South Australia 
SCHRAPEL, Mr Simon, Chief Executive, Uniting Communities 
YATES, Mr Ian, Chief Executive, Council on the Ageing 
 
CANBERRA, 30 JULY 2014 
ABBOT, Ms Simone, Manager, Individuals Tax Unit, Personal and Retirement 
Income Division, The Treasury 
BAKER, Mr David, Director of Research, The Australia Institute 
BLACK, Ms Susan, Principal Adviser, Homelessness, National Rental Affordability 
Scheme and Gambling, Department of Social Services 
BROOKFIELD, Ms Kristin, Senior Executive Director, Building Development and 
Environment, Housing Industry Association 
COLEMAN, Ms Marie AO PSM, Chair, Social Policy Committee, National 
Foundation for Australian Women 
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DALE, Dr Harley, Chief Economist, Housing Industry Association 
DAVIS, Dr Brent, National Director, Industry Policy, Master Builders Australia Ltd 
DOWDELL, Ms Michelle, Manager, Social Policy Division, The Treasury 
FINDLATER SMITH, Ms Margaret, National Coordinator of Standing Committees, 
National Council of Women of Australia 
FOLEY, Mr Liam, Policy Officer, Urban Development Institute of Australia 
(National) 
FOSTER, Mr Chris, Principal Adviser, Social Policy Division, The Treasury 
GOLDSWORTHY, Mr Brenton, Principal Adviser, Forecasting, Macroeconomic 
Conditions Division, The Treasury 
HAND, Ms Felicity, Deputy Secretary, Department of Social Services 
HARNISCH, Mr Wilhelm, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia Ltd 
HEFEREN, Mr Rob, Executive Director, Revenue Group, The Treasury 
JELFS, Dr Paul, First Assistant Statistician, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
JOHNSON, Ms Molly, Researcher, The Australia Institute 
KREITALS, Mr Jock, Manager, Policy, Real Estate Institute of Australia 
LEGGETT, Mr Chris, Manager, Law Design Practice, Revenue Group, The Treasury 
LINDSAY, Mr Richard, Chief Executive Officer, Urban Development Institute of  
Australia (National) 
LYNCH, Ms Amanda, Chief Executive Officer, Real Estate Institute of Australia 
MORRIS, Mrs Julie Anne, President, National Council of Women of Australia 
MURRAY, Mr Geordan, Economist, Housing Industry Association 
PALMER, Mr Bryan, Group Manager, Housing, Homelessness and Gambling, 
Department of Social Services 
RILEY, Mr John, Branch Manager, Housing and Analysis, Department of Social 
Services 
WELLHAM, Mr Michael, Senior Adviser, Personal and Retirement Income Division, 
The Treasury 
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WOLFE, Mr Graham, Chief Executive, Industry Policy and Media Relations, Housing 
Industry Association 
ZAGO, Mr David, Assistant Statistician, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
MELBOURNE, 9 SEPTEMBER 2014 
BENNETT, Mr James, Policy and Liaison Officer, Tenants Union of Victoria 
BURKE, Professor Terry, Private capacity 
COLLYER, Mr David, Policy Director, Prosper Australia 
COMELLO, Mr Elio, Coordinator Strategic Planning, Wyndham City Council 
DALTON, Professor Tony, Professor of Urban and Social Policy, RMIT University 
DODSON, Professor Jago, Professor of Urban Policy, RMIT University 
GRACIE, Mr Jack, National Welfare Officer, National Union of Students 
HOLST, Dr Heather, Chief Executive Officer, HomeGround Services 
HULSE, Professor Kath, Private capacity 
JARVIS, Mr Alex, Senior Policy and Planning Officer, Wyndham City Council 
MILLS, Mr Adam, Senior Strategic Planner, City of Melbourne 
MOORE, Mr John, Manager Strategic Planning, Wyndham City Council 
MOORE, Ms Shorna, Senior Policy Lawyer, Wyndham Legal Service Inc. 
MURRAY, Professor Shane, Dean, MADA, Monash University Faculty of Art 
Design & Architecture 
NELTHORPE, Mr Denis, Manager, Wyndham Legal Service Inc. 
O'BRIEN, Mr Mark, Chief Executive Officer, Tenants Union of Victoria 
PARKINSON, Dr Sharon, AHURI Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Centre for Urban 
Research, RMIT University 
SOOS, Mr Philip, Researcher, Prosper Australia 
SPIELMAN, Ms Ruth, Executive Officer, National Growth Areas Alliance  
STONE, Dr Wendy, Private capacity 
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TOOHEY, Ms Sarah, Manager, Policy and Communications, Council to Homeless 
Persons 
WHITZMAN, Professor Carolyn, Professor of Urban Planning, University of 
Melbourne 
WILKINS, Associate Professor, Principal Research Fellow, Melbourne Institute of 
Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne 
WINTER, Dr Ian, Executive Director, Australian Housing and Urban Research 
Institute Limited 
 
BRISBANE, 10 SEPTEMBER 2014 
CANT, Mr David Hugh, Chief Executive Officer, Brisbane Housing Company 
Limited 
DOSS, Mr Kerry, Manager, City Planning and Economic Development, City Planning 
and Sustainability Division, Brisbane City Council 
HONAN, Mr Stephen, Project Manager, Brisbane Housing Company Limited 
LEITCH, Mr Jonathan Michael, Executive Director, Department of Housing and 
Public Works, Queensland 
MILNE, Ms Lulu, Principal Social Worker, Women's Legal Service, Queensland 
MYERS, Mr Michael, Chief Executive Officer, National Affordable Housing 
Consortium 
NEIL, Ms Rachel, Solicitor, Women's Legal Service, Queensland 
PETERSEN, Dr Maree, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Institute for Social Science 
Research, University of Queensland 
PISARSKI, Mr Adrian, Executive Officer, National Shelter 
PRITCHARD, Mr Ian, Executive Officer, Regional Development Australia, Gold 
Coast 
SKINNER, Ms Marie, Senior Policy Adviser, National Seniors Australia 
SOMERVILLE, Mr David, Chair, NRAS Providers Limited 
ULLMANN, Mrs Kylie, Policy Adviser, National Seniors Australia 
WALKER, Mr Damien, Deputy Director-General, Department of Housing and Public 
Works, Queensland 
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YOUNG, Ms Kerrie, Committee Member, Regional Development Australia, Gold 
Coast 
 
CANBERRA, 2 OCTOBER 2014 
EDEY, Dr Malcolm, Assistant Governor, Financial System, Reserve Bank of 
Australia 
ELLIS, Dr Luci, Head, Financial Stability, Reserve Bank of Australia 
 
SYDNEY, 10 NOVEMBER 2014 
BURGMANN, Dr Lucy, Chief Executive Officer, NSW Federation of Housing 
Associations 
CROCE, Ms Carol, Executive Director, Community Housing Federation of Australia 
DALLEY-FISHER, Ms Helen, Manager, Equality Rights Alliance 
EVANS, Ms Rosemary, Policy Officer, Australian Council of Social Service 
FLYNN, Mr Patrick, Advocacy Campaign Manager, Mission Australia 
GISSANE, Ms Hannah, Project Coordinator, Equality Rights Alliance 
KING, Ms Sue, Director of Advocacy and Research, Anglicare Australia 
MARTIN, Dr Chris, Senior Policy Officer, Tenants' Union of New South Wales 
MILLIGAN, Dr Vivienne, Associate Professor, City Futures Research Centre, 
University of New South Wales 
PAWSON, Professor Hal, Associate Director, City Futures Research Centre, 
University of New South Wales 
PHILLIPS, Ms Jacqueline, Director of Policy, Australian Council of Social Service 
PROUD, Mr Nicholas, Executive Director, Residential Development Council, 
Property Council of Australia 
PUNSHON, Mrs Simone, ACSA National Housing, Retirement and Independent 
Living Committee Member, Aged and Community Services Australia 
SAVERY, Mr Neil, General Manager, Australian Building Codes Board 
WATERFORD, Ms Michelle, Director, Research and Policy, Anglicare Australia 
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WITHAM, Ms Heather, Manager, Government Relations and Policy, Aged and 
Community Services Australia 
WOOD, Ms Mary, Executive Director, Retirement Living Council, Property Council 
of Australia 
YATES, Honorary Associate Professor Judith, University of Sydney's Senior Visiting 
Fellow, City Futures Research Centre, University of New South Wales 
 
PERTH, 11 NOVEMBER 2014 
ABDI, Dr Siyat, Systemic Advocate Officer, Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre 
ASTBURY, Mr Rod, Chief Executive Officer, Western Australian Association for 
Mental Health 
Bevan, Private capacity 
BOUFFLER, Mr John, Executive Director, Community Employers WA 
CARTER, Ms Jacqui, Board Member, Western Australian Association for Mental 
Health  
CASH, Mr Gregory, Acting General Manager Service Delivery, Department of 
Housing 
COMRIE, Mr Craig, CEO, Youth Affairs Council of Western Australia 
FARMER, Mr Owen, Private capacity 
GREEN, Mr Christopher, Senior Planner, Planning and Development, Western 
Australian Local Government Association 
HAILES, Mrs Allison, Executive Manager, Planning and Community Development, 
Western Australian Local Government Association 
HASLAM MCKENZIE, Professor Fiona, Principal Research Leader, Co-operative 
Research Centre for Remote Economic Participation, Curtin University 
ISCEL, Ms Nihal, Manager, Advocacy Services, Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre 
LOOSLEY-SMITH, Ms Tania, General Manager, Strategy and Policy, Department of 
Housing 
Mervan, Private capacity 
PIETROPICCOLO, Mr Tony, AM, Co-Chair, Community Employers WA 
ROBERTS, Ms Chantal, Executive Officer, Shelter WA 
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SCHOLLUM, Mr Paul, Policy Manager—Economics, Western Australian Local 
Government Association  
SEARLE, Mr Grahame John, Director-General, Department of Housing 
SHAPIERA, Mr Jonathan, Private capacity 
 
CANBERRA, 11 FEBRUARY 2014 
CAMPBELL, Mrs Belinda, Assistant Secretary, Housing Branch, Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 
COBURN, Mr Damian, A/g Group Manager, Housing, Homelessness and Gambling, 
Department of Social Services 
DAVIDSON, Ms Nina, First Assistant Secretary, Economic Division, Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
GROCE, Ms Carol, Executive Director, Community Housing Federation of Australia 
HAND, Ms Felicity, Deputy Secretary, Disabilities and Housing, Department of 
Social Services 
HEFREN-WEBB, Ms Elizabeth, First Assistant Secretary, Housing, Land and 
Community Capability Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
MILLS, Ms Jill, A/g Branch Manager, Housing and Homelessness, Department of 
Social Services 
PALMER, Mr Bryan, Group Manager, Department of Social Services 
PISARSKI, Mr Adrian, Executive Officer, National Shelter 
QUINNELL, Mr Nathan, Private capacity 
RILEY, Mr John, Branch Manager, Department of Social Services 
STEVENS, Ms Glenda, Chief Executive Officer, Homelessness Australia 
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